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Swede Generally, Sweden is a safe country,  
but for one thing.  
Beware of the Finns. 
Me Seriously? (perplexed) Why? 
Swede ...because they all carry jack-knives,  
and when they are drunk... (exit) 
 
Me (first Finn I met) 
 
Do you have a jack-knife?  
Finn Ha! Of course not.  
But go ahead, ask a Swede!  
I’m sure he’ll have one...  
and when he’s drunk... 
 
(Episode based on a true event) 
 
 
Introduction1 
The historical events between 1989 and 1991 made way to a lively process of region-
building across the previous East-West divide, whose dynamics have often been 
referred to as the ‘Nordic Boom’, the rise of the ‘New North’ or ‘New Regionalism’. In 
the early 1990s, a sheer countless variety of regional initiatives, associations, and 
councils emerged, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Union of the 
Baltic Cities (UBC) and the Baltic Development Forum (BDF), to name just a few 
examples. Over the last one or two decades, Northern Europe has turned into, as Bailes 
put it, “a veritable laboratory of innovative ways of dealing with the divisive nature of 
borders.”2 In fact, progressive regionalist cohesion has considerably blurred the old 
dividing lines of the Cold War and rendered the region a less rigid political landscape. 
These regional dynamics have also changed the outside view on what is perceived to be 
‘Northern’. Today, as a result, ‘Northernness’ is no longer exclusively allocated to the 
‘far up North’. Throughout the last one or two decades, the Northern European centre of 
gravity has remarkably shifted southwards, with the Baltic Sea becoming its very heart 
and main point of reference. Before 1989, regional cooperation in Northern Europe was 
quite exclusive since it was mainly restricted to the Nordic sphere and the so-called ‘Old 
North’ comprising the five Nordic States Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and 
Iceland. The regionalist dynamics newly arising in the early 1990s included instead also 
the southern part of the Baltic Sea meaning the three Baltic States, and to some extent 
Poland and Northern Germany. The changing regional power balances in Northern 
Europe materialised in the form of new institutional constructs and policy practices.3 
                                                 
1  The author would like to thank Gernot Stimmer and Dieter Segert (University of Vienna) as well as 
two anonymous reviewers for their comments and recommendations on the draft manuscript.  
2  See BAILES Alyson: The Role of Subregional Co-operation in the Post Cold War Europe. 
Integration, Security, Democracy. In: COTTEY Andrew (ed.): Subregional Co-operation in Post 
Cold War Europe. London 1998, pp. 153-185, here p. 183. 
3  See FAWCETT Louise: Regionalism from a Historical Perspective. In: FARRELL Mary/HETTNE 
Björn/VAN LANGENHOVE Luk (eds): Global Politics and Regionalism. London 2005, pp. 21-37, 
here p. 30. 
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Today, the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) features an extremely high concentration of 
cooperative structures. They add up to a tight network of cooperative arrangements that 
all label themselves as ‘Baltic’ or at least, define themselves as closely affiliated to the 
BSR. They do not only differ in terms of membership pattern and institutional setup, 
they also cover a wide array of functional areas, each of them pursuing diverse albeit 
often related objectives and strategic visions. Baltic Sea Regionalism occurs at different 
levels of action, and therefore involves various types of actors. State-level cooperation 
certainly plays a central role in regard to the overall development of regionalism in the 
BSR, as governmental action often provides for the basic conditions of proactive 
regional, sub-regional and also non-official cooperation. The political changes of 
1989/90 have not least opened new opportunities for the nation states in the region to 
realign their geopolitical position and to strike new paths in their regional orientation. 
To some extent, regional cooperation made it possible for the BSR state actors to 
anticipate the integrative political ramifications of the European project. This applied 
most particularly to the Nordic States bordering the Baltic Sea, namely Sweden and 
Finland, and to the Baltic States, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
The independence of the Baltic States from the Soviet Union, the political changes in 
Poland as well as the enlargements of the European Union (EU) in 1995 and 2004, have 
decisively changed the geo-political landscape in the northern part of the European 
continent. In 1995, Sweden and Finland were the first states in the region to become full 
EU member states, the three Baltic States and Poland followed in 2004. These events 
turned the Baltic Sea almost into an inland sea of the EU. In various different ways, the 
development of the BSR and Baltic Sea Regionalism has always been related to the 
European integration process. Generally, the EU had more of an indirect impact on the 
region, most of all through the enlargement process and the changing membership 
pattern in the area. However, at a certain point, the EU also became more directly 
involved in terms of specific policy provisions for this aspiring region. Since late 1997, 
when these ideas first appeared on the official EU working agenda, it was tried to 
evolve a comprehensive political framework for the EU external and cross-border 
activities in the BSR, which later turned out to become the so-called ‘Northern 
Dimension of the EU’ (EU ND).4 
Some years have passed since the ‘rise’ of Baltic Sea Regionalism commenced in the 
early 1990s, and since the BSR was swept by a wave of enthusiasm and ‘regionalist’ 
hilarity. Not least, the 2004 EU enlargement round has certainly changed the 
circumstances for both trans-national networking in the BSR and the EU’s regarding 
policies. These considerations build the point of departure for this study.  
                                                 
4  Hereinafter, this specific EU policy is referred to as “Northern Dimension” written in capital letters 
(or as EU ND in short form). If written otherwise, the term is used in a wider context.  
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Chapter 1: Overview, Purpose and Background  
A. Outline and Main Objective  
It is the primary objective of this study to grasp at least part of the pluridimensional 
intricacy of Baltic Sea Regionalism, and to unravel the conundrum behind the distinct 
regionalist tendencies that have characterized the BSR since the end of the Cold War.5 
The study does not aim at drawing an overall analytical picture of the region but focuses 
exclusively on the specific empirical phenomenon of regionalism and subregionalism in 
the BSR, its relationship with the broader framework of European integration, and the 
role national actors play in this regard. A comparison between Sweden and Finland as 
between two major regional stakeholders is intended to provide empirical reference for 
the interrelation between the supranational arena of European integration and the 
regionalist dimension of Baltic Sea cooperation and networking. 
The Swedish and the Finnish case appear to be most significant for this purpose, as 
although they are very similar in many respects, such as concerning their geopolitical 
position or their joint accession to the EU, their strategic reaction to certain decisive 
events, such as the 2004 enlargements, has been rather contrarious. The fact that the two 
countries recently made diverging political choices despite their apparent similarities 
supports the choice of a comparative approach as well as the selection of these two 
cases. Taking these analytical aspects together, the focus of this study is trifold: the BSR 
as a region of its own (the Baltic Sea ‘regionness’), the EU as an overall framework for 
regionalist activities and initiatives in the BSR, and Finland and Sweden as regional 
stakeholders and member states of the EU.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Analytical Cornerstones of the Study 
The study seeks to elaborate on each of the above cornerstones as well as on the 
relationship between them. It mainly aims to clarify the conceptual basics of 
regionalism and regional integration, single out the virtual linkages between the 
different analytical factors at stake, develop typologies, and not least, open new ways of 
looking at regionalism and integration by discussing how the phenomenon could be 
incorporated theoretically. 
                                                 
5  A previous version of this study was submitted as a doctoral thesis in Comparative Politics at the 
University of Vienna, Austria.  
SWEDEN 
    FINLAND
REGIONNESS
 EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION
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B. Relevance of the Topic – Europe in a Nutshell 
Northern Europe and the BSR are traditionally considered as part of the European 
periphery, that is, the margins of an alleged European ‘centre’ or ‘core’. Generally, 
academic conceptions often doubt about the relevance political processes in so-called 
‘peripheral’ regions potentially have for EU politics and the further development of the 
European project as a whole and thus, neglect several related factors in the course of 
their analysis or theory construction.6 Even studies that claim to offer a global view on 
Europe’s geo-political landscape often neglect the politico-strategic impact impulses 
from the ‘margins’ might have on the ‘centre’. Also in the general discourse of 
International Relations (IR), geographical remoteness is often equated with political 
marginality. Tómas Ingi Olrich found a clear albeit very sarcastic way to describe this 
common perspective: 
The North is marginal and will remain so. Its position is marginal in the geographical and 
geological sense, since it is perceived by the major players of world politics as a frontier 
post or back garden, if it isn’t simply regarded as no-man’s land.7 
This study, however, builds on the assumption that the political development in the BSR 
is of decisive importance for the development of the European project and the course of 
the integration process as a whole. It is contended that (sub)regional dynamics 
potentially influence or even sideline macro-level integration and thus, are likely to 
affect and determine the course and finality of the overall process. 
From my point of view, the geo-strategic importance of the BSR in today’s Europe is 
virtually indisputable. During the Cold War period, it was an area of relatively low 
tension and little political action.8 However, with the fall of the unnatural division of the 
Iron Curtain the region (re)gained its key position in the European geo-strategic 
landscape. The Baltic Sea has returned to being a uniting rather than a dividing element 
for its littoral states.9 Throughout the past two decades, the countries in the region have 
shown enormous potential to overcome the political and economic cleavages of the past. 
However, numerous challenges have remained, next to new ones that have emerged in 
the course of political transition in the southeastern BSR. This study builds on the 
assumption that the way the EU member states in the BSR decide to tackle these 
challenges does not only determine their own role as politico-strategic actors in the 
region but is also highly significant if not symptomatic for their conduct as member 
states of the European Union.  
                                                 
6  Browning provides a positive exception in this regard. See BROWNING Christopher S. (ed.): 
Remaking Europe in the Margins. Northern Europe after the Enlargements. Aldershot 2005. 
7  OLRICH Tómas Ingi: Implementation of a Northern Dimension. In: Northern Research Forum (ed.): 
North meets North. Proceedings of the First Northern Research Forum, held in Akureyri and 
Bessastaðir, Iceland. 4-6 November 2002, pp. 119-121, here p. 119. 
8  During the Cold War, the Nordic countries consciously tried to keep the political tension in the 
region as low as possible. “Finland’s cautious policy of coexistence, Sweden’s neutrality, and 
Norway’s and Denmark’s footnotes to their NATO membership all played a reinforcing role in 
diminishing pressure in the Nordic-Baltic region.” PERRY Charles M./SWEENEY Michael 
J./WINNER Andrew C. (eds): Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Region. Implications for US 
Policy. Dulles 2000, p. 121. 
9  See HYDE-PRICE Adrian: NATO and the Baltic Sea Region: Towards Regional Security 
Governance? NATO Research Fellowship Scheme 1998-2000. Final Report, p. 3. 
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With the EU accession of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, the Baltic Sea has 
almost become an inland sea of the EU, as today it is flanked by eight of its Member 
States. Some have even referred to the Baltic Sea as being the ‘European Sea’ (lat. Mare 
Europaeum).10 In fact, there are many seas surrounding Europe, but the Baltic Sea is the 
only one fully surrounded by Europe.11 In recent years, the EU border to Russia has 
lengthened significantly. The EU’s future external relations to Russia will to a large 
extent be set in this region, because it forms the area where the fundamental strategic 
interests of both Russia and the EU intersect in many respects.12  
Whatever you call it, there’s a buzz about the Baltic. What was until recently little more 
than a heavily polluted body of water divided by a Baltic Wall has rapidly evolved into the 
most dynamic, politically unified region of Europe, and an area responsible for 15 percent 
of the world’s trade.13 
Even Samuel P. Huntington drew his world-renowned ‘Velvet Curtain’, the Eastern 
border of Western Civilization, right through the BSR and underlined its crucial role in 
the geo-strategic landscape. 
The most significant dividing line in Europe may well be the eastern boundary of Western 
Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between 
Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus and 
Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, 
swings westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through 
Yugoslavia [...].14 
Taking all the political dynamics of the recent years, the BSR may be seen as some sort 
of “representative cross-section of today’s Europe”:15 The unique composition of 
cultures, identities and political traditions we find in the BSR somehow makes the 
region a microcosmic version of pan-European relations.16 This is not least applicable to 
the post Cold War and post enlargement development of both the European project and 
the course of Baltic Sea Regionalism.  
 
                                                 
10  TASSINARI Fabrizio: Mare Europaeum. Baltic Sea Region Security and Cooperation from Post-
Wall to post-Enlargement Europe. Copenhagen 2004.  
11  See Baltic Study Net. Introduction to the Baltic Summer School Mare Europaeum, Berlin 23 July – 6 
August 2006. Website of the Centre for Baltic Sea Region Studies (CEBAST)  
www.balticstudies.org [27 September 2007]. 
12  See MOSHES Arkady: The Eastern Neighbours of the European Union as an Opportunity for Nordic 
Actors. In: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS): Working Paper, No. 12/06, p. 3.  
13  SANDER Gordon: Off Centre. Baltic hands link across a troubled sea. In: Financial Times, 8 April 
2000. 
14  HUNTINGTON Samuel P.: The Clash of Civilizations? In: Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22-
34, here p. 25.  
15  Baltic Study Net. Introduction to the Baltic Summer School Mare Europaeum, Berlin 23 July – 6 
August 2006. Website of the Centre for Baltic Sea Region Studies (CEBAST) 
www.balticstudies.org [27 September 2007]. 
16  See HYDE-PRICE Adrian: NATO and the Baltic Sea Region. Towards Regional Security 
Governance? NATO Research Fellowship Scheme 1998-2000. Final Report, p. 4. See also HUBEL 
Helmut: The Baltic Dimension of European Unification. In: LÄHTEENMÄKI Kaisa (ed.): 
Dimensions of Cooperation and Conflict in the Baltic Sea Rim. Tampere 1994, pp. 57-67, here p. 59. 
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[The BSR] connects ‘old’ with ‘new’ Europeans inside the European Union, and with 
Russia, outside the EU. It links Europe’s wealthiest societies with some of the continent’s 
poorest regions, and it combines some of the most matured democracies in Europe with 
some of the youngest. Studying the Baltic Sea Region thus means getting acquainted with 
Europe in a nutshell.17 
Since the end of the Cold War, many cooperative arrangements on the regional and sub-
regional level have emerged. Given this high concentration and structural diversity of 
regional cohesiveness, the BSR can be considered the most networked, if not the most 
complex region in the New Europe.  
C. State of Research  
I. Looking Back – ‘Northern’ Issues in European Political Science 
When trying to assess the presence of ‘Northern’ issues on the European Political 
Science agenda, one must clearly differ between research based in and around the 
region versus research that was and is being conducted by experts based outside the 
region. In BSR-based academia, regional affairs naturally retain an entrenched and close 
to permanent position on the research agenda. Their presence on ‘foreign’ agendas in 
turn highly depends upon international trends and global developments. After 1989/90, 
Northern Europe and the BSR gained exceptional attention from ‘outside’, with the 
uncertain outcome of the post-Soviet transition process being the ‘crowd puller’ in the 
academic world. Heininen referred to this wave of awareness and academic interest as 
the “Arctic boom” in IR studies.18 The essential geo-strategic and political changes in 
Northern Europe, and particularly in the BSR after the end of the Cold War, could not 
go unnoticed by the international academic community. Both BSR-based analysts and 
‘outsiders’ have made extensive research efforts in order to study the potential 
consequences of the changing political and security environment around the Baltic Sea. 
Indeed, the main empirical focus of this study, which is the phenomenon of distinct 
regionalist tendencies in the BSR, made up one of the most prominent research subjects 
during the 1990s. However, after the first decade, this ‘booming’ academic awareness 
gradually started to decline. After the 2004 enlargements, and once the field of BSR 
studies had been substantially ‘balticised’, the academic attention drew again back to 
the regional research arena.  
The event of Norway’s second negative referendum in 1994, and the Swedish and 
Finnish EU accessions in 1995, attracted a lot of public and academic attention both 
inside and outside the region. In the long run, however, this enlargement round 
generally had a negative impact on the standing of BSR issues on the European 
integration research agenda. The Swedish and Finnish EU membership was seen as a 
major achievement for the stabilisation of the northeastern sphere, with the two new 
member states attaining the function of regional promoters of ‘Europeanness’.  
                                                 
17  Baltic Study Net, Berlin 23 July – 6 August 2006. Website of the Centre for Baltic Sea Region 
Studies (CEBAST) www.balticstudies.org [27 September 2007]. 
18  HEININEN Lassi: Ideas and Outcomes. Finding a Concrete Form for the Northern Dimension 
Initiative. In: OJANEN Hanna (ed.): The Northern Dimension. Fuel for the EU? Kauhava 2001, pp. 
20-53, here p. 20. 
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Hence, once this enlargement round was concluded, both political awareness and 
academic interest gradually moved back to other, more vibrant regional issues, e.g. the 
peace process on the Balkans. The Finnish policy initiative that introduced the so-called 
‘Northern Dimension’ in 1997 did cause another wave of scholarly interest from 
outside, which however, did not last very long. The next, and for the time being, last 
‘hype’ about specific BSR matters in IR emerged in the years preceding the Baltic and 
Polish accessions to the EU, and the North Atlantic Treaties Organisation (NATO) 
respectively.  
In the public debate, the 2004 enlargement round was mostly discussed as an issue of its 
own, and thus, was not directly related to the regional development of the Baltic Sea as 
a region. Moreover, the EU accession of the three Baltic countries was seen as a major 
turn in their respective political orientation. As a result, the heated debate about Baltic 
post-communist transition gradually declined, which then moved the spotlight more to 
the East and the South, or at least, away from the North. A similar effect can be ascribed 
to the introduction of a Neighbourhood Policy for the European Union, and the 
promoted vision of constructing a ‘ring of friends’ around the Western European 
community. Even though some have claimed that the shift of the EU’s geopolitical 
focus towards the East could open a window of opportunity for the Nordic states to 
become ‘project managers’ in this ambitious undertaking, the fact that a specific agenda 
for the North is recently loosing momentum cannot be denied.19  
II. Mapping Out the White Spots on the Research Agenda 
The body of scholarly knowledge about BSR issues is vast and widely developed in all 
related academic disciplines, most notably in Political Science, Human Geography and 
Economics. While the academic interest coming from ‘outsiders’, i.e. non-BSR-based 
research institutions or individuals, has always been symptomatically low, the BSR-
based academic landscape has brought about a large stock of expertise.20 Generally, 
much has been written about the socio-economic development and the changing 
political conditions in the area. Also the historical and geographical questions, e.g. the 
question of Kaliningrad or of border demarcation with Russia, have gained considerable 
attention. Anyway, a large part of BSR studies deal with the region as a matter of its 
own, describing and analysing, e.g. the internal dynamics of regionalism, or the inherent 
patterns of regional and sub-regional co-operation. Only few of them have tried to link 
the regional specificities at hand to the broader framework of European integration, and, 
more interestingly, to the question of finality and the potential outcome of the European 
integration process.  
While most issues about the region itself are covered by substantial academic 
contributions, more could have been done on a more abstract level, in the sense of a 
theoretical incorporation and typology of the empirical characteristics of the region and 
the systemic frame. One important aspect that has been largely neglected up until now is 
the potential contrariety between the perpetual existence and functioning of an 
integrative unit like the EU at the macro-level and the simultaneous and progressive 
                                                 
19  See MOSHES Arkady: The Eastern Neighbours of the European Union as an Opportunity for Nordic 
Actors, DIIS Working Paper, No. 12/2006. Copenhagen 2006, p. 7. 
20  However, this is not to discredit the value of external analyses that have recently been brought into 
the field, e.g. BROWNING Christopher (ed.): Remaking Europe in the Margins. Aldershot 2005. 
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build-up of some sort of meso-level regional and subregional agenda or even 
counterpart. The effectiveness and positive performance of the EU, as of any other 
international organisation, highly depends on the constructive attitude and ideational 
solidarity of its member states. The question of the disintegrative impact that, for 
example, regional self-centeredness of single member states could have on the European 
Union as a political project should be considered more explicitly in academic studies 
that deal with region-building and regionalist developments. Scholars have found very 
flowery phrases to describe the regionalist dynamics, the “myriads”21 of cooperative 
ventures that have “mushroomed”22 “in the name of the Baltic world.”23 Indeed, 
countless papers and case studies about the BSR have taken the phenomenon of Baltic 
Sea Regionalism as a starting point for analysis. However, only few of them have 
suggested some sort of classification that would first help to systemise the high number 
of different associations and initiatives and thus, to grasp the structural diversity at 
hand.24  
D. Methodological Approach  
I. Working Material and Information Retrieval 
Undertaking a study about ‘regionness’ including regional self-definition and identity as 
an outsider, which means in this case, as a European but non-Scandinavian and non-
Baltic as well as an academic that is not based in the region, to some extent always 
raises the question of credibility and originality. One must always be aware of the risk 
of producing an external view without sufficiently taking into account certain societal 
and ideological factors, which might indeed be crucial for an overall understanding of 
the regional specificities. This is why I consciously tried to especially consider the 
written sources produced in the region, most importantly in Scandinavia and the Baltic 
States, including daily press and official documents by governmental and other 
authorities. Even though most official documents as well as a great part of the academic 
literature are available in English, it generally proved useful to include Swedish, 
Danish, Norwegian and Icelandic sources as well. The collection of Scandinavian 
material was mainly conducted in the course of two sojourns (in 2005 and 2007) at the 
Baltic and East European Graduate School (BEEGS) in Huddinge (S) and at the A. 
Lindh Centrum for Defence, Security and Foreign Policy situated at the Swedish 
Defence College (Försvarshögskolan) in Stockholm (S). Major sources of information 
were also found at the European Documentation Centre/European Institute of Public 
Administration (EIPA) in Maastricht (NL).  
                                                 
21  VON SYDOW Emily: Den Baltiska dimensionen. Stockholms geopolitiska roll i EU. In: EHRLING 
Guy (ed.): Stockholm international. Stockholm 2000, pp. 23-36, here 23.  
22  SCOTT James Wesley: Cross-border Governance in the Baltic Sea Region. In: ANDERSON 
James/O’DOWD Liam/WILSON Thomas M. (eds): New Borders for a Changing Europe. Cross-
border Cooperation and Governance. London 2002, pp. 135-153, here p. 135. 
23  LEHTI Marko: Competing or Complementary Images. The North and the Baltic World from the 
Historical Perspective. In: HAUKKALA Hiski (ed.): Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension. 
Turku 1999, pp. 2-28, here p. 23. 
24  One of those rare examples can be found in KERN Kristine: Voller Dynamik: Der Ostseeraum. 
Governance jenseits des Nationalstaats. In: Mitteilungen des Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin, Nr. 106, 
p. 45-47. 
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Details about the single cooperative formations in the region as laid out in the annex of 
this study were partly collected on the basis of direct requests to the respective 
secretariat or administrative board. The collection of relevant information also 
comprised a series of informal explorative interviews with selected EU officials as well 
as with experts from relevant international think tanks such as, for example, Hiski 
Haukkala, Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs/Ulkopoliittisen 
instituutin in Helsinki (FI), and Arūnas Molis, Head of the Eastern Countries 
Monitoring Division at the Centre for Strategic Studies/Strateginių studijų centras in 
Vilnius (LT).25 The working material mainly comprised secondary literature (textbooks, 
relevant periodicals and scholarly journals), journalistic (daily and weekly press) as well 
as primary sources, such as official EU-documents, constitutive declarations and 
statutes of regional and sub-regional associations.  
II. Research Strategy  
This study follows an issue and problem-oriented research strategy. The empirical 
phenomenon of regionalism in the BSR builds the point of departure, and remains the 
centre of reference throughout the whole analytical process. Instead of presenting a 
compound theoretical framework at the beginning to frame the focus of analytical 
perception, the study follows an inverted structure, in which the theoretical 
incorporation and abstraction of Baltic Sea Regionalism, of the Baltic Sea Conundrum, 
constitutes the ultimate step in the research process. The consideration behind this 
strategic choice is that the present stock of theories does not offer any approach that 
would perfectly suit and accommodate the specificities of the very research questions 
investigated in this study. As the most appropriate theoretical model is expected to 
involve a combination of existing theoretical models, the study seeks to reconciliate 
various traditions of thought alongside the demands posed by the empirical subject 
matter. The underlying motivation is mainly to provide a theoretical basis for future 
empirical contributions to the field without necessarily opting for any single approach to 
explain a limited range of questions. The study also refrains from testing certain pre-
given hypotheses, which is supported by the fact that many aspects of the empirical 
phenomenon concerned are not immediately manifest and testable in the narrow sense. 
The study first locates the BSR case conceptually within the broad range of 
‘regionalisms’, which include various different forms of collective organisation or 
networking focusing on a specific region or spatial entity. Descriptive elaborations on 
the emergence and development of Baltic Sea Regionalism prepare for the issue-driven 
discussion of various strands of theory, namely European Integration Theory (EIT), 
International Relations Theory (IRT) as well as Comparative Theory (CT). The 
overview gained from this assessment builds the basis for the concluding remarks on the 
‘abstractability’ of the subject matter. The practical aim of the theoretical section 
(chapter 4) is to track the explanatory value and potential shortcomings of selected 
approaches in the face of the analytical perspective of this study, and thereby, to provide 
useful reference for further discussions about the theoretical incorporation of Baltic Sea 
Regionalism, and for future empirical studies dealing with the phenomenon. 
                                                 
25  Most interview partners declined to be cited directly. Their contributions mainly influenced the 
overall arrangement of the study but did not add any content that would have to be quoted in detail. 
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E. Preliminary Assumptions, Research Questions and Structure 
As laid out above, this study focuses on three analytical cornerstones: (1) the Baltic Sea 
Region and Baltic Sea Regionalism, (2) Sweden and Finland as two major regional 
stakeholders and EU member states, and accordingly, (3) the EU as an overall 
framework and macro-level reference. The analytical aim is to elaborate on each of 
these points, and to analyse the interrelations between them on the basis of the 
following assumptions:26  
(1) The Baltic Sea Region and Baltic Sea Regionalism: 
The empirical point of reference for this study is the specific structural nature of the 
Baltic Sea region. This thematic focus is based on the following presumptions:  
– Since 1989, a variety of regionalist formations have emerged in Northern Europe.  
– These regionalist dynamics particularly concentrated in the BSR, and eventually, 
turned this region into the centre of gravity of Northern Europe.  
– Today’s BSR features a remarkably high density and variety of cooperative 
arrangements, such as regional councils, associations and initiatives. Therefore, it 
can be regarded as one of Europe’s most ‘networked’ regions. 
– It is assumed that this particular characteristic has an impact on the foreign policy 
orientation of nation states situated in the region. Hence, it is regarded as a highly 
significant factor influencing their conduct as EU member states. 
– The analysis of regionalism offers good opportunities for the evaluation of the 
integrative attitude of single EU member states. 
There is a certain tendency in IR to regard transnational regionalism as some sort of 
natural process that results from the fact of mere geographical closeness. Most often, 
according to this perception, regions have the connotation as something self-evident, 
secondary and marginal. In contrast thereto, this study is based on the assumption that  
– Regionalism, and most importantly, the degree of regional cohesion, has to be 
considered as rather being an option than a matter of course. 
(2) Sweden and Finland as major regional stakeholders and EU member states: 
– The foreign policy orientation of Sweden and Finland shows a particularly strong 
adherence to the immediate neighbourhood, and most importantly, the BSR.  
– This alleged regional affixedness is a typical peculiarity of small states in general, 
and most particularly, of small states situated in a peripheral position.  
– The impact of regionalist structures on their external and European policy conduct 
is likely to be stronger than in bigger continental BSR countries (e.g. Germany).  
– Despite many similarities, their EU membership profiles are basically different.  
– While Sweden has been traditionally reluctant to integrate fully into the EU, 
Finland has been rather pragmatic in its performance and conduct as a member.  
– This difference is likely to be reflected on the regional scene and the strategic 
conduct of these two states in various different regionalist matters and contexts. 
                                                 
26  The preliminary assumptions that guide the analysis partly reflect the findings of previous research 
conducted in the context of previous research on European Integration and Neutrality. See 
GEBHARD Carmen: Europäische Integration und Neutralität. Österreich und Schweden im 
Vergleich. Diplomarbeit Vienna 2004. 
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(3) The EU as an overall framework and macro-level reference: 
 
– The European integration process has always influenced the political setting in 
Northern Europe, and most particularly, in the BSR.  
– However, the EU’s impact on the development of the BSR was and is limited.  
– The adoption of the EU Northern Dimension (EU ND) was closely connected to the 
then upcoming Eastern and Northeastern enlargement.  
– The completion of the 2004 enlargements has shifted the regional and sub-regional 
focus of the EU to other regions in Europe. 
The study consists of three main sections. The first section (chapter 2) introduces the 
geo-political terminology and some case-specific features of the Baltic Sea Region, and 
elaborates on the conceptualisation of ‘regionness’ and ‘regionalism’ respectively. To 
this end, it focuses on the following research questions:  
– Which labels are commonly used to denominate geo-political entities in Northern 
Europe and how do they relate to each other?  
– What accounts for Baltic Sea ‘regionness’? What makes the BSR a ‘region’?  
– Which political and geographical features determine the character of the BSR?  
– How do all these BSR specificities influence the way the region is seen from 
outside? How can the structural specificities of the BSR be conceptualised?  
– How and on what grounds did Baltic Sea Regionalism emerge after 1989?  
– How did the newly emerging cooperative structures interact with other (established) 
formations in the ‘Old North’, such as classic ‘Nordic Cooperation’?  
– What kinds of cooperative undertakings emerged in the context of the ‘rise of the 
New North’? How can they be categorised? 
The second section (chapter 3) deals with the broader EU approach towards Northern 
Europe, focussing in particular on the EU ND and the regional policy orientation of 
Sweden and Finland in this respect. This section tries to cover the following questions:  
– How is the EU approach towards the European North composed? Which policies 
and instruments does the EU employ to have an impact on the region?  
– What steps have been taken while developing and implementing the EU ND?  
– How do the EU’s regional policies relate to the (sub) regional arrangements?  
– How has the changing EU membership pattern in the region influenced the EU’s 
actorness towards the North?  
– How do Sweden and Finland define their geo-political position in the region?  
– What role did the two regional stakeholders take over in the course of the EU ND 
establishment and implementation process?  
– To what extent do they pursue similar or divergent interests in this context?  
– What effects did the 2004 enlargements have on the regional orientation of the two?  
– To what extent does the regional policy conduct of Sweden and Finland reflect the 
specificities of their EU membership, and more generally, of their orientation in 
European integration affairs (reluctance? activism? passivity?)?  
The third section (chapter 4) addresses the question how the research matter could be 
interpreted on a more abstract and theoretical level. The annex of this study contains a 
detailed catalogue of the most important associations and cooperative structures based 
in the BSR. 
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Chapter 2: Regional and Sub-Regional Co-operation in Northern Europe 
A. Geo-political Labels in Northern Europe 
The coastal states of the Baltic Sea can all be attributed to different regional 
dependencies, as for instance the ‘North’, ‘Scandinavia’, the ‘Baltic’, or more generally, 
‘Northern Europe’. Confusingly, there is also a variety of meanings attached to each of 
these geopolitical labels. In fact, in every day parlance and in most political and cultural 
contexts, the various terms are usually adopted without questioning their exact meaning. 
Anyway, their inherent logic of inclusion and exclusion can be a rather sensitive issue. 
That is particularly true for expressions that denominate groupings of states (e.g. the 
‘Baltic countries’)27, and thus, go far beyond mere geographical classifications. Notions 
of this type do not only suggest some sort of inclusiveness, they eventually imply also a 
certain degree of cohesiveness that goes beyond the nation state level. If imposed from 
the outside, they are what Marko Lehti called “a strong tool of othering” whose 
adoption might, in some cases be perceived as an act of “marginalisation”.28 These 
labels all have various readings that result from different historical and political 
contexts. Therefore, the categories used by exponents from the Baltic States (i.e. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) naturally differ from those used by Swedes, Norwegians 
or Russians. Moreover, there are also divergent understandings to be found within single 
countries according to the respective ideological perspective or historical consciousness. 
An exhaustive discussion of the regarding terminological discourses would certainly go 
beyond the scope of this chapter. The following section rather aims at outlining the 
problem and eventually defining the geopolitical terminology applied hereinafter.  
I. Northern Europe, Scandinavia and the North 
From an outside perspective, ‘Northern Europe’ is generally conceived as consisting of 
the so-called Scandinavian countries, i.e. Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland (and 
less often, also Denmark). As a result, the terms ‘Northern Europe’, ‘North’ and 
‘Scandinavia’ are often used synonymously, even though Northern Europe covers a 
much wider area comprising Scandinavia (plus Denmark),29 Northwest Russia, 
Northern Germany and Poland as well as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. There is also a 
difference between the term ‘Scandinavia’,30 which generally refers to the Scandinavian 
Peninsula, i.e. mainland Norway and Sweden, and the wider concept of cultural 
                                                 
27  See HOLT Kristoffer: Rapport. Stockholms andra internationella skandinavistsymposium. Hur 
Nordiskt är Baltikum? 21-22 augusti 2006. Stockholm 2006, p. 17.  
28  LEHTI Marko: Eastern or Western, New or False? Classifying the Balts in the Post-Cold War Era. 
In: TASSINARI Fabrizio/JOENNIEMI Pertti/JAKOBSEN Uffe (eds): Wider Europe. Nordic and 
Baltic Lessons to Post-Enlargement Europe. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). 
Copenhagen 2006, pp. 69-88, here p. 69. 
29  In this context, Denmark includes the autonomous territories of Faroe Islands and Greenland, and 
Finland includes Åland Island. 
30  ‘Scandinavia’ is derived from the ancient term “Scandia”, which dates back to the descendants of 
Ashkenaz (Noah’s grandson, Genesis 10:3). Known as the Askaeni, they were the first people to 
migrate to Northern Europe introducing the country’s name “Ascania”. Latin and Greek writers 
called the land “Scandza” or “Scandia”. See GANNHOLM Tore: The origin of Svear and their 
arrival into Lake Mälar area in the 6th century. Stånga 1996, p. 12. 
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‘Scandinavia’, including Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and conditionally, 
Finland. The closeness of languages is certainly one of the strongest arguments for the 
demarcation of socio-cultural ‘Scandinavia’: The three main Scandinavian languages 
(Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian) spin off from the language of Old Norse and build 
the Germanic Group of the Indo-European family. The same applies to Icelandic and 
Faroese, while Finnish, just as Estonian, does not belong to this family at all, but to the 
Finno-Ugrian languages. Latvian and Lithuanian together form the Baltic Indo-
European Group.31 While the linguistic argumentation seems to be fairly simple and 
clear, in political affairs, the occasional inclusion or exclusion of single countries, such 
as Iceland or Finland, from these geopolitical labels can be a rather sensitive matter.32 In 
fact, some North Europeans could even take offence for being or not being classified as 
Scandinavians.33 Sometimes even Estonia is considered a Scandinavian or Nordic 
country, referring to its cultural heritage and the close linguistic links to Finland.34  
There is yet another important expression that should be mentioned in this context. The 
geographic and geological notion of ‘Fennoscandia’ (also ‘Fenno-Scandinavia’) 
includes the Scandinavian Peninsula, Karelia, Finland and Denmark. In a cultural sense, 
Fennoscandia underlines the close historical link between Finnic, Sami and the 
Scandinavian peoples and cultures. Anyway, unlike the term ‘Nordic’, Fennoscandia 
does not include Iceland or other geographically disconnected overseas areas (e.g. 
Greenland). As for the EU perspective, Sweden and Finland, and occasionally, also 
Denmark are labelled as the ‘Scandinavian’ group of member states or simply as 
‘Scandinavia’ – sometimes even misleadingly implying that they form some sort of 
political block within the Union. This study will eventually contribute to the reflection 
of whether and to what extent the conditions apply to this sort of global assumption.35 
                                                 
31  See JAANSON Kaido: The Baltic States and Norden. In: The Baltic Review, Vol. 19. Online 
Edition. Website of the Journal ‘The Baltic Review’ www.tbr.ee [12 August 2007]. Out of the group 
of the Nordic Five only Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have a truly common heritage from the 
early beginnings of recorded history. They have all been inhabited by the same Nordic-Teutonic race 
of peoples. In the course of the Viking expansions, as early as 900 A.D., Norse settlements were also 
founded on the Faroe Islands and Iceland. Only more than two centuries later, a different race of 
peoples with a distinct tribal and linguistic origin started to settle the Gulf of Finland and today’s 
Balticum, forming the basis for the Finnish and Estonian ethnic background. See BONNÉN 
Preben/SØSTED Michael: The Origin, Development and Perspectives of Nordic Co-operation in a 
New and Enlarged European Union. In: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, Nr. 
1/2003, pp. 19-32, here p. 30 (note 2). 
32  For more details, see JOENNIEMI Pertti/LEHTI Marko: On the encounter between the Nordic and 
the northern. Torn Apart but Meeting Again? COPRI Working Paper 11/2001. 
33  Especially the Finns have a very distinct perception about where to draw this line and how to 
interpret the background of a common Scandinavian heritage. Finland did not share an important 
chapter of Scandinavian history, the so-called “Scandinavist movement” in mid-19th century. This 
political movement aimed at the creation of a Nordic defense alliance and even at the re-unification 
of the Scandinavian countries as a single state. At that time, Finland already found itself under the 
yoke of Russian dominance, and was thus reluctant to join the movement.  
34  See KANARBIK Madis: Skandinavistikens ställning i Baltikum. In: HOLT Kristoffer: Rapport. 
Stockholms andra internationella skandinavistsymposium. Hur Nordiskt är Baltikum? 21-22 augusti 
2006. Stockholm 2006, p. 14. The most important example in this regard is Meri Lennart, the former 
Estonian minister of foreign affairs, who repeatedly argued that Estonia had a distinct Scandinavian 
and Nordic inheritance. See e.g. MERI Lennart: Eurooppa on Viron ohjelma. In: Helsingin Sanomat, 
2 December 1990.  
35  See chapter “Nordic Togetherness – the Changing Role of Nordic Cooperation”, p. 61-. 
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II. ‘Nordic’ vs. ‘Northern’ 
The English expression ‘Nordic Countries’ (Swed. nordiska länder) is a neologism that 
was introduced in the second half of the 20th century. Normally, it is perceived to 
comprise the Nordic group of five, i.e. Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and 
Iceland.36 Most of the time, the English terms ‘Nordic’ and ‘Northern’ are used 
interchangeably, even though ‘Nordic’ has a clearly political connotation whereas 
‘northern’ barely indicates the geographical position, and denominates a much wider 
area. ‘Nordic’, and ‘Nordicness’ respectively, are closely affiliated with the so-called 
‘Nordic Cooperation’, a largely informal system of cooperation established between the 
above-mentioned ‘Nordic Countries’ after the end of the Second World War. Outside 
Scandinavia, there is normally also no distinction drawn between ‘Nordic’ and 
‘Scandinavian’, although in the narrow sense of the term, ‘Scandinavia’ can only be 
applied collectively to the respective group of states, whereas the notion of a ‘Nordic’ 
sphere, again, implies some sort of cultural, ideological and political inclusiveness 
based in the traditional system of ‘Nordic Cooperation’.37 The ‘North’ as a noun is 
commonly used for the designation of the ‘Nordic Countries’, stemming from the 
Scandinavian equivalent ‘Norden’ (Finn. Pohjola).38 For Scandinavians themselves, this 
notion is rather clear, but especially for non-Europeans it is all the more opaque and 
therefore also less common. After the end of the Cold War, the political and ideological 
standing of ‘Nordic Cooperation’ gradually changed in respect to both the outside 
perspective and the self-perception of the Nordic States. The newly gained 
independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the newly arising tendencies of 
progressive regionalism in the BSR seemed to shift the focus of Northern European 
affairs southwards, challenging the traditional system of Nordic exclusiveness. To some 
extent the ‘Old Nordic North’ and the newly promoted ‘Northernness’ had become 
competing geopolitical concepts.39 
III. The ‘Baltic States’  
From the specific perspective of this study, it is important to differentiate the term 
‘Baltic Sea States’, meaning the group of Baltic Sea littoral states, from the notion of 
‘Baltic States’ (or also: ‘Balticum’), which is what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are 
commonly referred to. The latter is a rather recent terminological invention that only 
emerged in the wake of the First World War. Before 1918, it was only used to 
                                                 
36  In fact, it is a somewhat problematic translation of the Swedish term nordisk, which is often used in 
other (e.g. cultural) contexts. See HOLT Kristoffer: Rapport. Stockholms andra internationella 
skandinavistsymposium. Hur Nordiskt är Baltikum? 21-22 augusti 2006. Stockholm 2006, p. 17. The 
Nordic group includes three autonomous territories: the Faroe Islands, Greenland (both DK) and 
Åland (FI). 
37  The system of Nordic Cooperation will be further elaborated in chapter “Nordic Togetherness – the 
Changing Role of Nordic Cooperation”, p. 61-. 
38  See The Nordic Council: The Swan Symbol and the Logotype Norden. Background information. 
Official Website of the Nordic Region www.norden.org [5 March 2008]. 
39  See JOENNIEMI Pertti/LEHTI Marko: On the encounter between the Nordic and the northern. Torn 
Apart but Meeting Again? Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI): Working Paper, 11/2001, 
p. 5-6. This very central issue of Nordic self-definition in the light of New Baltic Sea Regionalism 
will be taken up at another point in this study. See chapter “Old North vs. New Regionalism. Visions 
Competing for the Same Space?”, p. 76-. 
27
denominate the former Russian provinces of Estonia, Livonia and Courland.40 Today, 
the collective label of ‘Baltic States’ as the ‘Baltic Three’ is not always appreciated by 
the concerning states themselves as it does not comply with their specific historical 
consciousness and geopolitical self-identification.41  
IV. Overview: The Geo-Political Terminology Used in this Study 
As so many terminologies are in use to structure the region and denominate certain parts 
of it, it seems important at this point, to clarify the terminology I am applying in the 
course of this study.  
 
Nordic Countries Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland 
Northern Europe European Russia, Northern Germany, Northern Poland, 
Scandinavia, Baltic States 
Scandinavia Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland 
Scandinavian Baltic Sweden, Denmark and Finland 
Baltic Sea States Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Russia, Finland 
Baltic Sea Region Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, European Russia, Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, the German Länder of Berlin, Brandenburg, 
Bremen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Schleswig-Holstein, 
Niedersachsen (Regierungsbezirk Lüneburg)42 
Table 1: The Geo-Political Terminology Applied in this Study 
B. Northern Europe – Some General Characteristics and Features  
I. BSR Specificities and Sensitivities  
In the last two decades, the geopolitical situation in the Baltic Sea area has changed 
drastically. The most important break in recent BSR history was certainly the fall of the 
east-west divide in 1989/90 – or as Sander called it – the “fall of the Baltic Wall”, 
involving independence for the Baltic States, the reunification of Germany and the 
conclusion of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia.43 
As from a geostrategic point of view, the specific importance of the BSR has been 
traditionally related to its unclear and therefore problematic Eastern delimitation.44  
                                                 
40  See MEDIJAINEN Eero: The Baltic Question in the Twentieth Century. Historiographic Aspects. 
In: AMELANG James S./BEER Siegfried (eds): Public Power in Europe. Studies in Historical 
Transformations. Pisa 2006, pp. 109-124, here p. 112. 
41  See CAVE Andrew: Finding a Role in an Enlarged EU. In: Central Europe Review, Nr. 20. 22 May 
2000. Online publication www.ce-review.org [26 November 2007]. See chapter “The Baltic States 
and Baltic Unity – Imposition or Expedient?”, p. 67-.  
42  This geographical definition of the BSR is also employed in the framework of EU structural 
initiatives (e.g. INTERREG).  
43  See SANDER Gordon: Off Centre. Baltic hands link across a troubled sea. In: Financial Times, 8 
April 2000. 
44  See DELLENBRANT Jan Åke: The Baltic Sea Co-operation. Visions and Realities. In: 
BALDERSHEIM Harald/STÅHLBERG Krister (eds): Nordic Region-Building in a European 
Perspective. Aldershot 1999, pp. 83-97, here p. 85.  
     28
For the BSR there is no natural border to the East. While until the end of the Second 
World War, the Baltic Sea was not prominently perceived as a barrier in geostrategic 
terms but rather as a body of water that facilitated contacts between the shores, during 
the Cold War era it assumed this sort of grey or dead zone between opposing 
ideological systems. The geostrategic importance resulting from this unique position has 
not changed over recent decades. However, what has changed after the end of the Cold 
War is the nature of this old dividing line. “Fault lines between civilisations are 
replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for 
crisis and blood-shed.”45 In his renowned model of clashing civilizations, Huntington 
maintained that the so-called ‘Velvet Curtain’ of cultural diversity, the Eastern border of 
Western Civilization, runs right through the BSR. 
The most significant dividing line in Europe [...] may well be the eastern boundary of 
Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries 
between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus 
and Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, 
swings westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through 
Yugoslavia [...].46 
Another factor that has decisively altered the geopolitical constellation in Northern 
Europe has been the progressing and enlarging European project as well as the process 
of transatlantic security integration. Today, the distribution of memberships in 
international organisations can be said to constitute a decisive albeit ambivalent 
structural component in the BSR. While the NATO membership pattern draws an 
intrinsic dividing line across the Baltic Sea Rim, with the states alongside the lower 
Baltic region being full NATO-member states, and the Baltic North still pertaining to 
the block of permanently neutral or non-aligned states,47 EU membership rather 
constitutes a uniting factor for the BSR. The enlargements in 1995 and 2004 have 
turned the Baltic Sea almost into an inland sea of the EU.48  
One of the most challenging specificities in the BSR is distance, and equally, physical 
remoteness. The distance between the northern and southern extremes of the Baltic Sea 
Rim equals the one between London and Istanbul. Distance as such does not necessarily 
pose economic, social or infrastructural problems. However, what is different about the 
BSR in comparison to other extended regions is the issue of remoteness and 
accessibility. In spatial planning, accessibility constitutes one of the decisive factors for 
the calculation of the socio-economic competitiveness of a region or sub-regional area 
and the relative disadvantage resulting from its specific geographical position.49  
                                                 
45  HUNTINGTON Samuel P.: The Clash of Civilizations? In: Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22-
34, here p. 31. 
46  Ibd., here p. 25.  
47  See VON SYDOW Emily: Den Baltiska dimensionen. Stockholms geopolitiska roll i EU. In: 
EHRLING Guy (ed.): Stockholm international. En antologi om Stockholm i en regionaliserad och 
globaliserad värld. Stockholm 2000, pp. 23-36, here 25. Anyway, Sweden and Finland do take part 
in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme, and thus, are fully involved in the practical 
field activities as well as training and capability development.  
48  See Baltic Study Net. Introduction to the Baltic Summer School Mare Europaeum, Berlin 23 July – 6 
August 2006. Website of the Centre for Baltic Sea Region Studies (CEBAST) 
www.balticstudies.org [27 September 2007]. 
49  See for example SPIEKERMANN Klaus/AALBU Hallgeir: Nordic Peripherality in Europe. 
Nordregion Working Paper, Nr. 2/2004. Stockholm 2004.  
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What yet increases the load of distance and remoteness in structural terms is the 
additional factor of harsh climate in Northern Europe, which does not only affect the 
extreme North but also the urban areas in the Scandinavian south.  
The political changes of 1989/90 not only gave rise to a wave of political 
transformation, they also opened the scene to new forms of security challenges. Soft 
security threats such as organised crime, illegal migration, drug trafficking and 
communicable diseases may be regarded as “direct consequences of the fall of the 
Baltic Wall”50 or of the “accelerated social and political transformation” in the post-
Soviet countries.51 A set of other, more persistent and traditional problems is related to 
environmental hazards. They are partly aggravated by the fact that due to the low and 
variable salinity of the Baltic Sea, its marine life is exceptionally vulnerable. The lack of 
circulation creates lethal deposits of nutrients in the depths of the sea. Death and decay 
are increasingly spreading under the surface.  
Nuclear safety is a particular cause for concern because of the serious and trans-boundary 
character of a possible accident. Together with other regional and local hazards, the 
environmental deterioration in the Murmansk area is a significant problem.52 
Significantly, some of these challenges, such as pollution or health risks, have already 
existed before, but apparently, awareness about them only resurfaced now that the 
global security political perspective on the BSR was no longer solely determined by the 
Soviet threat. In fact, emphasis must be placed on the fact that not only the changing 
political circumstances resulted in a new set of security challenges; it was also the 
shifting level of ambition in international relations that eventually altered the parameters 
for risk assessment in the BSR.  
Through the EU accession of the three Baltic States and of Poland, the security 
challenge resulting from the extreme economic and social disparities across the Baltic 
Sea rim has also become more visible. Haukkala emphasises that the Fenno-Russian 
border represents, next to the US-Mexican border, “one of the greatest drops in living 
standards in the world.”53 The following table shows the socio-economic gap between 
the northern and the southern and eastern part of the BSR, giving details about each 
country’s Human Development Index (HDI) ranking, life expectancy, inflation rates and 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50  See SANDER Gordon: Off Centre. Baltic hands link across a troubled sea. In: Financial Times, 8 
April 2000. 
51  See MOROFF Holger: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): European Soft Security Policies. The Northern 
Dimension. Kauhava 2002, pp. 12-36, here p. 13. 
52  HEROLF Gunilla: The Swedish Approach. Constructive Competition for a Common Goal. In: 
BONVICINI Gianni/VAAHTORANTA Tapani/WESSELS Wolfgang (eds): The Northern EU. 
National Views on the Emerging Security Dimension. Helsinki 2000, pp. 141-160, here 146. 
53  HAUKKALA Hiski: Whose Governance? Challenging the Dominant Northern Dimension 
Discourse. In: Northern Research Forum (ed.): Northern Veche. Proceedings of the Second Northern 
Research Forum, held in Veliky Novgorod, Russia. 19-22 September 2002, pp. 105-107, here p. 105. 
     30
 HDI ranking life expectancy inflation GDP p.c. (US $) 
Sweden 5. 80.3 0.5 38,525 
Finland 11. 78.7 0.9 35,562 
Denmark 15. 77.3 1.8 44,673 
Estonia 40. 71.6 4.1 8,331 
Latvia 45. 71.8 6.7 5,868 
Lithuania 41. 72.5 2.7 6,480 
Poland  37. 74.3 2.2 6,346 
Table 2: Socio-Economic Disparities in the BSR54 
The general characteristics of the BSR are largely determined by its unique geo-political 
position. The specificities resulting from this position pose remarkable challenges to the 
policy makers in the region. The BSR features a variety of security problems that. 
through profound “transboundary effects”, have a far-ranging impact on the wider 
region of Northern Europe.55 In fact, one of the most important BSR specificities is that 
overcoming the various problems resulting from its unique position needs to be seen as 
a trans-border challenge, a task that does not allow national or unilateral solutions. Over 
recent decades, this quest for cooperative cohesion and for harnessing of synergies has 
been extensively materialised in the form of Nordic Cooperation. Since the end of the 
Cold War had removed the superpower overlay, prospects for the establishment of 
cooperative structures across old dividing lines have grown progressively. The 
challenge of having to find joint solutions for common problems has considerably 
stimulated region-building actors to start up various different projects and initiatives 
serving these transregional purposes.  
II. Remoteness and Marginality – The Periphery’s Romantic Temptation 
Physical remoteness can, as shown for the geographic context, result in certain 
structural disadvantages for the region or country concerned. When looking at the factor 
of remoteness from a political, and more generally, a social perspective the effect 
appears to be similar. Countries and regions situated at the margins of a continent or of 
a political community, such as the BSR in regard to the European Union are often 
associated with the idea of being marginal in the sense of politically unimportant or 
secondary.  
In discourses of modernity and in the major theories of international politics, being on the 
margins is equated with a lack of influence, and even a lack of subjectivity in international 
affairs. A position in the margins is usually seen as something from which one should try to 
escape, by trying to instead get closer to the core.56  
 
                                                 
54  Table generated on the basis of the Human Development Report 2006. Available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/ [24 January 2008]. 
55  See MOROFF Holger: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): European Soft Security Policies. The Northern 
Dimension. Kauhava 2002, pp. 12-36, here p. 12. 
56  BROWNING Christopher S.: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): Remaking Europe in the Margins. Northern 
Europe after the Enlargements. Aldershot 2005, p. 1-10, here p. 5. 
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Parker claims that marginality has to be dissociated from the notion of inferiority to, or 
dependence upon, a corresponding core. According to his vision, marginal players can 
have remarkable power in their own right and have considerable impact on the 
international scene. The basis for this ability is their very position at the margins that 
puts them into a state of permanent uncertainty. As their belonging to a certain entity 
always remains in doubt, they are pushed to assume a proactive attitude. However, also 
the ‘centre’ needs more commitment in order to keep the margins “on track”. This is 
mostly because they have, in contrast to those who are part of the declared core, a large 
set of options at hand that could serve them as profitable alternatives to the ‘core 
option’.57 Even though Parker in his argumentation is not strictly talking about margins 
in the sense of territoriality, these reflections may well be applied to the question of the 
role a ‘marginal’ region such as the BSR can have in relation to its respective centre, i.e. 
the EU or ‘Brussels’.58 
This study is based on the assumption that geographical remoteness furthers the 
establishment of distinct identities, based on a strong awareness about the fact of being 
‘peripheral’. The psychological effects of potentially ‘not being part of it’ might, in the 
long run, also affect or determine the foreign policy conduct of states situated in 
peripheral regions. The unity of the system of Nordic Cooperation, for example, has 
always been promoted by the relative isolation and the insularity of the Northern 
European area, composed of peninsulas, islands and archipelagos. In fact, the Nordic 
sphere features only two mainland borders: a very short one between Germany and 
Denmark, and one in a rather desolate and uninhabited area between Finland and 
Russia.59 However, the way Northern Europe and the ‘far up North’ are perceived is 
subject to changes. A look back into history shows that Northernness has not always 
been associated with mere remoteness and peripherality. The various notions attached to 
being positioned in the northern hemisphere of Europe were most commonly employed 
on the basis of a North-South division. 
The North-South division of the world dominated European spatial imagination [...] from 
Antiquity up until the gradual emergence of a new East-West division during the early 
modern period. In ancient Greece and Rome, and for centuries thereafter, the North denoted 
a veritable cultural and economic backwater, a sphere inhabited by uncivilized barbarians. 
This image of extreme peripherality was challenged during the 16th and the 17th centuries, 
when the North acquired a more positive aspect and became the resource in the identity-
building processes of realms and nations. In the 19th century, however, it ceased to function 
as a master-signifier of Europeanness and again assumed a connotation of remoteness and 
peripherality.60 
                                                 
57  See PARKER Noel: Integrated Europe and its ‘Margins’. Action and Reaction. In: 
Id./ARMSTRONG Bill (eds): Margins in European Integration. Houndmills 2000, pp. 3-27, here p. 
8-13. 
58  For a more abstract analysis on these centre-periphery aspects, see chapter “Application PatternII: 
Sketching a Model of Explanation”, p. 198-.  
59  See JAANSON Kaido: The Baltic States and Norden. In: The Baltic Review, Vol. 19. Online 
Edition. Website of the Journal ‘The Baltic Review’ www.tbr.ee [12 August 2007].  
60  JOENNIEMI Pertti/LEHTI Marko: On the encounter between the Nordic and the northern. Torn 
Apart but Meeting Again? Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI): Working Paper, 11/2001, 
p. 5. 
     32
Generally, there is a certain tendency to disregard the political developments at the 
‘margins’, i.e. the peripheral parts of Europe. This applies to both political practice and 
academic research. Most notably in the context of integration and the respective 
political discourse, Northern Europe often appears as a ‘blank spot’ on the virtual map 
of the European project. Joenniemi points at the additional problem that in most 
contexts Northern Europe, or the ‘North’, is treated as a “marker with a given content 
and unproblematic status.”61 
The marker remains embedded in perceptions of immobility and permanency. It is depicted, 
similarly to the other main markers on the compass, as being frozen, fixed and pre-set [...]. 
It is so firmly naturalised and sedimented that it is difficult to comprehend that in the end, 
the North too forms a discursive construct with changing borders.62 
Apart from these various forms of academic disinterest and symptomatic political 
negligence coming from the ‘southern’ parts of Europe, peripheral regions such as the 
BSR are often subject to, as Olrich put it, “extreme views by those who are central.” 
These “extreme views” again range between total disregard and political 
underestimation and the hyperbolic romanticisation of alleged attributes and value-laden 
categories such as the “Nordic spirit” or the “Arctic Mystery”.63  
Northern Europe has been something of a post-modern playground, where scholars well 
versed in critical understandings of international politics have played a hands-on role in how 
the region has developed.64  
In fact, Northern Europe as other peripheral regions has been and still is often subject to 
the external (and often, arbitrary) application of either  
 
– enthusiastic concepts that personate the North as something extraordinarily different 
in the sense of extreme or even preternatural,  
– or charming and neat concepts, that classify the actors based in this part of Europe 
as largely inoffensive, tolerant and libertarian, and thus, most significantly, as 
harmless on the scene of global or European power politics.  
 
Even though these concepts do not always comply with the genuine specificities and 
‘real’ interests of Northern European actors, it is also very common to take these 
international clichés as reference models for official policy orientation. One important 
example in this context is the often close to romantic idealisation of the so-called 
‘Nordic Model’ and the normative implications that it is said and thought to entail.65 
Nordic self-esteem is boosted by the claims that ‘Norden’ is ‘the teacher of the rest of 
Europe’, a ‘future orientation of the European Union’ or the ‘EU’s rich periphery’. It is 
claimed that ‘Norden’ has something to teach Europe in the fields of minority rights, gender 
                                                 
61  JOENNIEMI Pertti: North Goes Europe. Restoring Meaning or Playing with Emptiness? 
Copenhagen 2001, p. 1. 
62  Ibd., p. 3. 
63  See OLRICH Tómas Ingi: Implementation of a Northern Dimension. In: Northern Research Forum 
(ed.): North meets North. Proceedings of the First Northern Research Forum, held in Akureyri and 
Bessastaðir, Iceland. 4-6 November 2002, pp. 119-121, here p. 119. 
64  BROWNING Christopher S.: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): Remaking Europe in the Margins. Northern 
Europe after the Enlargements. Aldershot 2005, pp. 1-10, here p. 3.  
65  For a discussion about the international perception of the Nordic Model, see ØSTERGÅRD Uffe: 
The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity from Composite States to Nation-States. Copenhagen 1997, p. 4.   
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equality, environmental policies, consumer policy, local administration and policy in 
dealing with the autonomic regions. The list of ‘Nordic’ merits is long, but the extent to 
which these are merely taken for granted conceptions, traditional myths and political 
slogans is hardly ever problematized.66 
Also political actors within Northern Europe often ply with similar arguments, trying to 
profit from the sometimes gainful effect of either being reckoned as an ideal model of 
reference, or in other cases, as the “boring backwater” of Europe that takes pride in its 
“lethargic and uncontroversial political system” without ever lapsing into the infamous 
maelstrom of power politics.”67 Notions of “tiny and tidy Scandinavia”68 or of the five 
Nordic states being “small, peace-loving, democratic countries” 69 allude to this specific 
Nordic attitude.70 Some actors involved in the Baltic Sea region-building process also 
tried to avail themselves of colourful and idealised notion of what this region is 
basically about. The following example that claims to describe a “northern perspective 
on European history and culture” illustrates the lofty character of notions and images 
used in the context of these argumentative strategies. 
Anthropologists and cultural historians consider all that Human do as culture. According to 
a brief definition, culture reflects the creativity of the human mind. [...] This limited every 
day concept of culture can support our common observations. In the Lappish heart, 
Rovaniemi does not compete with Florence or Rome. We would not catch up Central 
Europe’s lead, even if we brought Luciano Pavarotti and la Scala’s opera house to the 
Lappish mountains. Laplanders set a framework for high culture in the wonderful 
mountains, but it is representative of cultural understanding from the southern perspective. 
According to the wider concept, Lapland’s nature floods into the culture, but one should 
learn to understand it as a rapids shooter reads the rapids. The Northern dimension opens 
unmeasurable wealth to the European audience and a complete new way to realize cultural 
capital status. [...] Snow and ice are used as elements of fine arts. Northern culture is a part 
of nature, in which the seasons are stages of fantasy and drama.71 
C. What Makes a Region a ‘Region’? Reflections on Baltic Sea ‘Regionness’  
Generally, many analysts have tried to define the concept of ‘region’ in various 
contexts. In fact, there are many different territorial entities commonly – and sometimes 
mistakenly – classified under the same label – ‘region’.  
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The range of so-called regions in Europe actually encompasses a variety of remarkably 
different phenomena. We call the BSR just as we do Bremen, Brussels and the Baranya.72 
There is no transdisciplinary or global definition but generally a region can be 
conceived as a category that regroups disparate aggregates. However, as such it may 
still denominate very different concepts, e.g. intermediary formations between the local 
and the national level, sub-state entities within a country or nation, a cooperation zone 
that includes the respective state, a trans-border area, or indeed, an entire sub-
continent.73 What makes a region a region? This plain question leads us first to the 
aspect of territoriality and thus, to geography. When trying to define what it is exactly 
that makes us classify something as a region, the first and foremost condition seems to 
be locality. As Schmitt-Egner put it: “Location matters.”74 However, Nekrasas pointed 
out that political geography should not try to lock regions up in a “steel cage” since 
geographical affiliations are subject to constant re-interpretation.75 In fact, defining the 
BSR along sharp geographical borders by including all states and sub-state entities that 
directly border on the Baltic Sea seems problematic.  
 
 
 
Estonia 
 
Germany 
Hamburg 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
 
Latvia 
 
Lithuania 
 
Poland 
West Pomerania 
Pomerania 
Warmia-Masuria 
 
Sweden 
Skåne 
Blekinge 
Östergötland 
Södermanland 
Gotland 
Stockholm 
Uppsala 
Gävleborg 
Västernorrland 
Västerbotten 
Norrbotten 
 
Finland 
Lapland Northern-
Ostrobothnia 
Central Ostrobothnia 
Ostrobothnia 
Satakunta 
Finland Proper 
Uusimaa 
Eastern Uusimaa 
Kymenlaakso  
Russia 
North-Western 
Federal District 
Kaliningrad 
 
Table 3: BSR States and Respective Sub-States 
However, Schäfer is right in saying that these ambits only serve the purpose of 
delineating administrative entities whose coverage does not necessarily correspond with 
the catchment area of the cooperative networks that Baltic Sea Regionalism has put 
forth.76 Therefore, any sort of geographical definition has to remain vague in the sense 
that the BSR as a spatial concept does not have clear-cut borders.  
                                                 
72  SCHMITT-EGNER: The Concept of ‘Region’. Theoretical and methodological Notes on its 
Reconstruction. In: Journal of European Integration, No. 3/2002, pp. 179-200, here p. 179.  
73  See SMOUTS Marie-Claude: The region as a new imagined community. In: LEQUESNE 
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Reconstruction. In: Journal of European Integration, No. 3/2002, pp. 179-200, here p. 180.   
75  See NEKRASAS Evaldas: Is Lithuania a Northern or Central European Country? In: Lithuanian 
Foreign Policy Review, 1/1998, pp. 19-45, here p. 22. 
76  See SCHÄFER Imke: Region-Building and Identity Formation in the Baltic Sea Region. In: The 
Interdisciplinary Journal of International Studies, No. 1/2005, pp. 45-69, here p. 46.  
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The notion of ‘Baltic Sea Region’ cannot be simply equated with the geographic 
‘region’ concept. In this study, the ‘region’ is perceived not to be solely determined by 
its factual characteristic features such as natural or geomorphic similarities. Geographic 
factors such as a common littoral form a region just as much as bare physical closeness 
does. The concept of a ‘region’ underlying this study is based on the assumption, that 
regions emerging from regionalist tendencies or proactive region-building efforts are 
based on additional ideational factors, with geographic circumstances forming some sort 
of conceptual auxiliary. To put it differently, geographical proximity is a fact, whereas 
‘regionness’ is the outcome of a political process, the process of regionalism. 
Defining ‘regions’ in the sense of spatial units is linked with the question of perceiving 
and conceptualizing borders. From a modernist point of view, a ‘region’ in the sense of 
a territorial entity is a clearly and neatly defined space with clear-cut borders and a 
designated centre that projects its power evenly across the whole terrain. From this point 
of view, borders do have the plain function of demarcating the inside from the outside 
without having any sort of constitutive subjectivity on their own. In contrast thereto, the 
concept of “fuzzy borders”77 defines the margins as some sort of intermediary spaces of 
interaction and exchange whose cross-links reach right beyond the borders. According 
to this perspective, the mere fact that they do not only form the border but rather 
transcend and overlap borders and dividing lines already provides them with a 
substantive power of their own.78 Instead of defining concepts of regions and borders, 
Hettne introduced a set of criteria that determine a region’s ‘regionness’ assuming that 
the fact of a region being a region is not exclusive or absolute but that there are various 
degrees of ‘regionness’ that “make a region more or less of a region”:  
 
– geographical unit: a ‘region’ should form some sort of geographical unit, i.e. it 
should have more or less discernible boundaries defined by natural physical 
borders. A good example for this type of ‘proto-region’ is Sub-Saharan Africa; 
– social system: the region is inhabited by human beings that at least maintain some 
kind of trans-local relationship (also hostile or negative); combined with a low level 
of organisation this level constitutes so-called “primitive regions”; 
– organised cooperation: the region implies organisational membership and respective 
structures (“formal region”); 
– civil society: organizational framework promotes social communication and 
convergence of values across the region; shared cultural tradition is a basic 
precondition for this sort of “regional anarchic society”; 
– acting subject: this stage is achieved with the coalescence of a distinct identity, 
actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision-making; this regionalism is 
very similar to the process of state formation and nation-building. The ultimate 
outcome could be a “region state”, which Hettne defines as a “supranational 
security community, where sovereignty is pooled for the best of all.”79 
 
                                                 
77  See CHRISTIANSEN Thomas/PETITO Fabio/TONRA Ben (eds): Fuzzy Politics around Fuzzy 
Borders. The European Union’s ‘Near Abroad’. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 4/December 2000, 
pp. 389-415. 
78  See BROWNING Christopher S.: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): Remaking Europe in the Margins. 
Northern Europe after the Enlargements. Aldershot 2005, pp. 1-10, here p. 5-6. 
79  See HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper presented at the 
Global Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan, pp. 3-4.  
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Even though Hettne claims that this scale of regionness is not intended as a stage theory, 
it nevertheless suggests some sort of evolutionary logic, according to which state-like 
regionness seems to constitute the most advanced stage a ‘region’ can reach. According 
to this line of argument, ‘regionness’ is closely linked with ‘actorness’. In other words, 
the region is perceived as an independent variable, and the whole process of increasing 
regionness is a question of developing actor-like qualities such as decision-making and 
state-like self-identification. The BSR would probably range somewhere between 
Hettne’s concept of a ‘formal region’ and a ‘regional anarchic society’ and thus, be 
fairly close to the ultimate stage of state-like regionness. However, the idea of a linearly 
progressing regionness seems neither applicable nor desirable for the Baltic Sea case at 
its current stage. This study’s dealing with the BSR is based on the concept that equates 
‘region’ to some kind of virtual ‘action space’ rather than conceiving it, in line with 
Hettne’s ‘region-state’ image, as an aspiring ‘action unit’.80 
D. Regionalism – Definitions, Delimitations and Typologies 
After the end of the Cold War, the study of regionalism has received new interest in 
both Political Science and Economics. Analysts have tried to identify different types of 
regionalism and to discover the inherent dynamics of regionalist developments, and 
have thus accumulated a rich store of expertise. The following subchapters are intended 
to give a brief overview of the terminological and conceptual basics, and eventually, to 
outline various approaches developed in order to describe and analyse this global 
phenomenon.  
I. The Regionalism Complex and the Importance of Conceptual Clarity 
Regionalism is a multidimensional and pluralistic phenomenon in international politics, 
and it is a complex and (maybe even more) contested subject area in IR studies. This is 
partly due to its multidisciplinary provenance: the academic concern with regional 
spatiality and regionness has not emerged from within conventional Political Science. 
Indeed, the respective research agenda has been shaped by various different disciplines, 
such as Geography, Sociology, Urban Studies, Anthropology, and Spatial Planning.81 
Consequently, theorists have developed many different ways of defining ‘regionalism’, 
each in view of their specific study and research purpose. As Herrschel and Gore put it, 
there is no global definition of ‘region’ or ‘regionalism’ as “regionalism means a lot of 
things to many people.”82 The popularity that regionalism gained in recent years has not 
only enhanced academic productivity; the variety of approaches has also produced a 
certain lack of conceptual clarity. An enormous variety of phenomena and 
developments is placed under the heading of ‘regionalism’: processes of social or 
economic regionalisation, growth of regional awareness or identity, formation of inter-
state regional institutions, state-promoted economic integration, or emergence of 
                                                 
80  See SCHMITT-EGNER: The Concept of ‘Region’. Theoretical and Methodological Notes on its 
Reconstruction. In: Journal of European Integration, No. 3/2002, pp. 179-200, here p. 181. 
81  RUMFORD Chris: Rethinking European Spaces. Territory, Borders, Governance. In: Comparative 
European Politics, Issue 2/3 (July/September 2006), pp. 127–140, here p. 129. 
82  HERRSCHEL Tassilo/GORE Benjamin: Creating the Multi-Purpose and Multi-Scalar ‘Virtual 
Region’. New Regionalisation in the Baltic Sea Area. Paper presented at the 6th EURS Conference, 
Roskilde 21-23 September 2006, p. 1.  
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politically cohesive regional blocks, to name just a few examples. Given the extreme 
complexity and variety of the concept, Hurrell even suggests regarding “regionalism as 
an unstable and indeterminate process of multiple and competing logics with no 
overriding teleology or single end point. [...] It is very unlikely that any single theory 
will be able to explain the regionalism complex.”83 Even though this statement might 
appear fairly scepticist, it could be considered helpful to the extent it emphasises the 
importance of terminological clarity.  
Distinguishing between Regionalism’s multiple forms is a task too often ignored by 
observers, but it stands as a necessary precondition for all future empirical study. [...] 
Regionalism in its many guises is a moving target, especially when examined cross-
nationally. [...] The dangers of conceptual imprecision include limits on comparability 
across countries, limits on the ability of regional specialists in multiple disciplines to 
communicate effectively, and limits on the ability to link theoretical work with necessary 
practical applications.84 
The distinctions between the different forms of regionalism matter greatly, as many 
studies on regionalism seem indeed to be muddled because the respective analyst is 
insufficiently clear about the conceptual relationship between the various processes 
described under the banner of ‘regionalism’.85  
II. Baltic Sea Region: What Sort of ‘Regionalism’?  
Regionalism as it is dealt with in this study needs to be clearly distinguished from the 
notion of ‘regionalism’ as an approach to state administration. In the context of national 
or low politics, ‘regionalism’ denominates the logic of dividing a political entity 
(usually a nation state) into a certain number of smaller political districts, and thereby of 
transferring power from the central government to these ‘regions’. The regarding 
political process is called ‘regionalisation’.86 Another viable interpretation in this regard 
is ‘regionalism’ as a form of sub-national region-based tendency of disintegration, i.e. a 
domestic process – be it on peaceful terms or not – where a certain administrative sub-
entity seeks greater voice or autonomy, if not outright independence or statehood. The 
basis of this sort of regionalism is usually a strong regional and ethno-territorial identity, 
e.g. Scotland, Catalonia, Corsica.87  
 
                                                 
83  See HURRELL Andrew: The Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory. In: FARRELL 
Mary/HETTNE Björn/VAN LANGENHOVE Luk (eds): Global Politics and Regionalism. London 
2005, pp. 38-53, here p. 41.  
84  DOWNS William M.: Regionalism in the European Union. Key Concepts and Project Overview. In: 
Journal of European Integration, No. 3/2002, pp. 171-177, here p. 172. 
85  See HURRELL Andrew: The Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory. In: FARRELL 
Mary/HETTNE Björn/VAN LANGENHOVE Luk (eds): Global Politics and Regionalism. London 
2005, pp. 38-53, here p. 42. 
86  See JOENNIEMI Pertti/WÆVER Ole (eds): Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region. Washington 
1993, p. 4. A similar form of regionalism albeit under more constructive circumstances is the one 
underlying the concept of a ‘Europe of Regions’. For a critical discussion, see chapter “What kind of 
‘Europe of the Regions’?”, p. 206-.  
87  See SCHRIJVER Frans: Regionalism after regionalisation: Regional identities, political space and 
political mobilisation in Galicia, Brittany and Wales. Amsterdam 2004, p. 4. 
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In contrast to this concept, the notion of ‘Baltic Sea Regionalism’ refers to regionalist 
action in terms of ‘region-building’ across national borders as a phenomenon in 
international politics, i.e. a process of cohesion and networking that takes place in a 
certain region. Hence, ‘Baltic Sea Regionalism’ denominates all sorts of cooperative 
action set in the respective catchment area.88 In the widest sense of the term, this type of 
regionalism could be defined as increasing cooperative activity gathering around a 
certain region or territorial entity. It is the process of a region ‘growing together’ on the 
ground of coordination, cooperation and mutual support in political, economical and 
ideological terms.  
Apart form the Baltic Sea Region there are three other frontier regions in Europe that 
function as bridgeheads between East and West. In the North, there is the Barents Euro-
Arctic Region, which promotes cooperation between the Northern parts of Norway, Sweden 
and Finland and the North Western part of Russia. In the centre of Europe there is the so-
called new Euro-region that unites Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. And 
on the Northern shores of the Adriatic Sea a co-operative arrangement has been formed 
called the Alp-Adria Region.89 
A certain degree of cohesiveness as well as a basic preference for region-based 
incorporation probably forms the most essential precondition for the emergence and 
consolidation of this sort of regionalist tendencies. Gunnarsson suggests another 
practicable and fairly comprehensive definition of ‘regionalism’: 
Regionalism is the political idea of desirability in regionalisation of politics. Regionalisation 
refers to the empirical process that leads to the establishment of regions. This process can be 
generated from either within a region or through forces from outside of a geographical area, 
trying to establish a region.90 
In this study, regionalism is conceived as a dynamic process that leads to the emergence 
of regional entities or ‘regions’, which eventually assume the shape of political, cultural 
or economic spaces founded on specific cohesive patterns. This process is determined 
by intersecting and competing interests and objectives effectuated by different types of 
players, e.g. governmental/official, non-governmental/non-official, corporate or 
particulate players. Hence, they are not to be found exclusively on the nation state level 
but below or rather beyond the scope of state-to-state action.  
Before starting to elaborate on these different levels of regionalism, it is important to 
point at yet another usage of the term ‘regionalism’. Confusingly, it also popped up in 
the political debate about the post Cold War developments in the BSR. The regional 
policy of single BSR states in view of the newly emerging post Cold War opportunities 
was sometimes also labelled as ‘regionalism’. However, it was rather meant in the 
polemic sense of a negative or judgmental ‘-ism’, a regionalist ‘activism’ or ‘proactive 
regionalism’ that was said to be driven largely by national interests and expedience. 
Bergman elaborated on this phenomenon of “adjacent internationalism”.  
                                                 
88  See FAWCETT Louise/HURRELL Andrew (eds): Regionalism in World Politics. Regional 
organization and international order. New York 1998, p. 11.  
89  DELLENBRANT Jan Åke: The Baltic Sea Co-operation. Visions and Realities. In: 
BALDERSHEIM Harald/STÅHLBERG Krister (eds): Nordic Region-Building in a European 
Perspective. Aldershot 1999, pp. 83-97, here p. 85. 
90  GUNNARSSON Malin: Regionalism and Security. Two Concepts in the Wind of Change. Umeå 
2000. 
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As a result of the break-up of the USSR in 1991, the Nordic states were given a unique 
opportunity to engage more actively in their adjacent region. [...] The Nordics demonstrated 
extensive willingness to support the democratic, economic and social development of the 
three Baltics.91 
In the case of nation-state regional policy, this phenomenon is also called “defensive” or 
“proactive regionalism”, a state behaviour that can be interpreted as either being a sign 
of genuinely constructive efforts or as a geo-strategic approach aiming at mere (soft) 
power accumulation.92 In this very context, Sweden’s post Cold War regionalism 
directed towards the BSR was often said to have mainly served the purpose of 
enhancing its own geopolitical standing and of demonstrating its normative power by 
virtually transcending old dividing lines between East and West.93 This type of 
judgmental ‘regional-ism’ has also been applied to describe the activist attitude of the 
various region-building players that used to avail themselves of overblown and 
grandiose rhetoric and value-laden symbolisms in order to mobilise partners for their 
own objectives and purposes. 
III. Levels of Regionalism: Macro-, Meso- and Micro-Regionalism 
Regionalism as a phenomenon in international politics does not only involve different 
types of actors at different levels of political competence; regionalist dynamics also 
differ in terms of geographical reach and coverage. The process of regionalism occurs at 
different levels, i.e. covering a macro-, meso- or micro-sized area. Hence, an important 
distinction needs to be made between so-called Macro-, Meso- and Micro-
Regionalism.94 
 
 examples 
Macro-Regionalism Large geographical units (‘world regions’ or 
‘international regions’), ranging between the ‘state’ 
and the ‘global’ level; 
EU 
Meso-Regionalism 
or Sub-Regionalism 
medium size entities, also occurring between the 
‘state’ and the ‘global’ level, but one level below 
Macro-Regionalism 
BSR 
Micro-Regionalism small geographical units, ranging between the 
‘national’ and the ‘local’ or ‘municipal’ level 
Vlaanders 
region 
Table 4: Levels of Regionalism: Macro-, Meso- and Micro-Regionalism 
                                                 
91  See BERGMAN Annika: Adjacent Internationalism. The Concept of Solidarity and Post-Cold War 
Nordic-Baltic Relations. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 1/2006, pp. 73-97, here p. 74. See also 
chapter “The BSR as an Auto-Dynamic Unit Within the Wider Unit Europe”, p. 203-. 
92  For more comments on “defensive Regionalism”, see chapter “Old North vs. New Regionalism – 
Visions Competing for the Same Space?”, p. 76-. 
93  Sweden’s regional policy in the early post Cold War phase will be addressed in chapter “What 
accounts for Swedish and Finnish Self-Perception?”, p. 113-. 
94  See SÖDERBAUM Fredrik: Exploring the Links between Micro-Regionalism and Macro-
Regionalism. In: FARRELL Mary/HETTNE Björn/VAN LANGENHOVE Luk (eds): Global 
Politics and Regionalism. London 2005, pp. 87-103, here p. 91. 
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This tripartite typology shows that the case of the BSR is covered by the concept of 
Sub-regionalism, or rather Meso-Regionalism.95 The notion of ‘Meso-Regionalism’ 
appears more applicable to the purpose of this study as the idea of a sub-region suggests 
that there must always be a reference to the entity ranging above, i.e. the respective 
macro-region (in this case, the EU).96 In academic analyses, the BSR is alternately 
defined as a ‘region’ or a ‘sub-region’; accordingly, BSR specific political dynamics are 
referred to as either ‘regionalism’ or ‘sub-regionalism’. The use of these terms mainly 
depends on whether the BSR is being viewed and analysed as an entity of its own 
(‘region’), or as a subordinate entity subjected to a wider spatial framework, e.g. the 
EU, or more generally, Europe (‘sub-region’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BSR as a ‘region’ of its own 
  
BSR as a European ‘sub-region’ 
Figure 2: Models of Baltic Sea ‘Regionness’ – ‘Region’ and ‘Sub-Region’ 
This study is builds on the assumption that Baltic Sea Regionalism is to some extent but 
not exclusively embedded in the wider framework of European integration. Hence, the 
BSR is being analysed as both a European sub-region and a self-standing regional entity 
of its own. In order to clarify the terminology further, one also needs to differentiate 
between ‘regional’ and ‘sub-regional’ as terms either denominating  
 
– a certain catchment area, i.e. as given in the above-stated typology, covering the 
horizontal dimension of geographical reach, position and territorial correlation with 
other entities (e.g. BSR vs. Europe) or97 
– a certain level of action, i.e. as terms concerning the vertical dimension of actorness 
and institutional responsibility, accountability and power. 
 
                                                 
95  The concept of ‘meso-regions’ is also commonly used in Science of History. There, it is based on the 
“identification of clusters of transnational structures common to a constructed region that is not 
necessarily congruent with political or geographical boundaries. [...] This heuristic approach serves 
as a device for comparative analysis.” See TROEBST Stefan: What is a historical region? A 
Teutonic Perspective. In: European Review of History, No. 2/Summer 2003, pp. 173-188, here p. 
173. 
96  Söderbaum gives a useful definition of what a sub-region is about. “Their ‘sub’ prefix indicates that 
they only make sense and must be understood in relation to macro-regions (for example there can be 
no sub-regions without reference to a larger macro-region).” SÖDERBAUM Fredrik: Exploring the 
Links between Micro-Regionalism and Macro-Regionalism. In: FARRELL Mary/HETTNE 
Björn/VAN LANGENHOVE Luk (eds): Global Politics and Regionalism. London 2005, pp. 87-103, 
here p. 91. 
97  See scheme above. 
 
Europe/EU 
 
BSR BSR 
Mediterranean 
Balkans 
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In this second sense, the notion of ‘sub-regional’ and ‘sub-regionalism’ refers to the 
subordinate (and most often sub-state) actors existing and operating at subordinate 
levels. Confusingly, Baltic Sea Regionalism is sometimes also referred to as ‘Micro-
Regionalism’ based on the notion of a much broader European macro-scale process. 
The conventional form of macro-regionalism is purely sub-national and usually takes 
place within the parameters of a nation-state. This sort of regionalism on the ‘micro’ or 
local level is often related to political/administrative planning, democratic or 
economic/distributional motives; in most cases it is also shaped by the relationship 
between central government and micro-regional political or administrative forces. 
Hence, it reflects a model of vertical and state-oriented organisation. Meso-Regionalism 
has a distinct cross-border focus, i.e. it stretches out beyond both the state level and the 
state territory. Hence, Meso-Regionalism as it occurs in the case of the BSR could also 
be labelled as “cross-border regionalism” or “transnational regionalism”.98 This type of 
regionalism is mostly based on a horizontal model of interaction and involves a wide 
range of different public and private actors that find themselves grouped together by 
way of networks or other cooperative formations.99  
The territorial extent of regionalism, i.e. whether the respective catchment area is large 
or small, often informs about the level of action and the type of actors involved. In fact, 
it can be said that macro-regionalism mainly occurs at the inter-state or 
intergovernmental level, primarily involving state actors. Meso-Regionalism, on the 
other hand, may involve both state and non-state actors and includes intergovernmental 
interaction as well as non-governmental networking. Micro-Regionalism is naturally 
dominated by non-state actors and mainly occurs at a local level of action. However, 
needless to say, this pattern is not universally applicable.  
IV. Typologies  
Approaches that suggest certain typologies of regionalism that go beyond these simple 
distinctions considerably help to reduce the empirical complexity of various regionalist 
manifestations in international politics. They do serve as a tool for characterising the 
structure of different regionalist models, and for tracing certain regionalist 
developments over time. However, typologies remain practical tools with limited 
applicability and validity.  
                                                 
98  The notion of “trans-nationality” needs to be clearly distinguished from the term and concept of 
“inter-nationality”. Whereas internationality includes intergovernmental dealings, i.e. between the 
government of one nation-state with the government of another nation-state, or of several nation-
states, transnationality covers activity which transcends national boundaries and in which nation-
state governments do not play the most important or even a significant role. 
99  See JÖNSSON, Christer/TÄGIL Sven/TÖRNQVIST Gunnar: Organizing European Space. 
Lund/London 2000, p. 149. According to this definition, one can identify a respectable number of 
Meso-Regions in Europe, such as the North Atlantic Basin, the Northern Atlantic Region, the 
Metropolises of Northwestern Europe, the Alpine Region, the Carpathian Region, the Danube Basin, 
the Southern Atlantic, the Latin Region, the Adriatic Basin, the Balkan Region, the Western 
Mediterranean Basin, and the Central Mediterranean Basin. See KIVIKARI Urpo: The Legacy of the 
Hansa. The Baltic Economic Region. Helsinki 1996. 
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1. Old vs. New Regionalism and the New Regionalism Approach 
One of the most common typological distinctions of regionalism is the one 
differentiating between ‘Old’ and ‘New Regionalism’. In the early 1990s, scholars 
began to use the phrase of ‘New Regionalism’ in many different contexts. It was mainly 
meant to stress the difference between current regionalist phenomena and ‘Old 
Regionalism’, meaning the respective body of theory and practice developed from the 
1880s up until the late 1980s. Most studies on the characteristics of the ‘New regionalist 
paradigm’ have been conducted in the field of Economics and Economic Geography, 
focussing mainly on the link between trade-related processes and corresponding 
structures of governance.  
New insights into the development of the space economy over the last two decades have 
meant that the scope and nature of economic geography have changed dramatically. [...] The 
field of New Regionalism is characterised, in particular, by an interest in the role of 
innovation and economic success (‘competitiveness’) at the level of particular international 
regions.100 
The recent regionalist developments in East Asia and Latin America have been among 
the most popular examples used for empirical illustration in this context.101 Most studies 
on the rise of ‘New Regionalism’ focussed on the international scale, i.e. on macro-
regionalist manifestations such as ASEAN or Mercosur.102 Hettne, one of the founding 
fathers of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA), introduced a more comprehensive 
model defining‘New Regionalism’ as a multidimensional process of regional integration 
that includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects, and thus, goes far beyond 
the mere context of free trade and liberalisation.103  
The following table brings together various findings of different exponents of this 
specific approach, and thus, reflects some sort of typological and terminological 
commonsense of the NRA.104 
 
                                                 
100  LAGENDIJK Arnoud: Will New Regionalism survive? Tracing dominant concepts in economic 
geography. CURDS (Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies) Discussion Paper, No. 
10. Newcastle 1998, p. 3. 
101  See e.g. BULMER-THOMAS Victor (ed.): Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribean. 
The Political Economy of Open Regionalism. London 2001. And STORPER Michael: The 
Resurgence of regional economies, ten years later. The region as a nexus of untraded 
interdependencies. In: European Urban and Regional Studies 2/2005, pp. 191-221. And 
LAGENDIJK Arnoud: Will New Regionalism survive? Tracing dominant concepts in economic 
geography. CURDS (Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies) Discussion Paper, No. 
10. Newcastle 1998. 
102  See SCHMITTER Philippe C./MALAMUD Andrés: Theorizing Regional Integration and Inter-
Regional Relations. Workshop Proposal. Florence/Lisbon 2006, p. 1. Website of the European 
University Institute, Florence www.iue.it [22 November 2007].  
103  Hettne also focussed more on the subject of city-regions and other locality-based ‘bottom-up’ region 
building processes. See HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper 
presented at the Global Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan, p. 3. 
104  See ibd. and VÄYRYNEN Raimo: Regionalism. Old and New. In: International Studies Review, 
Issue 1/2003, pp. 25-52. And FABBRI Claudia M.: The Constructivist Promise and Regional 
Integration. An Answer to ‘old’ and ‘new’ puzzles. CSGR (Centre for the Study of Globalisation) 
Working Paper, Nr. 182/05. Warwick 2005. And HERRSCHEL Tassilo/GORE Benjamin: Creating 
the Multi-Purpose and Multi-Scalar ‘Virtual Region’. New Regionalisation in the Baltic Sea Area. 
Paper presented at the 6th EURS Conference, Roskilde 21-23 September 2006. 
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OLD REGIONALISM NEW REGIONALISM 
top-down bottom-up 
launched from above, on the basis of formal 
state-level initiatives 
emerging from within the region, less formal 
and more spontaneous 
structure process 
main focus on structural planning 
formal proceduralism 
main focus on strategic planning 
deregulated progression 
government governance 
state-oriented 
restriction to public sector 
open to all types of actors 
non-public actors involved 
exclusiveness openness 
introverted and particularistic 
exclusive and (partly) protectionist 
formal importance of membership criteria 
extroverted and multitlateral 
inclusive 
flexible membership 
objective-centered comprehensive 
e.g. security or economy-oriented variety of fields, including ‘low policy’ 
concentration of power decentralisation 
vertical state-type hierarchy horizontal/decentralised diffusion of power  
responsibility trust 
no one-sided accumulation of power 
clear separation of labour 
confidence-building activities 
creation of visions and common identity 
coordination cooperation 
distribution of resources voluntary pooling 
continuity change 
constant development/stability rapid changes/volatile conditions 
Table 5: Old and New Regionalism in Comparison 
Hettne claims that new regionalism has to be seen in connection with globalisation and 
the resulting demise of the Westphalian state model, which is a process that has not only 
qualified the very notion of national sovereignty but has also blurred the lines between 
national, regional and global contexts. Recent regionalist activity is thought to represent 
a defence or reaction to globalisation, and an attempt by governments to claw back 
collectively some autonomy over decision-making and to manage both the positive and 
negative aspects of international independence (reactive/defensive’ regionalism).  
Globalism implies the growth of a world market, increasingly penetrating and dominating 
the ‘national’ economies [...]. From this, there may emerge a political will to halt or to 
reverse the process of globalization, in order to safeguard some degree of territorial control 
and cultural diversity.105 
                                                 
105  HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper presented at the Global 
Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan, pp.1-2. 
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In Economics and Urban Studies on regionalism, this alleged correlation between 
globalisation and progressive regional and local mobilisation has also been termed the 
“Glocalisation-Thesis” [sic!], which claims that globalisation is directly linked to an 
increase in the significance of the regional and the local, of regions and cities.106 While 
these again economy-based reflections might play a certain role in the case of Baltic Sea 
Regionalism, the line of argument shows that also the more comprehensive 
interpretation of ‘New Regionalism’ is not neatly applicable to the BSR. Hettne’s NRA 
has been subject to harsh criticism, mainly as being too vague and arbitrary for the 
explanation of regionalist dynamics. Lovering is one of the most vibrant critics:  
It is a set of claims thrown together with inadequate attention to either factual evidence or 
theoretical coherence, which both misrepresent the real experiences of regions and 
illegitimately debates over strategy. As a rather vague framework within which to speculate 
on some possible relationships between hypothetical actors at a vaguely specified level of 
abstraction it has some limited utility.107 
However, most of the features that the NRA suggested for the ‘New’ type of 
regionalism have been used repeatedly in the scholar debate about Baltic Sea 
Regionalism. This is particularly true for Hettne’s assumption that the ‘bottom-up’ 
character of New Regionalism is conditionally related to the progressive deconstruction 
of the modern or Westphalian state concept. In fact, analysts have outdone themselves 
trying to typify and characterise the phenomenon of Baltic Sea Regionalism, 
establishing ‘post-sovereignty’, ‘post-modernism’, ‘post-Westphalianism’, ‘post-
security political’ or ‘neo-medieval’ as the most common labels attributed to the BSR in 
this context. These attributions may briefly be summarized as follows: 
 
– post-sovereign: The inherent structural approach to regional cohesion that the BSR 
setting implies transcends the idea of national and territorial sovereignty: it 
propagates complexity and the establishment of a network character that blurs 
vertical hierarchies and allows trans-boundary economic flows, transnational 
exchange and the establishment of border-breaking cultural identities.108  
– post-modern/Westphalian: These attributions are very closely related to the idea of 
post-sovereignty as the structural orientation of modern states, or rather the 
‘Westphalian state’, is strongly linked to sovereignty and state independence. 
“The wide array of projects of regional cooperation that have developed in Northern Europe 
since the end of the Cold War have fundamentally re-conceptualised the nature of borders in 
the region (including EU borders), and as such significantly problematise any Westphalian 
aspirations that may exist at the EU centre.”109 
                                                 
106  The “Glocalisation” neologism originally stems from Japanese business practices in the 1980s, 
which Robertson later develeoped in theory. See ROBERTSON Roland: Globalisation or 
Glocalisation? In: Journal of International Communication, Issue 1:1994, pp. 33-52. 
107  LOVERING John: Theory led by Policy? The Inadequacies of the “New Regionalism” in economic 
geography illustrated from the Case of Wales. Paper presented at the Economic Geography Research 
Group Seminar ‘Institutions and Governance’. London July 1998, p. 21. 
108  MAKARYCHEV Andrey S.: Where the North Meets the East. Europe’s ‘Dimensionalism’ and 
Poland’s ‘Marginality Strategy’. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3/2004, pp. 299-315, here p. 301. 
109  BROWNING Christopher S.: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): Remaking Europe in the Margins. Northern 
Europe after the Enlargements. Aldershot 2005, pp. 1-10, here p. 6. 
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– post-security political: since the policy solutions developed in the context of Baltic 
Sea Regionalism mainly address issues of soft security, this type of regionalism is 
perceived to pursue an alternative or new concept of security and threat perception. 
– neo-medieval: argument based on the multitude of overlapping spaces of authority 
and transnational identities that regionalism shares with the Middle Ages.110 
 
Hettne perceived the end of the Cold War as the central and decisive historical marker 
for the transition from the ‘Old’ to the ‘New’ regionalist paradigm of the 1990s.  
Whereas the old regionalism was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, the new is taking 
shape in a multi-polar world order. The new regionalism and multipolarity are, in fact, two 
sides of the same coin. The decline of US hegemony and the breakdown of the Communist 
subsystem created a room-for-manoeuvre, in which the new regionalism could develop. It 
would never have been compatible with the Cold War system, since the ‘quasi-regions’ of 
that system tended to reproduce bipolarity within themselves.111 
According to the primary logic of this argument, the post Cold War setting should have 
had similar consequences for the BSR. In fact, the political changes of 1989/90 paved 
the way for regionalist activities across old dividing lines, and for the first time, opened 
the scene for new kinds of ‘bottom-up’ regionalism. However, Williams exemplified a 
new way of applying the old-new dichotomy laid down in the NRA, essentially 
breaking with this argumentation.  
In my study, ‘New Regionalism’ is understood not as a theory for explaining [emphasis 
added] the genesis of regions but as a tool for describing certain structural constituencies of 
regional settings. This allows a precise differentiation between types of regional 
development, where ‘New Regionalism’ is primarily being seen as a ‘bottom-up’ 
development that questions hierarchies and supports multilateralism. ‘Old Regionalism’ 
stands for classical intergovernmental relations where states and sovereignty play a crucial 
role.112 
Instead of ascribing the “New regionalist paradigm” to all forms of post Cold War 
regionalism in the BSR she used the typology of ‘Old’ and ‘New’ in order to 
characterise and compare various coexisting regionalist formations. Williams’ reading 
of the NRA shows that the end of the Cold War did indeed open new opportunities for 
regional cooperation and thus, allowed the emergence of what is commonly defined as 
‘open’ or ‘New Regionalism’. However, it also shows that nevertheless, not all 
cooperative formations that surfaced in that period fit into this new conceptual 
paradigm. In the public perception, e.g. the CBSS was seen as one of the most 
prominent examples for the so called ‘new’ regionalist activism that popped up in the 
BSR after 1989, even though structurally, it adhered more to the ‘old style’ 
regionalism.113  
 
                                                 
110  See ibd., here p. 3.   
111  HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper presented at the Global 
Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan. 
112  WILLIAMS Leena-Kaarina: Post-modern and intergovernmental paradigms of Baltic Sea co-
operation between 1988 and 1992. In: NORDEUROPA Forum 1/2005, pp. 3-20, here p. 7. 
113  For a detailed discussion, see chapter “The Irony of Competition I”, p. 47-. 
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Herrschel and Gore developed yet another alternative or comprehensive interpretation 
for the NRA and its underlying concepts and terminology, building on the general 
assumption that ‘Old’ and ‘New’ regionalist manifestations should not be seen as two 
separate concepts but rather as “two sides of the same coin.”114  
Generally referred to as ‘old’ and ‘new’ respectively, different features are associated with 
the two categories, depending on the respective condition at the beginning of the presumed 
changes. But [...] rather than following a simple sequential shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’, 
whereby the latter, as repeatedly suggested, replaces the former, there seems to be need for 
concurrency of the two. They are two sides of the same coin. This means that whatever 
features of ‘old’ Regionalism there are first, they will be complemented by the relevant 
‘new’ features of the respective new form of the region.115 
According to Herrschel and Gore, this specific combination of old and new qualities 
forms the basis for an “integrated” or “comprehensive regionalism.” That is to say that 
in practice, ‘New Regionalism’ should not be perceived to have replaced the “old 
pattern” but rather to have added to the existing regionalist fashion. 
Evidence ‘on the ground’ suggests less of a shift than a need for complementarity between 
‘old’ and ‘new’ practices. In this, existing ways of ‘doing regions’ are expanded, rather than 
replaced by new ways. How this is done reflects local conditions, including the personalities 
of the main decision makers.116 
Applied to the BSR this means that it is only the diversity of approaches materialised 
after the end of the Cold War that made it a model case for the ‘full set’ of regionalisms. 
Drawing on a broad range of regional scales and thus their associated interests and 
understandings of regional cohesion, it offers a particularly diverse example of the 
multi-faceted nature of regionalism in its full and “integrated extent” by bringing 
together the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ logic of regionalism.117  
2. Hard vs. Soft Regionalism 
The dichotomy of ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ in the context of regional development originally 
stems from the field of Urban Geography and is thus far less common in Political 
Science.118 Makarychev tried to apply this terminology to the conceptual background of 
regionalisation in Northeastern Europe and produced a typology of regionalism that is 
much akin to the old-new paradigm presented earlier in the chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114  See HERRSCHEL Tassilo/GORE Benjamin: Creating the Multi-Purpose and Multi-Scalar ‘Virtual 
Region’. New Regionalisation in the Baltic Sea Area. Paper presented at the 6th EURS Conference, 
Roskilde 21-23 September 2006, p. 2. 
115  See ibd., pp. 1-2. 
116  See, ibd., pp. 4. 
117  See ibd., p. 17. 
118  See e.g. MATTHIESEN Ulf/BÜRKNER Hans-Joachim: Grenzmilieus im potentiellen Verflech-
tungsraum von Polen mit Deutschland. Erkner 2002. 
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HARD REGIONALISM SOFT REGIONALISM 
actorness – scale of interaction 
state-to-state diversified 
flow of activities/distribution of power and responsibility 
vertical horizontal 
focus 
control influence 
promoting 
hierarchy and standardisation autonomy and variety 
structural logic 
administrative and/or diplomatic integrated network concept 
main organizing principle 
sovereignty and security de-regulated regionality 
relations 
formal and framework-oriented flexible and network-oriented 
vision of regionality 
sovereign (modern) post-sovereign (post-modern) 
Table 6: Hard and Soft Regionalism in Comparison  
Just as the old-new dichotomy introduced by Hettne, these two opponent concepts of 
regionalism suggest a formalistic and state-centered structure on the one side, and a 
more flexible and informal design on the other. According to Makarychev’s typology, 
‘Soft Regionalism’ is based on a decentralized network-centric logic of organisation.  
Its accent on networked Regionalism [...] leaves ample space for grass-roots initiatives 
beyond the ‘administrative market’. Creativity, inspiration and imagination become guiding 
principles of ‘soft’ Regionalism. It draws on a set of shared meanings giving rise to a sense 
of belonging. [...] ‘Hard Regionalism’ refers to top-down, state-centric, hard security-
oriented cooperation. It is centralised and elicits a hierarchical pattern of regional dynamics 
focused on control over sovereignty, territory and borders.119 
Even though the ‘hard’-’soft’ dichotomy has never been linked to a sequencing logic, 
still it presents ‘Soft Regionalism’ as the more progressive or advanced version of the 
two. Drawing on the argument suggested by Herrschel and Gore in the context of the 
‘old’-’new’ dichotomy, it should be emphasised that these typologies cannot be 
perceived as exclusive categories but rather as concurrent concepts.120 
                                                 
119  MAKARYCHEV Andrey S.: Where the North Meets the East. Europe’s ‘Dimensionalism’ and 
Poland’s ‘Marginality Strategy’. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3/2004, p 301. 
120  See HERRSCHEL Tassilo/GORE Benjamin: Creating the Multi-Purpose and Multi-Scalar ‘Virtual 
Region’. New Regionalisation in the Baltic Sea Area. Paper presented at the 6th EURS Conference, 
Roskilde 21-23 September 2006, p. 2. 
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E. Regionalism in Northern Europe After 1989 
The political changes of 1989/90 opened a “historical window of opportunity” for the 
establishment of cooperative cross-border networks in Northern Europe.121 The newly 
gained independence of the three Baltic States made it possible for regional and sub-
regional actors to try to bridge the gaps and dividing lines caused by the static bipolar 
structure of the Cold War. For the BSR the collapse of the Iron Curtain stood for the fall 
of – what Sander called – a ‘Baltic Wall.’122 The specific circumstances that followed 
the end of the Cold War in the BSR paved the way for regional cooperation across the 
Baltic Sea Rim – a phenomenon that has put forth a large number of associations, 
projects and initiatives operating at different levels of action and covering a large range 
of policy fields. Promoted by the decentralisation of the international system and the 
removal of the superpower overlay, both the number of regional organisations and 
interest in what was called the ‘New Regionalism’ grew exponentially.123  
I. The Early Phase of Construction 
Today’s BSR is said to be the most networked, and therefore, among the most complex 
regions in Europe. Given the huge variety of cooperative structures and initiatives at 
hand, it would go beyond the scope of this study to explain the history of establishment 
in detail, or to mention every single initiative in a specific content-related context. At 
this point, it seems more practicable and helpful to offer a structured overview on the 
bulk of cooperative formations and to outline the fundamental events in the early phase 
of Baltic Sea Regionalism, focussing in particular on the major discursive trends at the 
first stage of region-building and construction.124  
Most of the cooperative structures in the BSR were founded (or, as in the case of 
HELCOM, structurally reconceptualized) in the wake of the 1989/90 events. Stålvant 
called this early phase of pro-active cohesiveness the ‘construction period’ (Germ. 
Grundlegungsperiode) of Baltic Sea Regionalism, in which the first generation of 
regionalist structures emerged.  
It was the phase of seminars and of debates about ideas and visions. The variety of Baltic 
Sea identities was made aware, and new organising principles for cross-border action and 
cooperation were formulated. The first regionalist actors entered the scene: networks and 
action groups (such as Coalition Green Baltic) as well as official interregional initiatives 
were launched at the national, regional and local level.125 
                                                 
121  See WILLIAMS Leena-Kaarina: Post-modern and intergovernmental paradigms of Baltic Sea co-
operation between 1988 and 1992. The Genesis of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) as a 
historical case study. In: NORDEUROPA Forum 1/2005, pp. 3-20, here p. 5. 
122  See SANDER Gordon: Off Centre. Baltic hands link across a troubled sea. In: Financial Times, 8 
April 2000. 
123  See FAWCETT Louise: Regionalism from a Historical Perspective. In: FARRELL Mary/HETTNE 
Björn/VAN LANGENHOVE Luk (eds): Global Politics and Regionalism. London 2005, pp. 21-37, 
here pp. 29-30.  
124  For a detailed description of the major associations and initiatives, see the annex of this study. 
125  STÅLVANT Carl-Einar: Zehn Jahre Ostseekooperation. Was wurde erreicht – was bleibt zu tun? 
In: Schleswig-Holsteinisches Institut für Friedenswissenschaften (ed.): SCHIFF Texte, No. 61. Kiel 
2000, p. 12.  
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There is no consensus in academia about who the real founding fathers were, and where 
exactly to allocate the starting point of Baltic Sea Regionalism. Williams identified 
ideas about the creation of a New Baltic Sea Region as early as in 1988, when Björn 
Engholm, then social-democratic Prime Minister of the German Bundesland Schleswig-
Holstein, launched the vision of building up a cooperative network across the Baltic by 
reviving the spirit of the old historic Hanseatic League (“New Hansa”) in the form of a 
“Baltic Forum”.126 However, the development of Baltic Sea Regionalism in this early 
period was nothing of a clear process of progressive and controlled regionalisation. 
There were many parallel and partly diverging region-building projects that 
characterised the phase between 1989 and 1995.  
II. The Irony of Competition I 
The emergence of Baltic Sea Regionalism in the early 1990s has been accompanied by a 
fervent and enthusiastic rhetoric about the positive dynamics of new Baltic 
‘togetherness’ that were to transcend historic dividing lines. The emerging regionalist 
dynamics that shaped the post Cold War phase in Northern Europe have often been 
referred to as a “wave of cooperative spirit” or a “rush of togetherness.”127 What has 
hardly entered the public and academic debate is that this enthusiasm, which in a certain 
sense unified the wide range of initiatives and region-building projects, actually built on 
very different grounds. The specific circumstances that can be identified in the BSR 
case call for a more differentiated perspective. The various newly established 
associations and projects did not only strive for innovation and proactive originality but 
also had specific strategic objectives. In some cases, these newly appearing regional 
entities resulted in the creation of a series of different and potentially competing visions 
of spatial prototypes, each building on specific normative foundations and different 
ideological and societal perceptions. The most prominent example in this regard is 
closely related to the above-mentioned “Baltic Forum” initiative by Björn Engholm, 
then social-democratic Prime Minister of the German Bundesland Schleswig-Holstein, 
and the establishment of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). Engholm had 
envisaged the creation of some sort of coordinating platform to embrace all cooperative 
activities in the BSR. At first his initiative found fertile soil, most importantly among 
Swedish and Northern-German scholars. 
This group of actors was determined to create a post-modern paradigm, in which the nation-
state was gradually to lose importance and new forms of interaction, based on networking 
and people-to-people contact, should take over. It was seen as a region-building experiment, 
where the actors obviously had their own interests but were joining forces in order to reach 
a synergetic effect.128 
                                                 
126  See WILLIAMS Leena-Kaarina: Post-modern and intergovernmental paradigms of Baltic Sea co-
operation between 1988 and 1992. The Genesis of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) as a 
historical case study. In: NORDEUROPA Forum 1/2005, pp. 3-20, here p. 4-5.  
127  See e.g. ANTOLA Esko/KIVIKARI Urpo: The Baltic Sea Region. A Dynamic Third of Europe. 
Turku 2004.  
128  WILLIAMS Leena-Kaarina: Post-modern and intergovernmental paradigms of Baltic Sea co-
operation between 1988 and 1992. The Genesis of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) as a 
historical case study. In: NORDEUROPA Forum 1/2005, pp. 3-20, here p. 5. 
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However, Engholm’s “model of open participation” had only little in common with a 
state-level construct. He rather aimed at the establishment of a multi-centric network, a 
de-centralised forum for various societal groups.  
The Baltic Forum was to be pragmatic and consensus-oriented. Practical questions should 
have priority over the fundamental and institutional concerns of international politics. Co-
operation should be flexible, open and not prone to rigid hierarchical structures, the main 
goal being societal dialogue, not political integration. Therefore, the institution should 
represent a forum for different societal groups instead of governments.129 
Engholm’s “New Hansa” initiative was thwarted by a parallel, more traditionally 
oriented intergovernmental construction. Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Uffe Ellemann-
Jensen, then liberal foreign ministers of Germany and Denmark, initiated and 
encouraged the establishment of the CBSS as a state-level umbrella association that was 
to facilitate and promote cooperation and coordination among the Baltic Sea littoral 
states including Norway.130 Beforehand, Genscher had been reported to have 
complained about Engholm’s proposal, as he perceived it to infringe the federal state 
prerogatives in foreign policy.131 
According to Williams’ interpretation, the final construction of the CBSS eventually 
met many criteria of the ‘old style’ regionalism even though it was actually part of the 
alleged ‘new’ regionalist wave in the BSR, following the decline of the Soviet empire. 
While Engholm’s vision of a ‘Baltic Forum’ was more of a model for “open 
participation” that was to involve all different types of official and non-official actors 
(civil society, NGOs, sub-regional entities) and thus, very much complied with the 
typology of ‘New Regionalism’, the structural concept of the CBSS was more 
formalistic and state-centric. It was designed according to strictly intergovernmental 
logics, with e.g. its main decision-making body, the Committee of Senior Officials 
(CSO), being recruited from the member-state Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Williams 
identified yet another aspect that brought the CBSS concept closer to the ‘old’ idea of 
regionalism.  
The main difference to the initial ideas proposed by Slesvig-Holstein [note: the Baltic 
Forum] was not only that the activities had been shifted to the intergovernmental level, but 
that they had been shifted to give a stronger focus on ‘development aid’ for the Baltic 
States, and thus formulated in the wording of classical foreign policy.132 
Engholm failed to keep his image of being the founding father of Baltic Sea 
Regionalism as his ‘new style’ project was eventually displaced by the formalistic and 
‘old style’ counterpart – the CBSS. Williams mentions one last attempt to “counteract 
the intergovernmentalism of the CBSS.” This time it was not a political initiative but an 
idea emerging from an academic background. Joenniemi and Wæver, two Nordic 
researchers, proposed the creation of a “Confederation of Baltic Sea Regions” with 
                                                 
129  Ibd., here p. 14. 
130  Iceland joined the CBSS in 1995. 
131  See STÅLVANT Carl-Einar: The Council of the Baltic Sea States. In: COTTEY Andrew (ed.): 
Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe. Building Security, Prosperity from the Barents to the 
Black Sea. London/New York 1998, pp. 46-68, here p. 56.  
132  WILLIAMS Leena-Kaarina: Post-modern and intergovernmental paradigms of Baltic Sea co-
operation between 1988 and 1992. The Genesis of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) as a 
historical case study. In: NORDEUROPA Forum 1/2005, pp. 3-20, here p. 17. 
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loose structures, voluntary membership and a flexible agenda. Anyway, just as the 
Baltic Forum, this version of a ‘new style’ regionalist formation never took shape. At 
the time it was presented to the public, in summer 1992, the CBSS had already been 
established as the model case of Baltic Sea regionalist cooperation. Looking at these 
inner-German events, two ‘German’ factors can be identified that dominated the 
“construction phase” of Baltic Sea Regionalism:133  
 
– German party-politics; most importantly, disputes between social democrats and 
liberals;  
– internal struggles between the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein and the German 
Foreign Ministry. 
 
This study does not intend to focus on the specific role and importance of domestic 
discourse within the single states involved in the process of post-1989 regionalism. 
However, these observations help to characterise the general course of events in the 
BSR. This example gives important information about how Baltic Sea Regionalism 
evolved in its early stages, to what extent individual players shaped the development of 
cooperative links in the region. Interestingly, the emergence of the new inclusive ‘Baltic 
Sea Region’ occurred in a highly competitive political atmosphere. There is a certain 
degree of irony in the fact that instead of pooling the efforts in order to achieve common 
or at least very similar goals, some region-builders decided to mingle their regionalist 
ambitions with trite every day politics. However, this sort of competition between 
different region-building projects might have contributed to the number and variety of 
cooperative formations present in the region of today. While in the case of Engholm’s 
Baltic Forum, an innovative regionalist vision has actually been outperformed by its 
intergovernmental counterpart, in other cases, these dynamics might have inspired the 
creation of a parallel and competing region-building project. Today, the BSR allows 
both functional overlap and constructive competition. 
III. The Council of the Baltic Sea States  
The CBSS was founded in 1992 under the overall objective to create a regional forum 
for dialogue and coordination between the national governments of the Baltic Sea 
States. The establishment of the CBSS was based on a Danish-German initiative 
launched Genscher and Ellemann-Jensen, then liberal foreign ministers of Germany and 
Denmark.134  
                                                 
133  See ibd., here p. 5 and 18. 
134  Catellani points out that the role of the Danish foreign minister was less proactive than it might have 
appeared. The fact that the CBSS was launched right after a bilateral meeting held in Copenhagen 
did support the impression that Denmark had been the driving force behind the initiative. “Uffe 
Ellemann Jensen [...] contributed substantially both to the creation of the CBSS and to the 
development of a more assertive stand by Denmark within the framework of the European 
integration process. However, the importance of his activism should not be overestimated, especially 
in the light of the role Germany played in connection with the launch of the initiative.” Genscher in 
turn was bound by the consideration that a German initiative in the BSR involving Russia as a 
partner would have appeared inappropriate for the geopolitical allocation of Germany in the New 
Europe. See CATELLANI Nicola: The EU’s Northern Dimension. Testing a New Approach to 
Neighbourhood Relations? Utrikespolitiska Institutet, Research Report 35, Stockholm 2003, p. 5.   
     52
Its very nature and structural constitution turns the CBSS into much more than ‘just 
another regional organisation’ as it unites the major regional actors on the governmental 
level, comprising all states bordering the Baltic Sea, including Russia as well as 
Norway, and the European Commission.135 Hence, the CBSS was the first organisation 
to bring the Commission, Russia, Germany, the Baltic republics and the Nordic 
countries together at one table. Given its direct institutional link to the European Union 
and the unique constellation of members, right from the beginning, the CBSS 
constituted a sort of umbrella organisation for all forms of cooperation in the BSR.136 In 
fact, the CBSS was officially intended to serve as a point of reference for all forms of 
Baltic regional cooperation. One of the constitutive factors of this special status of the 
CBSS results from its close links to the European integration process. The CBSS has 
considerably backed the EU enlargement process. After the accession of Sweden and 
Finland, the CBSS agenda has been gradually syntonised with the relevant EU policies. 
A similar effect could be observed following the 2004 enlargement round. Due to its 
close institutional ties with the European Commission, the CBSS also actively 
contributed to the development of the EU ND. After the launch of the policy in 1997, 
the CBSS was formally involved in the implementation process. 
The CBSS benefits from the fact that it has focussed on security issues from the beginning. 
It has a top-down logic much in line with that of the European Union, a central player in 
setting the dominant thinking of today’s security co-operation in Europe. […] The CBSS 
has a role to play as the catalyst of a security community much like Norden.137 
Another decisive factor was the strategic potential that the formal involvement of Russia 
bore for the bilateral relations of the EU. Working closely together with the CBSS not 
least opened additional channels for communication and provided a multilateral forum 
for consultation and debate with this important strategic partner.138 Since 2001, the 
CBSS has also intensified the efforts of coordinating its activities with those of other 
regional organisations in the Baltic Sea area by way of annual coordination meetings. 
This should generally provide a more structured channel for the involvement of other 
stakeholders. The Council also has appointed a number of strategic partners that on 
these occasions get the opportunity to voice their concerns and coordinate their efforts 
with the CBSS and other organisations. In this regard, the CBSS has established 
particularly close links to the BSSSC, the UBC, VASAB 2010, and HELCOM.139  
Today, the CBSS seeks to act as a hub between the European Commission and other 
regional organisations. In 2001, the CBSS has taken the initiative to hold annual 
                                                 
135  See PETERSEN Nikolaj: Denmark and the European Union 1985-96. In: Cooperation and Conflict, 
No. 2/1996, pp. 185-210, here p. 189. 
136  See CATELLANI Nicola: The EU’s Northern Dimension. Testing a New Approach to Neighbour-
hood Relations? Utrikespolitiska Institutet, Research Report 35, Stockholm 2003, p. 4.  
137  BONNÉN Preben/SØSTED Michael: The Origin, Development and Perspectives of Nordic Co-
operation in a New and Enlarged European Union. In: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politik-
wissenschaft, Nr. 1/2003, pp. 19-32, here p. 29. 
138  See HUBEL Helmut/GÄNZLE Stefan: The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) as a Sub-
Regional Organisation for ‘soft security risk management’ in the North-East of Europe. Report to the 
Presidency of the CBSS, 18 May 2001, p. 19. 
139  Other strategic partners are the Baltic Development Forum (BDF), the Baltic Sea Chambers of 
Commerce Association (BCCA), the Baltic Sea Forum ‘Pro Baltica’, the Baltic Sea NGO Forum 
(BSNF), and the Baltic Sea Trade Union Network (BASTUN). For details see official CBSS website 
www.cbss.st [26 November 2007]. 
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coordination meetings with the heads of a group of subregional organisations. Six such 
meetings have been held to date: 2001 in Riga/Latvia, 2002 in Lillehammer/Norway, 
2003 in Klaipeda/Lithuania, 2004 and 2005 in Malmö/Sweden, and 2007 in 
Bornholm/Denmark. In addition to providing a more structured channel for CBSS 
Special Participants, these meetings were also thought to allow the partner organisations 
to voice their concerns and coordinate their efforts with the CBSS and other regional 
actors. Two specific agenda issues have dominated the meetings so far: coordination of 
input to the elaboration and implementation of the EU Northern Dimension Action Plan 
(ND AP), and improved coordination of activities and information flows among the 
participating organisations. The CBSS tries to fulfil the function of communicating the 
collected positions to the European Commission. The CBSS has also launched an 
internet portal for the BSR in order to provide a single entry point and information 
source on the wide range of Baltic Sea regional cooperation activities.140 
IV. Visions and Constructed Realities – The History Tool 
The post Cold War discourse on the emergence of a ‘new’, ‘comprehensive’ and 
‘inclusive’ BSR was dominated by visionary and elocutionary images. Generally, many 
of the regional and sub-regional initiatives that emerged in the BSR after the end of the 
Cold War were based upon rather enthusiastic ambitions, stressing the normative power 
of the cooperative spirit of the past. Many promoted Baltic Sea Regionalism by 
preaching the existence of some sort of natural habit or inclination to cohesion and 
togetherness present in the area, and occasionally helped themselves with the history 
tool: Various initiators of regional and sub-regional cooperation referred to history, 
presenting a carefully selected set of historical events of regional cooperation in order to 
support their regionalist visions. 
Trade relation or political domination in the pre-nation state era was employed to present 
region-building as a natural process. A specific version of history suggested a certain 
naturally founded, generic community of destiny in the BSR. Hanseatic trade or the geo-
political figure of Dominium Maris Baltici or Mare Nostrum were among the most 
spectacular constructs.141 
In 1990, for example, a number of leading politicians, journalists, authors, academics 
and intellectuals met in the Finnish town of Kotka in order to discuss the perspectives of 
a ‘New Hansa’, and thereby created another label for the vision of a peaceful and 
prosperous BSR that would tie in with its historical antecedents: the “Spirit of 
Kotka”.142 The discursive creation of a certain cohesive spirit is an important factor in 
most region-building projects.  
Region-building begins in the field of ideas and public debates, and is supposed to convince 
participants of a common background by making common values come into force.143 
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Approaching Knowledge Society in the Baltic Sea Region. Gdańsk/Berlin 2002, pp. 42-60, here p. 
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142  See SUNDQVIST Ulf: The Spirit of Kotka. In: Framtider international, 1/1991, p. 4.  
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Regionalism requires social stimulation and validation, and as such it is likely to be 
prominent in those regions that effectively mobilise a unifying historic identity and 
distinctive consciousness.144 
The promoters and initiators of regionalism, i.e. the ‘region-builders’, frequently avail 
themselves of identity-related arguments in order to support the idea of togetherness in 
some way, and thus, to legitimise the objectives of respective region-building efforts. 
References to alleged historic predecessors are very common argumentative tools in this 
respect. The ambition hereinafter is certainly not to give an exhaustive presentation of 
the images introduced in the course of the region-building process. The following 
section elaborates on three of the most prominent examples in this regard: The idea of a 
‘New Hansa’, mostly promoted by actors with a German background, the notion of a 
New Mare Balticum, and the vision of a Homo Balticus, a specific breed of man 
inhabiting the Baltic Sea rim that was said to have outstanding moral qualities. 
1. The Vision of a ‘New Hansa’ and the ‘Spirit of Kotka’ 
The idea of a ‘New Hansa’ based on the historical example of the medieval Hanseatic 
League (Germ. Hanse) dates back to one of the early visionaries of Baltic Sea 
Cooperation, Björn Engholm, then Prime Minister of the German federal state of 
Schleswig-Holstein.145 In his view, it was not only one of the first manifestations of 
cooperative cohesion in this region, it rather held the allure of a cross-border bottom-up 
vision fostering enhanced and peaceful relations between East and West.146 In fact, the 
historic Hanseatic League was a union of trading guilds, whose establishment in the 
middle of the 14th century tackled a revolution of commerce in medieval Europe and 
gradually turned the region into the mainspring of continental trade: for three centuries, 
it linked more than one hundred cities and enhanced the convergence of their peoples, 
cultures and economies, with a catchment area stretching from Novgorod in the east of 
the BSR to London and Bruges in the west of the North Sea.147  
After being rediscovered by a group of politicians and intellectuals, the notion of a 
Hanseatic spirit or legacy eventually became one of the most popular images promoted 
in the context of the new regionalist wave.148 In 1980, a network of towns and cities 
called ‘Hansa’ was founded upon a German initiative. It committed itself to the purpose 
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of “acting in the spirit of the border-transcending idea of the Hanseatic League” and the 
associated historical experience, in order to “revive the spirit and the ideas of the 
European city/municipality.”149 Some of the BSR ‘leagues’ established after 1989 even 
labelled themselves literally ‘Hansa’ or ‘Hanseatic’, e.g. the Social Hansa (founded in 
1993) and the Hanseatic Parliament (2004).  
Along the German Baltic and North Sea coast, Hansa has still a close-to “religious” 
meaning, and the myth of the Hanseatic age is still present in every day life. However – 
be this enthusiasm based on historical experiences or not – there are strong tendencies 
of idealising the original nature of the league. As Yrjo Kaukiainen pointed out – there is 
a doubtful ambivalence about the so-called ‘Hanseatic spirit’:  
When you take away the trimmings – the Hanseatic houses, the diets – what Hanse was 
really about, was making money, which is fine, but to speak of a higher Hanseatic ethos is 
going a bit too far. [...] The Hanse could be quite an aggressive organisation and was 
perfectly willing to engage in boycotts, embargoes, even outright war to accomplish its 
ends.150 
Despite the league’s dramatic collapse,151 many cities in the BSR have maintained the 
ties to their glorious past as Hanse cities. This mainly applies to German and Dutch 
cities, whereas Sweden and Poland always seemed to be more reserved in respect to this 
sort of anachronistic identification with local history.152  
The New Hansa was not equally attractive to all regional actors. Instead of references to 
remote history, Scandinavian scholars preferred imagining the future co-operation across 
the Baltic Sea within the framework tried out among the Nordic countries.153 
Most significantly, Swedish Chambers of Commerce and of Skilled Crafts are not active 
members of the Hanseatic Parliament, and Swedish cities show comparably low interest 
in the context of the New Hansa City Network.  
                                                 
149  Hansa Statutes, art. 2. Official website of the Hansa network www.hanse.org [20 October 2007]. 
150  KAUKIAINEN Yrjo, cited by SANDER Gordon: Off Centre. Baltic hands link across a troubled 
sea. In: Financial Times, 8 April 2000. 
151  After Dutch merchants had aggressively tried to challenge the league and to break the Hansa 
monopoly and the Hansa capital had shifted from the German City of Lübeck to Gdańsk in Poland, 
the league was gradually weakened by a set of unfavourable developments in the area, such as 
repeated clashes with Denmark and later on, the Dutch-Hanseatic War (1438-1444), where it was 
finally defeated. Moreover, the rise of national and territorial economies left no more room for the 
sort of cross-border trading the Hanseatic merchants, towns and cities conducted by way of the 
league structures. Ultimately, the association failed to withstand the multiple challenges and 
imploded in the late 16th century. See POSTEL Rainer: The Hanseatic League and its Decline. Paper 
presented at the Central Connecticut State University, New Britain. 20 November 1996. 
152  VON SYDOW Emily: Den Baltiska dimensionen. Stockholms geopolitiska roll i EU. In: EHRLING 
Guy (ed.): Stockholm international. En antologi om Stockholm i en regionaliserad och globaliserad 
värld. Stockholm 2000, pp. 23-36, here 24. The German and the Dutch enthusiasm are based on the 
fact that, within the Hanseatic League, at first, there was a strong German dominance, which was 
over the years transposed to the western part of the North Sea, i.e. the Netherlands. See POSTEL 
Rainer: The Hanseatic League and its Decline. Paper presented at the Central Connecticut State 
University, New Britain. 20 November 1996. 
153  MUSIAL Kazimierz: Education, Research and the Baltic Sea Region-building. In: Id. (ed.): 
Approaching Knowledge Society in the Baltic Sea Region. Gdańsk/Berlin 2002, pp. 42-60, here p. 
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When the Premier of German Land Schleswig-Holstein Björn Engholm popularized the 
concept ‘New Hansa’, many actors were reluctant to engage in his project, as it reminded 
them more of German hegemony than of a time of peaceful and prosperous cooperation.154 
In contrast to Germany, for Sweden and Finland the notion of ‘Hansa’ has always had 
negative connotations as their Hanseatic experience was not a success story. Therefore, 
for them the idea raised after 1989 of reconstructing a ‘New Hansa’ was not the most 
attractive one. The vision of this ‘New Hansa’ was also the guiding slogan of a 
conference held in the Finnish town of Kotka in June/July 1990, which was organised 
by the Swedish Institute of Future Studies (Institutet för framtidsstudier) upon a 
German initiative.155 The Swedish public debate in the aftermath of this international 
conference was dominated by the general and serious concern about a newly arising 
“Teutonic” dominance after the German reunification.156 Another divisive aspect about 
these Teutonic ideas of revitalising Baltic Sea cooperation was the fact that the ancient 
Hansa model had a clear economic focus, whereas the Nordic model of regionalism, as 
best materialised in the Nordic Cooperation has always strictly stuck to soft policy areas 
and was traditionally based on the broad substance of cultural and ideological 
commonality.157 Sweden and Finland certainly bore a similar feeling when the issue 
reappeared in the context of their EU accession, and again, much was said about the 
“Baltic dimension” of their membership and their potential of leading the renaissance of 
the “old Hanseatic spirit”.158 
2. The Tale of Homo Balticus  
In the context of this chapter, yet another ‘historiophile’ vision about the Baltic Sea has 
to be considered: the idea of a Baltic Man or Homo Balticus, i.e. a specific human breed 
that is said to inhabit the Baltic Sea coastal area. Even though this image got 
comparably low advertency around the Baltic Sea, it can still serve as a good example 
of how colourful the Baltic Sea region-building discourses were in the early 
construction period. It was particularly promoted by one of the newly emerged Baltic 
Sea regional associations, the Union of Baltic Cities (UBC). The UBC is what Sander 
called the “most visionary (or the most deluded) of the new Baltic leagues.”159 The 
UBC introduced Homo Balticus in the context of its foundation in 1991 as some sort of 
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enlightened and morally superior breed, a type of man that holds a unique set of 
characteristics – all of them distinctly coined by the Baltic surrounding. 
There is no doubt that Baltic cities are linked by Homo Balticus. Why the people from 
mainland say: ‘you are different’? First of all, Homo Balticus has always been in contact 
with the Sea. He struggled with it during his work – fishing, sailing and sporting. Living by 
the Sea, he received the beneficial effect of rich aerosols, which made him calm and eager 
to work. Without doubt, Homo Balticus is calm and hard working. Homo Balticus is 
interested in the world. [...] He enthusiastically welcomes befriended and invited guests. 
Yes – he is for sure hospitable. An inhabitant of a Baltic city is in touch with nature in his 
every day life in its richest and most secret form – the Sea. [...] Yes – Homo Balticus loves 
nature. He is very sensitive to its threatened values and unites eagerly to protect it. Homo 
Balticus is very active. He still sets out for work, knowledge and entertainment but always 
comes back to his town. [...] Homo Balticus is not afraid of risk, he is full of initiative, he is 
open to technical and organizational inventions. Homo Balticus, thanks to his contacts with 
the greatest masterpiece – nature – is sensitive to art.160 
This description was published in a UBC information folder aiming to give an overview 
of the association’s founding principles. In its 1998-1999 Action Plan, the UBC even set 
out the ambition of furthering the knowledge about Homo Balticus in order to 
strengthen the image of Baltic identity.161 Even though it is the UBC that is vigorously 
promoting this special breed of man, the idea has also appeared in a very different 
context. The notion of a certain human species native to the Baltic littoral has often 
occurred in the Baltic States during their early post-communist transition phase.  
Morality is the core of self-consciousness of the Baltic Man. It is one of those untranslatable 
and thus essential words. [...] Morality is a mark of the divine order and the godly 
imperative goodness in a man.162 
After 1996, Algirdas Patackas, then member of the Lithuanian Seimas (parliament) 
repeatedly adopted the notion of Baltic moral exclusiveness to distinguish Baltic people 
from the mass of Soviet rulers. These attempts of distancing themselves from the past 
were, as Balockaite put it, part of the “healing process” after the Soviet experience.163  
In this case, the act of promoting the idea of a morally supreme ‘Baltic Man’ was 
clearly related to the general process of political and ideological transition. In Estonia, a 
similar discourse was linked with the process of European integration. The ‘Baltic Man’ 
was thought to especially qualify for instant EU membership. In one of his imaginative 
speeches, Toomas Hendrik Ilves outlined the notion of what he called “Yule-land” 
(literally ‘North-land’), a visionary spatial entity also inhabited by a certain breed of 
man. In his description, this entity would extend from Estonia and Finland, over 
Sweden and Norway to the British Isles. According to Ilves, these countries share a 
stock of normative principles that determine their societies and their people’s whole 
way of being and acting. In contrast to the Orthodox East and the Catholic South, this 
Yule-land would be based on protestant ethics, progressive modernism and the diligence 
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of its hard-working people, a picture that is remarkably close to the image produced by 
the UBC.164  
Jōul in Estonia, Joulu in Finland, Jul in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Yule on the British 
Isles. [...] Today, these peoples share a common mentality expressed in rationality, 
stubbornness and diligence. They rank the highest in the world in Internet connections and 
in mobile phone penetration, lowest in the world in corruption.165 
Visionary statements of this type recurrently suggest the idea of the Baltic Sea area and 
certain parts of it respectively to be united in some sort of innate or even genetically 
inbred moral exclusiveness, if not supremacy. A less popular connotation in this regard 
is offered by modern history: precedent ideas about the existence of a morally and 
ethnically superior breed of man inhabiting the area were produced in the context of 
Scientific Racism under the German Nazi Regime. The proto Nazi race theorist Hans F. 
K. Günther identified the Aryan race to be constituted by two major ethnical strands: the 
Nordic and the Eastern Baltic one. The Nordic-Baltic race was perceived as the natural 
leader and the essentially Moral Man.166  
Even though this comparison might appear overdrawn if referred to in this context it 
nevertheless helps to characterise the argumentative strategies politicians and other 
region-building actors have tried to apply in this regard. The idea of moral supremacy 
albeit on very different grounds has also a strong tradition in the Nordic context.167 
Even though these visions were sometimes carried too far and became 
“counterproductive to efficient practical co-operation” they nevertheless helped to 
create a feeling of common identity around the Baltic Sea.168 
V. The Argument of Challenges – United in Diversity 
Another argumentative tool that was implemented in the Baltic Sea region-building 
discourse was the accentuation of challenges. While many associations and initiatives in 
the early post Cold War wave of regionalism availed themselves of the above-
mentioned history tool, others strictly abstained from the attempt to link present 
ambitions to any sort of alleged historical predecessor, or to avail themselves of 
identity-related arguments. These region-building projects rather appealed to the “other 
side of the coin”, the differences, challenges and problems that the region was and is 
facing in present days, and promoted Baltic Sea Regionalism as a useful forum to 
overcome obviously existing differences as well as to find constructive solutions for 
common problems such as the lack of infrastructure, illegal migration, drugs- and arms 
trafficking, environmental degradation etc.. Instead of reviving historical concepts, they 
chose to emphasise the fact that the BSR has never been a homogenous entity and that, 
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throughout history, the Baltic Sea States have mostly regarded themselves as parts of 
other regional constructs such as the Nordic sphere or Continental Europe. A gaze back 
into history shows that indeed the powers surrounding the Baltic Sea have “more often 
been brought together in conflict than in cooperation.”169  
The CBSS is one of the outstanding examples in this regard. In contrast to all the 
enthusiastic visions promoted by other regional associations and initiatives, this 
organisation rather committed itself to the functional challenges that emerged after the 
political changes of 1989/1990. 
The recent dramatic changes in Europe herald a new era of European relations where the 
confrontation and division of the past is replaced by partnership and cooperation. An 
enhanced and strengthened Baltic cooperation is a natural and logical consequence of these 
events.170 
The CBSS never tried to build on a value-laden rhetoric but rather aimed at pointing out 
the differences to emphasise the respective need for cooperation. In one of her public 
statements, Gabriele Kötschau, then CBSS Secretariat Director, took up the issue of 
Baltic togetherness and the challenge and problem of “branding the region”.  
Why should we ‘brand’ this region that has much in common, but has even more 
differences? What is the Baltic Sea Region known for? [...] What do we have in common? 
One has to talk of something intangible, the ‘Baltic brand’ as a combination of attributes, 
something that is both tangible – by geography and intangible – through memory and 
emotional attachment to an ideal of the Baltic Sea. [...] We as nations are so different – so 
how to convince us to act as one region with one brand identity? Exactly for this reason! We 
are rich on diversity and it is exactly for this reason that we must come together. Why 
should we look homogenous? We are not! The link between perception and reality – that is 
the art of selling, even if the Baltic Sea Region has a lot to sell, the buyers must believe in it 
– and we ourselves, convinced of our region, should be encouraged to do so.171 
VASAB 2010 (Visions and Strategies about the Baltic 2010) provides yet another albeit 
less clear-cut case in point. In most of its recent declarations and action plans the 
organisation is not reluctant to talk openly about the problems that the region is facing 
because of its political, cultural and structural disparity. 
The BSR is maybe the least homogenous region in Europe. This creates a demand for 
internal cohesion and is a source of particular market potentials. [...] The BSR spans arctic 
to temperate climate zones. Its 103 million inhabitants live in 11 different countries or parts 
thereof, in which as many major languages are spoken.172 
However, in its founding declarations, VASAB 2010 was less outspoken. It also 
appealed to the history tool by clearly emphasizing the historical background of its 
strategic ambitions and defined the re-integration of the region as its “top objective”. 
                                                 
169  KNUDSEN Olav F. (ed.): Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. London 1999, p. ix. 
170  CBSS Copenhagen Declaration, agreed on at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Baltic Sea 
States, Copenhagen 5-6 March 1992. Official CBSS website www.cbss.st [23 December 2007]. 
171  KÖTSCHAU Gabriele: Branding the Region. What, by the way, is “Uusimaa”? Strömsborg Direct. 
In: Baltinfo. CBSS Newsletter, November-December 2006, p. 12. 
172  See VASAB 2010 Plus Spatial Development Action Programme 2001. Available on the official 
VASAB website www.vasab.org.pl [30 November 2007].  
     60
The BSR, in the millennium until the early 20th century, developed a rich network in many 
areas of society. Trade was widespread; the Baltic Sea provided an important link in the 
transport system. The Viking Age, the Hanseatic Epoch and other transnational networks 
succeeded one another. The spread of Christianity, during the 10th century, played an 
important role in cultural co-operation. Regional development occurred along the shores of 
the Baltic Sea (with corresponding urban networks), expanding from there to the hinterland. 
After World War II, Europe was split into two parts. Most contacts across this curtain were 
cut off. Since the recent end of this period of separation re-integration is a top issue.173 
Yet another example in the above-mentioned context is the Northern Dimension 
Initiative (NDI), launched by Finland in 1997. The Finnish initiators completely 
refrained from any sort of ideology-related rhetoric and simply counted on the argument 
of European responsibility. Paavo Lipponen, then Finnish Prime Minister and founding 
father of the NDI, put it as follows:  
With the accession of Finland and Sweden, the European Union now extends from the 
Mediterranean to just a few kilometres from the Barents Sea. The Union has thus acquired a 
natural ‘northern dimension.’ We need a policy for this dimension too.174 
The fact that Finland aimed at bringing some of its foremost geopolitical interests onto 
the EU working agenda was probably the basic reasoning behind this strategic choice. 
The initiators did not employ any region-based argumentation; they rather chose to 
point at the problems and challenges this region was facing, underlining the inherent 
responsibility of the EU not to close the eyes in front of its mission. Joenniemi and 
Lehti actually identified this aspect as part of the reason why the EU ND never gained 
much public support r even cognition in the region.  
 
No narrative has been coined in the context of the NDI that would aim at reconfiguring the 
past and linking into earlier historical experiences. There is nothing like the Hanse of the 
Baltic Sea related discourse or the elevation of the Pomor period when imagining a Baltic 
Region. Since there is no obviously identity-related rhetoric present in the discourse on the 
NDI, people do not feel that the matter is one of considerable urgency and relevance in 
relation to who ‘we’ are in the post Cold War period.175 
The utilitarian and functional approach applied in the EU ND context did obviously 
refrain from joining the regional discourse about inclusive Baltic togetherness. In recent 
years, the question whether this actually favoured the effectiveness of the policy or not 
was part of a wider academic debate about the overall success or failure of the policy.176 
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F. Mental Geography – The Constitution of the BSR as a Spatial Concept  
The notion of a region generally implies the existence of a spatial unit, which is at least 
to some extent self-contained and thereby evidently recognisable and delimitable as an 
entity. In fact, after the end of the Cold War, part of the European North has developed 
into some sort of regional unit: the BSR. Numerous regional initiatives, associations and 
networks carrying the Baltic label give us a ‘proof’ that in fact, there must be some sort 
of regional entity in Northern Europe that is gathering around the Baltic Sea. Still, 
ascribing a cohesive image to an area as ample and diverse as the BSR seems to be a 
bold venture. Jasper von Altenbockum chose a quite provocative way to put it: 
There is nothing, which doesn’t exist at [sic!] the Baltic. A politician would however 
struggle if asked: is there a Baltic? Because he would have to say: Oh yes, there are Baltic 
programs, Baltic concepts, Baltic sub-regions, Baltic councils and Baltic conferences. [As] 
said: there is nothing, which doesn’t exist at the Baltic Sea. Something for everyone and 
nothing for all.177 
In fact, is there any supportive evidence for ‘Baltic togetherness’ besides the mere 
existence of ‘Baltic’ associations? The BSR is a uniquely diverse geographical area, on 
the political as well as on the economic, cultural and ideological level. What actually 
accounts for comprehensive Balticness besides the plain fact of physical vicinity? These 
are questions raised in the context of “mental geography”.178 In contrast to physical 
geography, mental geography is widely determined by normative factors, such as 
identity, values and cultural connotations.  
Identity markers always involve a choice (what we wish to belong to?), because the social 
world is defined not just by physical constraints but also in spiritual and normative 
categories.179 
After the end of the Cold War, the spatial framework in Northern Europe has 
considerably altered and diversified, a development that Jukarainen labelled the “growth 
of spatial complexity”.180 Today, the region features a variety of virtually constructed 
sub-spaces, such as the ‘Nordic’ or the ‘Baltic sphere’. The following chapters deal with 
the consistencies of the ‘Baltic Sea Region’ as a spatial concept, questioning and 
analysing the various sub-spaces that have emerged in the course of the recent 
international developments.  
I. Is ‘Nordic’ Plus ‘Baltic’ Equal to Inclusive ‘Balticness’? 
The demise of the unnatural Cold War division and the national independence of the 
three Baltic States paved the way for different forms of regional cohesion in the BSR, 
and thus, for the development of an inclusive ‘Balticness’. Formerly isolated sub-spaces 
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could now be drawn together on various levels of action and in different policy areas. In 
order to grasp the nature of the ‘Balticness’ resulting from these opportunities, one 
could ask for its constitutive elements and examine their respective potential for 
cohesion across geographical, political and functional borders. The main two regionalist 
entities that met in the course of Baltic Sea Regionalism are the well-established 
‘Nordic sphere’ on the one hand, and the ‘Baltic sphere’ on the other. This dichotomy 
also reflects the former Cold War divide, which in Northern Europe and particularly in 
the BSR was a matter of the East facing the North rather than the ‘West’. At first 
glance, it is the diversity between these two sub-spaces that seems to be striking, while 
for themselves, they appear rather uniform and inherently cohesive.181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What degree and quality of togetherness did the three Baltic States really bring in? To 
what extent did they close ranks to encounter their Baltic Sea neighbours? On what 
ideational basis did the Nordic core group interfere with the new regionalist formations 
emerging in the BSR? By what terms and to what extent did the Nordic five and the 
Baltic three add up to a comprehensive Baltic i.e. Nordic-Baltic community? Before 
addressing these questions, it seems helpful to identify the ideological background of 
both the Nordic and the Baltic sphere, and most importantly, to track the development 
that these two spatial entities have experienced in recent years. How did the end of the 
Cold War affect the ideological self-determination of the Nordic sphere, and to what 
extent did Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania actually strive for ‘Baltic unity’? 
1. Nordic Togetherness – The Changing Role of Nordic Cooperation 
The fall of the Iron Curtain opened new possibilities for regional and sub-regional co-
operation in the BSR. However, also the bipolar constellation of the Cold War period 
had not been entirely divisive but left some leeway for structural tendencies that 
deviated from the prevailing ideological block pattern. One of the most substantial 
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examples is probably ‘Nordic Cooperation’, a largely informal community for 
coordination and cooperation established between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden, i.e. conglomerating the group of five Nordic States. This cooperative 
formation never fully adhered to the global logic of the Cold War, which was for most 
European states in those times, to deliberately toe the line of either of the confronting 
blocks.182 However, Nordic Cooperation was not only invented in the wake of East-
West-Polarisation; it is rather based on deep historical, cultural and linguistic links, and 
most importantly, a shared understanding of certain moral values. As early as in the 
1880s, the Nordic Countries already started to harmonise their legislation and to 
elaborate a common set of legal principles.183 In 1907, they established a Nordic 
Interparliamentary Union. The system of Nordic Cooperation reached its first zenith in 
the course of World War I.  
During World War I, Nordic co-operation extended into new areas resulting in a greater 
public awareness of the situation. In many instances, the Nordic area appeared as a single 
socio-political and economic unit to many observers in Europe and Northern America.184 
In the early post-war years, Nordic Cooperation was strengthened even further. The 
Nordic countries established a high-level network that incorporated their governments, 
officials, national assemblies and to some extent also their respective political parties 
and trade organisations. The most prominent indication for the growing Nordic ‘we-
ness’ was certainly the practice of retaining a joint Nordic seat in the Council of the 
League of Nations, filling it on rotation.185  
In 1919, they founded the ‘Norden’ community, whose activities at popular level such 
as sister-town projects remarkably increased mutual understanding, solidarity and 
togetherness as well as the international visibility of the promoted Nordic unity. Today, 
‘Norden’ has representations all around Scandinavia and the BSR.186 From the early 
1930s onwards, the Nordic heads of government and ministers held occasional meetings 
and consulted each other on an informal basis.187 However, the fact that the five states 
went through very different experiences in World War II temporarily weakened the role 
of the Nordic Cooperation system as far as concrete cooperative action and international 
awareness were concerned.188 The five countries faced widely differing external 
security constellations, with Germany occupying Norway and Denmark, Great Britain 
the Faroe Islands and Iceland, and Sweden retaining a neutral position. Between 1941 
and 1944, Finland allied itself with Germany against the Soviet threat. Some point out 
that despite the dividing nature of this Second World War experience, the ideological 
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ties of solidarity continued to grow. This created a fertile soil for the new rise of Nordic 
Cooperation after 1945.189 
In the course of the Cold War, the links were again considerably strengthened through 
both stronger isolation, and as a consequence thereof, gradual institutionalisation. At 
first, the Nordic States seemed to fail to keep out of the logic of global polarisation: 
Denmark and Norway joined NATO in 1949, while Sweden chose to pursue a policy of 
permanent neutrality.190 From 1948 onwards, Finland was bound with the Soviet Union 
by way of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (TFCMA). 
However, the Nordic group managed to develop a unique political and security identity 
that helped to create a virtual entity, later called the system of ‘Nordic Balance’.191 They 
all sought to pursue a policy of modification, essentially by limiting Soviet involvement 
in Finland and US involvement in Norway, and thus eventually found a way to 
circumvent total Nordic entrapment in either of the two blocks.192  
In 1952, the Nordic Countries established the Nordic Council as a forum for inter-
parliamentary cooperation and discourse.193 Even though the Council decisions were not 
binding, the individual Nordic governments often chose to follow its recommendations. 
The Nordic countries created a Nordic passport union, a common labour market, and a 
Nordic social insurance convention to serve all Nordic citizens. In 1971, these important 
steps were followed by the establishment of the Nordic Council of Ministers as a 
platform for coordination and consultation between corresponding Nordic ministries 
that produced binding decisions on the basis of unanimity.194 The Cold War surrounding 
literally furthered the consolidation of Nordic Cooperation. Laursen and Olsen 
identified the aim of avoiding entrapment in bipolarity as the main factor that 
encouraged Nordic Cooperation during the Cold War. The Nordic ‘we’ feeling was 
strongly determined by their common definition of the respective ‘them’, i.e. American 
Capitalism on the one side, and Soviet Bolshevism on the other.195 Similar conditions 
applied to the regional self-perception of the Nordic five. 
 
Over the last fifty years the Scandinavian countries […] have tended to downplay the Baltic 
component of their national identifications. At the same time, they have downplayed the 
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195  See LAURSEN Johnny N./OLSEN Thorsten B.: A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The 
Interdependence of Denmark’s Nordic and European policies, 1945–1998. CORE Working Paper, 
2/1998. Copenhagen 1998, pp. 10-11.  
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general European character of their historical experiences and gradually replaced Northern 
Europe with ‘Norden’ when talking of their collective identities. Still today, for many 
Scandinavians, the secret to economic and political success in this remote and sparsely 
populated part of Europe lies precisely in keeping distance to all the neighbouring powers, 
Germany and Russia in particular.196 
According to Connolly, this ‘negative’ way of defining the ‘self’ against the ‘other’ is 
part of any process of identity construction.  
Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order 
to secure its own self-certainty [...].197 
However, in the Nordic case, this effect became particularly important for the 
consolidation and institutionalisation of that regionalist formation. On the other hand, 
the bipolar setting certainly also posed a rather rigid framework to Nordic cooperation, 
hindering any sort of deep-going political collaboration between the five: From the 
1950s onwards, Nordic Cooperation was roughly restricted to soft and low policies, and 
most importantly, it was to exclude external security or defence related policy areas.198 
Anyway, these negative effects of the Cold War constellation should not be 
overestimated as history has shown that the Nordic Countries have always been very 
reluctant in these policy fields.199 The Nordic Countries made several attempts to 
deepen their economic cooperation. However, these intentions were roughly opposed by 
Norwegian industry and its unwillingness to establish a customs union. In 1960, the 
countries that were unable or unwilling to join the newly established European 
Economic Community (EEC) founded the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
EFTA had a strong stimulating effect on intra-Nordic trade.200 Internationally, the 
EFTA was often perceived as some sort of reluctant and reserved alternative to full EC 
membership. In fact, the commitments of EFTA-members exclusively remained on the 
intergovernmental level. Progressive supranationalization as provided in the framework 
of the overall European integration process was not intended. 
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The development of the European project, and more generally, of Western and 
transatlantic integration, has had remarkable impact on the traditional meaning of the 
concept of Nordic togetherness.201 Each of the five Nordic States made very different 
choices in the context of European (and transatlantic) integration. The Danish accession 
to the (then) EC in 1973 has already altered the balance of togetherness within the 
Nordic group. One of the Nordic partners became a full EC member, while Norway 
voted against the accession and remained – as part of some sort of ‘reluctant 
alternative’, within EFTA, together with Sweden, Iceland and (then associated) Finland. 
Moreover, only two out of the five, namely Iceland and Norway, were among the 
founding states of NATO in 1949. Sweden and Finland entered the EU at the same time, 
in 1995. However, it was only Finland that eventually joined the ‘Euroland’ in 2004.  
The membership applications and subsequent accessions to the EU had repercussions on 
Nordic institutions. At a special session of the Nordic Council in November 1991, it was 
decided that Nordic countries should try to actively influence the developments in Europe. 
In 1995, a thorough reform of the Nordic Council was initiated. Nordic co-operation was 
regarded as a ‘bridge’ between the Nordic EU members and outsiders. ‘Norden’ would not 
be an alternative to ‘Europe’, but a part of European co-operation.202 
Anyway, in political practice there was little evidence to be found for Swedish, Danish 
or Finnish ambitions to create some kind of ‘Nordic Bloc’ within the Union.203 Henrik 
Wilén, Director of the Nordic Institute in Finland (NIFIN), found very charming words 
to counter this type of assessment. 
In terms of their attitudes to the historic process of integration, which is in progress in 
Europe, the Nordic countries are marching out of step. [...] That is the clichéd view, which 
admittedly has some basis in fact.204 
In fact, despite an indisputable range of shared interests, Sweden has always tried to 
avoid the establishment of permanent alliances of interest both as a self-standing 
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regional actor, and later, as an EU member state.205 Sweden has also applied for EU 
membership without ever consulting its Nordic partners. They in turn regarded the 
abrupt announcement of membership application as a signpost for Sweden’s lacking and 
potentially decreasing Nordic solidarity. Even though eventually, Finland joined the EU 
at the same time, the Finnish public was among the most polemic in this regard.206  
Also the Swedish ‘no’ against an accession to the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
was a strong setback for Nordic integration since it cemented the intra-Nordic 
constellation for many years to come instead of eliminating existing boundaries towards 
Finland and, in the long term, towards Denmark. Just as in the EMU context, the three 
Nordic EU Member States often have different opinions about European key issues, and 
Nordic politicians openly refuse the idea a ‘Nordic bloc’ within the EU. The Prime 
Ministers do meet up prior to every EU summit. However, there seem to be no plans or 
prospects for a joint Nordic strategy within the EU. On selected occasions, there 
actually appeared to be some sort of Nordic unity on certain EU issues.  
One important and also very popular example is the alleged ‘joint’ performance at the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) leading to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1996. Indeed, 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland did all seem to have very similar interests: they all 
claimed institutional openness and transparency, highlighted the importance of 
environmental policies and strove for a proper administrative and political preparation 
of enlargement. However, in spite of actively coordinating each other’s positions and 
presenting themselves as a united bloc, they all decided to act as individual member 
states emphasizing similar but still different aspects in the course of the following IGC 
sessions.207 This pattern of behaviour, i.e. of taking different ways on the basis of 
similar interests, is symptomatic for Nordic EU membership. The different and 
sometimes diverging attitudes towards integration support the argument that as for the 
EU context the supposed ‘togetherness’ of the Nordic member states, i.e. Sweden, 
Finland, and Denmark, is more of a cliché than a reality. To put it differently, in most 
cases, it is more of a coincidence than a rule. The Nordic EU countries seem to pursue 
similar agendas, but based on different perceptions of interest, and most importantly for 
the EU context, without any reference to their common Nordic heritage and 
togetherness. 
Turning to the more Nordic specific reasons as to why permanent co-ordination has not 
materialized, it is of primary importance to note that the Nordic region is not fully 
represented in the EU. This means that Nordic countries are split as a bloc, each with its 
own interests and approaches towards the EU.208 
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Thus, assuming something like a Scandinavian or Nordic position within the EU-25 or 
27 would probably find little empirical evidence in most policy areas. Some argue that 
the advance of political and economic integration, most importantly, after the end of the 
Cold War, has strengthened the ties between the Nordic States. Hilary Barnes 
emphasises the case of Finland and the positive effects of its comprehensive integration 
on the Nordic ‘link’.  
Just as Ireland has used EU membership as an instrument to lift it from the shadow of its 
long and troubled relationship with Britain, so Finland is using the EU as a platform for 
establishing its liberation from the Soviet influence [...]. Finland’s new position in Europe 
has an important Nordic dimension. The evolution of Finnish self-confidence in the Post-
Cold War world has worked a positive influence on Finland’s relationship with Sweden, its 
larger, more powerful and richer neighbour. Today, the two can meet on terms of 
equality.209 
However, Finland’s liberation from past dependencies did not only boost its self-
confidence in geo-political terms, it certainly also enhanced the competition with old 
storebror (Swed. for “big brother”) Sweden.210 Presumably, this rather widened the gap 
between the two countries than it deepened their Nordic tie of virtual togetherness. 
Generally, the post Cold War situation has offered Finland a large range of new 
opportunities for cooperation and integration, rendering the ‘Nordic way’ one out of 
many options for its orientation in foreign affairs. Economy and financial services do 
form an exception in this regard, as cooperation in these fields among the Nordic states 
and most importantly, between Finland and Sweden, has veritably increased since 
1995.211  
Anyway, this is likely to be a general result of progressive globalisation and can hardly 
be ascribed to growing Nordic togetherness. There are a few occasions where Finland 
and Sweden seemed to walk the way of Nordic unity, suggesting joint solutions for 
certain EU topics. However, practice has shown that also in those cases, other more 
coincidental factors like good personal relations on the negotiating level had played a 
more important role than the factor of an alleged Nordic “we-feeling” and 
togetherness.212 Bonnén and Søsted are right in emphasizing that Nordic Cooperation 
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has traditionally functioned best within a broader international or global framework, and 
less within a specific Norden-centric scale.213  
There is no consensus as to the overall picture of the EU and this makes it difficult to 
coordinate policies. Adding to this situation is the fact that there are significant differences 
between Nordic countries themselves. Having some basic common heritage does not mean 
that the countries have developed alike in all aspects. […] The consequence of these 
disparities is their perception of European cooperation. This is amplified by differences in 
national attitudes towards European integration as such. […] Yet another reason why 
Nordic countries have not reached a higher degree of co-operation has to do with another 
fact, namely that Norden has become a vehicle for co-operation vis-à-vis the external world. 
Having previously been almost exclusively focused on internal questions, Norden has not 
been transformed into a centralised, political and state-governed entity.214 
Intra-Nordic activity still has no parallel in the rest of Europe, with civil servants, lobby 
groups and businessmen meeting on a regular basis, and sheer countless Nordic cultural 
organisations and initiatives of every kind maintaining a tight network of cooperation 
and proactive involvement all around the Nordic sphere. However, the Nordic schemes 
are restricted to uncontroversial policy fields with ‘low impact’, such as mobility, 
education, employment, gender equality, environmental protection, culture and 
research. The mere fact of being ‘Nordic’ has not had any clear impact on the major 
politico-strategic choices in EU and foreign policy matters of the respective countries. 
This is closely linkes to the question whether Nordic Cooperation can still be considered 
to have an integrative impact on the wider BSR.215 
2. The Baltic States and Baltic Unity – Imposition or Expedient? 
In the EU context, and more generally, in world politics it is common to denominate 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania collectively as the ‘Baltic States’. However, this geo-
political label has not always been appreciated by the concerning countries themselves 
as indeed, it has only little to do with their historical background, and most importantly, 
their individual cultural identity.  
 
In the 1990s, the West has comfortably lumped Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into one 
geopolitical entity, imposing the ‘Baltic unity’ on the three historically and culturally 
diverse nations. [...] The years under the Russian empire in the 19th century and the Soviet 
empire between 1945 and 1991 are the only truly common experiences of the Baltic 
states.216 
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 establishment 
of statehood 
language dominant 
religion 
geographical    
self-identification 
cultural 
influences 
Estonia 1918 Finno-ugric German 
Danish 
Swedish 
Finnish 
Latvia 1918 
 
 
Lutheran 
 
 
Northern and 
Northeastern 
Europe 
German 
Swedish 
Lithuania 13th century 
 
Baltic 
Roman catholic Central Europe217 Polish 
Table 7: Historical and Cultural Diversity of the Baltic States218 
Paulauskas argues that in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the term itself is partly 
associated with the historical experience of Soviet rule and that this is the reason why it 
often has a fairly negative connotation among the respective societies. Hence, from time 
to time, the expression has been regarded by the Balts as an attempt of marginalizing 
and easternizing them in both a geo-political and an ideological sense.219 In contrast 
thereto, others claim that during the Soviet era, it even evoked some sort of pride among 
some Balts of being labelled as ‘Baltic’ (Russ. Pribaltika) since that was implicitly 
related to the notion of being ‘western’, or at least, different from the rest of the Soviet 
Empire. In fact, after gaining independence, it was also very popular and common for 
the three states to openly label themselves as ‘Baltic States’.220 To some extent, this 
even seemed to be part of their transition strategy. In fact, right after they had gained 
their independence, they signed a large number of agreements for mutual co-
operation.221 In 1990, they founded the highly emblematic Baltic Assembly (BA), and 
in 1994, the Baltic Council of Ministers (BCM) in order to promote intra-Baltic 
cooperation. One could also argue that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania did show some 
sort of ‘Baltic unity’ when it came to prepare their accession to NATO and EU.  
In the post-Cold War period, the Baltic States have had much to gain by adopting a positive 
attitude to regional cooperation, not least because it has been seen as enhancing their 
prospects of EU and NATO membership. In a sense, regional cooperation in the North 
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could be conceptualised as having been something of a training ground where they could 
prove they were responsible international citizens worthy of EU and NATO membership.222 
According to Paulauskas, they had two good reasons to do this despite their dislike of 
the ‘Baltic’ unity imposed by their Western partners (i.e. NATO and EU member 
states), just as by the Soviet rule in the decades before: 
 
– to give proof of their socio-economic maturity and show their willingness to strive 
for continuous Europeanization and progressive integration; 
– to counter the doubts about their ‘defensibility’ and to present themselves as 
dignified future Western countries. 
 
However, this approach of pooling their interests through the label of global 
‘Balticness’ on the European scene has never really complied with each country’s self-
perception. When looking at the three ‘Baltic’ perspectives more closely, it becomes 
clear that their sense of diversity has “re-emerged” at some point during the political 
transition process. Medijainen argues that the deconstruction of the Baltic image first 
started in the late 1990s.223  
It seems that these countries [note: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania] are returning to the 
pattern of the 1920s and the 1930s, when they were able to co-operate only to a very limited 
extent, something which contributed to the weakness of their resistance to Germany and the 
Soviet Union. This observation was confirmed at a meeting between the Baltic prime 
ministers in September 1992 when no specific results could be achieved. On the contrary, a 
certain rivalry between these states could be observed concerning the policies towards 
Russia. These problems have by no means ceased to exist.224 
The gradual diversification among the Baltic group was generally reflected in the three 
countries’ relations with Russia. Estonia and Latvia, for example, were roughly 
disdained for their migration policy that was said to affect the legal status of the 
Russian-speaking minority living in either of the two countries.225 Lithuania, on the 
other hand, succeeded in retaining good relations with the Russian Federation. In the 
EU context, this specific relationship enabled Lithuania to portray itself as a potential 
negotiating partner for the West in dealings with Russia and Belarus.226  
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In the course of the 1990s, the three states have largely taken different developments, 
with each having a different regional partner for the course of their transatlantic and 
European integration process: for Lithuania it was Poland, for Latvia – Sweden, and for 
Estonia, it was Finland.227 In the last stages of the accession process to both NATO and 
the EU, the three neighbours also started to point out their individual qualities, with e.g. 
Lithuania claiming its comparative advantage in defence matters, and Estonia alleged 
stressing its economic pre-eminence.228 
In terms of their regional orientation towards their regional surrounding, the three 
countries underwent a similar development. After a first phase of apparent unity right 
after they had gained independence, each of the three started to diversify its political 
position towards the regional neighbourhood. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, then Estonian 
minister for foreign affairs, delivered some of the most striking public statements in this 
context. He repeatedly claimed that his country should no longer be considered as part 
of the ‘Baltic group’ but rather be allocated to the sphere of ‘Nordic’ culture and 
identity. He also fought against the common assumption that there existed something 
like a ‘Baltic entity’ that could be treated as a culturally and politically homogenous 
collective. 
I think it is time to do away with poorly fitting, externally imposed categories. It is time that 
we recognise that we are dealing with three very different countries in the Baltic area, with 
completely different affinities. There is no Baltic identity with a common culture, language 
group, religious tradition. [...] What the three Baltic States have in common derives almost 
entirely from shared unhappy experiences imposed upon them from outside: occupations, 
deportations, annexation, sovietization, collectivization, russification. What these countries 
do not share is a common identity.229 
Since the end of the 1990s, Estonia has been actively trying to reinvent its own position 
in the region and in Europe by recasting itself as one of the Nordic Countries.230 The 
most obvious reason behind this proactive Estonian attitude lay in the fact that the 
association with the other two Baltic countries was largely seen as a ballast impeding 
Estonia’s Western integration.231 Lehti claims that during Ilves’ second period as 
foreign minister (1999-2002), this specific policy of ‘Nordicisation’ reached its 
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culmination.232 Some analysts support the claim that there are aspects that link Estonia 
more to Northern Europe, or at least, that make it different from the ‘other two’ Baltics.  
Estonian society is more akin to societies in the Northern states such as Sweden and Finland 
than to the Catholic persuasions of Lithuania. Its economy is more liberal and 
technologically advanced than that of any other Baltic state, and corruption in Estonia is 
lower than in some existing member states.233 
Lithuania, on the other hand, has made considerable effort to position itself on the other, 
Catholic and Central European side, particularly emphasizing its historical and 
ideological links to Poland, and the other Visegrád countries.234 This ideological process 
of Baltic diversification has passed various phases: right after their independence, the 
three chose to rally behind the Baltic label as it helped them to distance from the Soviet 
past. In the course of the 1990s, however, the desire to stand out as individual nation 
states grew stronger, and eventually reached its height between 1999 and 2002, before it 
perked up again in the wake of enlargement.  
After 9/11, the Balts have taken a more active role. They [were] no longer automatically 
accepting external labels as such and instead increasingly defined themselves as something 
special. Such a move can provide the Balts with increased discursive power in order for 
them to contribute to the European configuration and in particular to the notion of the EU’s 
Eastern border.235 
As for today, it may generally be assumed that the three countries do definitely prefer to 
be treated individually rather than in the context of a “Baltic pot”.236 As Ozolina 
claimed at an earlier stage of the process, the Baltic States might have started to 
emphasise their differences at some point. However, whether and to what extent they 
accepted the rationale of Baltic unity or not, the stereotype remained and was eventually 
reinforced in the enlargement context, with the three of them being simultaneously 
“redrawn” into Europe.237 
This is all not to say that the background of Baltic togetherness is all about externally 
imposed unity or mere strategic calculation from Estonia’s, Latvia’s or Lithuania’s side. 
It should not be neglected that in fact, their efforts taken on the long road towards full 
integration and more generally, in the course of their Post Soviet transition did produce 
some sort of common historical experience that tightened the link between them and 
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produced a certain ‘we’ feeling. What is Baltic unity about and to what extent does its 
quality and substance matter in the context of Baltic Sea Regionalism? It seems as if the 
answer to these questions has to remain uncertain and largely ambiguous. 
The political transformation has been considerably fuelled by the immediate post Soviet 
reaction of the Baltic States, whose first and foremost aim it was to get rid of past 
dependencies, by whatever means. In this situation, sub-regional cooperation offered a 
good opportunity to anticipatedly (re-)enter the European sphere, make inroads to the 
West and thus, to distance from Russia. As Ozolina argued, the unity of the Baltic States 
has always been more dependent on external factors than on internal need.  
The more threatened the Baltic Republics were in their efforts for sovereignty while they 
were still in the USSR, the more unified were their activities and the more powerful was 
their understanding of self-identity.238 
The same certainly applies to their joint strive for sub-regional integration as some sort 
of pre-stage to anticipate their full EU membership. This is not to say that the three 
Baltic States featured identical geo-strategic orientations in this context. Estonia and 
Latvia certainly felt closer associated with their northern Baltic Sea neighbours than e.g. 
Lithuania did. Especially in regard to their geo-political long-term prospects, they were 
certainly not strictly striving northwards as a homogenous group of three. However, in 
the first years of their national independence, Baltic Sea Regionalism offered a very 
good opportunity for them to consolidate their ‘Europeanness’, and eventually, prepare 
for their accession to the EU. In fact, in the eve of EU-accession, the concept of a 
‘Nordic Europe’ was a very popular idea among the aspiring candidate countries. 
3. Nordic-Baltic Co-operation 
Baltic Sea Cooperation is a manifold and complex phenomenon. Integration between 
the Baltic Sea littoral states takes place at various levels of action, and thus, includes 
both official and non-official actors. The most obvious link that has been installed 
between the two subspaces, the Nordic and the Baltic sphere, is “Nordic-Baltic 
Cooperation.” This intraregional format has traditionally been referred to as the “5+3-
Cooperation.” In summer 2000, at the Conference of the Baltic Sea Foreign Ministers in 
Middelfart/Denmark, another more illustrative term was introduced to denominate this 
formation, the “Nordic-Baltic-Eight” (NB8).239 Cooperation in the NB8 format is 
primarily conducted in the form of annual meetings of the Baltic Sea Prime Ministers, 
Foreign Ministers, and Cooperation Ministers. However, also representatives from other 
departments, secretary-generals and political directors meet on a regular basis.  
The origins of the NB8 date back to a meeting of the Nordic Ministers for Cooperation 
held on 31 January 1990, where Sweden initiated a proposal under ‘other business’ 
worded as follows: “It was agreed to investigate the possibilities of establishing Nordic 
Information- and Culture Centres in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.” The greatest 
restriction on the scope of activities at that time was that the three Baltic countries were 
still part of the Soviet Union. After verbose negotiations with Moscow, the first step 
could be taken: in April 1991, a Nordic Information Office was launched in the Latvian 
Capital of Riga.  
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In 1992, the ‘5+3’ meetings started on the prime ministerial level. The Prime Ministers 
now meet annually to discuss common foreign policy and regional issues. The Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs meet annually since 1993, the Ministers of Defence since 1994, and 
the Ministers for Regional Cooperation (Baltic States are represented by Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs) since 1996. Cooperation according to formula 5+3 also got a new 
impetus through frequent consultations on the level of Political Directors. Ad hoc 
meetings with the participation of one guest country are also common. On important 
example was the presence of the EU High Commissioner Javier Solana at the above-
mentioned meeting in Middelfart/Denmark in summer 2000. At the given meeting 
Ministers have come to a consensus that forthcoming meetings are to be called Nordic 
Baltic 8. The NB8 cooperation system heavily relies on the coordination between the 
Nordic Council of Ministers, on the one hand, and the Baltic Council of Ministers, on 
the other. Since 2005, the NB8 also engages in the development of support programmes 
for the Russian and Belarus NGOs in the BSR in order to further strengthen the civic 
society development and democracy in the region.240 
II. The ‘Nordic Bloc’ – Driving Core for Baltic Sea Regionalism? 
Given their experiences in the context of Nordic Cooperation, the Nordic States have a 
certain tradition in the field of cooperation across borders. This might lead to the 
assumption that Nordic Cooperation could have provided for some sort of “driving 
core” or “source of inspiration” for Baltic Sea Regionalism after 1989.241 Indeed, over 
the years, the Nordic States have established a tight network of cooperation on both 
state and non-state level. Networking between nongovernmental actors, including 
organised interest groups and political parties as well as daily informal contacts among 
civil servants have always been a significant basis of the Nordic Cooperation.242 Intra-
Nordic collaboration and togetherness is a structural phenomenon that has not only 
shaped the external policies of the respective states, it has also led to the generation of a 
certain Nordic image in international politics.243  
‘Nordic-ness’ or ‘Nordicity’ was, and still is, often seen as some sort of third way, as a 
political choice in itself, materialised in the institutional framework of Nordic 
Cooperation. The ‘Nordic Model’ is still widely perceived to embody a set of morally 
superior political visions, e.g. the pre-eminence of the welfare-state model, a strict 
approach to democracy and human rights, strong socio-democratic traditions, all adding 
up with the substance of shared historical heritage as well as a common cultural and 
ideological background.244 For many Nordic officials, even today, ‘Nordic togetherness’ 
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is a beloved and viable concept. Thus, they try to promote the vision behind it and to 
keep it a present issue on the European level and more generally, within the outside 
perspective on the North. One of the more recent examples was Henrik Lax, the 
candidate of the Swedish People’s Party (svenska folkpartiet) for the Finnish 
presidential elections in 2006, arguing that 
[Our] Nordic ties constitute a unique asset that enables [us] to build bridges to the Baltic 
countries and to Russia, which would increase the prospects for a prosperous Baltic 
Europe.245 
However, as argued before, the quality and substance of Nordic togetherness has 
changed over time. In the course of the 20th century, Nordic Cooperation has passed 
different stages of institutionalisation and consolidation. The external conditions have 
always played a decisive role for the overall development of intra-Nordic cooperation. 
This applies particularly to the impact of the EU integration process, with the 1995 and 
the 2004 EU enlargements building two of the most important geo-political changes in 
the Northern European constellation. These changes have certainly led to a gradual 
diversification of activities and to the adaptation of formerly common positions. Studies 
have shown, for instance, that Sweden and Finland, once they had joined the EU, started 
to adapt their voting behaviour within the UN to the European mainstream.246  
Only in questions where there was no EU consensus a distinctive stance among Nordic 
countries could be established, e.g. concerning the reform of the UN Security Council.247 
Intra-Nordic Coordination in the UN framework has once been the cornerstone of 
Nordic Cooperation.248 However, Nordic Cooperation has certainly lost in substance. 
Hence, also the integrative impact of Nordicness should not be overestimated, in neither 
the EU context nor concerning Baltic Sea Regionalism. 
A closer look at the development of Baltic Sea Regionalism or integration shows that 
the Nordic Countries, most notably Sweden and Finland, pursued rather different 
regional strategies.249 As for the quality and significance of Nordic unity and 
togetherness, the post Cold War setting constituted an enormous challenge. The political 
changes of 1989/90 revolutionised the circumstances for foreign policy of most states in 
Europe. For the Nordic States, the new geopolitical constellation did not only involve 
the medium-term integration into the European project; the Nordic Countries also had to 
incorporate into newly arising spatial concepts, such as the ‘New North’ or the new 
‘Baltic Sea Region’. The post Cold War situation was quite ambivalent for the Nordic 
countries. On the one hand, they were offered a new variety of regional policy options 
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that allowed for a geo-strategic reorientation. On the other hand, now they were also 
forced to take major strategic decisions while the bipolar structure had never asked for 
any geo-political creativity.250 
Every now and then the Nordic countries might feel a certain nostalgia for the good old 
days of the Cold War, when national strategy was a stable and predictable phenomenon. 
United in what became known as the ‘Nordic Balance’, a strategic concept of their own 
design but resulting from the bipolar division of the international system, Sweden, Norway, 
Iceland, Finland, and Denmark formed something of a regional quilt of complementary 
strategic choices.251 
During the phase of global block confrontation, the Nordic ‘third way’ had justified the 
reluctant position of “surveying the international arena from a distance with a certain air 
of superiority.”252 However, the geopolitical changes after 1989 considerably 
challenged the viability and credibility of this traditional Nordic attitude.  
Distance now meant: away from the centre of the new dynamism. The future lay with 
integration, participation, involvement – not neutrality and non-engagement. The future was 
in Europe, Norden just backward and reluctant.253 
The Nordics had to re-orient themselves on the map of the ‘New Europe’. In this 
context, it was most of all Sweden that was pulled into a strong coil of geopolitical 
identity crisis. While Finland tried to capitalise politically on its newly gained 
independence by strongly aspiring towards Western European integration, not least in 
order to create distance to past ideological and political dependencies from (then Soviet) 
Russia.254 Due to its traditional transatlantic ties, Norway pursued a very clear post Cold 
War strategy in geopolitics. Regionally, it focussed more on the Barents and Arctic 
dimension, while globally, it was more given to the tendencies of general 
internationalisation and globalisation than to institutional integration, e.g. in the 
framework of the EU or (sub)regional cooperation initiatives.255 Taking these 
considerations together, there appears to be reason enough to question the ability of the 
Nordic ‘core’ to enhance or stimulate further (sub)regional integration. In the post Cold 
War setting, the Nordic group rather strived towards foreign policy individualisation 
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with each of the five applying different strategies in order to avoid geopolitical 
marginalisation.256 
III. ‘Old North’ vs. ‘New Regionalism’ – Competing for the Same Space? 
The post-Cold War boom of cooperative regionalism in the BSR has often been referred 
to as the rise of the ‘New North’, or the dawn of ‘New Regionalism’. In fact, the 
epochal events of the late 1990s have not only changed the political and geo-strategic 
framework of Northern European affairs, they have also altered the nature of what is 
generally perceived to account for ‘Northern Europe’ and the ‘North’. Up until the late 
1980s, the notion of a ‘Nordic sphere’ was a very strong marker in terms of mental 
geography.  
Until the breakdown of the Communist block the model of the Nordic welfare state 
represented a third way between the two dominant superpowers and their attendant 
ideologies.257 
During the Cold War, the Nordic block actually constituted a clearly delimitable entity 
whose politico-strategic substance was hardly ever questioned from the bi-polarised 
outside world. Nordic unity had largely been fostered by relative isolation in both the 
political and the geographical sense.258 The Nordic States are, as Joenniemi put it, “not 
to be held responsible for the emergence and success of Norden.”259 The Cold War 
setting had been ideal in the sense that the notion of this “third way” justified a certain 
reluctance towards the “embattled international arena”.260 However, in the course of 
post-Soviet transition, the well-established image of a ‘Nordic North’ happened to be 
considerably challenged.  
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There emerges a ‘new Northernness’, facing both east and south and expanding from its 
previous territorial boundaries. The new ‘North’ is not purely of European, Russian or 
Baltic influence, but instead should be viewed as a complex geographical mixture of all 
these spatial elements, stirred together with a touch of spice (i.e. the former Nordic legacy) 
for added piquancy. [...] In general it appears to be the case that little demand remains for 
what we can label as Cold War ‘Nordicity’.261 
The newly emerging and comprehensive ‘North’ that, at first, cropped up in the form of 
progressive Baltic Sea Regionalism directly interfered with the traditional Nordic 
formation. Joenniemi and Lehti called it the “clash between Nordism and Baltism”262 or 
the “encounter of old Nordicity with new Northernness”, i.e. of two regional formations 
that “coin a rather different ‘we’-feeling but” however, are not strictly opposite.263 
The wave of cooperative ‘Baltic Sea’ ventures that emerged after the end of the Cold 
War for the first time seemed to open the compact system of Nordic political and 
ideological insularity.264 The newly gained independence of the three Baltic States 
enabled them to strive for regional and sub-regional integration, aspirations that were 
naturally focussed on the near neighbourhood, i.e. the Northern and Western Baltic 
Rim. As from the Nordic perspective, this process of regional re-orientation of the 
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Baltic States added a new ‘Eastern’ dimension to ‘Nordicity’/’Nordicness’ and thus, 
potentially challenged this traditional regionalist formation. By way of this 
development, Norden got literally ‘balticised’ and as a result, ‘Nordic Cooperation’ 
itself had to face up to the political and mental impact of New ‘Baltic Cooperation’. In 
the course of the 1990s, the Baltic Sea became the major point of reference for 
regionalism in Northern Europe. Thus, the Northern European centre of gravity had 
shifted southwards, and thereby actually away from the Nordic Norden. 
The Nordic formation itself never had a core or centre in terms of a positive and explicit 
geographical reference. As Østergård points out, the Nordic group has rather defined 
itself alongside a negative pattern, in the sense of being distinct from the “southern 
rest”, and thus, clearly “non-European, non-Catholic, anti-Rome, anti-imperialist, non-
colonial, non-exploitative, peaceful, small and social democratic.”265 Stråth found a 
similar way to put it, claiming that the democratic, Protestant and egalitarian Norden 
traditionally functioned as a demarcation from Catholic, conservative and capitalistic 
Europe.”266 While Nordic togetherness had always been based on the logic of being 
different and of distancing oneself from an ideologically remote and different ‘other’, 
Baltic Sea Regionalism now claimed for a border-crossing and to some extent pan-
European togetherness, that does not act on the ground of exclusion but rather on the 
ground of inclusion and comprehensive ‘Northernness’.  
Thus, when in the course of the 1990s Nordic Norden gained a Baltic dimension, it was 
not equally welcomed on both sides of the Baltic Sea. The events that caused so much 
enthusiasm in Northern Europe, and particularly in the countries of the former Soviet 
bloc, were treated by the North with much more scepticism. The Northern part of the 
New Europe, previously characterized by the low military pressure, moral superiority 
and socio-economic particularity (the so called ‘third way’) was about to lose its unique 
status.  
In spite of the ‘absence’ of the European Communities in Northern Europe, a turning point 
was reached after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike to the Scandinavian states, EU 
membership could not be granted to the Baltic States in transition, but processes of regional 
integration and co-operation have arisen in the Baltic Sea region, even before their 
independence, to create a kind a Baltic identity.267  
For the Baltic States, the newly emerging opportunity for regional and most 
importantly, westbound integration offered a good way to distance themselves from the 
unloved East and to aspire towards Europeanness, or at least, virtual Northernness.  
In the first years of independence, the abilities of the Baltic States to implement foreign and 
security policies were fairly limited. [...] For that reason, the first partners in the 
international environment were found among each country’s neighbours, and the initial 
operations of the Baltic States in terms of launching joint projects was a reaction to the fact 
that international communications channels at that time were somewhat limited.268 
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For the Baltic States, this idea of becoming part of the Northern sphere, of shifting 
‘northwards’ on the mental map of Europe, was less an end in itself than a means to get 
rid of the ideological dependencies and burdens of the past. For the Northwestern 
Baltic, i.e. the old Nordic group, in contrast, the idea of Northernness was not to be 
subjected to any sort of Easternization whatsoever. The Nordic perspective on Baltic 
Sea Regionalism largely differed from the Baltic point of view. 
Whilst the Balts felt uncomfortable with the Baltic label, the Western Baltics – Sweden, 
Danes and northern Germans – defined their ‘Balticness’ in a very different manner 
compared to the other side of the Baltic Sea. This is so as the Western Baltic understanding 
concentrates on focussing on the whole Baltic Sea area [...].269 
Thus, New Baltic Regionalism generally founded on very different understandings on 
either sides of what this ‘new region’ should be about and on what premises it should be 
constructed. It could be seen as some sort of ‘battlefield’ where different and partly 
diverging interpretations about the essence of single regionalist initiatives virtually 
collided but still managed to uphold the cohesive image of inclusiveness.270 Lehti has a 
point when emphasising that despite the Baltic enthusiastic visions and their struggle to 
become a perceived part of the North, the ‘Nordic core’ has always remained exclusive.  
In the 1990s it seemed that the North and ‘Northernness’ would constitute something new 
and receive new political importance whereas the old Norden would loose its exclusiveness. 
Norden has, however, remained resilient and even if it has opened up eastwards, the Nordic 
core has remained exclusive.271 
In fact, the links between the southeastern and the northwestern Baltic have measurably 
tightened, but still, as from a Nordic point of view the Baltic States continue to be 
considered as partners instead of Nordic fellows. One important reason for Nordicness 
to remain exclusive in ideological terms probably lies in the fact that the construct of a 
‘New North’ or comprehensive ‘Baltic North’ did not imply any sort of structural and 
normative similarity between its constituents, meaning democratic traditions or socio-
economic characteristics.  
The present common identity of people in the Nordic countries is based not only on an 
awareness of cultural and historical commonalities, but also on several concrete 
characteristics of their present-day societies that are distinctive of the region in international 
comparison (i.e. legal and administrative traditions including municipal self-determination, 
rule of law, gender equality and a social democratic tradition).272 
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Considering the functionalist and pragmatic foundation that inclusive Baltic Sea 
Regionalism was build upon, these newly emerging spatial visions could actually not be 
seen as a true competitor of the traditional Nordic system of cooperation. The new 
regional formations did no longer invoke any common model of society or a societal 
sense of belonging together; this very characteristic could be seen as both a blessing and 
a curse. The ideological openness and inclusiveness of the new regionalism enabled the 
newly emerging networks to span across old dividing lines. On the other hand, this 
‘open frame’ approach also proved to be rather weak and superficial in the sense that 
old established ‘mental spaces’ were not sufficiently challenged. There was no pressure 
or incentive for traditional formations like the Nordic system of cooperation to unclose 
for new ideological or political inspirations coming from the outside, or rather, from the 
East. The Nordic core proved to be consistent enough to leave these influences outside.  
Lagerspetz tried to identify the basis and consistency of inclusive Balticness in the sense 
that the traditional Nordic system could be opening up for new inspirations, and in a 
next step, for new Nordic fellows. He assessed the three Baltic States’ potential to 
qualify for such an ‘enlarging’ Nordicness, coming to the general conclusion that the 
cohesive substance of such a spatial construction remains low. 
 
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Geographical location + + (+) 
Historical ties + + - 
Linguistic affinity (+) - - 
Lutheran faith (+) - - 
Social development (the Nordic Model) - - - 
Nordic cooperative organs (+) (+) (+) 
Legal and administrative tradition (+) (+) ? 
Gender equality - - - 
Table 8: Assessing the Nordic Potential of the Baltic States273 
Nordic uniqueness as a notion traditionally associated to the longstanding continuity in 
the five countries’ foreign policy making and thinking, as well as to the immanent nexus 
between the state and society has often been said to be based on a “societal but largely 
illusory proximity.”274 However, whether one is willing to question the normative 
grounds of Nordicness or not, in the Baltic Sea discourse it has proved to be a strong 
and lasting marker. As pointed out above, the global changes following the end of the 
Cold War did have remarkable repercussions on Nordicness and the substance of Nordic 
                                                 
273  Table generated on the basis of LAGERSPETZ Mikko: How Many Nordic Countries? Possibilities 
and Limits of Geopolitical Identity Construction. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 1/2003, pp. 49-
61, here p. 57. Obvious elements of conformity are indicated by ‘+’, relative conformities by ‘(+)’ 
and ‘?’ marks relationships where the conformity is not clear.  
274  Simoulin claimed this heritage to be illusory because it “basically meant that each Nordic country 
shared with one or two others a social feature, but that it was closer to others for other particular 
features. See SIMOULIN Vincent: The State of Nordic Cooperation in a Changing Europe. Toulouse 
2000, pp. 3-4.  
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togetherness in both the regional and the broader European context, since each of the 
five states appeared to pursue a different strategy for managing the global systemic 
changes. Most interestingly, this impact rather concerned the inside-out dimension of 
Nordicness, meaning that the internal coherence and togetherness of the Nordic system 
lost in substance. As for the outside-in dimension, the Nordic system has largely 
remained impervious and compact.  
The alleged “superiority of Nordic Norden”275 has also been present in the intra-Nordic 
dialogue about Baltic Sea Regionalism; it was noticeable in the way the Nordic 
countries addressed their newly independent neighbours in political discourse. 
Browning has a point when noting that “the political discourse about and in favour of 
the so-called New North” widely founded on the “missionary narratives of Western 
identity.” 
Post Cold War region-building in the European North is frequently depicted highly 
positively as representative of a new, original, post-modern and humanistic approach to 
regional cooperation. Central to such notions has been the idea that all participants, but 
particularly Russia, in the regional partnership can be treated as equals in a mutually 
beneficial dialogue. [...] The key thing to note here is that in many discourses this is not 
simply the New North we are talking about, but Europe’s [original emphasis] New North 
and the prefix of Europe is important because in Western discourse Europe is a highly 
loaded term. [...] Only those ‘like us’ will receive this northern passport into the European 
Club. Those not like us will remain outside to remind us who we are.276 
The Nordic five obviously perceived themselves (and still do) to be the ‘more 
European’ North, the North that could potentially bring some more Europeanness to the 
Easterners. The intra-Nordic discourse about new forms of regionalism across the whole 
Baltic area was generally strongly exclusive to the extent that they appealed to a 
Nordicisation of the ‘un-Nordic rest’ instead of the creation of a new inclusive concept. 
Even this aim of ‘nordicising’ the BSR did not imply any inclusive togetherness of the 
Nordic Baltic and what could be called the ‘Baltic Baltic.’ By avoiding any sort of 
Easternisation, Nordicness has been kept exclusive and as for the BSR context superior. 
It appears that some Nordic state actors have recognized the potential of Regionalism as 
a means to “keep the Nordic profile alive”.277 
The idea of trying to keep the Nordic profile alive also seems to be reflected in the 
Nordic countries’ self-perception, and equally, their way of presenting themselves as 
actors and partners on the international scene. In fact, the notion of Nordic uniqueness is 
still a very common argument; many Nordic officials try to employ the old clichés of 
the ‘third way’ in order to position their country’s attitude on the mental map of Europe. 
Among the Nordic countries, it is still very common to appeal to their own alleged 
weakness and the resulting unobtrusiveness, to the notion of being “small, peace-loving 
                                                 
275  See WÆVER Ole: Balts, Books and Brussels. Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) 
Working Papers, No. 11. Copenhagen 1994, p. 3. 
276  BROWNING Christopher S.: The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of 
Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in the European North. In: Geopolitics, No. 1/2003, pp. 45-
71, here p. 69. 
277  See WÆVER Ole: The Baltic Sea: A Region after Post-Modernity? In: JOENNIEMI Pertti (ed.): 
Neo-Nationalism or Regionality. The Restructuring of political space around the Baltic Rim. 
Stockholm 1997, pp. 293-342, here p. 324.   
     84
and democratic countries.” 278 This tendency can be observed in the Swedish foreign 
policy discourse whenever it comes to the question of strategic interests and power 
related bargaining on the international or global scene. This aspect is also closely related 
to what could be seen as the most ironic similarity between Sweden and Finland. Even 
though in recent years they have made very different politico-strategic choices, some 
kind of strong and intrinsic belief that within the EU and Europe they are politically 
‘different’, if not superior to the average res, is common to both of them.279  
G. Councils, Associations, Unions, Leagues 
There is a great bulk of studies dealing with the topic of ‘New’ Baltic Sea Regionalism 
in various different contexts. Scholars from both inside and outside the region have 
found very flowery descriptions for this phenomenon, pointing at the “myriads”280 of 
cooperative undertakings that have “mushroomed”281 “in the name of the Baltic 
world”.282 To various extents, they have highlighted the pivotal role of identity or the 
newly emerging “we-feeling”, and tried to find explanations for the inherent dynamics 
of the regional activism around the Baltic Sea.  
I. Networks and Clusters 
Given the complexity and amount of cooperative structures in the BSR, it is difficult to 
overlook the variety of actors and contents that they build upon. Many exponents in this 
tight network have very similar, if not identical, working agendas. When looking at the 
objectives of the various associations and cooperative ventures it seems as if there was a 
high potential of institutional and functional overlap. However, they differ in their way 
of approaching a certain issue, and most often, they deploy different means for similar 
objectives. Most importantly, they operate on diverse levels of action and thus, involve 
different types of actors. This is what Hubel and Gänzle called “positive overlap”. i.e. 
constructive division of labour in both functional and organisational terms instead of 
mere duplication of efforts and working structures.283  
                                                 
278  ØSTERGÅRD Uffe: The Nordic Countries in the Baltic Region. In: JOENNIEMI Pertti (ed.): Neo-
Nationalism or Regionality: The Restructuring of Political Space around the Baltic Rim. Stockholm 
1997, pp. 26-53 here p. 28.  
279  For an extensive comparison between Sweden an Finland, including this aspect, see chapter 
“Excursus: Mare Europaeum – Whose Mare Nostrum?”, p. 111-. 
280  VON SYDOW Emily: Den Baltiska dimensionen. Stockholms geopolitiska roll i EU. In: EHRLING 
Guy (ed.): Stockholm international. En antologi om Stockholm i en regionaliserad och globaliserad 
värld. Stockholm 2000, pp. 23-36, here 23. Von Sydow defined the proliferation of regionalist 
undertakings in the BSR as svindlande (Swed. vertigious) and added the humorous comment that 
sometimes it appears as if not even the ministers responsible for these regional agendas “were in the 
know” of what they are all about. See ibd. 26.   
281  SCOTT James Wesley: Cross-border Governance in the Baltic Sea Region. In: ANDERSON 
James/O’DOWD Liam/WILSON Thomas M. (eds): New Borders for a Changing Europe. Cross-
border Cooperation and Governance. London 2002, pp. 135-153, here p. 135. 
282  LEHTI Marko: Competing or Complementary Images. The North and the Baltic World from the 
Historical Perspective. In: HAUKKALA Hiski (ed.): Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension. 
Turku 1999, pp. 1-28, here p. 23. 
283  See HUBEL Helmut/GÄNZLE Stefan: The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) as a Sub-
Regional Organisation for ‘soft security risk management’ in the North-East of Europe. Report to the 
Presidency of the CBSS, 18 May 2001, p. 18. 
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Some of the associations in the BSR have built up formal or informal strategic 
partnerships and link together in organisational clusters. The two major coordinating 
hubs that stand at the centre of the two most important clusters are the CBSS for the 
regional level, and the UBC for the sub-regional level. In its function as an umbrella 
organisation, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) tries to pool and link the 
various associations in the BSR in various different ways. It has launched coordination 
meetings to bring the heads of regional associations together as well as an Internet 
Portal to provide a central point of reference for the distribution of information and the 
promotion of the BSR working agenda to a broad audience. Most importantly, it has 
established a network of strategic partners, aiming to provide a structured organisation, 
and thus, to enhance coordination and harmonisation. It links together the BDF, the 
BCCA, the BSSSC, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, the Baltic Sea Forum 
(BSF) – Pro Baltica, the Baltic Sea NGO Forum, the Baltic Sea Trade Union Network 
(BASTUN), HELCOM, Baltic 21, VASAB 2010, the UBC, and CPMR-BSC. Together 
they officially refer to themselves as the “Baltic Sea Association” (BSA). In the sub-
regional context, the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC) plays a similar role. On the 
initiative of A. Engström, then President of the UBC, in October 1997, the leaders of the 
major sub-regional BSR associations decided to establish closer ties of cooperation and 
coordination between the different formations. Besides the UBC, the organisations 
clustering in this context are the BSSSC, CPMR–BSC, BDF, B7 Islands, and the Baltic 
Sea Tourism Commission (BTC).284 
Another virtual network that links formations on similar levels of action and with 
similar institutional characteristics and a similar degree of formalisation can be found 
between the three major scale councils in the Northern European sphere: The CBSS, the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Arctic Council (AC). Reut called the 
group of three “the sub-regional engines of Northern Europe.”285 The CBSS, the BEAC 
and the AC are very similar institutional constructs that cover a wider geographical area. 
They have partially intersecting, albeit not clashing catchment areas. The overlapping 
membership patterns with the AC, for instance, including all five Nordic states and 
Russia, do not lead to conflicts of interest. These regional bodies promote common 
values, harmonisation of regulatory frameworks and concerted operative action. 
Another case in point for an organisational cluster in the BSR is the close cooperative 
interrelation between the Nordic and Baltic Council of Ministers as well as between the 
Nordic Council and the Baltic Assembly. Their cooperative relationship and their modes 
of interaction will be subject to closer investigation in one of the following section of 
this study.286   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
284  See UBC Bulletin, issue 3/1997, p. 2. Official UBC website www.ubc.net [30 November 2007]. 
285  REUT Oleg: Asymmetry of and in Dimensionalism. In: North Meets North Proceedings of the 1st  
Northern Research Forum. Akureyri and Bessastaðir, 4-6 November 2000, pp. 174-178, here p. 174. 
286  See chapter “Nordic-Baltic Co-operation”, p. 72-.  
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II. Patterns of Cooperation: Sorting out the Mess 
Despite the proliferation of studies on Baltic Sea regionalism, there still is a clear lack 
of contributions that would attempt to enumerate and interpret the wide array of 
regionalist formations, coalitions, projects and initiatives in detail.287 While it would 
definitely go beyond the scope of this study to trace back the development process of 
each cooperative formation that emerged in the BSR after the end of the Cold War, it 
seems useful to at least give an overview to illustrate the organisational and political 
diversity at hand and to structure the array of organisations present in the region. 288 
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ACMBS 91 TNA NO SC M - - - + - - + + - - - NL TB S 
Ars Baltica 91 TNW NO SC L - - - + - - - - - - + NL TB S 
Baltic 21 96 EPJ all SC L + + + - + - + + + - - FL TB S 
BaltMet  02 TNW SS LP L - + + - - + + + - - + FL TB V 
BCF 94 TNW NO LP L - + - - - - - - - - - IL TB S 
BDF 98 TNW all LP L - + - - - - + - - - + NL TB S 
BEIDS 98 EPJ NO SC  ? + - - - + + - - + - - FL TB S 
BIF 94     ?289 all LP H + + + + + + + + + - - NL TB ? 
BPO 91 TNA NO LP L - + + - - - - - + - - NL TB S 
BRN 99 TNA NO LP L - + + - - - - - - - - NL TB S 
BSC-CPMR 96 TNA SS IG M + + + - + - - - + - - FL       TB290 S 
BSF 92 TNA all LP L - + + + - - - - - - - IL N S 
BSSSC 93 TNA SS IG H + - + + + + + + + - - FL TB S 
CBSS 92 IGA OS IG H + - + + + - + + + - + FL TB S 
CCB 90 TNA NO LP L + - - - - - - - + - - NL TB S 
Helcom 74 IRE OS IG M + - - - - - - - + - - FL TB S 
UBC 91 TNW SS IG M + + + + + + + + + + + FL TB V 
VASAB 92 IGA all IG M - + - - + + - - - - - IL TB S 
Table 9: Cooperative Structures and Formations in the BSR: Synoptic Overview 
                                                 
287  Deas provides one of the few positive exceptions in this regard. He tried to identify the structural 
nature of various micro- and meso-regionalist formations all across Europe, thus offering a valuable 
contribution to the conceptualisation of the type of regionalism prominent in the BSR. Some factors 
applied in this chapter were inspired by Deas’ considerations about the nature of “Unusual 
Regionalism”. See DEAS Iain: From a New Regionalism to an Unusual Regionalism? Mapping the 
emergence of non-standard regional configurations in Europe. Manchester 2004. See also KERN 
Christine/LÖFFELSEND Tina: Governance Beyond the Nation-State: Transnationalization and 
Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region. In: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Discussion 
Paper SPS IV 2004-105. Berlin 2004. 
288  Cases where a certain category is not applicable are marked with an ‘?’. 
289  The BIF could be categorised as a self-standing institution that was established on the basis of a 
Finnish domestic initiative. 
290  Since 2004, most member states of the BSC-CPMR are also formal members of the EU (except 
Norway). The BSC does not include Russia. 
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The overview is based on the following categories: 
Year of establishment: shows to what extent the end of the Cold War can be perceived 
as a decisive marker in the process of regionalism in Northern Europe;  
Governance model: distinguishing between 
 
– transnational associations [TNA],  
– intergovernmental associations [IGA],  
– international regimes [IRE],  
– transnational fora and networks [TNW],  
– self-organising [PJ], and  
– embedded projects [EPJ]. 
 
Type of actors: according to governance model, informing about the nature and type of 
actors involved in the respective formation, distinguishing between  
 
– official actors: state- [OS] and sub-state [SS], and  
– non-official actors [NO]. 
 
Organising principle: specifies whether a formation is organised according to an  
 
– intergovernmental [IG], 
– state-centric [SC] or  
– loose pattern [LP].  
 
This category has to be distinguished from the governance model and thetypification of 
actors. An intergovernmentally organised formation cannot only include official actors 
at state or sub-state level. This categorisation depends on the way the respective 
association administers its activities and on the way it presents itself to the public.  
Degree of institutionalisation: classifies the level of formalisation 
 
– low [L], no institutionalisation, very loose structure; 
– medium [M], simple structure, e.g. a central management unit or secretariat; 
– high [H], established and complex structure, formalised division of labour. 
 
Policy fields and working agendas: informs about the frequency of policy fields 
commonly relevant in the BSR regionalist context, such as environment and 
environmental security, research, art and culture etc. This illustrates the degree of 
positive functional overlap between the various regionalist formations.  
Linkage to the EU: classification depends on whether the respective formation holds a  
 
– formal [FL],  
– informal link [IL] or  
– no link [NL] to the EU or one of its major institutions. 
 
Linkage to the non-EU states and actors: informs about whether an association 
stretches beyond the EU-border, and has thus a trans-border or trans-European quality 
or objective. It indicates whether ‘extracommunitarian’ actors have been involved and 
included since the point of its establishment (e.g. Russia, Russian stakeholders or 
Russian civil society actors, but also former candidate countries).  
 
– trans-border [TB] or 
– non-inclusive [N] 
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Identity or pragmatism, vision or strategy: drawing on the objectives and normative 
foundations of each formation, this category distinguishes associations pursuing a  
 
– vision [V], initiatives and associations that avail themselves of value-laden 
arguments such as the one of inclusive Balticness or of common heritage, to justify 
their objectives and activities; this implies i.a. the employment of the above-
mentioned history tool or other approaches that build on identity-related self-
justification; 
– or a strategy [S], meaning an approach that is pragmatic and solution-oriented and 
argumentatively tends to underline challenges instead of common heritage.  
 
The scheme is not exhaustive in the sense that it does not include all regionalist 
formations that emerged in the BSR after the end of the Cold War. It is restricted to the 
associations and initiatives that have shown enduring operability and have undergone 
substantial steps of structural consolidation, either in terms of institutional formalisation 
or by way of producing manifest policy outputs. The scheme shows that a great part of 
the organisations and initiatives in the BSR operate at the sub-state level: the actors 
involved represent regions, local entities, cities or non-official bodies and interest 
groups. Most associations and cooperative formations adhere to the governance model 
of transnational networks and fora, involving in most cases a low or medium level of 
institutionalisation. They feature various forms of polities, involving anything from a 
council, to a simple secretariat or mere intergovernmental meetings or irregular fora. 
However, only few of them avail themselves of extensive formalisation for the pursuit 
of their strategic objectives. Intergovernmental patterns of organisation are particularly 
prominent at both the sub-regional and regional level.  
Cooperating actors and partners show a high preference of organising themselves 
according to their nation state affiliation. Generally, the regionalist activities in the BSR 
seem to be rather practice-oriented and pragmatic, while only few exception show a 
strong tendency for value-laden argumentation and ‘thick’ normative foundations. 
Baldersheim and Ståhlberg pointed out that a great number of Baltic Sea organisations 
could be characterised as “organised partnerships” based on loose structures in order to 
enable the respective group of actors to solve common problems or to face common 
challenges.291 When seeking to explain this general tendency for pragmatic institutional 
solutions one could argue that the creation of regimes instead of supranational 
constructs certainly provides for enhanced functional and structural flexibility. This 
organisational choice and strategic orientation is, not least, likely to allay the fears state 
actors might have in regard to potential infringements on their national sovereignty.292  
 
 
 
                                                 
291  BALDERSHEIM Harald/STÅHLBERG Krister: The Dynamics of Cross-Border Region-Building 
and Nordic Co-operation. In: Idd. (eds): Nordic Region-Building in a European Perspective. 
Aldershot 1999, pp. 165-174, here p. 165.   
292  See JOHANSSON Elisabeth: EU and its Near Neighbourhood: Subregionalization in the Baltic Sea 
and in the Mediterranean. In: WILLA Pierre/LEVRAT Nicolas (eds): Actors and Models. Assessing 
the European Union’s External Capability and Influence. Genève 2001, pp. 200-222, here p. 205.  
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Chapter 3: The EU Northern Dimension  
A. Introduction: The EU Approach Towards the North 
An assessment of the “EU approach towards the North” (or “Northern Europe”) as it is 
addressed in this chapter should include all policy initiatives and programmes that 
generally deal with regionness in Europe as well as with issues like (re)bordering and 
the development of transnational cooperation.293 The analytical objective behind this 
exercise lies in the identification and characterisation of what could be called the 
supranational context conditioning cross-border cooperation and all patterns and 
processes that relate to the emergence and establishment of regional entities in the 
widest sense of the term. Given the amount and variety of different policy areas that are 
likely to be relevant from this perspective, such an assessment cannot be exhaustive. 
However, it can serve as a point of reference for the analysis of single state policy 
conduct within a European region, or rather a region that in various different ways is 
related to, influenced by and potentially, impacting on, the wider framework of 
European integration.  
The EU has played an important role in the post Cold War development of Northern 
Europe, and most importantly, of the BSR. First and foremost, the EU must be regarded 
as the most important provider of security and stability in the BSR. It is arguably the 
most significant soft security actor in the region, even if from a critical point of view 
mainly “by sheer merit of its attraction and the ensuing disciplinary effect.”294 However, 
the political stability of the Northeastern sphere of the European continent has been one 
of the main ambitions of the European project after 1989. Generally, there are two ways 
of how the EU can approach and affect a region like the BSR: (1) as a political actor 
that disposes of concrete instruments to address specific regional challenges, and (2) in 
the sense of its indirect impact as a normative framework, and as a political and 
ideological point of reference for various state- and non-state actors, and their respective 
regional orientation and strategies (i.e. through the above-stated “disciplinary effect”).  
In practice, it proves to be difficult to distinguish clearly between these two categories. 
The EU policy approaches towards Northern Europe include a variety of instruments 
that comply with either one of each, or both categories. In 1998, the EU has established 
a specific framework for its policy actions and objectives in Northern and Northeastern 
Europe, the so-called “Northern Dimension” (EU ND).295 Other EU policies, like the 
general process of EU enlargement, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
had a more indirect albeit not less important impact on the region.  
 
 
                                                 
293  See KRAMSCH Olivier/PIJPERS Roos/PLUG Roald/VAN HOUTUM Henk: Project Study Report. 
EXLINEA (Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-operation Reconfiguring the External Boundaries of 
Europe Policies, Practices and Perceptions). Research on the Policy of the European Commission 
Towards the Re-bordering of the European Union. Nijmegen 2004, p. 1. 
294  See MOROFF Holger: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): European Soft Security Policies. The Northern 
Dimension. Kauhava 2002, pp. 12-36, here p. 17. 
295  See A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union. Communication from the Commission. 
COM(1998) 0589 final, 25 November 1998. 
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The following chapter deals with some of the EU policies, instruments and institutions 
that have or had a direct or indirect impact on the regional development in Northern 
Europe: the EU enlargement process, the establishment of the EU Committee of the 
Regions, the EU programmes and instruments in the field of regional development, and 
the most recently released ENP. The EU policy directly designed for the Northern 
European sphere, the EU ND, will also be shortly introduced at this point in order to 
complete the overall picture of how the EU approaches this part of Europe as an actor in 
this region or sub-region. However, the background of its establishment and its political 
significance will be revisited in greater detail at another point of this study.296 
I. Enlarging the Union – Association, Partnership and Accession in the BSR 
In the history of the European project, enlargement has proved to be a very strong and 
successful stability instrument. Missiroli called enlargement “a quintessential security 
policy” that has had remarkable success all over the European continent, and more 
specifically, also in respect to the stabilisation of the Baltic Sea Rim.297 The two 
enlargement rounds that directly affected the BSR, the 1995 EU accessions of Sweden 
and Finland, and the 2004 accessions of the three Baltic States and Poland, have 
decisively changed the geopolitical landscape in Northern Europe, and have additionally 
altered the overall international profile of the European Union.  
1. The Swedish and Finnish EU Accession 
The Nordic States have traditionally shown an inherent reluctance towards regional 
political cooperation. Consequently, they were also among the last European core 
countries to seek formal EC/EU membership.298 
Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland were absent at the creation of the Treaty 
of Rome and eventually joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a more 
limited trade partnership that was less threatening to national control over policy than EC 
membership would have been.299 
The key argument used by Sweden and Finland in order to legitimise their reluctance 
towards wider European integration had mainly been related to their foreign and 
security political orientation. Given the supranational ambitions of the European project 
in many political areas, the neutral status was seen as a strong condition of 
(self)exclusion. 
Nordic governments long viewed political integration with the European Community and 
other entangling alliances such as NATO as options of last resort, and instead, these states 
have maintained the greatest possible distance from supranational forms of cooperation.300 
                                                 
296  See chapter “The EU Northern Dimension – Showcase for the Swedish-Finnish Divide?”, p. 132-, 
and chapter “Evaluation: The EU ND Reconsidered”, p. 148-.  
297  MISSIROLI Antonio: The European Union and Its Periphery. Stabilisation, Integration, Partnership. 
Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). Occasional Papers, No. 32. Geneva 2002, p. 5. 
298  With the exception of Denmark which became a full EU member in 1973 (just as Greenland, which 
however, withdrew membership in 1985). 
299  INGEBRITSEN Christine: The Nordic States and European Unity. Cornell 1998, p. 5. 
300  Ibd., p. 6. 
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In the late 1980s, there were first indications for a shift in the Swedish and Finnish 
policy orientation towards the European project. The Austrian application for formal 
membership posed in July 1989 came as a surprise to both Sweden and Finland. It was 
most of all Sweden that had excluded the membership option over decades with 
recurrent reference to its official status of permanent neutrality (Swed. alliansfrihet). 301 
The Swedish accession was preceded by a decade long domestic struggle both between 
and within the political parties. The overall dependence on public support led to the 
persistence of largely fuzzy attitudes. Now that even Austria – whose neutrality clause 
had always been perceived far more rigid and exclusive – had applied for membership, 
the inner-Swedish debate naturally gained new momentum. However, it was the 
progressive decline of the Swedish economy that eventually opened the doors of 
traditional Swedish reluctance towards wider European integration.302 After in 1990 a 
last attempt of the social democratic government to find a domestic solution for the 
crisis had failed, the way to the Swedish membership application was paved. The 
official application request was posed on the 1 July 1991. 
The suspicion that economic considerations had tipped the balance was strengthened by the 
fact that Prime Minister Carlsson left it to Finance Minister Allan Larsson to announce the 
new integration policy. The government’s haste in dealing with this issue was also evident 
from the fact that it had not taken the time to inform the other Nordic governments in 
advance.303 
The Finnish application occurred comparably late, in March 1992.304 The formal request 
was submitted after a short an uncontroversial debate and without any greater discussion 
in public. The reason for this very different political atmosphere preceding the accession 
is to be found in the specific Finnish Cold War experience.  
Because of the FCMA Treaty Finland was an exception among European neutrals. 
Permanent neutrality, according to the Swiss and Austrian model, imposed an obligation to 
the countries concerned to remain outside all wars, an idea also inherent in the Swedish 
neutrality doctrine. Finland’s position was different because the FCMA Treaty included an 
obligation to abstain from neutrality under specific circumstances defined in the Treaty. It 
was precisely this deviation from the fundamental purpose of neutrality – neutrality in war – 
which was the most original feature of Finland’s Cold War neutrality policy.305 
 
                                                 
301  Sweden had already applied for EC membership in July 1967; however, this first attempt of entering 
the Community was dimissed by a French veto (in the context of the British case). Once there would 
have been another chance to pose another request for membership, the Swedish amibtions had 
already dissolved due to domestic struggles between the political parties but also due to the negative 
opinion in the Swedish public. For more details, see MILES Lee: Sweden and Security. In: 
REDMOND John (ed.): The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union. Aldershot 2000. 
302  See HADENIUS, Stig: Modern svensk politisk historia. Konflikt och samförstånd. Stockholm 2003, 
pp. 219-220. 
303  LUIF Paul: On the Road to Brussels. The Political Dimension of Austria’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s 
Accession to the European Union. Vienna 1995, p. 216. 
304  It was only the Norwegian request that was posed even later, in November 1992. 
305  RUHALA Kalevi: Alliance and Non-Alignment at the Onset of the 21st Century. In: RIES 
Tomas/HULDT Bo/MÖRTBERG Jan/DAVIDSON Elisabeth (eds): The New Northern Security 
Agenda. Perspectives from Finland and Sweden. Strategic Yearbook 2004, pp. 103-118, here p. 114.  
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The fall of the Soviet regime had major repercussions for Finnish sovereignty, and most 
significantly, for its freedom of action in the foreign and security political field. After 
having been locked in the formal obligations of the so-called Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (TFCMA) over decades, both the Finnish political 
leaders and the Finnish public were ready and willing to take the newly opened 
opportunities in order to enhance integration in the wider European project. For Finland, 
the question of EU membership was very much about a “return to Europe” and the 
liberation from past dependencies both in political and ideological terms. In the late 
1980s, the Finnish economy had also been caught by a progressing commercial crisis. 
Finland had to face a difficult economic situation as the intense and lucrative 
commercial relations it had maintained with the Soviet Union during the Cold War 
broke down after 1989/90.306 However, the political pressure emanating from the 
unclear post Soviet situation was much more decisive in respect to the Finnish attitude 
towards EU accession. While for Sweden, the economic motives constituted the main 
reason for immediate application, Finland still had to consider the potential security 
political consequences overhasty action could have had in the immediate post Cold War 
situation. In fact, the Finnish membership request had to be delayed for months until the 
bilateral relationship with Russia allowed for this decisive step.307 
From the EU perspective, this second Northern enlargement involving the two Nordic 
core countries has been a largely uncontroversial event. Both candidates exceeded the 
threshold standards that should qualify them for full membership. Since Sweden even 
abstained from posing any sort of reservation concerning its neutrality policy, even the 
security political circumstances were largely serene.308 Also the Finnish quest for 
enhanced security to protect it against Russia did not find much visibility on the 
European scene. Hence, the enlargement event itself gained fairly little public attention 
in the other 12 Member States.309  
Once the round had been concluded and Sweden and Finland had entered the Union 
formally in January 1995, the Northern case was quickly removed from the public 
debate, and the main strategic interests of the EU turned (back) to the eastern sphere and 
the expected ‘Big Bang’ enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast, some 
analysts have repeatedly claimed that this enlargement had added a Northern dimension 
to the European working agenda – and that the launch of the Northern Dimension policy 
had then been a natural if not mandatory step of the European project towards a more 
active stance in this part of the continent.310 
                                                 
306  See ARTER David: Scandinavian Politics Today. Manchester 1999, p. 334. See also DUBOIS 
Jeroen: The Northern Dimension as Prototype of the Wider Europe Framework Policy. University of 
Liverpool, Working Paper. Liverpool 2004, p. 1. 
307  See LIPPONEN Paavo: Finnish Neutrality and EC Membership. In: HARDEN Sheila (ed.): Neutral 
States and the European Community. London 1994, pp. 63-103, here p. 80. 
308  For an extended discussion of the issue of neutrality in the European integration context, see 
GEBHARD Carmen: Europäische Integration und Neutralität. Österreich und Schweden im 
Vergleich. Diplomarbeit Vienna 2004.  
309  The Swedish-Finnish enlargement could – with the likely exception of Switzerland and Norway – be 
seen as a last step in the “Western European process of market integration” before the process of 
“Europe reuniting again” started in the end of the 1990s. See CHRISTIANSEN Thomas: Towards 
Statehood? The EU’s move towards Constitutionalisation and Territorialisation. In: Centre for 
European Studies. University of Oslo (ed.): ARENA Working Paper, No. 21, August 2005, p. 20.  
310  For more on this argument, see chapter “The Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative”, p. 132-. 
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2. The Baltic States  
The EU policy of enlargement towards the Baltic States passed through the various 
traditional stages of formal integration: full membership has been anticipated by 
bilateral trade agreements and the conclusion of association agreements.311 The 
following table gives a brief overview of the most important stages in this mid term 
integration process.312 
 
 
27 August 1991 The EU recognises the independence of the Baltic States 
11 May 1992 Conclusion of Agreements on Trade and Commercial 
Economic Cooperation  
27 January 1994 
3 February 1994 
18 July 1994 
Lithuania joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme 
Estonia joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme  
Latvia joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme  
9 May 1994 The Baltic States are admitted to the WEU (associate 
partners) 
18 July 1994 EU signs free trade agreements with the three Baltic States         
10 December 1994 The European Council of Essen adopts a pre-accession strategy 
27 October 1995 
28 November 1995 
08 December 1995 
Latvia submits EC membership application 
Estonia submits EC membership application 
Lithuania submits EC membership application 
31 March 1998 EU starts accession negotiations with Estonia  
15 February 2000 EU starts accession negotiations with Lithuania and Latvia 
November 2000 NATO accession talks start  
16 April 2003 Signing of the accession treaties for Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania 
29 March 2004 NATO accession of the three Baltic States 
1 May 2004 EU accession of the three Baltic States 
Table 10: Chronology – the European Integration Process of the Baltic States  
Unlike the Northern enlargement in 1995, the 2004 accession round including the Baltic 
States, had very strong ideological implications. Its preparation was framed by the 
overarching motto of European re-unification, and accordingly, for the candidate 
countries themselves it was mainly an issue of ‘returning to Europe’ after a long period 
                                                 
311  The case of Poland will not be considered in detail since the Baltic cases appear to be more relevant 
for the development of regionalism in the BSR, and thus, for the research purpose of this study. 
312 The scheme also includes important developments such as NATO accessions, since they are thought 
to have major repercussions on the way the BSR is positioned on the virtual strategic map of Europe. 
The scope of this chapter will not allow for a detailed discussion of the pre-accession processes in 
the Baltic States. For more information, see PETTAI Vello/ZIELONKA Jan (eds): The Road to the 
European Union, Vol. 2. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Manchester 2003.  
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of dependence and ideological confinement.313 From the early 1990s onwards, the 
“return to Europe” was an omnipresent topic in all three Baltic States. The EU and 
NATO symbolised a sense of belonging to Europe, or the West. 
Thus, the declaration to be European or Western implied a clear political programme of 
striving to join these institutions.314‘ 
The rhetoric in the Baltic public was also dominated by the issue of being and feeling 
“abnormal”, and accordingly, by the wish to achieve the state of political “normality”. 
The whole era of Soviet rule was perceived as a state of abnormity and “false history”. 
Normality in turn was not a clearly defined set of circumstances, but it was a notion as 
vague as being part of the “West” again. Thus, the integration into Western institutions 
was deemed the sole possibility for the Baltic States to re-gain the state of normality.315 
The accession of the Baltic States could generally not be seen separate from the bilateral 
relations of both the EU and the Baltic States with Russia. What Carl Bildt called the 
Litmus test for Russia’s new direction after the breakdown of the Soviet empire, 
meaning its policies towards the Baltic States after their independence, was indeed a 
crucial factor in the EU relationship with Russia.316 As for the Baltic States, formal 
membership in both NATO and EU equally opened new channels across which they 
could encounter their big neighbour.  
Membership of the EU and NATO gave the Baltic decision makers a firm ground, 
confidence and structural power they never had before to deal with Russia.317 
II. The EU Committee of the Regions 
The legal establishment of the EU Committee of the Regions (CoR) in the course of the 
treaty of Maastricht was based on very different and partly diverging positions among 
the regional representations of the EU Member States.318 The German Länder as well as 
the Belgian and Austrian federal provinces were among the first sub-national actors that 
expressed reservations about the way in which the distribution of the then European 
Community’s regional support was increasingly held to the responsibility of member 
state governments, i.e. the national level. In a parallel development, the progress of the 
overall European integration process, most importantly the Single European Act (SEA) 
                                                 
313  See KEMPE Iris: Russia, the EU and the Baltic States. Filling in a strategic white spot on the 
European map. In: BUHBE Matthes/KEMPE Iris (eds): Russia, the EU and the Baltic States. 
Enhancing the Potential for Cooperation. Moscow 2005, pp. 3-4, here p. 4.  
314  LEHTI Marko: Eastern or Western, New or False? Classifying the Balts in the Post-Cold War Era. 
In: TASSINARI Fabrizio/JOENNIEMI Pertti/JAKOBSEN Uffe (eds): Wider Europe. Nordic and 
Baltic Lessons to Post-Enlargement Europe. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). 
Copenhagen 2006, pp. 69-88, here p. 71.  
315  See EGLITIS Daina Stukuls: Imagining the Nation. History, Modernity, and Revolution in Latvia. 
Pennsylvania 2004, p. 8. 
316  See BILDT Carl: The Baltic Litmus Test. Revealing Russia? In: Foreign Affairs, September/October 
1994, pp. 72-85. 
317  PAULAUSKAS Kęstutis: The Baltics. From Nation States to Member States. European Institute for 
Security Studies (EU-ISS), Occasional Papers, No. 62. Paris 2006, p. 39. See also chapter “The 
Baltic States and Baltic Unity – Imposition or Expedient?”, p. 67-. Fore more about the role of 
Sweden and Finland in the context of the Baltic enlargement, see chapter “Sweden, Finland and the 
BSR”, p. 128-. 
318  See also chapter “What kind of ‘Europe of the Regions’?”, p. 206-. 
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in 1987, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, 
progressively eroded the individual autonomy of the member states, and thus, brought 
regional factors to the forefront.319  
These developments have made the ‘regional dimension’ more central to European policies 
in general and have strengthened the participation and representation of regions and local 
authorities in European policy-making. EU regional policy now finds itself within the 
broader and more systematic ‘Structural Action Policy’, designed to bring about social and 
economic cohesion in the Union, which also includes social policy and part of agricultural 
policy. Regional policy now has the second largest budget of all EU policies, behind only 
the Common Agricultural Policy.320 
However, the overall development of the European project forms only one side of the 
coin. In recent years, European states have shown a clear tendency towards internal 
decentralisation. What Sharpe called the “rise of meso government,” meaning the 
growing salience of regions within Member States, coincided with, was influenced by 
and in trun influenced the general course of European integration.321 Most significantly, 
the establishment of the CoR was anticipated by a set of inter-regional activities that had 
been launched since the late 1950s, linking regions and local entities all across Europe. 
Among the most important examples in this respect is the Conference of Peripheral 
Maritime Regions, the Council of Municipal and Regional Authorities of Europe, the 
Assembly of the European Regions (AER) and the Association of Cross-Border 
Regions. The AER indeed played an active role in the debate preceding the 
establishment of the CoR, enthusiastically lobbying for a formalised incorporation of 
regional entities into the institutional framework of the EU.322 
As for the EU internal debate, pressure for some sort of regional representation at the 
Council of Ministers could mainly be felt in those member states where the federal 
principle was already firmly established. Most notably for the French regions that had 
been newly empowered in the course of the 1980s, the idea of a direct conduit to the 
European institutions has been very attractive. Other more centralised states such as 
Greece or Ireland, on the other hand, recognized the potential of EU regional funding 
and, consequently, started to consider measures of decentralisation in order to qualify 
for regional programmes. The United Kingdom wished at all costs to avoid the 
empowerment of a regional or a sub-national level of governance that could have been 
seen as a step towards a federal Europe.  
By endorsing the creation of an exclusively consultative body devoid of legislative powers, 
the UK could claim to be cooperating with European partners without endangering its own 
Member State role.323 
                                                 
319  See WAGSTAFF Peter: The Committee of the Regions of the European Union. In: Id. (ed.): 
Regionalism in the European Union. Wiltshire 1999, pp. 188-193, here p. 189. 
320  LOUGHLIN John: Representing Regions in Europe. The Committee of the Regions. In: JEFFERY 
Charlie (ed.): The Regional Dimension of the European Union. Towards a Third Level in Europe. 
London/Portland 1997, pp. 147-165, here 148. 
321  See SHARPE Laurence James (ed.): The Rise of Meso Government in Europe. London 1993. 
322  See LOUGHLIN John: Representing Regions in Europe. The Committee of the Regions. In: 
JEFFERY Charlie (ed.): The Regional Dimension of the European Union. Towards a Third Level in 
Europe. London/Portland 1997, pp. 147-165, here 150. 
323  Ibd., here 148. 
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Generally, there was support for the formal establishment of a regional representation, 
in varying degrees and for a variety of reasons. The respective provision in the 
Maastricht Treaty claimed for “an advisory committee of representatives of regional and 
local authorities, hence to be called the Committee of the Regions.”324 This was largely 
perceived as a considerable breakthrough with regard to the position of regions and 
other regional entities in the EU even though legally, the CoR did not range at the same 
level as the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Parliament.  
The operationalisation of the legal provision faced a set of problems primarily linked to 
the variety of regions and regional entities acting and interacting within and across the 
EU Member States. An early debate resulted from the fact that the Member State 
governments were given freedom to choose about how to fill their allocated seats. CoR 
members should be elected representatives within their own regions; however, there 
were no rigid restrictions applied as to the structural constituency of a “region” or 
“regional entity”. Such strict measures would have disqualified more than half of the 
respective entities at regional and local level. The institution emerging from this 
selection process was, somewhat understandably, a “highly heterogeneous body.”325 
The CoR members nominated by each member state were subject to an immense 
variation in both territorial and structural terms. In some cases, such as with 
Luxembourg, there was no regional tier but only a local level of representation. In other 
Member States, in turn there was either both a local and a regional representation, or an 
additional intermediate level of organisation, such as in France. Given this complexity it 
was to be expected that the decisions about working practice of the new institutional 
body, and its presidency were to become a rather sensitive issue.326 
A number of policy areas has been selected for obligatory consultancy by the decision-
making bodies of the EU, namely education, culture, public health, trans-European 
networks for transport, telecommunications and energy as well as economic and social 
cohesion. However, not only the range of subjects is limited; the opinions offered by the 
Committee are also not legally binding. None of the other European institutions has to 
take the CoR recommendations into account. Given this multiple weakness of the 
Committee, it is not surprising that, in recent years, it has tried to increase its influence 
and the effectivity of its consultative output. In the course of the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) preceding the Treaty of Amsterdam, various regional and local 
players tried to defend and reinforce the status of the Committee within the institutional 
setting of the EU. The Treaty of Amsterdam produced only modest gains for the CoR. 
The range of subjects on which it must be consulted has been enlarged to include aspects of 
employment, social policy, health, the environment, vocational training and transport. It has 
also been granted the status of ‘expert’ on matters concerning cross-border cooperation. In 
addition, it has gained a greater measure of administrative freedom to the extent that is now 
permitted to develop its own internal regulations.327 
 
                                                 
324  See Art. 198a TEU. 
325  See COLLINS Stephan/JEFFERY Charlie: Whither the Committee of the Regions? British and 
German Perspectives. London 1997, p. 6. 
326  See WAGSTAFF Peter: The Committee of the Regions of the European Union. In: Id. (ed.): 
Regionalism in the European Union. Wiltshire 1999, pp. 188-193, here p. 191. 
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Even though the institutional development of the CoR has not been a clear success 
story, its added value for the European representation of various different regional 
entities remains.  
Nevertheless, the CoR can claim to have contributed to European integration. Independent 
of what subsequently happens to the Opinions it issues, the CoR provides an open and 
public forum for discussion among a variety of different types of government. Such regular 
debate and deliberations can have long-term benefits in terms of achieving better 
understanding among these different organisations, developing common perspectives on 
policies and searching for solutions to problems. It also acts as a catalyst for regional and 
local politicians to network with each other. It has allowed representatives from different 
national domains who – without the CoR – might not have the chance, or even see the need, 
to discuss EU policies with one another.328 
This positive assessment notwithstanding, it must be emphasised that these apparent 
assets do not comply with the original objectives underlying the formal establishment of 
the Committee. 
III. The EU Performance in Regional Development: E.S.D.P. and INTERREG 
The development of a European perspective on spatial planning started in the beginning 
of the 1980s. The Directorate-General for Regional Policy and Cohesion, today also 
known as “DG Regio” held a prominent role in this development. However, in 1984, it 
was in the framework of the Council of Europe that first steps towards a “real European 
planning” were taken. The so-called Torremolinos Charter (European Regional Spatial 
Planning Charter) was launched in 1994, based on the objective of balancing the socio-
economic development of the regions within Europe, improving the quality of life, 
introducing responsible management strategies for natural resources and the protection 
of the environment, as well as rational land use. The SEA (1987) and the moves towards 
the Single Market (1992) have gradually increased European concerns with specific 
patterns of regional development.329  
In 1991, the European Commission launched the ‘Europe 2000’ Communication about 
“Views on the Development of the Territory of the Community”, analysing the multiple 
pressures on Europe’s territory arising from socio-economic developments as well as 
from national, regional and Community interventions. In 1994, it was followed by 
‘Europe 2000 Plus’ Communication on the “Co-operation for the Spatial Development 
of Europe” updating and extending the analysis in ‘Europe 2000’, and making the case 
for co-operation in the field of spatial planning across Europe. In 1991, the Committee 
on Spatial Development, bringing together the member state spatial planning ministers, 
was established in order to develop the European Spatial Development Perspective 
(E.S.D.P.), which was eventually launched in 1999. Even though in the first years, the 
E.S.D.P. remained somewhat inexact and vague, it marked an important step in the 
overall course of development.  
                                                 
328  CHRISTIANSEN Thomas/LINTNER Pamela: Has the CoR been a success? An independent view. 
In: WELCH Graham (ed.): The Committee of the Regions. The voice of local government in 
Europe. Local Government International Bureau. International Report Number 12. London 2006, pp. 
17-21, here p. 18.  
329  See JENSEN Ole B./RICHARDSON Tim: Nested Visions. New Rationalities of Space in European 
Spatial Planning. In: Regional Studies, No. 8/2001, pp. 703-717, here p. 705. 
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The E.S.D.P. symbolised the official EU commitment to territorial cohesion by 
promoting the vision of horizontally integrated geographic territories rather than 
vertically structured spaces. And most importantly, it marked territoriality as a new 
dimension in EU policies. Even though the E.S.D.P. does not have any statutory force at 
the supranational level, it has undoubtedly stimulated pioneering actions to begin to 
develop more meaningful spatial planning provisions within and across European 
regions and sub-regions.330  
Kai Böhme points at the fact that in the Scandinavian countries, officials even had 
considerable problems to translate the name of the E.S.D.P. into their respective 
language, and eventually, had to choose rather fuzzy and vague expressions describing 
the issue of spatial planning rather than denominating it in specific terms. Sweden chose 
Det regionala utvecklingsperspektivet inom Europeiska unionen (The Regional 
Development Perspective in the European Union) and Denmark Det europæiske fysiske 
og funktionelle udviklingsperspektiv (The European Physical and Functional 
Development Perspective) as a label for the E.S.D.P.  
The language predicament illustrates the situation in reality: that there is no such thing as 
spatial planning in Scandinavia – otherwise there would be a term for it.331  
The E.S.D.P. challenged the Nordic Member Countries to rethink their spatial planning 
concepts and development systems. The respective political discourse in Sweden has 
been rather reluctant, while Finland illustrated that change was not only possible but 
also openly welcome.332  
There are a number of issues where the European planning co-operation functions as a 
promoter or even an eye-opener in Scandinavia. It gives strength to the regional level and to 
territorial perspectives and it challenges the sector divide between planning and 
development. Certainly, not all European spatial topics are of relevance in all countries, but 
all of them give input to a discussion on spatial positioning. Scandinavia faces a challenge, 
as Nordic co-operation hardly touches on the question of spatial positioning, whereas both 
BSR and North Sea Region co-operation have elements of spatial positioning.333  
Responding to the encouragement to contribute to the establishment of a “polycentric 
trans-European development” promoted in the E.S.D.P. framework, member states 
showed strong aspirations to create new regional territorial structures. This development 
paved the way for the later INTERREG II initiative. The INTERREG Community 
initiative was first launched in 1990, in order to support European border regions with 
the challenges posed by their specific geopolitical position. While the INTERREG I 
initiative (1990-1993) had been very limited in both scope and content, the INTERREG 
II initiative (1995-1999) was considerably extended and more elaborate.  
                                                 
330  See FALUDI Andreas: The Application of the European Spatial Development Perspective. Evidence 
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Taking into account the various forms of cooperation across borders, the Community 
divided its INTERREG II initiative into three strands of activity.334  
 
– IIA cross-border cooperation: between adjacent regions, aims to develop cross-
border social and economic centres through common development strategies; the 
cross-border quality implies that the principle partners lie on both sides of the 
border; otherwise they are required to demonstrate the interest and impact for the 
overall cross-border region. 
– IIB transnational cooperation: involves national, regional and local authorities and 
aims to promote better integration within the EU through the formation of large 
groups of European Regions; “transnationality” implies that there are at least two 
cooperating parties from two different member states, and the project must have an 
overall impact on the cooperation area. 
– IIC inter-regional co-operation: aims to improve the effectiveness of regional 
development policies and instruments through large-scale information exchange and 
sharing of experience (networks); interregional cooperation should aim at 
multiplying the effects of other regional development policies. 
 
This trifold structure was also employed for the then following INTERREG III Initiative 
(2000-2006), which prominently involved Northern European partners. 
 
INTERREG IIIA  
Skärgården  
Kvarken-Mittskandia 
Sweden-Norway 
Öresund  
Karelia-Russia 
Southeast  
Finland-Russia  
Nordkalotten-Kolartic 
Finland-Estonia 
INTERREG IIIB  
South Baltic Arc – Spatial 
Strategies for Integration 
and Sustainable 
Development Acceleration 
Baltic Sea Region 
North Sea Region 
Northern Periphery  
 
INTERREG IIIC  
For administrative reasons, 
Interreg IIIC has been 
divided into four sections, 
with the BSR building the 
so-called “North Section”.335 
The North section is 
presently engaged in 35 
IIIC-operations.336 
Table 11: INTERREG III programmes in Northern Europe (2001-2006) 
The most important project for the region is the Baltic Sea INTERREG IIIB 
Programme, which in 2000 succeeded INTERREG IIC Baltic Sea. It is sponsored by the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), as part of the Structural Funds, and co-
financed by national project partners. The actions conducted in the framework of 
INTERREG IIIB BSR involve eleven countries: Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden as EU member states; North-West Russia and 
                                                 
334  See Website of the EU Inforegio ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm [25 December 2006]. 
335  The North Section includes entire Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Norway, as well as the German Länder Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Niedersachsen, Schleswig-Holstein, and the Polish Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie, Kujawsko-
Pomorskie, Warminsko-Mazurskie, and Podlaskie. 
336  See official INTERREG IIIC Website www.interreg3c.net [25 December 2007]. 
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Belarus have participated through TACIS as external partners.337 Moreover, the 
Norwegian government has provided a separate budget for project partners from 
Norway. In the framework of INTERREG IIIB, assistance programmes for the Baltic 
States were gradually turned into cooperation programmes, with the Nordic Council of 
Ministers playing an important role in the initiative. One of the leading projects in this 
regard is the “Baltic Euroregional Network” (BEN), which was launched in 2005. It is 
coordinated by the Nordic Council of Ministers Office in Lithuania and aims to enhance 
cross-border cooperation in the BSR with a special focus on the relationship between 
the Baltic States, Russia and Belarus. 
When looking at this set of initiatives one could come to the conclusion that the EU is, 
by way of its regional development programmes, very present in Northern Europe, and 
more specifically, in the BSR. However, what quality does this kind of political 
interaction have, and what does this specific nature imply for an overall assessment of 
the EU’s actorness in the region? Approaching a region by way of funding regional 
development projects carried out by external, or rather, de-central players could be seen 
as both a blessing and a curse for a region like the BSR.  
The EU’s regional approach as it materialises in frameworks like the INTERREG 
programme always produces winners and losers. In the BSR, the ‘lucky winners’ are 
mainly regions or micro-regional entities situated in strategically important geopolitical 
positions. This does not always refer to geographical centeredness, which would render 
urban areas more relevant than rural ones. It is rather linked to intermediate interests 
coming from ‘the centre’, i.e. alleged EU interests that determine the level of ambition 
and commitment. From this point of view, the obvious winners in the BSR were those 
regions that bordered former communist countries. The losers in turn were and are those 
that did or do not.338 
There is yet another reservation to this sort of EU engagement. Institutional 
arrangements like the INTERREG complex have often been criticised for encouraging 
competition instead of actual cooperation, and thus, largely falling short of their 
ambition to enhance positive regional and trans-regional interdependence.339 Critics 
have also expressed the concern that the institutional style of INTERREG is likely to 
benefit the official or public sector as well as the big corporations that hold close 
contacts with public officials, while excluding smaller “grass root” players 
systematically because of their limited structural and administrative capabilities and 
formal incompatibility with the programme requirements.340 However, these reproaches 
would have to be studied on thorough empirical grounds before validating them as 
significant aspects in the debate. 
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IV. The EU Neighbourhood Policy  
The idea of establishing a specific policy framework for the European neighbourhood 
entered the official EU working agenda in early 2002, while the negotiations for the 
2004 enlargements were moving towards conclusion. The growing awareness about the 
geopolitical challenges that the ‘Big Bang’ EU enlargement was expected to entail built 
the major source of stimulation for this policy initiative.  
In contrast to previous enlargement rounds, this one was different in terms of size and 
territorial extent. Moreover, its geostrategic implications also added a new factor to the 
logic of the European project, which therefore entered a crucial stage. The upcoming 
enlargements were not only expected to bring the EU into direct contact with new areas 
of strategic interests. It was also becoming clear that the EU borders would eventually 
be shifted to the very eastern, and probably ultimate, limits of Europe, leaving outside a 
number of states that are unlikely to ever become candidates for formal membership. 
While the previous history of European integration had been one of permanent 
expansion, the EU had now come to the point where enlargement was about drawing 
lines of ultimate exclusion.  
In order to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines across the European continent, 
the European Commission set out to develop a respective policy framework that would 
help to “promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the 
Union” and to enhance the establishment of a “ring of friends with whom the EU enjoys 
close, peaceful and cooperative relations.341 The ENP addresses all neighbouring 
countries of the EU that do not have a mid-term perspective for full membership. 
Therefore, it does not involve current candidate countries such as Turkey and Croatia, 
and until recently, Romania and Bulgaria, or the Western Balkans. Today, the ENP 
covers sixteen countries including Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, 
Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, 
Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. 
In April 2002, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) posed a 
request to the then External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, and the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, to 
elaborate ideas and suggestions for the EU policy towards its post-enlargement 
neighbourhood. The letter resulting from this inquiry was presented at an informal 
meeting of foreign ministers in September 2002, but did not get much political 
attention.342 The Copenhagen European Council first endorsed the political ambition to  
                                                 
341  See Wider Europe – Neighbourhood. A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and 
Southern Neighbours. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament. COM(2003) 104 final, 11 March 2003, p. 4. 
342  WALLACE William: Looking After the Neighbourhood. Responsibilities for the EU-25. London 
School of Economics, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, 2003/03. London 2003, p. 2. 
According to exclusive sources cited by Mureşan, the letter was based on a British initiative with 
seminal contributions coming from Anna Lindh, then Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. See 
MUREŞAN Ioana: The European Neighbourhood Policy. A New Framework for Europeanization? 
In: MOIA Mihai (ed.): Working Paper of the European Institute of Romania, No. 15:2005. Bucharest 
2005, p. 15. 
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take forward relations with neighbouring countries based on shared political and economic 
values, [...] to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity 
within and beyond the new borders of the Union.343 
It also reaffirmed that enlargement would serve to strengthen relations with Russia and 
called for enhanced relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Southern 
Mediterranean countries to be based on a long term approach promoting reform, 
sustainable development and trade. At the same time, the Council also emphasised the 
European perspective offered to the countries of the Western Balkans in the context of 
the Stabilisation and Association Process.344 In March 2003, the European Commission 
then launched its ‘Wider Europe’ Communication, which laid the ground for the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework, presenting its major rationale and 
specifying the methodology that the new policy should be based upon. The 
consideration lying at the core of the ENP initiative was that 
over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and 
sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in 
close cooperation with the neighbours. [...] “The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens 
and those of the new member states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to 
ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism. The EU should aim to develop 
a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU 
enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations. 345 
This ‘Wider Europe’ Communication was followed by a lively debate among the EU 
member states. In the course of 2003, drawing on the proposals that resulted from these 
discussions, a neighbourhood policy instrument was developed, destined to serve the 
implementation of the ENP in the field of regional cooperation. In view of the changing 
circumstances following the 2004 enlargements, the Commission decided to revise the 
array of existing financial instruments for regional development. The Communication 
“Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument” released in July 2003, 
addressed the issue of enhanced trans-border cooperation with partner states along 
external borders of the EU for the programming period of 2007-2013, pointing at the 
coordination problems caused by the range and variety of financial programmes.346 The 
implementation of the new instrument was organised in two phases. During the first 
transition period (2004-2006), the existing financial instruments (INTERREG, MEDA, 
TACIS, PHARE) were harmonised through the creation of so-called Neighbourhood 
Programmes, which were established either as new projects or as adapted succession 
programmes. To this end, projects involving partners from both EU member states and 
Russia/Belarus were imposed joint application, project selection and decision making 
procedures. The Baltic Sea INTERREG IIIB project, for instance, was converted into 
the “Baltic Sea Region INTERREG IIIB Neighbourhood Programme” as from 2004.347 
                                                 
343  Presidency Conclusions. Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002. DOC 15917/02, 
29 January 2003, pt. 22.  
344  See ibd., pt. 23-24. 
345  Wider Europe – Neighbourhood. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament. COM(2003) 104 final, 11 March 2003, p. 3 and 4. 
346  See Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument. Communication from the Commission. 
COM(2003) 393, 1 July 2003. 
347  For more details on the Neighbourhood Programme for the Baltic Sea Region, see the official 
programme website www.bsrinterreg.net [26 December 2007.  
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During the second phase of implementation beginning with the next budget cycle (2007-
2014), cooperation will be further enhanced with increased funding and harmonized 
instruments to eventually replace the existing programmes. The main idea behind the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) has been to remove the 
main obstacle to joint cross-border projects, i.e. the incompatibility of EU funding 
instruments, and to overcome situations where cooperation projects involving partners 
from inside and outside the EU would have to apply to different EU funding 
instruments, namely INTERREG for inside the Union, and e.g. TACIS for external 
partners such as Russia or Belarus.348 In recent years, the range and specificity of the 
existing financial instruments have caused considerable problems, since geographically 
they often operated in similar areas, but on different sides of the EU border. As a result, 
each project partner had to follow different rules and conditions for different funding 
programmes. In many cases, parallel projects in adjacent areas could not cooperate 
directly because the timing and availability of funds was largely asymmetric. To name 
an example: the Russian-Finnish ‘Culture-Savo’ project that aimed at fostering the 
cultural relations between St. Petersburg and South Savo (Finland) received 
INTERREG funding, but had to wait for one year until the TACIS funding was 
accredited. In the intervening period, the project partners found it difficult to build up 
cross-border relations to the extent they wished.349 By replacing the existing 
geographical and thematic programmes, this new approach to regional development 
funding aims not only to simplify administrative procedures but also to provide for 
genuine cross-border instruments. The joint programmes conducted in the ENPI 
framework will bring member states and partner states sharing a common border closer 
together, and thus, increase the effectivity of funding.350  
In October 2003, the European Commission was mandated to prepare proposals for 
country-specific ENP Action Plans (APs) to be implemented by the end of June 2004. 
This practical step was followed by a broader conceptual input, the ENP Strategy Paper 
published in May 2004.351 It was intended to complete and elaborate the foundations of 
the ENP as laid out in the ‘Wider Europe’ Communication. In late 2004, the first seven 
APs were proposed for Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, 
Tunisia and Ukraine. In 2005, the Commission started to prepare further five, including 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia and Lebanon. In late 2006, the Commission 
launched another significant communication on the “General approach to enable ENP 
partner countries to participate in Community agencies and Community pro-
                                                 
348  Even though Russia decided not to be part of the overall ENP, and instead to opt for the formally 
different, but practically similar EU-Russia Common Spaces Partnership, Russian partners will also 
be eligible for funding in the ENPI framework. To this end, the name of the instrument has been 
changed from New Neighbourhood Instrument (NNI) into European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI). 
349  See website of INTERACT, Forum for the exchange of experiences in INTERREG Funding 
www.interact-eu.net [25 December 2007]. 
350  For more details on the new financial instrument, see website of the EU on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm [25 December 2007]. 
351  See European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper. Communication from the Commission. 
COM(2004) 373, 12 May 2004. 
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grammes.”352 The institutional design of the ENP has been criticised for its “optimistic 
reliance on the well-established model of enlargement” even though the circumstances 
conditioning the success of the ENP are very different from the pre-accession situation 
of the Central and Eastern European States.353 Another structural reference can be 
identified for the EU ND. The ENP built on the policy model of the EU ND, with 
particular emphasis on the advantages of the structural openness in the context of 
regional and sub-regional cooperation.  
The Northern Dimension currently provides the only regional framework in which the EU 
participates with its Eastern partners to address trans-national and cross-border issues. […] 
New initiatives to encourage regional cooperation between Russia and the Western NIS 
[Newly Independent States – Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus] might also be considered. 
These could draw upon the Northern Dimension concept to take a broader and more 
inclusive approach to dealing with neighbourhood issues.354 
Another instance where the EU ND was explicitly mentioned as an exemplary model 
was the combat of environmental threats in the ENP framework.  
Efforts to combat trans-boundary pollution – air, sea, water or land – should be modelled on 
the collaborative approach taken by the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership.355 
These structural references notwithstanding, the institutional role the ENP has taken 
over within the CFSP of the Union has nevertheless derogated the visibility of the North 
and the Northern agenda. The ENP stands for the general tendency of the EU of rather 
turning to the East and the unsettled South than to the decent and uncontroversial North. 
In fact, the challenges emerging from these geographical areas are far more acute, and 
thus, more essential for the Union to be tackled. The success of the EU’s performance in 
its disconcerted neighbourhood must be seen as a key factor to determine its 
international standing as well as its legitimacy and acceptance on the global scene. 
B. The EU Northern Dimension – A General Overview 
Policy issues specifically addressing the Northern ‘near abroad’ of the Union first 
entered the EU agenda when the Nordic Countries, and especially Sweden and Finland 
began to shift their political attention from the European Economic Area (EEA) to the 
more comprehensive European integration project and their future membership in the 
EU.356 However, not even the preparations for the Swedish and the Finnish accession in 
                                                 
352  General approach to enable ENP partner countries to participate in Community agencies and 
Community programmes. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament. COM(2006) 724, 4 December 2006. 
353  See GEBHARD Carmen: Assessing EU Actorness Towards its ‘Near Abroad’. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Conference Paper, presented at the Centre of International Studies, 
University of Cambridge in April 2007. Maastricht/Stockholm 2007, p. 18.  
354  Wider Europe – Neighbourhood. A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. 
COM(2003) 104 final, 11 March 2003, p. 8. 
355  Ibd., p. 12. For a critical discussion of the structural references to the EU ND, see VAHL Marius: 
Models for the European Neighbourhood Policy. The European Economic Area and the Northern 
Dimension. In: CEPS Working Document No. 218/ February 2005.  
356  See CATELLANI Nicola: The EU’s Northern Dimension. Testing a New Approach to Neighbour-
hood Relations? Utrikespolitiska Institutet, Research Report 35, Stockholm 2003, p. 2. 
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1995 directly resulted in a distinct policy framework for this part of the continent. The 
establishment of the EU ND dates back to a Finnish initiative that was first brought up 
and circulated in late 1996, and officially promoted in 1997 by the then Finnish Prime 
Minister Paavo Lipponen. The formal launch of the official EU policy occurred in 
November 1998, in the form of a communication by the European Commission.357 The 
following chapter provides an introductory outline of the ND, focusing in particular on 
the content of the statutory documents and the most important steps in the course of the 
implementation process. This will be followed by a critical discussion of the policy.358  
I. Policy Outline 
The official communication on the EU ND was launched in response to a request posed 
by the European Council held in Luxembourg in December 1997, which resulted from 
the above-mentioned Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI). The policy is a 
common undertaking by the European Commission and the EU Member States together 
with a group of partners. The Commission plays the leading role in the implementation 
of the policy. It is responsible for project programming according to the EU ND action 
plans and for the proposition of appropriate follow up measures. The policy was 
designed as a regional dimension within the external and cross-border policies of the 
EU, intending to cover the Baltic Sea Region, the Arctic Sea Region including Iceland 
and Norway and North West Russia. It seeks to address the specific challenges of these 
regions, which result from specificities like the harsh climate, the long distances and the 
extreme disparities in living standard and welfare as well as the ecological sensitivity of 
the Baltic and the Arctic sea regions. It aims to create security and stability in this part 
of the continent, putting special emphasis on the enhancement of a safe, clean and 
accessible environment. Another major aim is to increase cooperation between the EU 
Member States and the European neighbourhood, most particularly Russia. In fact, the 
early working documents circulated in the EU ND context showed a clear focus on the 
EU policy towards Russia. In its conclusions, the European Council of Cardiff (June 
1998) emphasised the significance of “the commitment of the EU to help Russian 
efforts to tackle the problem of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste in North-West 
Russia and notes that such work might be taken forward under the proposed Northern 
Dimension”359 as the single priority at this point of the policy development process. The 
EU ND Communication launched in November 1998 then sought to  
 
– recall the Union’s activities and instruments with regard to the northern dimension; 
– set out the challenges facing the region;  
– identify areas where the EU could provide added value; 
– establish guidelines and operational recommendations for future action. 
 
While highlighting the human and economic potential of the region, the document put 
again particular emphasis on the significance of the bilateral relations towards Russia.  
                                                 
357  Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union. Communication from the Commission. 
COM(1998) 589 final, 25 November 1998. 
358  See chapter “The EU Northern Dimension – Showcase for the Swedish-Finnish Divide?”, p. 132-, 
and chapter “Evaluation: The EU ND Reconsidered” (p. 148-) for a critical reconsideration of the 
policy in view of the Swedish-Finnish comparison. 
359  Presidency Conclusions. Cardiff European Council, 15 and 16 June 1998. SN 150/1/98, pt. 79. 
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The Northern region is also the Union’s only direct geographical link with the Russian 
Federation and, as such, is important for co-operation between the EU and that country.360 
The EU ND Communication expressed the clear intent that the EU ND was going to be 
based upon existing activities and policy instruments. The EU ND should by no means 
lead to the duplication of current structures and policies. The policy tools at hand should 
be employed in a coordinated way in order to serve the essential objectives of 
facilitating economic and political cooperation, and to enhance the development of 
networks in the fields of infrastructure, telecommunications, energy and transport.  
The European Union strongly supports regional co-operation across the continent of 
Europe. In Northern Europe, regional co-operation is promoted by existing regional fora, 
notably the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Barents Euro Arctic Council 
(BEAC), in which the European Commission participates, and the Arctic Council. The 
Northern Dimension ensures that the Union’s activities and available instruments continue 
to focus on this region. [...] It can contribute to the strengthening of the Union’s external 
policies and reinforcement of the positive interdependence between Russia and the Baltic 
Sea region and the European Union, notably by achieving further synergies and coherence 
in these policies and actions.361  
The Commission identified the dramatic disparities in living standards as one of the 
most pressing challenges to be tackled in the region. Again, the official threat 
assessment in this context largely focussed on Russia. 
Differences in border areas between the Union and the Russian Federation are considerable. 
In the Russian Federation the infant mortality rate is today approximately six times higher 
than in neighbouring Finland. Life expectancy at birth is below 57 years in Russia, 77 in 
Finland. Narrowing down the disparities in living standards is today one of the major 
challenges for the Northern region.362 
The communication also pointed at the important issues of energy, transport and natural 
resources. On the one hand, the region is said to bear enormous potential for further oil 
and gas exploitation, on the other, the Northern European environment is very 
vulnerable to progressive ecological degradation. Once again, Russia is mentioned as 
the primary example given the extent of environmental risks emanating from outdated 
and inefficient technologies in oil extraction and mining.363 A similar distribution of 
priorities is given in the context of nuclear safety where Russia, most particularly its 
Western North, is perceived as a major source of potential threat. 
The treatment of nuclear waste in North West Russia is not at an adequate level of safety. 
Large quantities of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel are not properly managed or 
stored, especially on the Kola Peninsula. This is an important problem in which the 
European Community, Russia, the US, and Norway, are already engaged, for example in the 
framework of the Barents Euro Arctic Council.364 
                                                 
360  Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union. Communication from the Commission. 
COM(1998) 589 final, 25 November 1998, pt. 5. 
361  Ibd., pt. 9, 10 and 11. 
362  Ibd., pt. 13. 
363  See ibd., pt. 16 and 17. 
364  Ibd., pt. 18. 
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This quotation does not only show again that the EU ND has a very strong focus on the 
relationship towards Russia but that it also builds on existing structures both within and 
outside the Union. References to regional organisations like the Barents Euro Arctic 
Council add a certain decentralising aspect to the policy since responsibilities appear to 
be “outsourced”, and thus, shifted away from the supranational level of action. In the 
context of the economic growing potential, the communication also emphasises the 
important role of the Baltic States, stressing that the EU highly acknowledges the Baltic 
efforts in light of their upcoming accession.365  
The communication touches upon a set of challenges that the EU ND will seek to 
address, or at least, where it intends to contribute to the development and materialisation 
of regional counter-measures or long-term solutions. The document mentions illegal 
trafficking in drugs, nuclear material, illegal migration, criminal activities across 
borders, money laundering, social, training (managerial and vocational) and health 
issues, including reinforcement of consumer protection, veterinary and phytosanitary 
control as some of the most urgent threats that are to be addressed in the near future.366 
The communication then proceeds to identify areas where the Union could offer an 
added value; priority is given to:367 
 
– the exploitation of natural resources (especially gas and non-energy raw material),  
– the development of communications and transport,  
– environmental protection,  
– health (combat certain diseases)  
– nuclear safety,  
– trade and commercial cooperation,  
– research and technology,  
– fighting criminal activities across borders, as well as  
– social problems. 
 
The guidelines for the financial implementation of the EU ND strongly emphasise the 
institutional design of the whole policy undertaking, since it also suggests a structural 
reliance on existing structures and tools. 
Concerning the assistance programmes relevant for the Northern Dimension, the European 
Community will follow the existing procedures, within existing budgets. Assistance will 
continue to be provided through existing programmes.368 
The EU ND is meant to operate through the existing EU financing instruments (TACIS, 
Phare and INTERREG), aiming to achieve added value of them. International financial 
institutions (IFI) (e.g. the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
Nordic Investment Bank, the Nordic Environment Finance Cooperation, the Nordic 
Project Fund) and the private sector also play an important role in the financial handling 
of the policy. This implies in the first place that the policy is not provided with self-
standing allocations within the main EC budget.  
 
                                                 
365  See ibd., pt. 21. 
366  See ibd., pt. 24. 
367  See ibd., pt. 27. 
368  Ibd., pt. 29. 
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Eventually, the document recommended that the Commission should develop 
institutional arrangements to enhance effective coordination of existing policy 
instruments and that studies should be undertaken and funded by the community in 
order to develop expertise and assess the potential and needs specific for the region. By 
way of conclusion, the communication also offered concrete guidelines to frame the 
implementation process. Special emphasis and detailed instructions were given in the 
fields of energy, environment and nuclear safety, cross border cooperation, trade, 
transport and health.  
II. Policy Implementation and Progression  
Since its formal launch almost one decade ago, the EU ND has gone through an 
extensive development of implementation and further conceptual modification and 
innovation. The course of progression has generally been rather erratic with 
distinguished activist phases followed by long periods of stagnation. Given the 
numerous stages that the policy framework has gone through, the following overview 
cannot be exhaustive. It focuses on major achievements in the overall implementation 
process, and briefly indicates the respective formal consequences.  
 
09/97 Launch of the Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) 
12/98 Vienna European Council adopted formally acknowledged the Finnish initiative 
06/99 Cologne European Council adopted “Guidelines for the implementation of the ND” 
“The implementation and further development of the ND should be done in close 
consultation with the partners through the existing agreements and within regional 
bodies such as the CBSS and the BEAC. Council recommends that the relevant bodies 
should consider how to create synergies between the existing EU-programmes.”369 
11/99 Commission Communication “Strengthening the ND of European Energy Policy” 
“Energy has been identified as one of the key sectors in which significant added value 
of the EU ND is expected. The long term potential for the exploitation of oil, gas and 
non-energy raw materials (e.g. non-ferrous metal) is huge, but will require substantial 
improvements in energy and transport infrastructure.”370 
11/99 1st Ministerial Conference on the EU ND, initiated and hosted by the Finnish EU 
Presidency; adoption of an “Inventory of current EU ND activities”  
12/99 Helsinki European Council, invited the Commission to prepare a ND Action Plan (AP) 
06/99 Feira European Council adopted the 1st “Action Plan for the ND in the external and 
cross-border policies of the EU (2001-2003)” (ND AP) 
2001 The EU ND enters the operational phase 
03/01 Establishment of the “Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership” (NDEP) 
by the IFI active in the region (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Nordic Investment Bank, World Bank), intending to signal the endorsement of a new 
approach in promoting environmental investments, and in order to coordinate efforts to 
bring solutions to the legacy of environmental damage in the ND Area.. The European 
Investment Bank joined the NDEP, when their mandate was extended to 
environmental loans in Russia.371 
                                                 
369  Guidelines for the implementation of the ND, adopted by the Council of 31 May 1999. DOC 
9034/99. 
370  Strengthening the Northern Dimension of European Energy Policy. Communication from the 
Commission. COM(1999) 164, November 1999. 
371  For in-depth information, see the official NDEP website www.ndep.org [23 January 2007]. 
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04/01 2nd Ministerial Conference on the EU ND in Luxembourg hosted by the Swedish 
Presidency in reaction to a Finnish proposal. 
06/01 Göteborg European Council endorsed a “Full Report on ND Policies” taking stock of 
the activities undertaken to implement the Feira Action Plan and also outlining ideas 
and proposals for the continuation of the ND initiative. 
07/02 launch of a Support Fund for the implementation of the NDEP; objective of the Fund 
was to support the NDEP by mobilising grant funds to leverage IFI loans.372 
08/02 3rd Ministerial meeting in Illulisaat/Greenland; discussed guidelines for a 2nd ND AP; 
03/03 establishment of the Northern Dimension Research Centre (NORDI) in Lappeenranta 
06/03 Commission adopted 2nd Action Plan for the EU ND (2004-2006) 
10/03 establishment of the ND Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being (NDPHS) 
08/04 launch of the Northern Dimension Information System (internet-based) 
intended to provide a technical means to enable the dissemination of information in the 
ND context, covering the wide range of activities carried forward under the NDAP;  
10/04 1st Senior Officials Meeting (SOM),  
aiming to assess the implementation of the Action Plan, to review progress to date, to 
identify areas in which a further stimulus would be necessary 
11/05 4th Ministerial meeting held in Brussels, approves “Guidelines for the Development of 
a Political Declaration and a Policy Framework Document for the ND from 2007” 
11/06 Council approves “Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension”373 
01/07 The “New” EU ND enters into force 
02/07 Parliamentary Conference on the Northern Dimension 
Table 12: Chronology – the Implementation Process of the EU ND 
III. Preliminary Evaluation: What Role for the EU ND? 
The question of whether the EU ND was or still is rather a success story or a failure has 
recently dominated the academic debate about the policy. If ever the main ambition of 
the Finnish initiative was to get the “Northern issues” onto the official EU working 
agenda, then the outcome might certainly be seen as a major achievement. The EU ND 
has brought some more Europeanness to the North, while before, most “southern” 
Europeans considered it as something extremely remote and peripheral. To some extent, 
the EU ND can also be regarded as a result of some kind of new Nordic consciousness, 
some call it “Northernness”374, after the fall of the bipolar structure of world politics. 
“That implies for the EU a dilution of the strict distinction between internal and external 
policy, given the fact that the external borders of the EU are overlapped by that 
Northernness.”375 Indeed, one of the main objectives of the EU ND was to counteract 
tendencies towards a new European divide at an early stage.376  
                                                 
372  For more information about the NDEP Support Fund, see Rules of the Northern Dimension 
Environmental Partnership Support Fund. NDEP 02/50 Rev. 1, 30 November 2005. 
373  The relaunch of the EU ND in 2006 will be discussed thoroughly in chapter “Promoting the ‘Finnish 
Perspective’ – Finland’s EU Presidency 2006”, p. 143-.  
374  See JOENNIEMI Pertti: The North meets Europe. On the European Union’s Northern Dimension. 
Working Paper, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). Copenhagen 1999, p. 2. 
375  DUBOIS Jeroen: The Northern Dimension as Prototype of the Wider Europe Framework Policy. 
University of Liverpool, Working Paper. Liverpool 2004, p. 4.  
376  See STENLUND Peter: Implementation of a Northern Dimension. In: Northern Research Forum 
(ed.): North meets North. Proceedings of the First Northern Research Forum, held in Akureyri and 
Bessastaðir, Iceland. 4-6 November 2002, pp. 126-129, here p. 126.  
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Generally, the EU ND was certainly an important policy initiative to foil the general 
tendency in the continental European perspective of “northernizing” the Nordic member 
states, i.e. “imbuing the North with connotations of considerable peripherality 
somewhere at the margins of, if not outside Europe.”377 From this point of view, the EU 
ND cannot only be seen as a return of the North onto the European scene but also as a 
conceptual broadening of the term “North”. However, Joenniemi has a point with the 
assertion that “making it into the sphere of intra-Union diplomacy” does not yet turn the 
EU ND into a success story.378 Some emphasise the fact that the EU ND has, since its 
creation, been remarkably developed and advanced. Does that automatically imply that 
it can be regarded as an overall success? In the early years after the formal 
establishment of the EU ND, its institutional specificities often provoked irritations in 
both the political and the academic field.  
Quite a few observers doubted the utility and the wisdom of such a concept. For many the 
term was already strange: ‘dimension’ could mean different things, ranging from hard 
security to environmental and local cooperation.379 
In the first years of its existence, the EU ND was very much about political declarations 
and affirmative reports. In the wake of its establishment, many perceived the EU ND as 
some sort of “open frame” or an “imagined empty space” that still had to be filled with 
content in terms of concrete projects and concepts for further implementation.380 Still 
today, despite several progressions made in the implementation process, the EU ND 
remains a considerably fuzzy and vague policy concept. The EU ND has never been 
very substantial in institutional terms since it built almost exclusively on already 
existing financial and legal instruments. Most significantly, there never was a specific 
allocation for the policy framework within the general EC budget. Additionally, the 
geographical coverage of the EU ND appeared quite unclear from the beginning. For 
some it was mainly limited to the Baltic Sea area, most importantly including Russia 
and the Baltic States. For others, in turn, it was certainly to include the far up North 
meaning Iceland as well as the wider Arctic Circle.  
Furthermore the ‘real’ objectives appeared hidden: was it just a Finnish initiative proposed 
mainly in view of this country’s own geographical interest or the starting point for the 
policy of a larger group of northern countries?381 
 
                                                 
377  JOENNIEMI Pertti/LEHTI Marko: On the encounter between the Nordic and the northern. Torn 
Apart but Meeting Again? Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI): Working Paper, 11/2001, 
p. 6.  
378  See JOENNIEMI Pertti: Can Europe Be Told From The North? Tapping into the EU’s Northern 
Dimension. In: MÖLLER Frank/PEHKONEN Samu (eds): Encountering the North. Cultural 
Geography, International Relations, Northern Landscapes. Aldershot 2003, pp. 221-260, here p. 223.  
379  WESSELS Wolfgang: Introduction. The Northern Dimension as a Challenging Task. In: 
BONVICINI Gianni/VAAHTORANTA Tapani/WESSELS Wolfgang (eds): The Northern EU. 
National Views on the Emerging Security Dimension. Helsinki 2000, pp. 18-29, here p. 20. 
380  See CRONBERG Tarja: Transforming Russia From Military to Peace Economy. London 2003, p. 
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381  WESSELS Wolfgang: Introduction. The Northern Dimension as a Challenging Task. In: 
BONVICINI Gianni/VAAHTORANTA Tapani/WESSELS Wolfgang (eds): The Northern EU. 
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Indeed, the question of objectives, and relatedly, of the interests and strategic goals of 
the single players involved has been ambiguous right away. One aspect that proved to 
be a major weakness of the EU ND was the fact that the policy did not get equal support 
among the Member States. Repeated Finnish exhortations about the joint ‘European 
responsibility’ towards the Northeastern neighbourhood did certainly not change 
anything about the sceptical attitude of the Southern Member States that feared to be 
disadvantaged by this shift of political attention to the North.  
What certainly contributed to this effect of lacking awareness among the extra-regional 
Member States was the set of challenges appealed to by the Finnish initiators appeared 
to be far less acute and urgent than did, for example the complex security political 
situation on the Balkans. This scepticism and reluctance was not limited to the 
intergovernmental Member State context. What also hindered a more dynamic 
development of the policy was the distinct lack of enthusiasm on the side of the 
European Commission, which could already be told from the final wording of the policy 
itself, but was also evident in the way the implementation process was administered.382  
This again leads to another weakness of the EU ND, which is related to the overall 
standing of the policy on the EU geopolitical working agenda. This can be assessed by 
way of comparing it to the respective standing of other EU policies, and by relating each 
and either basic objectives in view of their potential complementarity or competition. In 
the early years, the EU ND has often been perceived as “just a synonym for a useful 
policy vis-à-vis Russia.”383 Critics argued that the EU would rather need a 
comprehensive policy not only directed towards one part of Russia but towards several 
geographical and sectoral areas of common concern and interest. The EU ND would 
then be integrated (!) into a common EU strategy towards Russia, and thus, be 
incorporated on a more comprehensive framework. This effect of the EU ND being 
‘swallowed’ by subsequent or concurrent EU policies with regional impact will be taken 
up in the next chapter about ‘the EU as a regional (f)actor in Northern Europe.  
C. Preliminary Conclusions: The EU as a Regional (F)Actor in Northern Europe 
The question of what quality the EU’s (f)actorness has in respect to Northern Europe is 
certainly difficult to be answered within one single chapter. As pointed out at the 
beginning of this section, the EU has two different ways of how it can impact on a 
region like the BSR and other meso-regions in Europe. The two channels are indeed 
available in every context of European integration: the EU can either perform diffusely, 
in the sense of a broad normative framework with an alleged “disciplinary” power,384 or 
it can operate actively by establishing concrete policy instruments for a certain policy 
field or indeed, a specific region.  
 
                                                 
382  See HAUKKALA Hiski, interview on 22 November 2006. Unpublished personal notes. This aspect 
will be taken up in chapter “The Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative”, p. 132-, and in chapter 
“Evaluation: The EU ND Reconsidered”, p. 148-. 
383  WESSELS Wolfgang: Introduction. The Northern Dimension as a Challenging Task. In: 
BONVICINI Gianni/VAAHTORANTA Tapani/WESSELS Wolfgang (eds): The Northern EU. 
National Views on the Emerging Security Dimension. Helsinki 2000, pp. 18-29, here p. 20. 
384  MOROFF Holger: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): European Soft Security Policies. The Northern 
Dimension. Kauhava 2002, pp. 12-36, here p. 17. 
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The global assessment of the EU’s actorness towards its Northern ‘outskirts’ as it has 
been conducted in the course of the previous chapters could lead to the conclusion that 
the first ‘diffuse’ channel of governance projection is far more pronounced in the 
Northern European area. This implies not least that the EU engages in European regions 
with widely differing intensities. On the one hand, it depends on the geostrategic 
priorities of the Union, on the other, it is also related to the perspective of single 
member states and their respective power of influencing the EU’s overall orientation 
towards a certain part of the continent. In EU terms, the distribution of financial 
resources is the first and foremost dependent variable in this regard.385 The most 
prominent example in this context is the permanent competition between the 
Mediterranean States and the Northern and Northeastern states when it comes to the 
distribution of EU funding. The BSR and more generally, Northern Europe has entered 
the EU working map only recently. However, when in the course of the 1990s the 
overall EU ambition for Eastern enlargement emerged, suspicion among the 
Mediterranean Member States started to grow exponentially. Most particularly Spain 
and Portugal feared to be sidelined by the EU prospects of actively furthering the post 
Soviet transformation in the European East and Northeast.  
Considering the overall constitution of today’s EU approach towards the North 
including Northwestern Russia and the wider European neighbourhood, the EU ND 
does not appear to take centre stage, or rather, to form a genuine framework in terms of 
an overarching policy structure that actually helps to pool the instrumental resources 
employed in the region. The EU approach towards the North is still rather fragmented, 
and cannot be said to be focussing on or to be framed by the EU ND. The EU internal 
standing of the ND has been considerably challenged by the emergence of other EU 
policies with geopolitical or regional implications, e.g. the bilateral agreements and 
partnerships the Union upholds with some of the regional actors. The establishment of 
the ENP in 2004, as well as the conclusion of the Four Spaces agreement reached in 
2003, with the central aim of strengthening the bilateral relations with Russia, have led 
to a certain marginalisation of the EU ND as a stand-alone policy. A similar effect may 
be related to the 2004 enlargements that virtually shifted the focus of the EU’s regional 
engagement towards the East, and away from the North. Haukkala anticipated the mid-
term consequences this step in European integration history might have for the ND:  
After enlargement the ND will have only three partners, Iceland, Norway and Russia, of 
which two will have more privileged avenues for their dealings with the Union, especially 
in the context of the European Economic Area agreement. This will result in a situation 
where the Northern Dimension will become centered almost entirely on Russia.386 
Haukkala pointed out that a Baltic enlargement could also have a certain positive effect 
on the post enlargement standing of the ND: the accession of the Baltic States would 
prolongate the EU border with Russia and could thus create an opening and demand for 
an increase in cross-border interregional cooperation. However, it cannot be denied that 
                                                 
385  See SCHULZ Günther: Wie weit liegt Brϋssel von der Ostsee entfernt? Die Rolle der Europäischen 
Union in Nordosteuropa. In: WELLMANN Christian (ed.): Kooperation und Konflikt in der 
Ostseeregion. Gegenwartsfragen 81. Kiel 1999, pp. 22-36, here p. 23. 
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the EU enlargement policy, the EU Strategic Partnership with Russia as well as the ENP 
have opened new policy channels that progressively sidelined the EU ND and to some 
extent even challenged its very existence on the geopolitical working agenda of the EU. 
By adopting the EU ND, the EU may be perceived to have shown a certain level of 
awareness about the specific needs of the Northern European sphere. However, 
apparently, and in contrast to other policies such as the ENP, in the context of the EU 
ND the EU did not make full use of its “opportunity to discipline a sphere previously at 
the fringes of its grasp.”387 This applies particularly to the attitude of the European 
Commission, whose commitment has remained somewhat vague and inconsistent 
throughout the whole implementation process. In the ‘wider Europe’ context of the 
ENP, the Commission has often been said to be striving to expand its foreign political 
role given that the conclusion of the enlargement negotiations had considerably 
narrowed its domain.388 In contrast, the Commission never seized this chance in the 
context of the Northern Dimension, and instead, chose to adhere to a reluctant position 
where much symbolic action was and is accompanied by flowery and uniquely vague 
and reluctant policy statements.389 
The following chapter intends to prepare a more in-depth discussion of the EU ND, 
putting special focus on the role and attitude of Sweden and Finland as two major 
regional stakeholders, in the specific context of the implementation of the policy. 
Sweden and Finland are compared alongside a set of factors that appear to account for 
and impact on the way they structure their politico-strategic choices in the BSR, with 
special respect to the EU ND. 
D. Excursus: Mare Europaeum – Whose Mare Nostrum? 
I. The Contended Sea – A Brief Historical Retrospect 
It is very common to use Latin terminologies in the context of seas and their geo-
political and geo-strategic significance. In recent years, the Baltic Sea has often been 
labelled the “European Sea” (or Mare Europaeum) given the fact that through the 1995 
and 2004 enlargements, it has almost become an inland sea of the EU.390 The notion of 
Mare Nostrum (Our Sea), on the other hand, alludes to the Southern European 
counterpart of the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean. It came into use as an affectionate 
expression the ancient Romans assigned to it in the course of the expansion of the 
Roman Empire across the wide coastal area of the Mediterranean and beyond. The 
                                                 
387  See JOENNIEMI Pertti: The Northern Dimension. Allegiance or Revolt? In: HEININEN 
Lassi/LASSINANTTI Gunnar (eds): Security in the European North. From ‘Hard’ to ‘Soft’. 
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388  See MAGEN Amichai: The Shadow of Enlargement. Can the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Achieve Compliance? Stanford Centre on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law 
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Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative”, p. 132-, and in chapter “Evaluation: The EU ND 
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390  See e.g. Baltic Study Net. Introduction to the Baltic Summer School Mare Europaeum, Berlin 23 
July – 6 August 2006. Website of the Centre for Baltic Sea Region Studies (CEBAST) 
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question of the Baltic Sea being a Mare Nostrum implies, equal to the Roman notion, 
that there is an immanent struggle for regional domination as well as certain dynamics 
of expansion and conquest. In the history of Northern Europe, yet another Latin 
expression has gained considerable importance; the notion of Dominium Maris Baltici 
(Dominion of the Baltic Sea) depicts the struggle for regional domination and 
supremacy that the various powers around the Baltic Sea have been leading for more 
than 400 years. The Baltic Sea has traditionally been pivotal to the overall balance of 
power in Northern Europe.391 In fact, early modern BSR history was dominated by 
continuous battles for the maritime control over the sea rim. The table below gives an 
overview of the circumstances characterising the phases of BSR development.392 
 
8200 BC-1100 AD 1100-1500 1600-1939 1939-1989 1989- (current) 
pre-historical time The Hansa Age Dominium Maris 
Baltici 
Iron Curtain Revival and growth 
1st crossing 
trade expansion 
Vikings 
Hanseatic League 
dominates 
Network between 
70 cities around 
the Baltic and the 
North Sea 
Swedish inland sea 
(1660) 
Russian domination 
(18th ct) 
Prussian period (19th 
ct) 
bipolar divide
system of 
Nordic 
balance 
Fall of the Berlin Wall
democratic 
development 
EU enlargement 
NATO enlargement 
Table 13: Phases in the Historical Development of the BSR 
From the 17th to the 20th century, Sweden, Denmark, Germany and Russia struggled for 
hegemony in the Baltic Sea area. During Sweden’s Great Power period in the 17th 
century, the Baltic Sea was considered a Swedish inland sea connecting the 
geographical areas occupied by Sweden. The dominant powers in the 19th and 20th 
century have been Germany and Russia. With the Second World War, the BSR became 
divided for half a century until the end of the Cold War.393 
The BSR was, and still is, a contended area among the regional stakeholders. While 
distant notions of a power related dominion over the region or a struggle for a Baltic 
Mare Nostrum are certainly not neatly applicable to nowadays’ circumstances, this bold 
analogy yet leads us to the issue of the current nature of power balance in the BSR. The 
following section of the study tries to outline the contemporary significance of a notion 
like Mare Nostrum in the BSR context, focussing in particular on the geo-political and 
geo-strategic orientation of Sweden and Finland as two major regional stakeholders. It 
mainly seeks to develop the argument that their foreign, European and regional 
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1492-1772. London 1990. And ØSTERGÅRD Uffe: Eidora Romani Terminus Imperii. Cooperation 
and Integration in Nordic and European Contexts. Jean Monnet Centre, University of Århus, 
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orientation, policy formulation and political conduct are strongly influenced by their 
self-image and their awareness about their geopolitical position.394  
II. What Accounts for Swedish and Finnish Self-Perception? 
Immediately after 1989, Sweden and Finland found themselves in very different 
geopolitical positions, which decisively influenced the politico-strategic choices the two 
countries have taken in the years to come. Their individual war experience proved to be 
one of the major factors determining their individual foreign political self-perception 
after the breakdown of the bipolar global setting. While Finland just as the Baltic States 
had been involved in the global block confrontation, Sweden had largely profited from 
the relative lack of Great Power interest in the European periphery. Because of their 
fortunate geographical position, the overwhelming majority of Swedes was able to live 
through the Cold War without noticing that they were involved in a war. 
Consequently, the [Swedish] population has not yet realised that they came out on the 
winning side. If noticed at all, this new confusing state of affairs is often deplored and many 
almost long back to the bad, but predictable, old days of Cold War confrontation. Because 
of this isolationist mentality the majority of Swedes, contrary to the Finlanders, have tended 
to ignore the Baltic character and determinants of their common history.395 
In the context of block confrontation, Sweden found enough room to pursue its policy 
of active neutrality, performing as a mediator in various global contexts, such as in 
Cuba, Northern Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic (GDR).396 Finland, in 
turn, had been restricted in foreign political terms since any sort of political activism 
could have provoked a dangerous reaction on the systemic level. Its geopolitical role 
during the Cold War was determined by its exposition to Soviet influence.  
Finland is the only small state neighbouring the USSR and not allied to the US that 
managed to avoid Soviet occupation during the Cold War. However, Finland did not occupy 
a sheltered geopolitical position such as Sweden, and was under almost constant Soviet 
pressure. Activism under these conditions would have been extremely dangerous. […] The 
alternative for Finland, given her [Finland’s] geopolitical situation, would have been closer 
diplomatic ties to the Soviet Union. This would have opened further channels for Soviet 
pressure, as well as risking the tenuous relations with the West, which Finland desperately 
sought to maintain, especially in her economic relations.397 
Finland had been more exposed to the logics of the global system confrontation than 
any other of the Nordic states. However, in certain contexts, Finland actually appeared 
to try to take over a more active or even proactive role; probably the most important 
example in this regard is the strong Finnish support for the Commission on Security and 
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Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) not least by hosting the initial conference in Helsinki in 
1975. At a later stage of the Cold War, Finland also played an active part in soothing the 
relationship between the two blocks. Anyway, this Finnish “activism”, if ever it can be 
labelled as such, always focussed on aspects of realpolitik, meaning issues where 
Finland had a vital interest, which was mostly to keep the balance between the blocks 
stable. Generally, Finland tried to maintain as low a foreign political profile as possible, 
trying to adhere to a truly “neutral” position in all contentious global issues. 
If anything, Finland was ‘anti-activist’ during the Cold War, at least if we define activism in 
terms of moral and ecological wrongs and seeking to redress them through public pressure. 
In contrast to most notions of activism, she thus avoided moral judgements and sought 
solutions through consensus and compromise rather than condemnation and pressure.398 
The Finnish attitude was strongly contrasted by the Swedish foreign policy style during 
the Cold War, which reached its peak under Prime Minister Olof Palme. Building on the 
argument of moral greatness and innate normative qualities, he tried to establish 
Sweden internationally as a moral great power (Swed. moraliska stormakten).399 
Presenting itself as a representative not only of the small states and vulnerable actors of 
primarily the Third World, but also as an aggressive defender of the United Nations and 
international law, the main available tool for the protection of the small, Sweden embarked 
under Social Democratic leadership on countless activist expeditions around the globe.400 
Palme’s internationalist activism dominated the Swedish international performance in 
the 1970s and the early 1980s until his assassination in 1986. During the Cold War, the 
Swedish foreign political profile was characterised by a permanent dichotomy between 
an active foreign policy attitude and a passive position in security and defence matters.  
Swedish political activism on the international scene took on such proportions that it 
became something of a trademark of the country, just as neutrality had been beforehand. 
Swedish activism followed two parallel tracks. On the one hand, solidarity with the Third 
World, resulting in an extensive development aid programme, primarily to other small and 
non-aligned countries and movements with a preference for socialist solutions to 
development problems. […] On the other hand, there existed a pacifist track promoting 
world peace, which resulted in a number of political initiatives to encourage global 
disarmament, arms negotiations, as well as Swedish offers to provide mediatory services in 
regional conflicts around the world.401 
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Today, the legacy of these years of bold Swedish internationalism still seems to be 
present in Sweden’s own international role perception.402 Equally, Finland appears to be 
acting in the old context of intra-Nordic inferiority to Sweden, but also to the old great 
power Denmark. The notion of Finland being the Nordic lillebror (Swed. little brother) 
and its closest neighbour, Sweden, Finland’s storebror (Swed. big brother) are still 
common in every-day talk in Northern Europe.403  
III. Small State Theory – The Conduct of Small States in Foreign Policy 
When analysing Swedish and Finnish self-perception, the aspect of small statehood and 
small state thinking must be treated as a strong and important marker. Sweden and 
Finland as well as their Nordic fellow states Denmark, Norway and Iceland could, in 
quantitative terms, all be termed as small states in the conventional sense. However, 
telling from each country’s foreign political conduct and domestic rhetoric, this factual 
state ‘size’ appears not to be always neatly complying with their respective self-
perception. As outlined above, this was particularly evident with Swedish foreign 
politics during the Cold War. Despite its clearly inferior position in respect to the two 
blocks, Sweden chose an activist and to large extents provocative strategy for its overall 
foreign political conduct. The following chapter will present a few elements of 
traditional Small State Theory in order to substantiate the discussion on small statehood 
in foreign policy. This should eventually allow for a more differentiated evaluation of 
notions like the Swedish ‘perceived greatness’ and the Finnish self-image of being the 
‘forever vulnerable and needy second.’404  
1. What Makes a State a ‘Small State’? 
Much literature about small states pays considerable attention to the question of how 
“small states” could be defined. Theorists have employed different measures to define 
the smallness of states: next to the geographical size of a state or its population, also the 
degree of influence in international affairs has been taken as a criterion for analysis.405 
However, various attempts of defining state smallness alongside quantitative criteria, 
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grouping countries by population, geography or any other quantifiable measure, have to 
remain vague. Taking, for instance, the measurement suggested by Clark and Payne, 
which classifies states with a population size between 10 and 15 million as “small”, 
states as different as Belgium and Ecuador would be put into the same category. The 
enormous variety of states that can be labelled “small” in quantitative terms limits the 
applicability of a general small state foreign policy theory.406 Given these 
methodological problems, it remains difficult to operationalise the smallness of states. 
In order to eschew rigid specifications and thus, trying to offer a flexible and 
nevertheless specific definition, Hey made a very pragmatic suggestion: 
The research on small states, despite its attempts at formal definitions, is best characterised 
by and ‘I know one when I see it’ approach to choosing its subject of inquiry. I would argue 
that this approach improves on rigid definitions that fail to reach an agreed-on group of 
small states. It also avoids the intellectual squabbles that invariably arise in reaction to any 
specific definition of a small state. Indeed, the small state literature has been too bogged 
down in such arguments.407 
This individualistic approach succeeds in giving a practicable but vague definition. It 
takes the variety of types of small states into account without refusing the significance 
of smallness as an analytical point of reference.408 Normative approaches, on the other 
hand, suggest definitions that are related to the respective state’s self-perception. The 
perceptive component of psychological and ideological self-imaging takes centre stage.  
The concept of a small state is not least based on the idea of perceptions. That is, if a state’s 
people and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other states’ people 
and institutions perceive that state as small, it shall be so considered.409 
This approach also reflects the model suggested by Rothstein und Keohane: 
A small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of 
its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of others.410 
A small power is a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small 
group, make a significant impact on the system.411 
According to these perception-based approaches, states are deemed small not by any 
objective definition or quantifiable measure, but by their (self)perceived power and role 
on the international or global scene. It appears important to point out that this perceived 
or alleged ‘size’ of a state is always defined with reference to other states.  
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Small [is meant] as small in relation to a much bigger and more powerful actor; ‘small’ as 
‘smaller than’, which may very well mean ‘bigger than’ a number of other actors in several 
ways. A small state may well be geographically extensive or economically or otherwise 
successful or even dominant; although semantically paradoxical, a ‘small’ state may well be 
considered a middle-sized power – as might be the case with Sweden.412 
Goetschel claims that the identity emerging from a state’s self-perception about its own 
size should be regarded as an important, if not as the only direct source of impact, 
“smallness” can have on state conduct or behaviour. Hence, the self-consciousness of 
the small state is said to constitute the major independent variable, either in the narrow 
sense that the state perceives itself as small or relatively minor, and thus, chooses an 
allegedly typical small state attitude; or the state perceives itself as bigger or equal to 
others, and thus, seeks to establish action strategies and adopt attitudes that comply with 
this self-image.413 
2. Is There a Specific Pattern for Small State Foreign Policy Conduct? 
Next to the question of how to define and conceptualise smallness, Small State Theory 
mainly focuses on whether, how and to what extent smallness impacts on the conduct 
and behaviour of a state. Works on this issue have largely emerged in the field of early 
classic Small State Theory, which based on a quantitative definition of state smallness 
and therefore, largely coincided with research on weak states and small power. Inspired 
by the Cold War context, these approaches largely focussed on the role of small states 
within an alleged hierarchical international system as well as on the relative limitation 
of their power and capabilities. Hence, small statehood is equated with material 
inferiority, and thus, has distinct negative connotations.414 Starting from these 
presumptions, classic Small State Theory has identified a set of patterns of behaviour 
that are said to constitute the typical foreign political profile of small states.415 Summing 
up the most commonly cited suggestions in this context, one could list the following 
commonsense assumptions: small states are thought to  
 
– exhibit a low level of participation, presence and activity in world affairs; 
– focus on a narrow scope of foreign policy issues; 
– limit their foreign political engagement to their immediate geographic arena; 
– concentrate on diplomatic and economic alternatives to power-related instruments;  
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– show a particular focus on internationalist principles, norms and rules, such as 
international law and other value and morality related ideals; 
– secure multinational arrangements whenever possible;416  
– choose neutral or mediatory positions in times of both conflict and peace; 
– uphold strong ties of solidarity with and rely on superpowers in order to gain 
protection and resources (“bandwagoning”);417 
– aim to cooperate and avoid conflict with others; 
– particular readiness of cooperation, engagement for de-escalation of conflicts;  
– spend a disproportionate amount of foreign policy resources and efforts on ensuring 
physical and political security and survival. 
 
These general assumptions all build on the notion of smallness in the sense of material 
weakness and endangeredness, and thus, exclusively rely on quantitative criteria. Small 
states are perceived to be limited in their foreign political resources, and therefore, to 
constantly seek to maintain their influence as best as they can “in a realist world in 
which they are at disadvantage.”418 Starting from the assumption that small states suffer 
from a permanent power deficit, it is expected that small states strive for foreign 
political strategies and positions that strengthen their sovereignty in respect to other, 
bigger states.419 Because of their relatively weak power base within the international 
system, small states are expected to act in passive and reactive modes, rather than as 
proactive agents of international change.420  
Despite single historical examples that might support part of these assumptions, the 
establishment of a standard model for small state action strategies in foreign policy 
appears to remain problematic. The most evident weakness of the above-given criteria is 
that most of them are not exclusive or unique to small states but could equally become 
applicable for medium-size or big states. Moreover, as the case of the Nordic group has 
shown, even the bipolar overlay produced by the Cold War setting did not keep small 
states from pursuing each a very different foreign political strategy. Again, small states 
are not unique in this respect, since states generally tend to respond differently to 
similar conditions. Additionally, it needs to be emphasised that since the end of the 
Cold War, small (and therefore weak) statehood is conditioned by the circumstances of 
a multipolar world order. ‘Realist’ power in terms of conventional military potential and 
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the ability of overplaying international competitors with material qualities have become 
less important.  
The concept of the small state has not lost all its significance but much of it: in the present-
day international arena small states have become standard players. Whereas, in the 
traditional sense of the term, the small state was defined by its weakness – especially with 
regard to its dependence on powerful states – the voice of the small state has been 
strengthened under the conditions of present-day international law and international 
politics.421 
With the rising level of international integration and growing interdependence, small 
states defined in quantitative terms gain new opportunities of getting involved and 
engaged internationally at the same level as other, bigger and allegedly more powerful 
states.  
The notion of small states has lost – if ever it has had one – its relevance thanks to 
integrated market, political union, and the advantages of global playing fields. It is not the 
size of a state, which is relevant to its international position. It is its willingness to make 
institutional commitments and create at home a competitive economic, educational, and 
cultural environment.422  
In recent years, many small states have emerged. Møller identified a sheer “proliferation 
of small states” in Europe, that started right after the Second World War and reached a 
new peak after the end of the Cold War.  
We are currently witnessing the birth of a new generation of small states, formed through 
the dissolution of empires and multinational states. The Soviet Union fragmented, with the 
former Union republics opting for statehood, but division has continued beyond that. 
Yugoslavia has likewise disintegrated, as has Czechoslovakia.423 
Even today’s EU can be said to be a Union of small states, with 19 out of 27 Member 
States having less than 11 million inhabitants. The changing circumstances are likely to 
have a positive long-term impact on the overall position of every single small state in 
Europe.424  
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3. Small States and ‘Perceived Greatness’ – ‘Too Big for Their Boots’?425 
Something that appears to have survived the paradigmatic change in world politics at 
the end of the 1980s is the complex of positive connotations that is commonly ascribed 
to small states. Early achievements in Small State Theory have significantly contributed 
to the establishment of some sort of small state myth, a close to romantic concept about 
small statehood and alleged qualities and specificities of small states operating in 
international politics. In contrast to the pejorative idea of small state weakness in the 
anarchy of the international system, the positive myth emphasises the normative 
qualities small states are likely to develop if exposed to a world dominated by the logic 
of conventional power and superiority. Leopold Kohr has been among the most fervent 
advocates of small statehood, or more generally, of compact and easily controllable 
social entities. Building on his general criticism of neoliberal rationalism and the 
dogmatic belief in permanent economic progress and stable growth, he maintained that 
contented smallness would offer exceptional opportunities for a state (or another entity) 
to develop its normative strength, and to substantiate its moral qualities in terms of 
virtuousness and integrity. From this perspective, Kohr established the popular phrase 
of “small is beautiful”.426 The positive connotation of small statehood has been 
recurrently reproduced in Small State Theory. 
In a regulated order […] small states would be expected, due to their own vulnerability, to 
enjoy a special legitimacy and credibility to play the role of a critical, moral authority in 
international relations. They do not have the potential to enforce judgements of decisions, 
but perhaps because of this, they are specially committed to principles and norms. […] 
Small states play a value-promotive role.427 
The proliferation of this image has involved both the way small states are seen by others 
and the way small states perceive themselves. The strong normative implications of this 
myth bring us back to the issue of psychological and ideological self-imaging of states. 
Just as a state’s awareness about the negative effects of its smallness (in terms of 
weakness and vulnerability) is perceived to elicit certain patterns of behaviour in the 
state’s foreign policy (strategies of power compensation), also a positive self-image 
must be expected to influence a state’s foreign political conduct. How can this argument 
be related to the phenomenon of ‘perceived greatness’? 
The positive myth of small statehood does not seek to deny the factual smallness of a 
state, it rather aims to emphasise the advantages of small statehood. Perceived greatness 
in turn could be said to ignore factual smallness, which remains a ‘fact’ either way. 
Developing this line of thought further in order to come to a conclusion about the 
effects a positive self-awareness could have, one could assume that a small state 
pursuing typical, in the conventional sense of power politics, ‘big state’ action strategies 
could, to a major extent be supported in its course and orientation when becoming 
aware of the wide-ranging positive connotation of its size and the strategic advantage 
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that might result from this. The positive image of small states could bring them to the 
assumption that their normative or moral superiority liberates them from the logic of a 
power-related hierarchy or balance. The internalised awareness about their qualities and 
reputation could stimulate them to assume proactive positions. In a polycentric and, in 
conventional terms, largely safe environment (e.g. post Cold War Europe) small states 
are additionally liberated from the permanent pressure of acute external threat. This 
opens additional potential for small states to overcome their position as ‘reactive 
inferiors.’ In an international security environment where conventional threat is largely 
absent and the notion of a ‘small state’ has distinctly positive connotations ‘small’ states 
find an ideal surrounding for the pursuance of alternative or ‘atypical’ action strategies. 
With reference to the above list of small state patterns in foreign politicy, this could be 
 
– increased level of participation and activity in world affairs; 
– foreign political engagement in remote regions; 
– assuming the habit of selective cooperation with strong tendencies of Alleingang; 
– abstention from establishing any close or committal relationship with a superpower; 
– proactive positioning in cases of international confrontation (e.g. diplomatic); 
– cut down on foreign policy resources that serve to ensure physical survival. 
 
The widened spectrum of possibilities produces a differentiated picture of ‘small states 
in Europe’, not least partly derogating the purported effect of small state solidarity. This 
implies that in the event of enhanced international exposedness, e.g. through a proactive 
move promoted at the EU level, mutual suspicion and competitive confrontation among 
the group of small states become ever more likely, while shared weaknesses, like 
increased vulnerability and an augmented need to pool capabilities against an alleged 
predominant actor, cease to have a unifying effect. 
4. Sweden and Finland – Typical Small States? 
In the conventional sense, i.e. telling from the size of their population, Sweden and 
Finland can both be regarded as ‘small’ states. Concerning their foreign political action 
pattern, the two Nordics show only little similarities. In the Cold War context, the 
Finnish external profile was largely determined and paralysed by the overlay of the 
permanent Soviet threat. Sweden in turn used the situation of lucky isolation in order to 
assume a largely activist role in international relations.428 In terms of the classical 
assumptions of Small State Theory, Sweden’s foreign political conduct during the Cold 
War must be categorised as largely atypical. Despite its material exposedness as a 
factually small state in a situation of bipolar superpower confrontation, Sweden stepped 
out of the shadow of mutual deterrence and pursued a proactive course in international 
politics, most significantly, with a unique air of self-confidence and pride. The notion of 
a ‘moral superpower’ (Swed. moraliska stormakten)429 probably describes this attitude 
best. The perceived greatness underlying this behaviour implied that the ‘typical’ 
concerns of small states in world politics did not have a major influence on Sweden’s 
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choices in global diplomacy.430 In other words, Sweden challenged the commonly held 
view that “the powerful do as they will, and the weak do as they must.”431 
After the end of the Cold War, Sweden again assumed an ‘atypical’ attitude in the sense 
that it did not seek to grasp the newly emerging opportunities that the multipolar world 
order had on offer. Finland in turn “rushed to embrace the West,”432 seizing the chance 
of ending its unloved state of conditioned isolation. After having already followed the 
logic of small statehood in power politics in the Cold War context, Finland also adhered 
to the (then) ‘typical’ action pattern once it had been liberated from past 
dependencies.433 Finland has sought to achieve a maximum of integratedness, and due 
to the absence of direct threat, also set out to assume a more proactive role in 
international politics. In contrast to the Swedish attitude during the Cold War, Finland 
has largely abstained from the promotion of any sort of ‘small state legacy’ for Europe.  
This turns Finland also into an atypical Nordic since the alleged moral progressiveness 
and superiority associated with this image still builds an important element in the 
Nordic self-image. Nordic superiority is also persistent in the outside perception; still 
today, Nordicness is largely associated with a group of “small, peace-loving and 
democratic countries”434 whose list of merits in international politics is long.435  
Scandinavia […] as a group of militarily weak, economically dependent, small states 
deliberately act as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in global eco-politics, conflict resolution, and the 
provision of aid. Scandinavia’s role in world politics today is to provide alternative models 
of engagement [that might be referred to as] the exercise of ‘social power.’436  
Sweden just as Norway, and to a large extent, also Iceland has maintained this important 
feature in its own foreign and geopolitical self-awareness. However, the way Sweden 
avails itself of these specificities as strategic tools for the creation and maintenance of a 
distinctive foreign political profile has changed. Sweden has largely withdrawn from the 
global scene, with its involvement in international crisis management operations 
building an important exception. Sweden does no longer promote its normative 
convictions in a missionary way. Sweden rather tries to maintain an international profile 
as low as possible, and focuses its foreign political action largely on its Baltic 
surrounding. However, Sweden’s great power pride and perceived greatness persists. 
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In their core, Swedes still see themselves as a traditionally great power that should have 
influence on the European scene.437 
Paradoxically, Sweden also employs the myth or cliché of small state integrity as an 
essential part of its current action strategy. Sweden still tries to profit politically from its 
own alleged marginality and weakness, trying to maintain its reputation as the 
offenceless and “boring backwater of Europe,”438 and thereby, to gain leeway and 
legitimation for its exceptionalist stance in questions of further integrative deepening on 
the European scale.439 
5. Small States, Great Powers and Leadership in the Nordic Family 
During the Cold War, Swedish self-perception appeared to be dominated by the 
traditional awareness of being a regional leader in Northern Europe with Stockholm 
building some sort of regional centre of gravity. Østergård found an amusing albeit 
arguable evidence for the self-proclaimed Swedish supremacy in the Nordic sphere. 
The Scandinavianist vision was materialised in a somewhat perverted form in the shape of a 
museum in Stockholm bearing the auspicious name ‘Nordiska museet’ (Nordic Museum), 
though the imposing name conceals little more than a Swedish local-heritage museum with 
a smattering of Swedish royalism and anti-Danish sentiment thrown in. In the entrance hall, 
the visitor is confronted by an enormous and intimidating granite statue of Gustav Vasa, the 
call to ‘Warer Swenska!’ [sic!] (Be Swedish!) carved unambiguously into its base.440 
While performing its own ‘felt’ or ‘perceived’ greatness, Sweden happened to be a 
strong supplier of what has been labelled ‘Nordic supremacy’. This self-produced image 
or cliché has been promoted eagerly and successfully in the context of the Cold War 
setting, and was gradually accepted, if not taken for granted on the international and 
global scene. Nordicness has been, and still often is, related to normative qualities such 
as virtue, righteousness or more generally, an inherent moral consciousness.441 Analysts 
have found different ways to evaluate the significance of this value-laden political label. 
Nordism’ is the label of this uniqueness, of the ‘superiority’ of Norden, which is enshrined 
in a historical, cultural, linguistic and even religious commonality.442 
In essence Nordicity is part and parcel of cultural modernity that merged with certain 
orientations of a political kind. In terms of cultural radicalism it amounted to a specific 
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Nordic ideology, which then paved the way for a societal development of its own kind 
during the 20th century.443 
A cultural modernism merged with political conceptualisations and boiled down, under the 
heading of cultural radicalism, into an autonomous ideological phenomenon.444 
In the context of European integration, this distinct ideological formation became also 
known for its inherent reluctance and symptomatical retentiveness when it came to the 
cession of sovereignty or parts of the exceptionalist stance in international relations. 
Over decades, the Nordic attitude was known as a ‘third way’, in both the ideological 
sense and in terms of political practice on the global scene. What has less often been 
considered in analyses about Nordic uniqueness is the analytical factor of intra-Nordic 
relationships and of the distribution of roles within the Nordic family.445 Looking 
further back into Nordic history, Iceland naturally had a more marginal position in both 
the development and international promotion of Nordicness, and with respect to the 
potential intra-Nordic competition or rivalry. Between Norway and Sweden, the close 
historical links and the geographical position have traditionally been decisive for their 
bilateral relationship. However, in recent years, their zones of geopolitical interest have 
not overlapped, given the strong Atlantic and Arctic orientation of Norway.446  
The rapport between Sweden and Finland cannot be said to have ever borne an openly 
competitive air as did, for instance, the Swedish-Danish relationship. While over the 
decades, Sweden and Denmark rather competed on the level of Great Powers rivalling 
for regional supremacy, the Swedish-Finnish relationship has mostly been one between 
similar yet unequal neighbours. Only recently, after Finland had been liberated from 
past dependencies, and both Sweden and Finland had approached full membership in 
the EU, a more competitive relationship developed between them, with the Brussels 
scene becoming a major arena for soft rivalry and indirect ousting among them.  
As all Nordic countries rushed to the support of their tiny Baltic neighbours, a friendly 
rivalry developed between in particular the Swedish and Danish governments, with Finland 
moving in more quietly. All were equally determined to do their utmost to help, by use of 
their different doctrines and alignments.447 
The Nordic countries tried to occupy a pivotal role in the process of EC/EU ‘approach-
building’ towards its Northern neighbourhood. The prospect of actively shaping the 
priorities of the enlarging EU was seen as an opportunity to, on the one hand, maximize 
their influence and further their national interests, and on the other, to offer themselves 
as a political interface between the EU and Russia or as a contact point for either side. 
Between 1991 and 1993, the Nordic countries redirected their foreign policies towards their 
neighbouring areas. The flourishing of Nordic-sponsored initiatives at regional level and the 
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substantial financial resources invested by the Nordic governments in the eastern part of the 
Baltic Sea area should be interpreted as the most evident sign of a rush to exploit the 
political and economic opportunities opened up by the [… ‘return’ of the Baltic states.448 
The distribution of geostrategic and political roles in this intra-Nordic competition was 
very clear, since it could partly be told from the traditional self-perception and regional 
orientation of each of the five Nordics. This became evident with the focus each of them 
put in the field of bilateral aid transfer, where e.g. Finland showed a strong affiliation to 
Estonia as its main traditional partner in the region. The efforts and interests of Norway 
(and naturally, also of Iceland) had always been more devoted to the far up North and 
the Arctic sphere, while for Sweden, the newly emerging opportunities for cooperative 
interaction in the BSR had a very strong geostrategic significance.449  
In other respects, the competitive game was influenced or determined by concurrent 
changes in the general political situation. This was particularly true for the Danish case 
since through the unexpected rejection of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in late 
1992, the country turned from the best-positioned player in the regional ‘game’ into an 
unfortunate outsider. In fact, after this event, the Danish government started to withdraw 
its early regionalist activism and assumed a more passive role in the process.450 
This dealt a decisive blow to Denmark’s ambitions to play a pivotal role in the Northern 
neighbourhood of the EU and led its political elite and foreign-policy makers to adopt a less 
assertive stance at both regional and EU level. There was a return in a sense to the pre-
1980s attitude, marked by a low profile and pragmatism.451 
Hence, since Denmark was forced out of the game, and Norway and Iceland clearly 
orientated themselves towards other spheres of geostrategic interest, which is, the Arctic 
Circle, the scene was largely left to Sweden and Finland.  
IV. Sweden and Finland as European Actors and Regional Stakeholders 
The following comparative chapters seek to identify some of the major differences 
between the two ‘similar but unequal’ Nordics, in order to eventually position them in 
the context of the implementation of the EU Northern Dimension. Before the study 
returns to the issue of policy creation and diffusion and the discussion of the intra-
Nordic standing and reception of the EU ND, Sweden and Finland are compared in 
respect to the following two aspects: 
 
– their conduct within the EU and in the broader context of European integration; 
– their profile as regional stakeholders in the BSR, with special focus on their 
behaviour towards the Baltic States and their performance and orientation in 
subregional cooperation. 
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1. Sweden, Finland, European Integration and the EU 
Before entering the EU in 1995, both Sweden and Finland had historically resisted any 
sort of regional cooperation structure with supranational elements. Besides a general 
reluctance towards institutionalised commitments, it was mostly security political 
considerations that had kept Sweden and Finland from applying to join the EC. Only in 
the late 1990s, the two Nordics started to open themselves towards the broader process 
of European integration. The global political changes required a thorough reassessment 
of both their foreign political and their regional policy orientation. 
The opening provided by the disintegration of the Cold War system of East-West alliances 
made it possible for neutral states, Finland and Sweden, to conceive of joining the European 
Community. The traditional obstacle to joining the EC, “What will Moscow think?”, was no 
longer significant. 452 
Despite their coincidental accession, once having become full members, Sweden and 
Finland developed very different member state profiles. Ingebritsen identified a scale of 
willingness for political integration among the Nordic five, where Finland ranged on 
first position as the most supportive candidate for further deepening in political fields of 
integration.453 The Swedish motivation for reassessing its relationship towards the EC in 
the early 1990s had a very strong economic background. Starting from 1991, the 
Swedish economy had suffered a dramatic breakdown, which in the years to come was 
expected to cause major infringements on the Swedish welfare system. For Finland, on 
the other hand, approaching the full membership option had a far ranging ideological, 
political and most importantly, also a security political significance. After Finland had 
liberated herself from the Soviet link, the first and foremost strategic aim became to 
gain distance from the past by distinctly turning to the West and seeking Western 
integration in the best visible way. What appeared essential on the Finnish side did in 
turn represent a major obstacle for Sweden. The idea of committing themselves to a 
supranational framework had been an unloved prospect for most Swedes at that time.  
The accession and full integration into the EC/EU was seen as a practical necessity that 
would help to tackle the domestic difficulties but ‘unfortunately’, would also entail 
major impacts on Swedish sovereignty. A strong marker for these specific 
circumstances in the Swedish case was the harsh lines that emerged between the pro- 
and anti-EC coalitions on the domestic level. In Sweden, it was the conservative party 
(moderata samlingspartiet/moderaterna), which set out to relativise the anti-EC 
atmosphere in the early 1990s. In November 1991, the then Swedish Prime Minister 
Carl Bildt promoted Sweden as being on the point of turning from “a reluctant into an 
enthusiastic European.” Speaking to a selected audience of European Commission 
officials, he renounced much of Sweden’s past scepticism towards European integration 
and claimed that Sweden was about to develop and pursue a clear European identity.454  
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The political debate preceding the EU accession was then, however, marked by fervent 
discussions, in the course of which a series of odd, and in respect to Sweden’s future 
fellow members, awkward rhetoric faux pas were made by high rank politicians.  
The early debate provides an embarrassing number of cases where the community is 
identified with ‘conservatives’, ‘colonialists’, ‘capitalists’ and ‘catholics’, or a ‘supposedly 
undesirable bedfellow for upright Swedes.’455 
Still today, more than ten years after the EU accession, the so called “no”-parties (Swed. 
nej-partier) form an important element in the inner-Swedish debate, with the question 
of whether being generally in favour or hostile towards Swedish EU-membership still 
building the decisive dividing line running across the domestic political landscape.456 In 
Finland, the public debate about joining the Union happened to be far less controversial. 
This was mainly because Finland had a specific security political objective which to 
achieve was perceived to be largely dependent upon Finnish membership in the EC. In 
the first place, the Finns viewed European integration as a way to “return to Europe” 
and a “liberation from past dependencies.” Most specifically, they perceived formal EC 
membership as a means of securing their protracted border with Russia.457 Herolf found 
a charming way to characterise the Swedish attitude about European integration  
Swedish views of the future of Europe tend to be more intergovernmental than 
supranational. [...] Swedish policy ambitions are those of a small state that has not hesitated 
on occasions to take its own road.458 
What does this ‘minor’ matter entail for Swedish membership in a Union that is per 
definitionem supranational? Bo Huldt identified three factors lying at the basis of 
Swedish reluctance. First, it is the argument of neutrality, second, a distinct propensity 
to maintain its full sovereignty, and third, it is “a rather nebulous category of arguments 
which concern Swedish ‘identity’ and a general aversion to ‘other identities’.”459 Ten 
years after the EU accession, the Swedish population is still among the most euro-
sceptical in the Union. Its Nordic fellow Finland in turn has gained the reputation of 
being the Nordic ‘model pupil.’460 Unsurprisingly, the Finnish gains in the context of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the implementation of the single currency 
were not very much appreciated by ‘big brother’ Sweden. However, after a short uproar 
following the Swedish referendum, the Swedes returned to reluctant self-sufficiency. 
Immediately after the referendum rejecting the euro, tensions were high between those who 
voted for and against joining the single currency. Now the issue is hardly debated at all; the 
fact that the Euro’s two most important countries – France and Germany – have not 
observed the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact means that for most people joining the 
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eurozone is out of the question. The fact that the Swedish economy is doing so well outside 
the euro is another persuasive factor.461 
For Finland in turn, joining the Monetary Union has never been a very controversial 
question. Finland generally pursued a more pragmatic course, trying to make the best 
out of its membership without taking any major risk of violating the principle of 
solidarity and loyalty. An issue where both Finland and Sweden actually adhered to a 
similar course was enlargement.462 Both were fervent supporters of the ‘Big Bang’ 
enlargement, and in contrast to many Central European countries, assumed a rather 
undogmatic position in the context of the debate on Turkey. However, once again, both 
Nordics had very different ideas about how the pre-enlargement process of the CEECs 
and the Baltic States should be developed in detail,463 and they had different 
expectations concerning a Turkish membership.  
Generally, Finland proved to have much better records in its membership conduct while 
the permanent Swedish exceptionalism often seemed inappropriate and 
counterproductive, evermore provoking scepticism and suspicion among the other 
23/25. This applies largely for the Swedish foreign political style assumed during the 
pre-accession process of the Baltic States where Sweden’s attempts of taking over a 
leading role often happened to become self-defeating and supportive of the impression 
that Swedish rhetorics were often “too big for its boots”.464 Before turning to the “major 
Swedish-Finnish divide” in the question of the EU ND, the following chapter will give a 
brief overview of the two Nordics’ approach towards the BSR.465 
2. Sweden, Finland and the BSR 
After 1989, the BSR constituted something of a “power vacuum,” with Germany being 
blocked because of internal difficulties and Russia being “out of the game” for the first 
decade following the decline of the Soviet empire.466 Sweden and Finland had to 
reposition themselves within the region by first of all, compensating for the void that 
emerged in the Nordic North (old Norden) after it had lost its middle way status.467  
For the two Nordic states, thinking the BSR in terms of cooperation instead of division 
and block confrontation was a wholly new experience. During the Cold War, trade as 
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well as political and human relations across the Baltic Sea rim had not deserved the 
name of a region; cooperative relationships had been limited to the Nordic sphere, 
consisting of Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland. However, soon after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, proactive cooperation between the Nordic States and the newly 
emerged democracies on “the other side” of the sea started to develop, putting forth an 
immense variety of cooperative structures and projects of cross-border collaboration. 
Sweden and Finland as the two major stakeholders in the BSR found very different 
ways to adapt their regional orientation to the new geopolitical setting and the 
circumstances of newly emerging openness and cooperativeness across old dividing 
lines. In the context of the bipolar setting, Sweden had mainly focussed on global 
engagement, contributing to and interfering in far off contexts such as the Korean 
dispute or the relationship between Cuba and the US.468  
For Sweden, the end of the Cold War brought some blessings, but it also brought 
hitherto relatively unknown strategic problems. On the one hand, Baltic freedom from 
superpower oppression and the reestablishment of three independent states along the 
Swedish borders was good news for the community of small states and for democracy 
worldwide. Sweden suddenly no longer had one dominant neighbour to the east and the 
south, but faced a whole number of friendly, independent states, some of which were 
small and vulnerable, much more so than Sweden itself, while another had doubled in 
size overnight.469 
The end of the Cold War era pushed Sweden towards a more openly activist attitude in 
its adjacent geographic area. Evidence for a change in its respective political orientation 
gradually began to take place in the early 1990s, when Sweden started to invest a 
considerable amount of political engagement, and not least, money, in order to help 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in a neighbourly effort, trying to safeguard and support 
their fragile independence and sovereignty. However, the closer the prospect of Baltic 
EU membership moved, the more it became clear that these efforts were not mere 
courtesy. In the years preceding the 2004 enlargements, Sweden sought eagerly to 
establish itself as an advocate for its Baltic neighbours, as many of its major strategic 
interests appeared to be touched by the Baltic transformation process. Notwithstanding 
the importance of the Balkans, the main arena for the Swedish pursuit of strengthening 
the transatlantic link, as well as for its foreign policy activism in the post Cold War era 
has been the BSR. As the centre of policy shifted from the Developing World to Europe 
in the early 1990s, the focus of Swedish security was placed on developments in the 
own neighbourhood, with special attention paid to the independence and survival of the 
three small and weak Baltic countries that had newly been freed from Soviet 
occupation.470 
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This Swedish focus on the geographically adjacent areas was not entirely new. The 
issue of Sweden’s geostrategic orientation had always been a question of party politics. 
While the Conservatives had always put a special focus on the BSR, the Social 
Democrats rather focussed on bilateral cooperation far outside the near neighbourhood. 
Already prior to Baltic independence, Swedish Conservatives and Liberals had for 
months organised public rallies around the country to support the Baltic cause. Under 
the Bildt cabinet, as from 1991, the BSR became the obvious centre of Swedish security 
policy, with the Prime Minister himself being personally involved in negotiations for 
the Soviet military withdrawal from Baltic territory. 
While Swedish Social Democrats in many ways were newcomers to the Baltic Sea region, it 
was quickly incorporated into their foreign and security policies when they again turned to 
power in 1994. The Bildt government brought the region to its central position in Swedish 
policy, but it has since stayed in that place, without regard to the ideological shadings of the 
party or parties of power. Prime Minister Persson has shown a very special interest in 
promoting stability in the region, demonstrating from his first days in office that this was 
indeed an issue close to his heart – and causing multiple diplomatic hiccups at the Foreign 
Ministry with his early statement that ‘the Baltic cause is the Swedish cause,’ a declaration 
that suggested a degree of commitment for which Swedish diplomats were not prepared.471 
The seminal event Dahl is alluding to in this quotation was indeed one of the key 
moments in the history of Swedish post Soviet Baltic Sea policy. At his inauguration as 
Prime Minister in March 1996, Persson had stated that Sweden would engage for the 
Baltic interests just as if it was a domestic concern (Swed. Balternas sak är vår, 
literally, ‘the affairs of the Baltics are ours as well’). This strong expression of Swedish 
commitment raised considerable irritations among Sweden’s Nordic fellows, most 
importantly Finland, but also on the Baltic side, it was received with distinct 
reservation. 
During the summer months of 1996, Prime Minister Göran Persson toured the Baltic States 
to maintain dialogue and discuss issues such as security in the region. The event would have 
not raised too much attention had it not been for some statements pertaining to Baltic 
security made in Riga and Vilnius. In Riga, Mr. Persson said: We now know that Latvia 
wants to become a member of NATO. We respect this and we shall do what we can to 
support Latvia in the process’ [4 June 1996]. As expected, this statement raised considerable 
confusion. What did Persson really mean regarding Latvian NATO membership? Would 
Sweden serve as an envoy speaking on behalf of Latvian NATO membership? Were 
Persson’s choice of words simply a Freudian slip or did he have deeper motives, such as 
testing how far Sweden could be part of the debate without raising too many reactions?472 
These were just examples in a whole series of curious official Swedish statements in the 
Baltic context. Sweden evidently tried to promote its alleged appropriateness to serve as 
a moral leader of transformation in the BSR. The Swedish policy of cooperation in the 
region was to some extent one of seeking to create and secure stability in the post Cold 
War setting. However, another strong motive was the Swedish ambition to attain 
regional leadership, to transfer its Nordic conviction to the former Warsaw Pact 
countries to an extent that would strengthen its own standing in Northern Europe, 
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including also prospects of an enlarged Nordic bloc. In fact, after the Danish defeat in 
the context of the Maastricht Treaty and the negative referendum in Norway, Sweden 
would have been given a double opportunity to take over the role of a Northern 
European leader.473 However, the factual absurdity of the Swedish prospects and of the 
resulting strategic choices in its post Cold War identity building process became 
apparent once the whole process started to take an unfavourable (albeit predictable) 
course: the Baltic States sought more direct channels to reconstruct their way ‘back into 
Europe’ and showed little interest in the Swedish offer of a ‘third way.’  
The Swedish disappointment about the Baltics’ eagerness to join the NATO was 
evident, even though, telling from the overall geostrategic situation it should not have 
come as a surprise. This Swedish disappointment could serve as part of an explanation 
why the early Swedish commitment for the ‘Baltic affair,’ in the eve of their accession, 
turned into overt frustration. The Swedish domestic discourse about the upcoming EU 
enlargement was dominated by negative sentiments; headwords like the “imminent 
danger of Baltic social tourists” (Persson, March 2004) and the Prime Minister’s 
proposal of a “new membership tax” to secure that the new members would contribute 
appropriately to the relative gains resulting from their accession shed very negative light 
on the formerly fervent supporter of enlargement.474 In contrast to this seesaw course of 
its Nordic brother, Finland pursued a much more straightforward approach in the BSR 
post Cold War setting. In contrast to Sweden, Finland remained fully supportive of the 
Baltic States’ striving for full both European and transatlantic integration. Finland had 
always followed a pragmatic course in the NATO context, never openly striving for 
membership itself, but however, never ruling the membership option out the way 
Sweden did. Hence, despite some reservations regarding the possible Russian reaction, 
Finland did not have any substantial concerns about a Baltic NATO-enlargement.  
While Finland followed this clear supportive line at the highest politico-strategic level, 
it nevertheless assumed an idiosyncratic position in the context of the Baltic EU pre-
accession process. Finland showed a strong selective commitment for the Estonian case 
and fervently supported the country’s quest for a preferential treatment in the accession 
negotiations.475 This again provoked considerable irritations on the Swedish side since 
Sweden strongly supported a lockstep model for the Baltic Sea states, repeatedly 
stressing that the preferential treatment of one of them could “send the wrong signals to 
the candidate states and lead to a negative atmosphere and attitude among them.”476  
The Swedish view is that [...] there is much to be gained from supporting the positive 
developments made so far, and it is much more costly to deal with frustration from those 
who consider that they have not been fairly treated in the enlargement process.477 
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From a Swedish point of view, the act of enlargement itself had much more significant 
impact on the region than small steps and achievements in the field of cross-border 
cooperation could have.478 Finland assumed a more pragmatic attitude and largely 
detached the enlargement issue from other efforts of ‘getting the EU involved’ in the 
region. The Finnish ND initiative opened another chapter in the history of the Swedish-
Finnish divide in regional matters.  
E. The EU Northern Dimension – Showcase for the Swedish-Finnish Divide? 
I. The Irony of Competition II 
The immediate post Cold War setting appeared to provide the ideal framework for the 
Nordic ideology of peaceful cooperation and pacifism to eventually triumph on a wider 
European scale. For the first time in decades, enduring international peace seemed 
within reach; however, ironically, this scenery did not allow for the traditional and 
widely established Nordic ‘third way’ to do ‘business as usual’. After decades of Nordic 
engagement and effort to keep the tension in the Nordic region low, surprisingly, the 
lack of bipolar tension indeed had a negative impact on Nordicness and Nordic 
togetherness.479 The global political changes had significant repercussions on the 
functioning of Nordic togetherness.480 Decisive markers in this context have been each 
Nordic country’s choices in the context of European integration. First, it was Denmark 
in 1973, and then Sweden and Finland in 1995, to abandon the old Nordic policy of 
distanciation. Norway and Iceland have continued to adhere to their traditional 
positions. This situation left the Nordic countries divided on an essential issue. 
The majority [of the Nordic group] had transcended the borderline that used to be rather 
important for the Nordic self-understanding, while others have remained with these policies. 
[…] Norden was no longer the same joint meeting-ground it used to be now that a major 
constitutive wall or external borderline, that of ‘Europe’, had fallen.481 
However, EU-accession and consequent membership itself were not the sole factors to 
determine the applicability of Nordic togetherness. What actually decided for the Nordic 
system of cooperation to loose momentum was the choice of the Nordic EU member 
states to remain within or to detach themselves from the Nordic commonsense. There 
actually was considerable potential for newly integrated countries like Sweden and 
Finland to at least get together in a Nordic coalition within the EU and thus, to pool 
common interests and common goals as they had been present throughout decades of 
Nordic cooperation. The departures of the Nordics could have been unified to the extent 
that Norden could have been given the function of a vehicle for the Nordic Member 
States to coordinate their European policies. Most importantly, the EU ND could have 
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been taken as an ideal opportunity for Sweden and Finland to revive their cooperative 
relationship. The following presentation of the intra-Nordic reception of the EU ND will 
show how, on what grounds and to what extent this chance has been seized by neither of 
the two.  
1. The Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative 
The institutional process that led to the creation of the EU Northern Dimension (Fin. 
pohjoisen ulottuvuuden/Swed. nordliga dimensionen) was initiated by Finland in 1997. 
The first formal outline of the Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) was 
produced in the context of a letter written by Paavo Lipponen, then Finnish Prime 
Minister, to the (then) President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, in April 
1997. In this seminal letter, Lipponen called for the establishment of a comprehensive 
policy to cover “the whole northern dimension of the Union’s external relations.”482  
The idea itself was not exclusively new. Since the end of the Cold War, Northern 
Europe had turned into a very active region in terms of regionalist activities and 
initiatives. While its Nordic fellows, most importantly Denmark and Norway, 
immediately set out to take initiatives for the foundation of consultative regional 
councils, Finland adopted a rather passive and reactive role in these early years.483 
Finland was in an outsider position when Denmark together with Germany set up the 
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992, and it was not perceptibly involved in 
the creation of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), initiated by Norway in 1993.  
With its accession negotiations in full swing, the launch of the BEAC came as a surprise to 
the Finnish establishment.484 
Additionally, in 1996, the European Commission launched the Baltic Sea Region 
Initiative (BSRI) within the CBSS framework, which put the Finnish government even 
more in a reactive position.485 Ojanen identified three main objectives for the Finnish 
initiative: First of all and in view of the circumstances outlined above, Finland wanted 
to show some sort of integrationist activism, offering its specific knowledge and 
experience in the region for a common project on the European level. Secondly, it 
probably tried to seize the chance of customising the EU policy agenda to its own 
national interests. Thirdly, Finland wanted to give a clear statement of its post Cold War 
policy direction, namely the conscious break with historical dependencies and its 
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traditional status of non-alignment.486 Some months later, in September 1997, Lipponen 
presented the political objectives of the initiative in a speech delivered at the ‘Barents 
Region Today’ conference in Rovaniemi/Finland.487  
With the accession of Finland and Sweden, the European Union now extends from the 
Mediterranean to just a few kilometres from the Barents Sea. The Union has thus acquired a 
natural ‘northern dimension.’ My thesis [...] is: we need a policy for this dimension too. 
Lipponen’s argument that through the 1995 enlargements, the EU had not only gained 
new borders but also a set of geopolitical responsibilities has been recurrently reflected 
in political analysis. Accordingly, Haukkala identifies the EU ND as one of the direct 
products of EU enlargement emphasising that by way of the 1995 Northern 
enlargement, the EU had already gained a ‘northern dimension’.  
[Through the 1995 enlargement] the EU established its presence in the region and acquired 
a new direct contact with Russia in the form of the 1300-kilometre Fenno-Russian border.488 
Joenniemi developed the idea further by claiming that the geopolitical changes resulting 
from the Finnish EU accession had literally forced the EU to become active player in 
the region. 
The new and ‘fuzzy’ constellations of the region forced the EU to make use of its presence 
with the more northerly aspects gained by enlargement. Particularly the joint border with 
Russia, acquired in the context of Finland’s membership, mandated reflection as the EU 
became Russia’s immediate neighbour.489 
To a certain extent, the emergence of a new border to Russia certainly influenced the 
politico-strategic attitude and perspective of the EU towards Northern Europe. 
However, the long-term effects of the 1995 enlargement round had to be questioned, 
and the respective relevance of the EU ND even more so. The perceived challenge or 
responsibility of the EU to become an active and visible player in this part of the 
continent proved to be a short-term ambition and declined in the late 1990s. Once the 
Finnish aspirations had been formally contented, the considerable part of geostrategic 
attention shifted to the East and turned to the issue of formal Baltic integration.  
The bilateral relations with Russia retained highest priority, which would not yet argue 
against the EU ND. However, the policy channels that were chosen in order to enhance 
this relationship did not exclusively focus on the EU ND framework. Other, more direct 
policy channels were favoured in order to become active in the region, just as the pre-
accession process of the Baltic States. The foreign political conduct of Russia in view of 
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the upcoming EU integration of the Baltic three was perceived a litmus test for the 
future relationship, and more generally, for the potential possibilities to stabilise the 
European neighbourhood in a sustainable way.490 The idea of the EU being “forced to 
act in the North” and the EU ND being the result of this enforcement certainly goes too 
far. The Finnish initiative was adopted on official terms and Finland got its way to an 
extent that it had transferred a set of distinct national interests to the level of “common 
responsibility”. Finland managed to draw official attention to a part of the continent that 
was at that time well outside the area of common concern for most member states. 
Other neighbourhood regions – such as the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe – were 
ranked much higher on the common list of shared EU challenges than the North. The long 
debate on European identity in the international system did not include the problems raised 
in that region in a satisfying way. […] Somehow, it was for many observers and politicians 
like an area forgotten or at least low on the agenda of threat perception. The benign neglect 
was due to geographical distance, the lack of historical memories and – perhaps most 
important – to apparently crisis-free evolutions.491 
Hence, at the early stage, Lipponen obviously had to avail himself of certain 
argumentative strategies in order to relativise the obvious curiosity of the initiative and 
to foil the wave of suspicion and latent protest emanating from the southern European 
Member States. An important element in this appeasement strategy was to ask neither 
for new funding instruments nor for particular EU ND budgetary allocations. Another 
dodge was to avoid considerations about new institutional structures to support the 
objectives of the future EU ND working agenda, and instead, to enhance the existing 
formal capacity of the EU and the Member States to implement the policy.  
Worried commentators claim the EU was implicitly pushed to take up responsibility, which 
it was unwilling and unable to shoulder. The EU as a key action [sic!] was apparently asked 
to contribute to solving some, so far rather distant problems; critics were afraid that a new 
regional responsibility without clear objectives and an adequate set of instruments would 
add to the ‘capability-expectations gap’ that the haunted Union was blamed for throughout 
the nineties. 492  
This could help to explain why during the first decade of policy implementation, the 
engagement and moral commitment of the EU institutions has been considerably low.  
The very early stages of the process (between the launch of the initiative and the first 
Commission Communication) were characterised by only lukewarm support for the 
initiative among certain sectors of the Commission’s DG External Relations.493 
An important evidence for the Commission’s reluctance in this respect can be found in 
the development of what could be called the “EU ND talk”. While the original Finnish 
declarations laying out the ambitions of the initiative were characterised by a positive 
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and widely enthusiastic tune, the subsequent EU documents that were to lay the ground 
for the respective EU policy framework were far more contained and close to 
noncommittal. The following statement offers a good example in this respect: 
The ND ensures that the EU’s activities and instruments continue to focus on this region. 
However, it should not be seen as a new regional initiative, which in the Commission’s 
view is not necessary. The CBSS and BEAC continue to play a useful role in addressing the 
problems facing the region. The Commission continues to participate in these fora, in 
particular regarding the exchange of information, cooperation and further development of 
these instruments in the perspective of advancing the objectives of the ND.494 
The Finnish initiative had initially postulated the establishment of a distinct EU policy 
that would address the specific needs and interests listed on their ambitious agenda. 
What the Commission made out of these prospects is that it limited the function of the 
EU ND to the coordination of existing programmes, and moreover, relegated to the 
sufficiency of existing instruments for regional development.495  
Concerning the assistance programmes relevant for the Northern Dimension, the European 
Community will follow the existing procedures, within existing budgets. Assistance will 
continue to be provided through existing programmes.496 
The motivation behind the EU ND was obviously strongly related to the overall EU 
strategy towards Russia, if it was not reducible to that motive, and the general 
expectation that the EU ND could add more substance to this bilateral relationship. 
The EU has appeared keen to purge the de-centralising notions from the initiative, whilst in 
other respects it has turned the ND into an initiative that actually supports the development 
of the Union’s actor status. Consequently, the focus of the ND has shifted somewhat from 
what the EU can do for Northern Europe, to what the ND can do for the EU.497 
The European Commission made clear that in fact there was no urgent need for a new 
regional initiative. These unfavourable preconditions were accompanied by general 
scepticism among the other Member States, and most significantly, also by Sweden.  
2. The Finnish Initiative from a Swedish Point of View 
Sweden’s reaction to the Finnish initiative was rather retentive and reserved. At first, 
that was most probably because Finland had not considered consulting its neighbour and 
Nordic fellow on the issue, even though the two new Member States would have had 
very similar backgrounds as well as a series of shared policy interests. According to the 
Nordic tradition of cooperative politics, the Nordic Council would have offered the 
appropriate platform for a prior consultation involving also the other Nordic Countries, 
Norway, Denmark and Iceland. The fact that Finland did by no means show the political 
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will to coordinate its policy plans with its Nordic fellows and take multilateral steps to 
prepare the initiative on the regional level, provoked considerable intra-Scandinavian 
irritations.498  
From a Swedish point of view, the Finnish initiative was seen as a competing project 
destined to challenge Sweden’s firmly established Baltic Sea activities. Since the end of 
the Cold War, Sweden had largely tried to keep distinct regional issues outside the grasp 
of supranational influence and to rather use other channels, and most importantly, the 
CBSS framework, in order to involve the EU more actively in the Baltic Sea area. The 
above-mentioned Baltic Sea Region Initiative (BSRI), launched by the Commission in 
1996 and strongly promoted by the then Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, was an 
important example in this context. In the context of its presidency in the CBSS (1995-
1996), Sweden had enhanced the establishment of the so-called Visby-Charter, a 
framework document of the CBSS stating the regional objectives of the organisation, 
and thus, seeking to offer a functional point of reference for the EU to become more 
involved as an active player in the course of its implementation. The resulting “Visby-
Process” was formally acknowledged by a Commission communication on the BSRI.499 
Even though by contrast, the Finnish initiative addressed a much wider geographical 
area not only including the Baltic Sea region but the ‘far up North’ as well, its objective 
reliance on the BSRI appeared evident to Swedish policy makers and experts in the 
field. In fact, the following comparison shows that both content and institutional design 
of the ‘Finnish’ policy were very similar to the BSRI. 
 
The Baltic Sea Region Initiative500 The ‘Finnish’ EU ND501 
“The objective of this document is to present an 
initiative to strengthen political stability and 
economic development in the BSR.” 
“The ND approach shall promote economic 
development, stability and security in the 
region.” 
“The BSR has a huge potential in terms of natural 
resources, production and trade. Its population is 
about 60 million of which half are EU citizens.” 
“The Northern region is of particular 
significance to the EU. It is a region of great 
natural resources, with considerable human and 
economic potential.” 
“The present initiative does not require funding 
additional to the existing Community programmes, 
nor affect the responsibilities of each provider of 
assistance with regard to their individual 
programmes and the rules which govern them. It 
outlines proposals for taking full advantage of 
existing co-operation and programmes by 
intensifying regional co-ordination and focusing 
on priority areas.” 
“Concerning the assistance programmes relevant 
for the ND, the EC will follow the existing 
procedures, within existing budgets. Assistance 
will continue to be provided through existing 
programmes. The Northern Dimension ensures 
that the Union’s activities and available 
instruments continue to focus on this region.” 
Table 14: The Baltic Sea Region Initiative and the EU ND in Comparison 
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Also the official objectives and policy issues addressed in the EU ND widely coincided 
with the main concerns and aims voiced in the BSRI context. The focus on the 
relationship with Russia, on environmental issues as well as on the fight against 
organised crime and drug trafficking was recurrent in both documents. While seeking to 
position and evaluate the Finnish initiative in a wider geographical context, Wessels 
chose to consider the general significance of regional initiatives by Member States,  
In a broader retrospective on the history of the European international profile, the Finnish 
initiative was in the end not particularly surprising: nearly all member states and most new 
states in particular define their role within the EU in terms of their own history and 
geography. […] This kind of national mission for the Union as a whole serves to keep and 
strengthen former ties and to underline one’s importance within the Union in relation to 
other EC states, who are supposed to accept a certain kind of natural ‘de facto’ leadership of 
the respective country in the common approaches. At the same time this, intra EU profile 
helps to reconcile one’s own national identity with the sometimes difficult membership of 
the EU: The Union is then perceived as a continuation of historical and geographical 
concerns and missions with other means – as the support of the whole of the Union needs to 
be mobilised. A merging and even fusion of national European perceptions and interests is 
then expected.502 
These considerations might help to explain the reluctant Swedish attitude towards the 
Finnish initiative. It was seen as a Finnish act of claiming regional leadership while this, 
based on a long tradition of regional self-awareness, had in turn been reserved by 
Sweden. When looking at these arguments in light of the Swedish integration policy, it 
becomes clear that Sweden pursues a different strategy in the course of its EU 
membership.  
While Sweden certainly holds strong regional ties that largely bind major parts of its 
foreign and security policy agenda, these ‘very Swedish’ items still seem to be safely 
kept outside its official EU working programme. Sweden can hardly be claimed to seek 
to establish a systematic transfer of its regional agenda to the EU level, neither in view 
of creating an individual profile towards its fellow member states nor in order to pursue 
its major politico-strategic goals. To remain in Wessels’ wording, since its accession to 
the EU, Sweden did everything to avoid the impression of its EU level activities to 
assume the character of a ‘continuation of historical and geographical concerns.’ This 
argument was easily sold in the Finnish public, since public opinion was heavily 
influenced by the newly emerged chance of ‘rushing into the West’, and therefore, 
traditionally featured a less distinct scepticism towards integration. In Sweden, in turn 
the notion of a systematic transfer of former domestic or rather exclusively Nordic 
issues to the unloved Eurocratic realm appeared to provoke connotations of loss of 
sovereignty. The comments by Herolf, a Swedish scholar and foreign policy analyst, are 
symptomatic for the Swedish attitude of reluctant reservedness and pragmatic albeit 
selective Nordic solidarity when it comes to the validation of the “Finnish Dimension”, 
the EU ND.  
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In Sweden, the terms ‘Northern ‘Dimension and ‘Northern Cooperation’ have traditionally 
been associated with the five Nordic states. […] The Finnish Proposal for a ND of the EU, 
while having received the full endorsement of Swedish politicians, is not particularly well 
known among the public at large. Insofar as it is discussed, it is seen as a proposal 
signifying that the northern part of Europe should attract greater attention from others 
within the European Union. The [Swedish] government has also expressed a wish that this 
will lead to a strengthening of the regional organisations in the area.503  
While there were certain reservations to this, as Herolf put it, “full endorsement” of the 
EU-ND among Swedish politicians, this quote also points at one of the most important 
specificities about the Swedish perspective on the policy. The potential of the EU ND to 
enhance existing forms of cooperation has major priority.  
While [regional cooperation] is an area in which Sweden is deeply engaged, it is also one in 
which it is eager to see other European states contribute, namely as trade partners and 
supporters in security cooperation and a variety of organisations, each according to its 
specific capability. Among them the European Union is, however seen to have a particularly 
important role, due to the rich spectrum of capabilities within this organisation.504 
The role of the EU as a framework actor for Baltic Sea Regionalism is not explicitly 
mentioned; the EU is rather seen as one out of many factors that contribute to the 
overall picture of a networked BSR. Moreover, special emphasis is given to the 
instrument of enlargement, which from an official Swedish point of view, appears to be 
the “single most significant building stone in a genuine, all-embracing security 
order.”505 The analytical choice employed by Herolf reflects yet another particular 
feature of the Swedish view on the EU ND. 
The term ‘Northern Dimension’ is not limited here to the Finnish initiative to create a 
northern dimension of the EU, but encompasses the impact which events and developments 
in northern Europe have on European security in general, and the EU in particular, and the 
role which various actors inside and outside the EU may play in this region.506 
There is a certain tendency in these statements of trying to ‘de-finlandise’ the policy 
framework, and to disperse and relativise the air of Finnish leadership in the field of EU 
involvement in Northern Europe. To a certain extent, this way of dealing with the policy 
could also be identified in the course of the years following the Finnish advance. 
Sweden has been criticised for its strategic reluctance in this context, and for utilizing 
the EU ND as a tool and an arena for its wider Nordic anti-cohesion course in regional 
politics.507 The following chapter will pick out two events of enhanced Swedish 
exposedness in this respect, the Swedish EU Presidency in 2001 and its CBSS 
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Chairmanship in 2006-2007, which should provide a deeper insight into the specific 
approach Sweden has exemplified in the context of the EU ND’s implementation. 
II. And the Story Goes On: Is Sweden Trying to ‘Keep the EU ND Alive’? 
At the time Sweden took over the EU Presidency from France in January 2001, the EU 
ND was just entering its operational phase. The European Council of Feira in June 2000 
had adopted the first EU ND Action Plan for the period of 2001-2003 and mandated the 
Swedish Presidency to elaborate a “Full Report on the Northern Dimension” to be 
presented at the European Council of Göteborg in June 2001. 
Despite the distinct Swedish reluctance in the context of the Finnish initiative, the 
Northern Dimension nonetheless formed part of the priority areas indicated on the 
Swedish agenda. The Swedish Presidency set out the aim to produce more action-
oriented input and to further the implementation of the policy in the sense of concrete 
measures and activities. Sweden requested the European Commission to report to the 
Foreign Minister’s Conference in Luxembourg in April 2001 on actions initiated in line 
with the ND Action Plan, and effected the formulation of the full report as foreseen. 
However, this should not be taken as a proof for a positive Swedish attitude or 
commitment. Sweden was merely sticking to the mandate posed by the Portuguese 
Presidency, and was in this sense simply fulfilling its “technical” obligations. Even 
though many observers did see the evidence of Sweden actually attaching importance to 
this very EU policy in the course of its presidency,508 it should be considered that there 
might have been incidental parallels between the Swedish agenda and the EU ND 
objectives. Anne Haglund states that  
Sweden chose to prioritise enlargement and achieved the political breakthrough one had 
aimed for, this also benefited the development of the ND. Also the second Presidency theme 
of environmental protection was compatible with the development of the ND.509 
While these assertions are certainly appropriate to some extent, the mere fact that most 
of the issues prioritised by the Swedish presidency do basically coincide with the 
overall objectives of the ND, should not be misinterpreted. For the purpose of this 
study, it is rather important to look at how Sweden sought to promote its political 
interests on the European scene and whether and to what extent it used the EU ND as a 
framework to achieve certain political results in the course of its presidency. 
Concerning the Swedish efforts to further development in environmental issues, one 
must state that the EU ND did not explicitly constitute the main point of reference for 
the presidency. The Swedish government generally seemed to welcome the policy at 
that time since it was seen as a “flexible tool for advancing its own interests.”510 In the 
presidency conclusions, the EU ND appears to be rather detached from other issues, and 
it is clearly not applied as an overarching policy frame for action, most particularly 
regarding its core objectives, objectives that would even largely comply with major 
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Swedish interests.511 The achievements of the Swedish chairmanship have remained 
very modest. Haukkala found a very clinical way to characterise the commitment 
towards the policy Sweden has shown during this phase. 
It is difficult to prove that Sweden has not done its best to keep the policy alive. To some 
extent, it appears that there was not much more that Sweden could do, but obviously, it 
could have done much more.512 
However, Haukkala still emphasised that Sweden had shown considerable dedication to 
the Finnish policy aspirations in 1999, when the EU ND for the first time risked to loose 
momentum and to be derogated by current political events. The upcoming preparations 
for the Eastern enlargement as well as the critical state of the EU’s bilateral relationship 
with Russia had major negative impact on the substance and visibility of the policy.513 
By guaranteeing to put the policy on its presidency agenda in 2001, Sweden provided 
significant support to its fellow Finnish policy makers.  
Another point of reference to analyse the Swedish attitude in the context of the EU ND 
implementation process is the Swedish Chairmanship in the CBSS (2006-2007). When 
comparing the official statements given in the context of the Swedish Chairmanship to 
their counterparts delivered in the course of the Finnish CBSS presidency in 2002-2003, 
there can be identified a series of differentiating tendencies. Sweden hardly ever refers 
to the EU ND as a superordinate policy framework, but rather (if at all) as a policy tool 
out of many others. Christer Persson, Ambassador and Chairman of the CBSS 
Committee of Senior Officials in 2006 and 2007 described the Swedish perspective on 
the EU ND as follows: 
Sweden, nationally and in its capacity of the present CBSS Presidency, attaches 
considerable importance to the discussions on, and development of a new Northern 
Dimension policy. Sweden in both capacities is convinced that the future ND-policy can 
increase the possibilities of regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea area in the years to come. 
Furthermore, from our perspective, the Northern Dimension policy also serves both an 
inspiration and a base for regional co-operation within other bodies and bilateral co-
operative efforts. This is an important role.514 
The EU ND is seen to be adding some value to existing structures but not to offer any 
exceptional instruments for concrete enhancement of regional cooperation. In its 
priority catalogue, Sweden does not mention the EU ND in a broader context or in the 
form of a major issue for the overall orientation of CBSS activities. It is merely 
mentioned in the context of a practical initiative in the field of Health Policy and Social 
Security, where the Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-
Being (NDPHS) is indicated as a framework to promote CBSS objectives and to enable 
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the exchange of information and expertise.515 What could be mentioned as a humoristic 
and bold indicator for the alleged lacking Swedish commitment to the EU ND 
implementation process is the fact that all official statements on the EU ND that were 
delivered during the period of Swedish Chairmanship were strongly relying on each 
other, and in some parts, the speeches held  
 
– by Hans Dahlgren, Swedish State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and516 
– by Christer Persson, Swedish Chairman of the CBSS517  
 
were literally copied from an article by Carl Bildt, present Swedish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, published in early 2006 in the “Baltic Rim Economies.”518 The sequences 
directly taken from Bildt’s text did, however, not even in one instance, mention the EU 
ND explicitly. In fact, the foreign minister’s essay on Sweden’s role in the BSR goes 
without any single reference to the EU “Northern Dimension”. Instead, he (and 
reproducing his statement, also Dahlgren and Persson) just vaguely mention(s) a 
“regional dimension” that “should not be underestimated”, obviously avoiding to apply 
the official label of the policy. He also refrains from mentioning the EU as any 
reference point or factor in the context of Baltic Sea cooperation. The strong 
commitment to the intergovernmental CBSS is obvious from the beginning of this 
essay: 
The cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region in the framework of the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS) – has helped pave the way for increased regional integration and been 
instrumental in making the Baltic Sea Region one of the most competitive areas in the world 
when it comes to economic growth.519 
However, it can also be told from Bildt’s statement that Sweden is ever more focussing 
on a dislocation of governance and responsibility ‘downwards’, meaning that 
subregional and local actors are becoming more important in comparison to 
governments. 
One effect of the changes during the last years is that the cooperation within the CBSS has 
changed character and reached a more concrete and diversified level. [...] The governments 
are no longer in the driving seat. It is instead much more business, local authorities, 
universities and independent organisations that cooperate on many levels and in different 
capacities. This I find encouraging.520 
Similar elements could also be found in a speech held by the then Swedish Prime 
Minister Göran Persson at the event of launching Sweden’s CBSS Chairmanship. While 
naturally, as a Social Democrat, he did not copy Bildt’s essay, there were still 
significant parallels in his considerations about the priorities in Baltic Sea cooperation. 
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In line with the other statements, he was particularly reluctant to use the official label of 
the policy and rather focussed on the role and function of regional organisations in 
terms of their concrete output. The ND appears only once in a subordinate sentence at 
the very end without any content-related reference. 
We intend to coordinate closely with the incoming Finnish and German Presidencies of the 
EU, not least as regards the implementation of the New Northern Dimension policy.521 
Next to these broad tendencies, there is yet another important indicator for the overall 
orientation of the Swedish CBSS Chairmanship towards the EU ND. Looking at the 
distribution of activities organised by the chair, and comparing it once again to the 
Finnish CBSS presidency calendar for 2002-2003, it becomes evident that 
(unsurprisingly) activities with a distinct focus on the EU ND are far less present on the 
Swedish agenda while Finland had been close to activist in this respect.  
Since the Swedish CBSS Chairmanship 2006-2007 coincided with the Finnish EU 
Presidency, the respective Swedish conduct can not least be regarded as a direct 
feedback and mirror of the concurrent efforts taken by Finland in the context of 
‘keeping the policy alive’. The year 2006 has been a key phase in the history of the EU 
ND. Almost ten years after its establishment, Finland effected a grand scale policy 
revival of the EU ND. A closer look at the Finnish commitments in this respect will 
provide a point of reference for the evaluation of the Swedish attitude, since it might 
make clear to what extent Sweden is lagging behind in terms of solidarity and genuine 
dedication. 
III. Promoting the Finnish Perspective: Finland’s EU Presidency 2006 
Finland’s EU Presidency in the second half of 2006 has been strongly focussed on the 
project of revitalising the EU ND and of introducing a new operational concept for the 
enhancement of its objectives. Finland’s first EU Presidency in autumn 1999 also had 
the EU ND as one of its key priorities. The first Northern Dimension Ministerial 
Conference was arranged then, and the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 
invited the Commission to prepare an Action Plan for the policy. Even though the whole 
undertaking had then been still in its infancy, the inherent weaknesses of the policy 
construct had already started to become apparent. Haukkala affirmed that the “problems 
were there right away in 1999.” 
From 1999 onwards, the EU ND was only loosing more and more momentum. Discussions 
about how to improve the standing of the policy were part of the every-day working 
process. At a very early point, Finland sought to map out the possibilities it had in order to 
bring the policy back on top. The options were clear. Finland could try to either make the 
whole construct more dynamic, or let it die right away. This second option was ruled out 
quite soon since Finland had already considerably exposed itself and could not just abscond 
after having reinforced the issue on highest levels.522 
As indicated earlier in this section, the policy has been facing structural problems from 
the very beginning, mostly related to its inherent fuzziness, the lack of an administrative 
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body proper and the unclear functional objectives. What proved to be the strongest 
drawback was the reluctant attitude of the European Commission, which should, in 
accordance with the legal foundations of the policy, constitute the major institutional 
actor guiding the implementation of the policy. What had already become clear in the 
final wording of the policy was continued throughout the later stages of the 
implementation process. Observers have repeatedly reported about the passiveness of 
the European Commission within the EU ND working bodies, and moreover, in respect 
to its responsibilities within the respective DGs. If at all, the Commission appeared to be 
solely concerned with the ‘Russian dimension’, not least reducing the EU ND to this 
substantial geostrategic issue. Whenever the initiative gained new momentum, it was 
mainly due to Finnish efforts to get the policy project back onto the current EU working 
agenda, whereas the European Commission showed little enthusiasm and hardly ever set 
active measures in order to develop the policy framework further or to proceed with the 
implementation process. In 2002, the Business Advisory Council (BAC) of the CBSS 
launched a fervid call for action to elicit “A New Start for the ND.”523  
It was claimed that the EU ND had widely failed its initial objectives, most particularly 
in respect to the enhancement of the visibility of the “Northern agenda” on the European 
and international scene. The policy was – to a large extent – not more than “an extra 
label on Phare and TACIS projects.” Moreover, the BAC criticised the constantly low 
commitment of the European Commission, stressing for example that “only one person 
within DG External can be said to work on an every day basis with the Northern 
Dimension” and that “in the other DGs, as well as among most of the Commissioners, 
the ND has attained very marginal attention.”524 Given this negative long-term course of 
developments, the recent Finnish efforts to keep the policy afloat (if ever it does not 
have to be reanimated indeed) could be interpreted as  
yet another chapter in the series of Finnish frustrations while trying to make the ND a more 
vivid policy. [...] Finland has always tried to make the EU ND a genuine EU policy – which 
it has never been indeed.525  
What Heininen once called the “new mantra or flagship of Finland’s EU policy”526 has 
turned into a “nightmare,” and from the outside perspective, into a “yesterday’s meal 
nobody is interested in anymore.”527 The Finnish Presidency has seen a series of well-
intentioned measures to counter the negative flow that had paralysed the policy over the 
years. Finland’s quest for a “New ND” first emerged in early 2005 when the awareness 
about the limitation of the then current second Action Plan started to become pressing. 
The viability of simply launching a third Action Plan for the years to follow and to 
continue working normally has never been assumed. The negative experiences made in 
the first years of implementation had reinforced concerns about the future of the policy 
and fuelled prospects about what could be done to enhance its quality and substance.  
                                                 
523  See Business Advisory Council of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). A Call for a New 
Start for the Northern Dimension. Presented at the ND Business Forum, 4th Annual BDF Summit, 
14 October 2002. Document available on the website of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(Stockholms Handelskammare) www.chamber.se [2 February 2008]. 
524  See ibd., p. 1. 
525  HAUKKALA Hiski, interview on 22 November 2006. Unpublished personal notes. 
526  HEININEN Lassi: Ideas and Outcomes. Finding a Concrete Form for the Northern Dimension 
Initiative. In: The Northern Dimension. Fuel for the EU? Helsinki 2001, pp. 20-53, here p. 20.  
527  HAUKKALA Hiski, interview on 22 November 2006. Unpublished personal notes. 
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Finland eventually chose to fight in order to get the policy construct where it had 
wanted it from the beginning: to the level of genuine joint commitment by both the 
European Commission and the fellow Member States. Analysts have recognised much 
earlier that the original setup was almost destined to fail.  
Without the introduction of a long-term political vision in the Northern Dimension concept 
complementing the existing format, the initiative is destined to remain in the oblivion of a 
de facto second-class policy framework serving as a surrogate of foreign policy. […] The 
absence of a strategic vision of Northern Europe and the need stressed by member states to 
attach substance to the initiative with short and mid-term projects are two aspects of the 
same question: the weakness of the EU as a foreign policy actor.528 
The tune at the beginning of the Finnish Presidency has been very positive. The 
abashing motivation behind the Finnish efforts could only be guessed from several 
allusive statements delivered by governmental representatives. In the preface of one of 
the numerous promotion folders produced in the run-up to the presidency, Prime 
Minister Matti Vanhanen gave a small hint about the ‘real’ background of the new 
Finnish initiative: 
The ND as a term is well known both in Finland and elsewhere in Europe even though its 
content and achievements have remained unknown to general public. One could even say 
that the ND has suffered from a sort of ‘marketing and communications problem.’ For 
example, few people are aware that environmental projects worth as much as EUR 2 billion, 
which are crucial for Finland, Russia and the rest of Europe, are currently being 
implemented by the ND Environmental Partnership. The Partnership is an excellent 
example of the fact that by joining our forces we can achieve more than we could on our 
own.529 
However, in this very same folder, notwithstanding this vague indication by the Prime 
Minister that “there might have been a problem indeed”, the main author concedes more 
overtly albeit not yet critically enough that the policy has multiple structural 
weaknesses. 
The EU’s Northern Dimension may be difficult to identify at times. On the one hand, it is 
scattered throughout the world in hundreds of projects largely unaware of one another. On 
the other hand, it is omnipresent as an umbrella term in policy and geographical discourse, 
covering pretty much everything. Even the region itself lacks clear delineation.530 
Haikkilä definitely found a good way to point at problems without letting them appear 
as such. He was probably just trying to master the mission of having to write a 
convincing reader about an unconvincing policy. Unsurprisingly, the official documents 
that followed in the course of the presidency sought to achieve a similar balance 
between the objectives promoted and the underlying honest concerns. 
                                                 
528  CATELLANI Nicola: The EU’s Northern Dimension after the Enlargement. In: BARBE Esther/ 
JOHANSSON-NOGUES Elisabeth (eds): Beyond enlargement. The new members and new frontiers 
of the enlarged European Union. Barcelona 2003, pp. 160-183, here p. 174. 
529  VANHANEN Matti: To the Reader. In: HEIKKILÄ Markku: The Northern Dimension. Europe 
Information. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 188c/2006, Helsinki 2006, pp. 7-8, here p. 8. 
530  HEIKKILÄ Markku: The Northern Dimension. Europe Information. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Finland, 188c/2006, Helsinki 2006, p. 9. 
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The first important step in the course of this ambitious policy revival had been the 
formal approval of a set of “Guidelines for the Development of a Political Declaration 
and a Policy Framework Document for the ND Policy From 2007” at the fourth 
ministerial meeting on the EU ND, held in Brussels in November 2005. Building on 
these guidelines, in November 2006, the Finnish Presidency presented a “Political 
Declaration on the Northern Dimension” at the ND Summit in Helsinki. The EU was 
represented by the Finnish Prime Minister Vanhanen, Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso and High Representative for the Common Security and Defence Policy 
Javier Solana. Russia was represented by Vladimir Putin, Norway by Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg, Iceland by Prime Minister Geir Haarde, and Finland by President 
Tarja Halonen. Telling from both EU and Finnish Press Releases, Sweden was not 
officially represented. The decisions announced in this context were intended to 
transform the EU ND into a “common permanent policy” to be pursued by four equal 
partners: the European Union, Russia, Norway and Iceland.531 One of the major 
specificities of the new policy framework is that it aims at ‘equal co-financing of a 
realistic number of agreed and concrete projects together with the active International 
Financial Institutions and bilateral donors in the ND region.’  
The present policy framework document is a joint achievement of the partners. The ND 
partners recognise that their cooperation framework can only be driven by the spirit of 
partnership and based on shared confidence. The ND is henceforward a common project 
and a common responsibility [emphases added]. 
Knowing the previous history and record of the Finnish efforts in the EU ND context, 
there may be identified some elements in this quotation that indicate the basic 
considerations lying at the background of this new initiative. The recurrent use of 
expression like “joint”, “common” and “shared” can be ascribed to the Finnish 
experience about the lacking commitment of the parties involved within the ‘old’ 
framework. The notion of “henceforward” can be interpreted in a similar way, in the 
sense of ‘as from now’ and ‘unlike in the past.’ The arguments that recurred in most 
official statements in the context of the policy revival could be categorised as follows: 
 
– the argument of Europeans being collectively responsible to maintain the substance 
of the policy, given the fact that it is the only one of its kind in Europe (“no other 
mechanism exists for such extensive cooperation”); 
– a persistent claim for more ‘genuine’ commitment by the parties involved; 
– the necessity to recall the added value of a joint venture in regional cooperation 
(“joining our forces in order to achieve more than we could on our own”); 
– gain awareness about the clear Northern European responsibility of the EU; 
– apparent weaknesses, such as lacking structure should be seen as an asset. 
 
                                                 
531  Given the explicit focus on these four constitutive partners, the absence of a Swedish representative 
might well have been result of deliberate considerations. However, it should be emphasised at this 
point that Finland is obviously not trying (any longer) to develop a broad intra-Nordic commonsense 
on this issue. The presence of other Nordics such as Denmark or Sweden would have been 
conducive to the overall standing of the new document. Quotations are taken from the framework 
document if not stated otherwise. See “Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document,” adopted 
by the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland at the Northern Dimension Summit in Helsinki, 24 
November 2006. 
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What appears most problematic is that Finland has assumed a defensive position, 
putting itself into the role of the begging one. From the promotional material distributed 
in the context of the Finnish Presidency, it becomes clear that Finland has long since 
begun to develop and cultivate its own version of the policy – a “Finnish perspective” 
on the Northern Dimension. Important evidence in this respect can be found in the 
output of the Northern Dimension Research Centre (NORDI) situated in 
Lappeenranta/Finland.532 In one of its recent folders published in the course of the 
Finnish Presidency, there can be found the following description of the nature and the 
objectives of the EU ND. 
The Northern Dimension exists on two levels. On the macro level, the Northern Dimension 
is a political concept for attracting the EU’s attention to north-east Europe and for 
emphasising the importance of the Union’s cooperation with north-west Russia. On a more 
concrete micro level, the Northern Dimension consists of the founded Partnership for Public 
Health and Social Well-being (NDPHS) and the Environmental Partership (NDEP), but it 
also involves all the activities that are being carried out within the Northern Dimension area 
by various actors, such as individual countries, coalitions of countries, the Commission, 
regional councils and authorities, NGOs and corporations.533 
A similar interpretation is reproduced in other publications of the Presidency, such as in 
a brochure on “The Northern Dimension – A Finnish Perspective.” The distinction 
between two policy levels does not occur in the policy document itself. In many 
respects, the newly emerging ‘Finnish reading’ deviates from ‘what has been agreed’ 
and in various respects, it also exceeds the scope and commitment of the official policy 
framework at hand. This might be seen as an evidence for the liability of Finland to 
duplicate its project in ‘private,’ trying to balance the fact that even within the new 
framework, the expected level of commitment by the other parties is not in line with 
Finnish expectations. The new Finnish ND initiative was to “replace ambitions with 
objectives” and to substantiate the policy by way of concrete commitments and 
eventually, visible outcomes. With these ambitious prospects, Finland has exposed itself 
once again at highest levels. However, this dedicated self-exposure must be seen as an 
emergency measure that Finland felt forced to take in order to keep the policy from an 
ultimate failure. 
Finland has clearly aimed to shift the policy contents to the responsibility of the Union, 
rather than being the driving force itself. If the development had taken another course, it 
would not have tried to stand out as a leader allegedly promoting national interest under the 
cloak of common European responsibility [as that is what Finland has been repeatedly 
accused of]. What is happening to its ND Initiative was and still is very embarrassing and 
frustrating for Finland.534 
                                                 
532  The Centre has been established upon a Finnish initiative in 2003, in order to “coordinate research 
into Russia and Eastern and Central Europe,” and thus, to increase cooperation with different 
departments and researchers at University. NORDI conducts research related to all fields of the 
Northern Dimension policy and seeks to fulfil an academic role as well as a public function as a 
centre for information and exchange of knowledge. For more information, see the official website of 
the Centre www.lut.fi/nordi [26 March 2008]. 
533  See INFO folder on the EU Northern Dimension. NORDI, Laapeenranta 2006. Available on the 
website of the Centre.  
534  HAUKKALA Hiski, interview on 22 November 2006. Unpublished personal notes. 
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Taking this assessment of recent developments together, and considering the respective 
attitude of Sweden, the following chapter will seek to give a broader picture of the 
actual state of affairs as well as an outlook on supposable future developments in this 
matter of Swedish-Finnish dispute. 
F. Evaluation: The EU ND Reconsidered 
The case of the Swedish-Finnish divide over the general nature, content and objectives 
of the EU ND makes clear that despite lacking interest and commitment from a major 
part of the EU Member States and – not least from the side of the Commission, the 
establishment of a genuine “northern dimension” is additionally hampered by an ironic 
and yet decisive conflict among neighbours and fellow Nordics. The argument that both 
Sweden and Finland would indeed profit from pooling their efforts directed to their 
geographical surrounding does not really necessitate sophisticated explanations. They 
are situated in similar geostrategic positions; even more so, they have an extensive set 
of shared security concerns and regional objectives, e.g. in the field of environmental or 
maritime policy. Their common Nordic background would constitute an additional 
asset. However, despite these close to ideal preconditions, there are no indicators for the 
readiness or willingness of any of the two to depart from their established positions, 
which in either case, might have legitimate and consistent normative foundations, but 
from a practical point of view, have no conceivable advantage. 
As the analysis has shown, Sweden and Finland do not agree on the most basic aspects 
of both European and regional cooperation. The Swedish-Finnish divide cuts through all 
facets of BSR politics. Their divergent approaches towards regional integration result, 
in the first place, from the difference in how they generally view the purpose and value 
of EU membership. While the Finnish attitude is rather affirmative, the Swedish 
position appears to be largely reserved. Sweden is constantly trying to keep the 
supranational or ‘outside’ impact as low as possible. Evidently, the Swedes prefer 
channels of bilateral cooperation, and moreover, they are rather in favour of governance 
shifts ‘downwards’ than ‘upwards.’ Sweden promotes structural diffusion in the field of 
Baltic Sea cooperation instead of enhancing large-scale framework solutions and further 
institutionalisation. This ‘grass root’ approach is diametrically opposed to the Finnish 
conception. Finland is not only a convinced and highly compliant EU member state that 
seeks to fulfil its official commitment in the best possible way; apparently, it is also 
very keen to use the opportunities that emerge from its membership. It seeks to deploy 
the EU channels at hand to pursue its goals and objectives, and it is not reluctant to take 
over the initiative role in order to customise the given supranational framework 
according to its needs and interests.  
In the EU ND context, Finland has therefore often been blamed to (ab)use its 
membership asset for the maximisation of its own interests, and to proclaim alleged 
‘shared’ responsibilities in order to sell its policy solutions and gain support for self-
serving political undertakings. Sweden has been very distrustful, and at times, overtly 
irritated about the Finnish attempts of ‘getting the best for being in the club.’ This 
lacking confidence has resulted from the competitiveness that emerged within the 
Nordic cooperative formation after the end of the Cold War. In many cases, this 
allegedly ‘soft’ competition had very negative effects for both sides.  
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Instead of permanently sidelining each other’s policy initiatives, the two neighbours 
could have tried to find a common denominator (which should have evidently not been 
impossible) and get together on coherent and effective grounds. However, the fact that 
this has not happened in the EU ND context, i.e. in a situation that would have provided 
close to ideal preconditions for a Swedish-Finnish joint venture, makes clear that this 
divide must result from much more than just an inherent unwillingness to make 
compromises, and thereby, to achieve more straightforward solutions.  
In fact, looking more closely at the interests and motives on either side, it becomes 
evident that even their idea of how to define ‘Norden’ is different. For Sweden, the 
‘North’ is clearly centred around the Baltic Sea. For Finland in turn, the ‘North’ is much 
more ‘northern’ in the sense that it includes also more remote areas like the Arctic and 
the Barents Sea. These diverging geopolitical perceptions already constitute a major 
problem. From the Swedish point of view, a policy like the EU ND with a 
comprehensive geographical scope is far too broad and diffuse. Therefore, other 
channels appear more attractive to Swedish policy makers. Well-defined approaches 
with a distinct focus on the key areas of strategic interest gain more attention; this 
commitment is then, as the EU ND case has shown, not available for policy alternatives 
offered and promoted by other actors. 
Another source of divergence that hampers the establishment of a joint northern policy 
perspective lies in the field of structural conceptions. As pointed out before, the EU ND 
in its past and present design is not very substantial in institutional terms. It has only a 
very loose formal structure, with the Senior Officials meeting and the ministerial 
sessions being its only structural ledgers. The output of these meetings and summits has 
been very low in the beginning, and has remained modest throughout the whole 
implementation process. However, evaluating the EU ND on the basis of rigid 
institutionalist criteria is probably neither fruitful nor appropriate. In fact, in essence, the 
EU ND has mainly been intended to operate on a project basis, and it was rather 
constructed as a process than as a “turn-key project.”535  
Finnish policy makers have repeatedly emphasised that this flexible structure should be 
seen as an advantage, bringing added value for all players involved. In fact, not even 
Finland would have supported the creation of a centralist or supranational body to 
govern the policy implementation, as not least on the national level, it would have been 
very difficult to promote. Haukkala claims that in the context of the first policy 
initiative, the Finns were not only unable but also unwilling to give more substance to 
the EU ND. 
Although this has often resulted in growing frustration in respect to the effectiveness of the 
initiative, one can also view the situation in a more favourable light. This vagueness or 
open-endedness of the Northern Dimension can also be seen as something that should be 
preserved rather than overcome by a frenetic bureaucratic development of the initiative.536 
 
                                                 
535  See DUBOIS Jeroen: The Northern Dimension as Prototype of the Wider Europe Framework Policy. 
University of Liverpool, Working Paper. Liverpool 2004, p. 5. 
536  HAUKKALA Hiski: Whose Governance? Challenging the Dominant Northern Dimension 
Discourse. In: Northern Research Forum (ed.): Northern Veche. Proceedings of the Second Northern 
Research Forum, held in Veliky Novgorod, Russia. 19-22 September 2002, pp. 105-107, here p. 107. 
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Even though a further institutionalisation would have enhanced the visibility and 
effectiveness of the policy, Finland has so far always abstained from the promotion of 
increased formalisation. The governance concept underlying this specific (a)structural 
nature of the EU ND is, not least, similar to that of traditional Nordic cooperation, 
which Joenniemi defines as follows: 
It has been relatively easy for the Nordic States to tolerate Nordicity. The states have not 
been seriously offended as the discourse rarely touched upon anything that belonged to the 
sphere of the Nordic states themselves, it had few interactionist consequences and the states 
have to a large degree remained indifferent to the whole Nordic spatialisation, nor has any 
Nordic state been dominant enough to be able to take over, politicise and transform 
Nordicity into a statist project of its own.537 
However, after the negative record of the policy had become evident in the first years of 
its implementation, these structural foundations had to be reconsidered in any case. As a 
consequence, Finland has recently developed a certain propensity for further steps of 
structural formalisation. Paula Lehtomäki, Finnish Minister for Foreign Trade and 
Development has recently made the following suggestion: 
There is room for even deeper commitment. In addition to ND meetings for ministers and 
civil servants, we need an operative body between different parties to ensure the execution 
and follow-up of Northern Dimension work.538 
At a conference in January 2007 held in Hanasaari/Espoo (Finland) on the “Northern 
Dimension and Nordic cooperation” Prime Minister Vanhanen then argued for the 
establishment of formal coordination mechanisms between the Nordic Council of 
Ministers and the EU 
Finland aims to build continuity between its recent Presidency of the EU and its current 
chairmanship of the Nordic Council of Ministers, with the aim of launching a long-term 
policy for the ND based on its new framework document. It should not come as a surprise 
that Finland intends to steer Nordic co-operation within the Council of Ministers closer 
towards influencing EU policies. Finland finds it natural that the same items should appear 
on the agendas of both the Nordic Council of Ministers and the EU. In this way, the Nordic 
Countries may stay one step ahead on EU and EEA issues, both in terms of decision-making 
and practical implementation. Under the new framework document, the ND will develop 
towards a cohesive joint policy for the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland.539  
From a Swedish perspective, this sort of interpretation about the ‘natural’ course of 
institutionalisation might well be idiosyncratic. Sweden has always abstained from the 
development of rigid and formal links between the EU level and its domestic, or at least, 
regional sphere. Equally, it has always been a strong advocate of Nordic exclusiveness, 
taking pride in its seclusiveness and self-chosen insularity.  
                                                 
537  JOENNIEMI Pertti: Norden as a Post-Nationalist Construction. In: Id. (ed.): Neo-Nationalism or 
Regionality: The Restructuring of Political Space around the Baltic Rim. Stockholm 1997, pp. 181-
234, here p. 206. 
538  LEHTOMÄKI Paula, cited in HEIKKILÄ Markku: The Northern Dimension. Europe Information. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 188c/2006, Helsinki 2006, pp. 7-8, here p. 70.  
539  Speech by the Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen at the conference on the Northern Dimension 
and Nordic cooperation in Hanasaari/Espoo (Finland), 17 January 2007. 
153
Hence, the Swedish reaction to these formalist aspirations of breaking the Nordic ‘seal’ 
and of opening a channel for supranational intrusion, is easily predictable. In addition to 
this intricate intra-Nordic situation, the problems within the EU framework remain. 
There is no clear evidence yet that the Commission is intending to show a stronger 
commitment for the Finnish ambitions. However, major developments like the final 
implementation of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) at 
the beginning of 2007 allow for a preliminary valuation. The combination of existing 
financing instruments for regional and cross-border cooperation constitutes a major 
achievement in the EU relationship towards the East, and most importantly, towards 
Russia.540 However, the policy channel employed for this seminal innovation was not 
the EU ND. 
In the context of its new policy initiative, Finland has obviously tried to get Russia more 
interested by turning the old institutional design into a “common” policy. The EU ND 
Action Plans had so far only enabled a unilateral problem assessment and working 
process, while now, Russia is officially involved as an equal partner. The question is 
whether these almost desperate Finnish attempts of making the policy more attractive 
can compete with the evident benefits provided in the other policy contexts, most 
notably the ENP and the Strategic Partnership with Russia. At this stage, the long-term 
effects of the new Finnish initiative are not yet foreseeable. However, telling from the 
hitherto problematic course of development and the respective international and 
‘European’ attitudes, and looking at the argumentative strategies employed in the 
context of this policy revival, the expectations should certainly not be too high.  
Ironically, from today’s point of view, the only terminological choice for the EU ND 
appears like an ill-fated marker and self-fulfilling prophecy. Obviously conscious of the 
fuzziness the notion of a “dimension” might convey, during its Presidency in 2006, 
Finland has been noticeably trying to promote the “policy” tag for its initiative. This 
balancing act evokes the earlier debate about the formal quality of the new EU treaty, 
whether it should be regarded as “constitutional” in the widest sense, and whether 
labelling it as such would make it more attractive to people. The choice taken in this 
context is familiar to everybody. However, the relevance and effectiveness of this kind 
of sophistication is known, too.  
                                                 
540  Even though Russia has abstained from taking part in the main ENP framework, Russian partners 
have been declared eligible for the new funding instrument. See note 348.  
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Chapter 4: Explaining the Baltic Sea Conundrum  
Many interpretations have been attached to the phenomenon of Baltic Sea Regionalism: 
for some, it is the response to globalisation, for others it is the manifestation of post-
modern security thinking541 or a post-security construction.542 Lehti describes the 
regionalist dynamics after 1989 as “attempts to reorganize a disintegrating world [...] 
and a result of the blurring of the Cold War East-West division.”543 The early cross-
border activities took place in what Lehti calls a “formative moment”, meaning that old 
narratives were replaced by new ones with the overall aim of “bringing order in the 
midst of change.”544 Sander identifies a certain predisposition for transnational 
cooperation or a “propensity for joining organisations” that is inherent to people living 
around the Baltic Sea.545 The following section seeks to address the question of how and 
to what extent various different theoretical approaches (European Integration Theories, 
International Relations Theories and Comparative approaches) can be applied in order 
to explain the “Baltic Sea conundrum” meaning the set of specificities that distinguishes 
the BSR from other European regions, most importantly its eminent cooperative 
cohesiveness that turns the region into a showcase for regionalism and subregionalism. 
The central aim is to identify the analytical and explanatory value of various 
approaches, and thereby to provide a comprehensive basis and starting point for 
consecutive analyses on Baltic Sea regionalism. 
A. Introductory Remarks on Regionalism and Integration 
Regionalism can be defined as a process in international politics that is based on mutual 
support, cooperation, coordination and cohesive networking between different actors 
within a certain geographical range. Integration, on the other hand, can be described as 
an act or process of a group of entities, and most commonly states, uniting to form an 
integrative whole or community. Integration can, just as regionalism, reach various 
levels of commitment, along a continuum from shallow to deep, depending on what 
degree of involvement the concerning parties wish to have.546 Shallow integration 
involves, for example, the elimination of trade barriers or the restrictions to free 
movement of people. Deep integration, on the other hand, includes further steps of 
commitment such as formalised harmonisation of procedures, institutionalisation or 
centralisation.  
                                                 
541  E.g. WÆVER Ole: The Baltic Sea: A Region after Post-Modernity? In: JOENNIEMI Pertti (ed.): 
Neo-Nationalism or Regionality. The Restructuring of political space around the Baltic Rim. 
Stockholm 1997, pp. 293-342.  
542  JOENNIEMI Pertti: Norden, Europe and Post-Security. Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 
Working Papers, 11/1998. 
543  See LEHTI Marko: Possessing a Baltic Europe. Retold National Narratives in the European North. 
In: Id./SMITH David J. (eds): Post-Cold War Identity Politics. Northern and Baltic Experiences. 
London 2003, pp. 11-49, here p. 14. 
544  See ibd., here p. 21. 
545  See SANDER Gordon: Off Centre. Baltic hands link across a troubled sea. In: Financial Times, 8 
April 2000. 
546  See BURFISHER Mary E./ROBINSON Sherman/THIERFELDER Karen: Regionalism. Old and 
New, Theory and Practice. Paper presented at the International Conference “Agricultural policy 
reform and the WTO. Where are we heading?” Capri/Italy, 23-26 June 2003, p. 5. 
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These definitions show that regionalism and integration are very close concepts. One of 
the essential preconditions for integration is a basic will and disposition to cooperate 
with other actors. This readiness and voluntariness of action also builds the ground for 
regionalism. In most cases, entities brought together by way of integration are also 
united by geographical vicinity. Integration processes often extend to the borders of a 
certain regional entity, e.g. a continent or parts of it respectively. Thus, in a certain way, 
European integration can be interpreted as a process of regional integration, a process 
that strengthens the economic, political and ideological links between the European 
states by way of cooperation. Baltic Sea Regionalism is based on similar grounds. 
Processing cooperation and networking across the Baltic Sea rim is an instance of 
integration, i.e. of the various actors conspiring for cooperation and togetherness. In line 
with this argumentation, BSR-based regionalism can be defined as yet another case of 
regional integration.  
Wrapping up, European integration and Baltic Sea Regionalism can both be seen as 
living examples of regional integration, with the geographical range building the main 
qualitative disparity between the two.  
 
Macro-level  - European Integration  
Meso-level  - Baltic Sea Regionalism 
 
Hence, besides the fact that the European project and the process of Baltic Sea 
Regionalism are closely related to each other (in the sense of macro- and respective sub-
region), it can also be assumed that they follow a similar logic, the logic of progressive 
integration. These considerations lead to the next step of argumentation. Given this 
conceptual closeness between regionalism and integration, it appears legitimate and 
viable to address the corpus of (European) Integration Theory (EIT) to try to explain the 
inherent dynamics of Baltic Sea Regionalism and moreover, to trace the correlation 
between the broader process of European integration and the specific regional 
development in the BSR. 
B. Theoretical Approaches to European Integration  
I. European Integration Theory: Addressing regional integration? 
Consulting the ‘oracle’ of EIT for the purpose of this study means, first and foremost, to 
concentrate on the ‘regional’ or ‘regionalist’ focus of the different theoretical 
approaches at hand. Many analysts equate the concept of ‘regional integration’ to that of 
‘(general) integration’ by using the terms interchangeably.547 However, not all 
approaches to European integration do explicitly emphasize the geographical or 
regional aspect. According to Rosamond, viewing European integration as an instance 
of regionalism, i.e. as “the tendency of groups of territorially-adjacent states to cluster 
together into blocs”, is actually only one approach out of several. He claims that there 
are at least four different “locations”, where one can seek to find an explanation for 
European integration:548 
 
                                                 
547  See for example MATTLI Walter: The Logic of Regional Integration. Europe and Beyond. 
Cambridge 1999. 
548  See ROSAMOND Ben: Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke 2000, pp. 14-15. 
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– International Organisations; 
– Regionalism; 
– Complex Policy and Governance Systems; 
– Subject sui generis. 
 
The materialization of the so-called European project has been a major challenge for 
International Relations (IR) Studies. The European integration process has been 
accompanied by decades of academic thinking, and thus, it inspired the establishment of 
what could be called an academic discipline of its own. European Integration Studies 
have brought about a large stock of theoretical approaches; in various different ways, 
analysts have tried to contribute to the global understanding of the political, 
institutional, social and economic processes that came along with the development of 
the European Community (EC), and later, the EU. Some approaches have managed to 
clarify certain aspects of integration, while they certainly failed to explain other 
particulars of the matter. However, it can generally be asserted that most traditional 
theoretical models of European integration do not specify or focus on the aspect of 
regionality or regionness. Indeed, most approaches take the fact of geographical 
adjacency for granted. Christiansen points at the fact that the EU has started very late to 
develop some sort of spatial approach towards certain policy issues.  
The process of seeking to achieve territorial integration came relatively late to the European 
project. For most of its life, the integration process had its emphasis on functional sectoral 
integration, geared towards greater mobility of goods, people and services […].549 
Also Niemann argues that aspects of spatiality for many years have been systematically 
excluded from the European politics debate.550 This tendency in the European 
integration process has been largely reflected in the models of explanation drawn by the 
respective contemporary integration theorists. Generally, the influence of the EU’s 
development on the course of theory production seems close to obvious. Indeed, there 
are many examples that show how and to what extent EIT has followed the ups and 
downs of its subject, one of the most prominent ones being the rise, fall, and comeback 
of Neo-Functionalism in the wake of the Empty Chair crisis, and later, the SEA 
respectively.551 Concerning a regional perspective on European integration, these 
dynamics resulted in a deep-seated inability among the dominant theoretical paradigms 
in integration studies to analyse spatiality or space. The question of what effects 
physical vicinity can have on the course of the integrative development of a region 
cannot be considered very current in traditional EIT. However, some theoretical models, 
most importantly the ones that involve normative reasoning about identity-related 
aspects of integration appear to be more dedicated to the effect of regional adjacency 
with the most prominent example being social constructivist integration theory.552  
                                                 
549  CHRISTIANSEN Thomas: Towards Statehood? The EU’s move towards Constitutionalisation and 
Territorialisation. In: Centre for European Studies. University of Oslo (ed.): ARENA Working 
Paper, No. 21, August 2005, pp. 13-14. 
550  See NIEMANN Michael: A Spatial Approach to Regionalisms in the Global Economy. Basingstoke 
2000, pp. 4-5. 
551  See DIEZ Thomas/WIENER Antje: Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory. In: Idd. (eds): 
European Integration Theory. Oxford 2004, pp. 1-24, here p. 13.   
552  See chapter “The Discursive Construction of Regions”, p. 170-, and chapter “Why the Explanatory 
Power of Social Constructivism Remains Low”, p. 177-.  
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The following considerations aim at structuring the plethora of theories at hand 
according to broad tendencies and developments in order to support and prepare the 
then following discussion about applicability and interpretation of European Integration 
Theories for the analytical purposes of this study.  
II. Broad Tendencies and Competing Traditions in EIT 
Given the confusingly large number of different approaches to (European) integration, it 
appears appropriate to offer some kind of reference pattern or line for orientation that 
helps to overview the bulk of European Integration Theories. It is not in the scope of 
this chapter to provide an exhaustive picture of the history and the state-of-play in EIT. 
The following discussion is rather meant to impose some sort of structure onto the large 
sum of theoretical approaches that decades of research in the field of (European) 
integration have brought about. There are different ways of how to structure EIT. Diez 
and Wiener offer a chronological classification that helps to grasp the development of 
EIT as a strain within the broader framework of IR Studies.553 Before outlining the three 
main phases of EIT, they draw an overall picture of what they call the “proto-integration 
theory period,” i.e. the scholar development that set the basis for what later became 
known as “European Integration Theory”. According to this perspective, classic 
Functionalism, with David Mitrany being its main representative, poses as some sort of 
‘prototype’ for all the theoretical reflections on European integration that followed.554 
Wiener and Diez offer an overview that suggests different phases of EIT, emphasising 
the close relation between the socio-political context and the development of theory. 
 
Phase Period of time Main issues in EIT 
Explanatory after 1960 integration as a process  
Analytical after 1980 the outcome of integration, EU governance and institutional features 
Constructive after 1990 different forms and levels of governance 
social and ideological construction of integration 
Table 15: Phases in European Integration Theory555 
                                                 
553  See WIENER Antje: Finality vs. Enlargement. Opposing Rationales and Constitutive Practices 
towards a new Transnational Order. In: Jean Monnet Working Paper, 8/02. New York 2002, p. 4.  
554  ‘A Working Peace System’ (1943) was Mitrany’s core publication. Impressed by the war experience, 
his contributions followed a very strong normative agenda. The main question addressed in his study 
was how to constrain states and prevent future war through the establishment of a network of 
transnational organizations on a functional basis. For him this question was more of a global concern 
than a specific European issue. In fact, Mitrany even strongly opposed the idea of regional 
integration since he perceived it to replicate rather than to transcend the state-centric design of 
International Relations. See ROSAMOND Ben: Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke 
2000, p. 36. Early Federalism can also be perceived as part of this formative proto-period of 
European Integration Theory. In contrast to Functionalism, Federalism was more directly related to 
the European case, claiming, for instance, for the establishment of a European Federation of States. 
See DIEZ Thomas/WIENER Antje: Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory. In: Idd. (eds): 
European Integration Theory. Oxford 2004, pp. 1-24, here p. 7. 
555  Table generated on the basis of DIEZ Thomas/WIENER Antje: Introducing the Mosaic of 
Integration Theory. In: Idd. (eds): European Integration Theory. Oxford 2004, pp. 1-24, here p. 7.  
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This scheme may serve as a first orientation guide. Anyway, most past and current 
approaches combine different aspects of theory and thus, do not clearly fit into these 
chronological categories. This is particularly true for the recent development in EIT, as 
the approaches that evolved after 1989/90 tend to be much more diversified and 
complex. The Eastern enlargement has brought about another rush of very diverse and 
innovative theoretical perspectives that made it even more difficult to identify some sort 
of analytical trend in EIT. This explosion of diversity is what Diez and Wiener referred 
to as the “mosaic of European Integration Theory”. Recent theoretical contributions 
have proved to be close to incommensurable, since their underlying analytical 
perspectives are becoming less mutually exclusive.556  
What is changing as compared to the initial phase of theorizing about the EU is the higher 
degree of theoretical pluralism and the mutual irrelevance of approaches. New insights in, 
say, coalition formation in the European Parliament do not have any impact on theorizing 
about EU constitutional bargains because these theories have different fields of application 
which do not overlap. [...] In the early days, European integration was the subject of a 
controversy within international relations about the relative importance of ‘second image’ 
vs. ‘third image’ explanations, about the relevance of state actors vs. societal actors and 
about the possibility of creating durable peace by overcoming the anarchical structure in the 
international system. This clear embeddedness in one single sub-discipline has been lost.557  
From the early 1950s onwards, Integration Theory used to be dominated by the major 
strands that academic thinking in IRT had put forth: Realism, Functionalism and their 
respective neo- and neo-neo-versions. In the late 1980s, as methods and approaches 
from other disciplines started to penetrate the field, the scenery became more and more 
diverse and fragmented. Even though indeed, it has become much more difficult to give 
a general overview of current theoretical approaches to regional and European 
integration, there are still certain “grand tendencies of thought” in the field. Scholarship 
about EIT has recently identified two significant “turns”:  
 
– the “governance turn”, bringing numerous concerns about the specific structure of 
the Union onto the European integration research agenda. This “second wave of 
integration theory”558 loosened from the bulk of tradition EIT by turning its focus 
more to the question of the Union’s specific “making”, i.e. the structural nature of 
its polity and the way politics occur across these structures.  
– the “constructivist turn” that entered the Political Science scene by taking 
inspiration from sociology, linguistics and particularly from psychology;559 what 
Rittberger decided to call the “deliberative turn” in EIT could be defined as a new 
strain of theories that highlight “the contribution of argumentative interaction.”560 
                                                 
556  See DIEZ Thomas/WIENER Antje: Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory. In: Idd. (eds): 
European Integration Theory. Oxford 2004, pp. 1-24, here p. 19. 
557  JACHTENFUCHS Markus: Deepening and Widening Integration Theory. In: Journal of European 
Public Policy, No. 9/2002, pp. 650-657, here p. 651.  
558  See KELSTRUP Morten: Integration Theories. History, Competing Approaches and New Per-
spectives. In: WIVEL Anders (ed.): Explaining European Integration. Copenhagen 1998, pp. 15-55, 
here p. 34. 
559  See CHECKEL Jeffrey T.: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. In: World 
Politics, No. 2/1998, pp. 324-348.  
560  See NEYER Jϋrgen: The Deliberative Turn in Integration Theory. In: Journal of European Public 
Policy, No. 5/2006, pp. 779-791. 
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The emergence of these turns did not follow any sort of time axis. There was no 
specifically identifiable point in the development of EIT where academia “turned” 
towards the analysis of governance; also, the “constructivist turn” should not be seen as 
an event reversing the direction of European integration thinking. Instead, the two turns 
occurred largely parallel to one another, or rather, they drew upon each other, and in 
turn, contributed to each other. A similar interpretation is suggested for the alleged 
“spatial turn” in integration theory, which has, as identified by Rumford, introduced 
issues like territoriality, spatiality as well as reflections about bordering and re-
bordering to the field. He claims that, while the above-mentioned “governance turn” has 
largely been acknowledged and documented; the transformation of space that this very 
turn has entailed has hardly gained much attention in the theoretical debate.561  
This assessment shows once again that these so-called “turns” should not be perceived 
as conceptual turning points that crossed the academic debate with a clear-cut new way 
of argumentation. In fact, the “governance turn” contributed to the transformation of 
what in traditional theoretical approaches was commonly perceived as “space” or 
“European territoriality”. The “levels” that multi-level governance approaches mainly 
focus on can be perceived as constructed spaces, and there again, the “spatial turn” 
starts to intersect with the constructivist trend in theoretical reasoning about European 
integration. Summing up, the image of chronology as it is purported by the notion of a 
“turn” in EIT is actually more confusing than helpful. It appears more appropriate to 
identify these newly emerging analytical perspectives as broad tendencies gradually 
changing and shaping the corpus of traditional EIT. We identify a certain tendency of 
analysts increasingly stressing the significance of normative effects of political 
discourse or social interaction as well as the tendency of questioning the nature of 
European space, a perspective that, in contrast to the traditional notion of European 
territoriality, focuses on the importance of spatial change and the potential effect these 
changes could have for the functioning of European governance structures.  
Besides pointing at recent “turns” and emerging tendencies in EIT, references to the big 
and allegedly competing strands of theory in traditional European integration studies 
should help to gain an overview of the bulk of theoretical approaches at hand. One can 
identify two major axes of competition in EIT that have proved to be formative, and 
thus, structuring for the overall development of the field: 
 
 
 
                                                 
561  See RUMFORD Chris: Rethinking European Spaces. Territory, Borders, Governance. In: Com-
parative European Politics, No. 4/2006, pp. 127-140, here 128. See for example ANDERSON 
James/O’DOWD Liam/WILSON Thomas M. (eds): New Borders for a Changing Europe. Cross-
border Cooperation and Governance. London 2002.  
Intergovernmentalism Neo-Functionalism 
Rationalism Constructivism 
Figure 5: Axes of Competition in European Integration Theory 
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1. Dichotomy I: Intergovernmentalism vs. Neo-Functionalism 
Intergovernmentalism and Neo-Functionalism are usually referred to as the main 
dichotomy that dominated the field of European Integration Studies over the decades. 
The intergovernmental strain covers the complex of realist approaches, including its 
pure intergovernmental and liberal intergovernmental modifications. The functionalist 
strain, on the other hand, includes its neo- and neo-neo-versions. The two paradigms are 
what Schmitter and Malamud called “historic or even natural opponents”.562 The 
establishment of the neo-functionalist paradigm could be seen as a “frontal assault” on 
the prevailing theories of IR at the time, which were intergovernmentalist approaches, 
or more specifically, approaches pertaining to the complex of Realism.563 The neo-
functionalist and the intergovernmentalist paradigm do have something in common, 
which is: their central explanandum. In contrast to other EIT approaches, both neo-
functionalists and intergovernmentalists are more concerned with the process of 
integration than with the political system that integration leads to.564 This common point 
of reference is what turns them into directly competing meta-theoretical models.565  
The most important difference between the two approaches lies in both the ontology of 
actors that they build upon, and the epistemological grounds that form the foundation of 
their models of explanation. Schmitter and Malamud have elaborated on the 
significance of these two variables when competing theoretical approaches are 
compared. Generally, the ontological grounds of an approach result from whether it 
presumes a process that reproduces the existing characteristics of its member-state 
participants and the interstate system of which they are a part, or whether it presumes a 
process that transforms the nature of these sovereign national actors and their relations 
with each other. Epistemology, on the other hand, results from the theoretical choice of 
whether the evidence gathered to monitor these processes focuses primarily on dramatic 
political events, or on prosaic socio-economic-cultural exchanges.566 
 
 ONTOLOGY EPISTEMOLOGY  
Neo-Functionalism transformative (actions and actors change 
in the course of the process) 
observation of gradual, 
unobtrusive exchanges  
Intergovernmentalism sovereign states remain dominant actors focus on decisive events that 
lead to modifications  
Table 16: Ontology – Epistemology: Neo-Functionalism vs. Intergovernmentalism 
                                                 
562  SCHMITTER Philippe C./MALAMUD Andrés: Theorizing Regional Integration and Inter-Regional 
Relations. Workshop Proposal. Florence/Lisbon 2006, p. 3. Website of the European University 
Institute, Florence www.iue.it [22 November 2007].  
563  See JACHTENFUCHS Markus: Deepening and Widening Integration Theory. In: Journal of 
European Public Policy, No. 9/2002, pp. 650-657, here p. 651.  
564  See DIEZ Thomas/WIENER Antje: Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory. In: Idd. (eds): 
European Integration Theory. Oxford 2004, pp. 1-24, here p. 5. 
565  See JACHTENFUCHS Markus: Deepening and Widening Integration Theory. In: Journal of 
European Public Policy, No. 9/2002, pp. 650-657, here p. 651. 
566  Table generated on the basis of MALAMUD Andrés/SCHMITTER Philippe C.: The Experience of 
European Integration and the Potential for Integration in MERCOSUR. Prepared for delivery at the 
“2006 Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)” 
Nicosia, Cyprus, 25-30 April, 2006, p. 5. Available on the website of the Instituto Superior de 
Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa in Lisbon. http://iscte.pt [12 December 2007]. 
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According to the ontological presumptions of the neo-functionalist approach, the key 
actors of integration are transformative, i.e. their actorness changes in the course of the 
process as well as the “games they play”. In contrast, Realism suggests a static 
ontology: sovereign nation states pursuing their unitary national interests and 
controlling the pace and outcome through periodic revisions of their mutual treaty 
obligations remain the dominant actors in the process.567 The neo-functionalist 
epistemology is rooted in the observation of gradual, normal and modest exchanges 
among a wide range of actors, while Realism rather looks at dramatic and obtrusive 
events that lead to decisive changes. Consequently, the intergovernmentalist definition 
of the integration process could be, as suggested by Katzenstein, “a sequence of 
irregular big bangs.”568 Interestingly, the relevance of the functionalist-inter-
governmentalist dichotomy is not a purely theoretical one. The functionalist paradigm 
has also entered EU reality to the extent that has become a quasi-official ideology in the 
European Commission and other parts of the supranational structure of the EU. 
Ironically, it is also used by the opponents of further functionalist integration to increase 
the fears of a technocratic, centralized, and undemocratic Union. Accordingly, 
governments supportive of further integration tend to resort to the intergovernmentalist 
rhetoric of sovereignty being only pooled to alleviate these fears.569  
2. Dichotomy II: Rationalism vs. Constructivism  
The second axis of competition presented here is different from the inter-
governmentalist-functionalist divide to the extent that Rationalism and Constructivism 
have to be perceived as opposing meta-theoretical positions. Both Rationalism and 
Constructivism build on a broad foundation of theoretical considerations drawn from 
other disciplines, most importantly, from philosophy, cognitive science and episte-
mology. As a result, they both do not directly lead to testable assertions about 
observable outcomes, but first have to be turned into substantive theories and to be 
combined with a specific reference model of explanation. 
Some even doubt about the possibility that meta-theories can be tested against each other, 
but argue instead that they constitute equally acceptable ways of explaining and 
understanding the world which can only be assessed within their own framework of 
rationality or by meta-criteria such as internal consistency and scope.570 
However, the distinction between these major meta-theoretical strands could serve for 
the retrospective classification of various theoretical debates by contributing to a better 
understanding of the variety of approaches current in the field.  
                                                 
567  SCHMITTER Philippe C./MALAMUD Andrés: Theorizing Regional Integration and Inter-Regional 
Relations. Workshop Proposal. Florence/Lisbon 2006, pp. 2-3. Website of the European University 
Institute, Florence www.iue.it [22 November 2007]. 
568  See KATZENSTEIN Peter J.: International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change. In: 
CZEMPIEL Ernst-Otto/ROSENAU James N. (eds): Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges. 
Lexington 1989, pp. 291-304, here p. 296. 
569  See BACHE Ian/GEORGE Stephen: Politics in the European Union. Oxford 2001, p. 15. And DIEZ 
Thomas/WIENER Antje: Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory. In: Idd. (eds): European 
Integration Theory. Oxford 2004, pp. 1-24, here p. 14. 
570  JACHTENFUCHS Markus: Deepening and Widening Integration Theory. In: Journal of European 
Public Policy, No. 9/2002, pp. 650-657, here p. 652. 
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When applying this structuring dichotomy to the various theoretical strands at hand it 
becomes clear that Constructivism marks a departure from what could be called 
‘mainstream theory’ in European integration. The main protagonists of traditional EIT, 
Intergovernmentalism and Neo-Functionalism, both largely adhere to the rationalist 
camp. Coming back to the above-given outline on the intergovernmentalist/neo-
functionalist divide alongside their respective ontological and epistemological 
foundations, Constructivism could be fit into the scheme as follows: 
 
 ONTOLOGY EPISTEMOLOGY  
Intergovernmentalism  sovereign states remain 
dominant actors 
focus on decisive events that 
lead to modifications 
R
at
io
na
lis
m
 
Neo-Functionalism transformative (actions and 
actors change in the course of 
the process) 
observation of gradual, 
unobtrusive exchanges 
Constructivism 
constituting (meaning is not 
restricted to the actor but 
comprises the significance given 
to it by other actors/society) 
focus on the permanent 
construction and reconstruction 
of political and social ‘reality’ 
Table 17: Ontology – Epistemology: Rationalism vs. Constructivism 
By largely rejecting causal explanations – and in its rigid version – also the need or 
possibility of formulating testable hypotheses, and by focussing on the social or 
discursive construction of events or actors/action units, Constructivism has clearly 
defied the epistemological and ontological grounds of both major paradigms.571 
Christiansen et al. depicted two major “moves” entailed by the constructivist turn:572 
 
– the ontological move: Constructivism does not perceive structure to be established 
by anarchy, but rather to result from social interaction among states; as Wendt put 
it: “Anarchy is what states make of it.”573 This claim is based on the 
constructedness of identity, as the character of anarchy depends on how identities 
are defined. What kind of anarchy prevails, depends on what kinds of conceptions 
of security actors have, on how they construe their identity in relation to others; 
– the epistemological move: highlighting the significance of inter-subjectivity in 
regime analysis, Constructivism perceives shared norms, rules and decisions as 
conditional. The relationship between conception of self and other and the 
prevailing systemic environment puts identities at the core of the constructivist 
approach. Again, identity is related to the claim about the inter-subjectivity of 
structures, which establishes the move towards the assumption that ‘reality’ is 
constructed, and away from any materialist stance. 
 
                                                 
571  See GUZZINI Stefano: A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations. In: European 
Journal of International Relations, No. 2/2000, pp. 147-182, here p. 156. 
572  See CHRISTIANSEN Thomas/JØRGENSEN Knud Erik/WIENER Antje: The Social Construction 
of Europe. In: Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, Special Issue 1999, pp. 528-544, here p. 535.   
573  WENDT Alexander: Anarchy is What States Make of it. In: International Organization, No. 2/1992, 
pp. 391-425. 
163
To large extents, Constructivism has perceived itself as offering an alternative research 
programme to the prevailing and established rationalist mainstream in EIT. 
Transcending the narrowness of rationalist perception constitutes one of the main 
formative foundations of constructivist contributions in the field of EIT. The argument 
that Constructivism allows the analyst to see issues and connections that Rationalism is 
simply not equipped to see, has been highly shaping in the early phase of its emergence 
in the field.  
[From a constructivist point of view] rationalist accounts miss an important part of the story, 
because they bracket identity and interest formation [...]. Constructivism can deal with the 
most interesting questions because it operates at the intersection between structures and 
agents: in contrast, rationalist [...] approaches ‘have life easy’, because they ignore the 
messy intersections and concentrate on one side of the story.574 
However, arguments about the ontological primacy of a constructivist view are not very 
helpful, since they reduce the debate to an either-or level, or to the question of victory of 
one paradigm over the other. Instead of interpreting the above-mentioned “constructivist 
turn” as some sort of major cleavage in the field of EIT, the emerging dichotomy could 
be used in order to structure and classify various new approaches and to create distinct 
theoretical positions in the sense of categories that can be tested against each other. An 
important example of how the rationalist-constructivist dichotomy is structuring the 
current debate on European integration is the institutionalist incorporation of EU 
enlargement. The following comparison refers to the instance of different institutionalist 
positions on enlargement to clarify the opposing factors along this axis of competition. 
 
Rationalist Institutionalism Constructivist Institutionalism 
empowerment of domestic actors 
The domestic impact of the EU is perceived 
to follow a ‘logic of consequences’. The 
opportunity structure for utility-maximising 
domestic actors changes due to the 
adaptational pressure emerging from the 
supranational framework of the EU. The 
main factors impending or facilitating 
changes in response to EU adjustment 
pressures are formal domestic institutions.   
In short, domestic change occurs by way of   
a differential empowerment of actors, and 
thereby, results from a redistribution of 
resources at the domestic level 
The responses to EU adjustment pressures 
follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’; The 
domestic impact of the EU results from the 
process of socialisation, i.e. from domestic 
actors internalising EU norms that they 
regard as legitimate and applicable to their 
respective framework. ‘Change agents’ or 
‘norm entrepreneurs’ inspire the process of 
persuasion by mobilising other actors in the 
domestic context and convincing them to 
redefine their interests and identities.575 
 
 
                                                 
574  SMITH Steve: Social Constructivism and European Studies: A Reflectivist Critique. In: Journal of 
European Public Policy, No. 4/1999 Special Issue, pp. 682-691, here p. 685. Referring to CHECKEL 
Jeffrey T.: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. In: World Politics, No. 2/1998, 
pp. 324-348.  
575  See MARCH James G./OLSEN Johan P.: The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders. In: International Organization 52:1998, pp. 943-969. 
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Rationalist Institutionalism Constructivist Institutionalism 
EU strategy towards candidate countries 
Conditionality: the EU uses conditional 
incentives to influence candidate countries. 
The clarity of the EU demands is perceived 
to be crucial just as the general credibility of 
the conditionality. Legitimacy is perceived to 
be achieved through overt pressure rather 
than through ‘soft tactics’. 
Socialisation: candidate countries come to 
consider that the EU’s rules have an intrinsic 
value, regardless of the material incentives 
for adopting them. Factors facilitating the 
process are: positive identification with the 
EU and the legitimacy of demands in light of 
the rewards. 
Table 18: Rationalist vs. Constructivist Institutionalism 576 
As this example shows, the dichotomy between rationalist and constructivist models of 
explanation is highly significant when it comes to the question of how the EU interacts 
with member states, or in this case, with candidate countries. Given this strong 
compatibility with contributions from the constructivist camp, the model of Rational/ 
Liberal Institutionalism will be taken up at another point of this study.577 
C. Applying Integration Theory to the Baltic Sea Case – Application Patterns 
The following chapter is based on the assumption that there are two basic ways of 
drawing on EIT in light of the purpose of this study. These two application patterns 
build the analytical point of reference for this study:  
 
application  
pattern I 
Both the European integration process and Baltic Sea Regionalism are 
assumed instances of regional integration. Therefore, it appears viable to 
apply European Integration Theories directly to the Baltic Sea Case. From 
this angle, the BSR is treated like a sort of micro-cosmic version of the EU, 
meaning an integrative unit with a specific regional and territorial 
affiliation. 
application  
pattern II 
This pattern is based on the consideration that the BSR as a European 
region holds a close albeit not exclusive connection to the EU. Thus, it 
appears legitimate to ask for a theoretical incorporation of what could be 
called the meso-macro connection, with the BSR being the meso-unit and 
the EU building the respective macro-framework.  
Table 19: Application Patterns for the Critical Discussion of EIT in the BSR Case 
 
                                                 
576  Table generated on the basis of SEDELMEIER Ulrich: Europeanisation in new member and 
candidate states. In: Living Reviews in European Governance, No. 3/2006. Online publication 
www.livingreviews.org [23 December 2007]. 
577  See chapter “Neoliberal/Rational Institutionalism”, p. 168-. 
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I. Application pattern I: The BSR – A Micro-Cosmic Version of the EU? 
A huge part of the theoretical models developed in the field of regional integration limit 
themselves to the specific model of European integration.578 According to Beeson, this 
is mainly because nowhere regionally-based processes of integration have gone further 
than in post-1945 Western Europe.579 These approaches have been directly inspired by 
the European project. Hence, in the first place, their applicability to integrative actions 
and processes in regional contexts other than the overall European (such as Baltic Sea 
Regionalism) must be questioned. The next problem results from the fact that the 
catchment area of the European project, as a macro-regional phenomenon, is much 
broader, involving both a bigger territory and a wider functional scope. Finally yet 
importantly, the European integration process has largely been driven by state-level 
actors while the phenomenon of Baltic Sea Regionalism has never been restricted to the 
intergovernmental sphere. Hence, can theoretical approaches to EI really explain meso-
regional phenomena of regionalism? Can a European “sub-region” like the BSR be 
conceptually perceived as a “micro-cosmic” version of the macro-region “Europe”? 
The debate about whether the EU constitutes an n of 1 and whether, as a consequence, 
inductive generalizations from the study of the EU cannot lead to generally applicable 
knowledge is almost as old as the study of the EU itself.580 
It may be assumed that basically, the major paradigms in EIT, such as the two 
traditional opponents of functional and realist or intergovernmentalist logic of 
integration can be applied in the meso-regional context without distorting the analytical 
key message of the respective approaches. However, the significance and explanatory 
power is likely to be relative or limited in certain respects. The traditional theoretical 
approaches to European integration can probably serve as a tool to describe the 
character and the dynamics of Baltic Sea Regionalism, while their power to explain the 
process might be more restricted. In the following section, a selection of EIT 
approaches will be discussed in line with the above application pattern I, thus taking the 
Baltic Sea case as a micro-cosmic version of the European project, and applying the 
models produced in this very European context directly to the subject of this study. 
1. Application of Selected Approaches to the BSR Case 
The following schemes intend to illustrate the above-stated assumptions about the 
applicability and explanatory power of European Integration Theories by picking out 
some of the most prominent theoretical models. The (non-exhaustive) overview lists the 
leading proponent(s), offers a brief introduction to the basic claims of each theoretical 
model, and then provides a brief interpretation in light of the research question. 
                                                 
578  Hurrell points at the problem that some approaches to regional integration claim to be generally 
applicable, but that eventually, all they present is a “bit more than the translation of a particular set 
of European experiences into a more abstract theoretical language.” HURRELL Andrew: The 
Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory. In: FARRELL Mary/HETTNE Björn/VAN 
LANGENHOVE Luk (eds): Global Politics and Regionalism. London 2005, pp. 38-53, here p. 38.  
579  See BEESON Mark: Re-Thinking Regionalism. Europe and East Asia in Comparative Historical 
Perspective. Paper presented at the Oceanic Conference on International Studies. Canberra, 14-16 
July 2004, p. 5. 
580  JACHTENFUCHS Markus: Deepening and widening integration theory. In: Journal of European 
Public Policy. Vol. 9/4 August 2002, pp. 650-657, here p. 650.  
     166
a. Neo-Realism  
Waltz, Morgenthau, Mearsheimer, Grieco 
From a neo-realist perspective, state interests and power are the major factors to 
determine the development of integrative projects;581 stressing the anarchical and 
decentralized nature of the international system and the ensuing condition of 
permanent power competition, regional cooperation is said to arise in reaction to an 
external threat or a countervailing power. States possess consistently ordered goals 
and select their strategies in order to achieve these goals in the largest possible 
measures. International cooperation involves the voluntary adjustment of state 
policies in a way that helps to reach a mutually desired goal. The unequal 
distribution of capabilities is thought to limit inter-state cooperation, since state 
attitude is driven by the fear of relative gains made by others.582 
According to the system-level explication of cooperative integration suggested by 
the (neo) realist camp, Baltic Sea Regionalism could be interpreted and described as 
the structural undertaking of a group of states following the (natural) imperative of 
survival in the global political system, and trying to balance their weaknesses as 
either small, weak or subordinate actors. The neo-realist model does not consider 
any potential non-state actor; neither does it include any consideration about the 
nature and institutional organisation of the emerging cooperative formation. While 
for traditional realist thinking, regions were treated as more of an “anomaly” than a 
reality, Neo-Realism has difficulties to explain the existence of regions without 
automatically seeing them as state-centered alliance formations and as tools for 
nation states to further their interests. For theorists like Waltz, a world of regions 
does not seem to be much more than the return to a system of multi-polar balance of 
power.583 Moreover, Neo-Realism largely fails to explain systemic changes, such 
as those following the end of the Cold War, as well as to consider the respective 
social and political challenges that emerge in similar historical situations. 
 
 
                                                 
581  Both Realism and Neo-Realism cannot be perceived as classic Integration Theories in the narrow 
sense. From a neo-realist perspective, bodies like the EU are placed into a broad structural and 
systemic context of the “global political society”. The European project was largely interpreted as a 
response to the emergence and establishment of superpower rivalry, a reactive attitude of Europe 
trying to shield itself against the Communist threat. The specific internal processes have been largely 
neglected by neo-realist thinkers. See STONE Alec: What is a Supranational Constitution? An Essay 
in International Relations Theory. In: Review of Politics 55/3, pp. 441-474, here p. 458. The specific 
differences between Realism and Neo-Realism are neglected in this scheme because they do not 
have direct relevance for the research perspective of this study. 
582  GRIECO Joseph M.: Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation. Analysis with an 
amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model. In: The Journal of Politics, No. 3/1988, pp. 600-625, here p. 
600. 
583  See WALTZ Kenneth: The Emerging Structure of International Politics. In: International Security, 
No. 2/1993, pp. 44-79, here p. 45. 
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b. Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
Hoffmann, Moravcsik 
As a “liberal modification of Realism”,584 this approach has also a distinct state-
centric focus and stresses the significance of relative power understood in terms of 
asymmetrical interdependence. However, unlike in the realist model, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism (LI) does not see state interest arise from each state’s 
perception of its own relative power, but from a national state-society interaction 
(resulting in demand for integration outcomes). It holds that state preferences, rather 
than material power or capabilities build the primary determinant of nation state 
behaviour. Once the interests are formulated, they are bargained at the 
intergovernmental level. These bargaining procedures occur, again, between states 
and basing on rationalist considerations. The EC/EU treaties are seen as the key 
independent variable shaping the integration process. Increasing integration is 
perceived to materialise in big decisions; these “bargains”, again, are mainly seen as 
the result of shifting, and eventually, merging state preferences. Supranational 
institutions are perceived to be of limited importance to the overall process of 
integration, which is by contrast thought to be largely dominated by intra-state 
negotiation and bargaining. According to this model, the state also constitutes the 
“critical intermediary between the Commission and sub-national regimes.”585 
In line with the liberal intergovernmentalist approach, regionalist processes in the 
BSR could be understood as the outcome of a series of rational choices made by 
national leaders. These choices were taken in reaction to the demands of outcomes 
formulated by powerful domestic constituents. The explanatory weakness of LI lies, 
again, in its state-centeredness and in its exclusively rationalist orientation. By 
focusing mainly on processes of interstate bargaining, LI offers a rather reduced, 
and to some extent distorted view on complex political action and development. 
The dominating ‘hard bargaining’ image conceals the significance of “soft” cause-
effect chains that potentially emerge from “within” a trans-national region like the 
BSR. Moreover, LI has a particularly strong focus on the EU polity system as a type 
of its own (sui generis); this poses decisive limitations to the applicability of the 
approach to other than the European context. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
584  SCHMITTER Philippe C./MALAMUD Andrés: Theorizing Regional Integration and Inter-Regional 
Relations. Workshop Proposal. Florence/Lisbon 2006, p. 3. Website of the European University 
Institute, Florence www.iue.it [22 November 2007]. 
585  See ANSELL Christopher K./PARSONS Craig A./DARDEN Keith A.: Dual Networks in European 
Regional Policy Development. In: Journal of Common Market Studies, No. 3/1997, pp. 347-375, 
here p. 358. 
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c. Neo-Functionalism 
Haas 
Neo-Functionalism places major emphasis on the role of non-state actors, which act 
within a supranational structure (e.g. the EU General Secretariat). Integration is 
perceived to be a conflictual process, in which states find themselves entangled by 
functional pressure. States counter this pressure by conceding a wider scope and 
devolving more authority to the supranational institutions they have created. 
Political integration is thought to be achieved through so-called spill over effects 
spinning off from economic and social integration. Political integration and the 
growth of authority at the supranational level occur as long-term consequence of 
modest (economic) integration. Neo-Functionalism completed the functionalist 
“form follows function” logic with what could be called “function follows 
interests”. In case of successful economic cooperation, self-interested groups of 
actors are drawn into the game through political spill over.586 Haas defined 
integration as the process “whereby political actors in several, distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities 
toward a new centre, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing nation states.”587 States remain important actors, but they do not 
exclusively determine the direction and extent of political change. Sub-national or 
non-state actors are not explicitly referred to in traditional neo-functional writings; 
however, according to the logic of Neo-Functionalism, they would build an 
important ally for supranational actors, since an alliance between the two levels 
would progressively sideline the structural position that nation states use to have.  
Even though Neo-Functionalism is – just as its opponent, Realism – state-centric in 
the sense that states (albeit not heads of states) do form the main type of actor, it 
still fails to assess how e.g. state preferences emerge and to what extent they could, 
in fact, hamper the flow of integration or “spill-over”. The (close to) automatic shift 
from economy or society based pressure for integration to the materialisation of 
political integration as it is suggested by the neo-functionalist model appears to 
have only little explanatory value for the Baltic Sea case. The pressure for 
integration present in the BSR after the end of the Cold War was strongly driven by 
state interests, since the Baltic States strived for Westernization, and thus, decided 
to use the regional arena in order to anticipate the effects of full integration. 
Applying the logic of a functional spill over to the specific development of the BSR 
networked structure appears difficult in that the regionalist wave emerging after 
1989 did not follow any recognisable sequence in functional terms. Political 
integration cannot be perceived to have been anticipated by cooperation in other 
policy fields. The BSR development could rather be described as an emerging 
creative chaos of functionally intersecting and parallel cooperative formations. 
                                                 
586  See NIEMANN Michael: A Spatial Approach to Regionalisms in the Global Economy. Basingstoke 
2000, p. 113. 
587  HAAS Ernst B.: The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957. Stanford 
1958, p. 16. 
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Moreover, the Baltic Sea case has not (yet) experienced the creation of any 
supranational body or institution, and thus, lacks an important factor that is usually 
referred to in Neo-Functionalism. In fact, Baltic Sea Regionalism does not seem to 
be moving into the direction of progressive “deepening” in neo-functionalist terms.  
d. Multi-Level Governance 
Kohler-Koch, Jachtenfuchs, Marks, Hooghe 
During the 1980s, and most particularly, after the end of the Cold War, EIT 
gradually shifted away from the exclusive focus on integration processes and the 
general development of the European project; academia started to focus on the 
nature of the Union and its governance structure, i.e. its institutional specificities 
and the specific nature of its polity. Analysts of the governance strand of EIT 
largely perceive decision-making competencies as shared by actors at different 
levels rather than monopolized by national governments. The interactions between 
them are non-hierarchical and lacking a central, predominant authority.  
Governance is the production of authoritative decisions, which are not produced by a 
simple hierarchical structure […] but instead arise from the interaction of a plethora of 
public and private, collective and individual actors.588 
Models of collective decision-making among states (such as the EU) are thought to 
involve a significant loss of control for national governments. Multi-level 
governance theorists largely claim that, rather than conceptualising regional policy 
as a national issue in which the lead role is taken by national institutions, it should 
be identified as an arena in which the EU plays an integral role in policy-making, 
together with the regional authorities and the central national institutions. In 
contrast to ‘government’, the concept of ‘governance’ is not restricted to the formal 
structures of state authority. It covers a wider notion of politics, including the 
production, accumulation and regulation of collective goods at all levels, the sub-
national, national, and international or supranational level.589 From thus point of 
view, political arenas are rather loosely interconnected than tightly nested. Sub-
national actors operate in both national and supranational arenas. Triadic alliances 
between the sub-national, national and supranational level shift, depending on 
immediate interests.590  
                                                 
588  CHRISTIANSEN Thomas/FØLLESDAL Andreas/PIATTONI Simona: Informal Governance in the 
European Union. An Introduction. In: CHRISTIANSEN Thomas/PIATTONI Simona (eds): Informal 
Governance in the European Union. Cheltenham/Northampton 2003, pp. 1-21, here p. 6. See also 
JACHTENFUCHS Markus: Democracy and Governance in the European Union. In: European 
Integration Online Papers (EIoP), No. 2/1997. 
589  See MARSH David/FURLONG Paul: A Skin not a Sweater. Ontology and Epistemology in Political 
Science. In: MARSH David/STOKER Gerry (eds): Theory and Methods in Political Science. 
London 2001, pp. 17-41, here p. 37. 
590  See HOOGHE Liesbet/MARKS Gary: Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. Lanham 
2001, p. 47. 
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Due to its broad analytical orientation and its comprehensiveness, the notion of 
(multi-level) Governance has been termed “one of the most acceptable labels one 
can stick on the contemporary EU.”591 In fact, the descriptive neutrality of 
governance approaches has enhanced its compatibility with existing theoretical 
models, and thus, contributed to its relative popularity all across the field of 
European integration studies. The governance focus addresses both empirical and 
normative questions, and thus, not least helps to bridge the gap between old 
paradigmatic divides in integration theory.592 What seems significant for the 
purpose of this study is that Governance approaches not only describe the 
dispersion of authoritative competence across territorial levels but that they also 
draw particular attention to the interconnection of multilevel political arenas in the 
process of governing. While state-centric approaches to integration suggest a strict 
separation between domestic and international politics, the Governance strain 
assumes the existence of a multi-level or poly-centric structure that involves 
political interaction across all levels. The focus on polity at various different levels, 
or rather across various political action layers, meets an important specificity of the 
Baltic Sea case. The numerous types of actors involved in the process of regional 
and trans-regional interaction call for this kind of multi-layered perspective. 
However, most models developed under the label of multi-level governance remain 
largely indifferent towards the question of why individual actors choose to 
collaborate, and of how interests impact on the course of governance interaction. 
e.  Neoliberal/Rational Institutionalism 
Keohane 
Emerging from the strand of philosophical ‘structuralism’ and drawing on 
interdependence theory, Neoliberal or Rational Institutionalism mainly insists on 
the importance of institutions and regimes in the structure of the international 
system and emphasises their influence on the behaviour of various actors. In short, 
the general rationale of this approach could be subsumed with the slogan that 
‘institutions matter.’ It accepts the neo-realist image of the international system as a 
regulated anarchy with no central authority but it rejects the neo-realist assumption 
that the systemic structure determines the political conduct of states. The structure 
of the system can influence state behaviour, but states can also influence structures 
by building institutions.593 The empirical starting point is the increasing 
interdependence in the international system. Trans-national challenges necessitate 
coordination, which results in the build-up of regimes (institutionalization).  
                                                 
591  SCHMITTER Philippe C./MALAMUD Andrés: Theorizing Regional Integration and Inter-Regional 
Relations. Workshop Proposal. Florence/Lisbon 2006, p. 4. Website of the European University 
Institute, Florence www.iue.it [22 November 2007]. 
592  See MELCHIOR Josef: New Spaces of European Governance. Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): New 
Spaces of European Governance. Vienna 2006, pp. 7-18, here p. 7. 
593  See JOHANSSON Elisabeth: EU and its Near Neighbourhood: Subregionalization in the Baltic Sea 
and in the Mediterranean. In: WILLA Pierre/LEVRAT Nicolas (eds): Actors and Models. Assessing 
the European Union’s External Capability and Influence. Genève 2001, pp. 200-222, here p. 210. 
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Cooperation helps to achieve certain strategic goals, which might partly also be 
shared by the actors involved. According to this approach, the emergence of loose 
regimes is more likely, and significantly more efficient than the creation of supra-
national structures. The nation state retains considerable influence in both policy 
initiative and decision-making.594 
Neoliberal Institutionalism appears to provide a comprehensive explanatory pattern 
for instances of regional integration as apparent in the BSR. While treating nation 
states as ‘rational egoists’595 and ‘effective gatekeepers’596 between the domestic and 
the international system, the approach does still not exclude the possibility that they 
are potentially ready, willing and able to engage in sustained cooperation. Neoliberal 
institutionalists rather argue that the management of (common) problems by way of 
cooperation may strengthen the role of the state involved. Interestingly, the approach 
puts power constellations, interests and preferences of states at the very heart of its 
research, focussing on what enhances and what constrains cooperative attitudes. The 
emergence and extension of cooperative networks is not perceived to be reflecting an 
alleged harmony of interests nor does it give clear evidence about growing economic 
interdependence. Cooperative regionalisation rather indicates national self-interest in  
 
– the simplification of processes;  
– the facilitation of interstate negotiation processes as well as  
– the constructive management of competitive dynamics. 
 
According to this logic of action, states try to foster linkages across certain policy 
areas of interests by negotiating packages; they profit from the outcomes of 
cooperation in the sense that transaction costs for action on the international or global 
scene are being reduced. While the preconditions underlying this argumentation 
highly comply with the analytical exigencies posed herein, the explicit focus on the 
nation state must, once again, be seen as a major drawback of this approach. 
Neoliberal Institutionalism does not consider the possibility of the nation state to 
become undermined by respective processes of regionalisation. Subregional 
cooperative interaction, be it on intergovernmental or non-official grounds, might 
possibly lead to the formation and establishment of informal transnational 
bureaucratic networks and alliances. This might entail the development of new forms 
of identity ranging both above and below the territorially confined state level, events 
that are largely not covered by the neoliberal institutionalist perspective.597 
                                                 
594  See ibd., here p. 211. 
595  The notion of states being “rational egoists in a self-help world” has been taken over from the neo-
realist camp. See MEARSHEIMER John: The False Promise of International Institutions. In: 
International Security, No.3/Winter 1994-1995, pp. 5-49, here p. 23. 
596  See POLLACK Mark A.: Theorizing the European Union. International Organization, Domestic 
Polity, or Experiment in New Governance? In: Annual Review of Political Science, No. 8/2005, pp. 
357-398, here p. 383. 
597  See HURRELL Andrew: Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics. In: Review 
of International Studies, No. 2/1995, pp. 331-358, here p. 349. 
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2. Excursus: Social Constructivism 
a. The Discursive Construction of Regions 
Since a couple of years, in Political Science, and most notably, in European Integration 
Studies, it has become bon ton to argue on constructivist grounds. Drawing on the large 
array of constructivist analyses generated in the field of psychology, sociology or 
linguistics, many political scientists have started to base their considerations about 
European integration on the general assumption that all social and political phenomena 
could be regarded as discursively constructed. These tendencies are often referred to as 
emerging from an academic community based in the Danish capital, the so-called 
Copenhagen School.598 Social constructivist models have been among the most popular, 
and arguably, among the most contested approaches in the “New Europe”.  
[Social] Constructivism has been explained, applied, positioned. It has been celebrated by 
some and dismissed by others. Whatever one’s view on the matter, constructivism has 
become increasingly difficult to avoid.599 
In the 1990s, Social Constructivism has literally flooded the field of EIT. Notions like 
‘the social construction of...’ are, as Katzenstein et al. put it, “littering the title pages of 
our books, articles and student assignments as did ‘the political economy of...’ in the 
1980s.”600 The US sociologists Berger and Luckman can be called the pioneer thinkers 
of Social Constructivism. The box offers some of their most popular and influential 
quotes, which coined masses of studies on European and regional integration.601 
 
Reality is a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being 
independent of our own volition; we cannot wish them away. (p. 1) 
Different objects present themselves to consciousness as constituents of different spheres of 
reality. My consciousness is capable of moving through different spheres of reality. […] I am 
conscious of the world as consisting of multiple realities. (p. 21) 
It is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world, however massive 
it may appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed objectivity. The process 
by which the externalized products of human activity attain the character of objectivity is 
objectivation. The reality of everyday life is not only filled with objectivations; it is only 
possible because of them. (p. 35). 
Any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be 
reproduced with an economy of effort and which, ipso facto, is apprehended by its performer 
as that pattern. This is the process of habitualization. (p. 53) 
 
                                                 
598  Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver are among the most prominent exponents of the Copenhagen School. 
599  ZEHFUSS Maja: Constructivism and Identity. A Dangerous Liaison. In: European Journal of 
International Relations, No. 3/2001, pp. 315-348, here p. 315. 
600  See KATZENSTEIN Peter/KEOHANE Robert O./KRASNER Stephen D.: International Organi-
zation and the Study of World Politics. In: International Organization, No. 4/1998, pp. 645-685, here 
p. 645. 
601  BERGER Peter/LUCKMAN Thomas: The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge. New York 1966. Exact location of the respective phrase given in brackets. 
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This habitualization precedes institutionalization. Institutionalization occurs whenever there 
is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors. (p. 54). 
Identity is a phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic between the individual and society. 
Identity types, on the other hand, are social products tout court, relatively stable elements of 
objective social reality […]. (p. 174) 
Table 20: Berger and Luckman: Key quotations of Constructivism 
The constructivist movement that captured the field of Integration Theory in the 
intermediate Post Cold War situation reverted to most of these seminal arguments about 
the nature and quality of society and more generally, of social reality. Since then, many 
different interpretations and variations of Social Constructivism have emerged. The 
perception of language and of its role and significance in research constituted an 
important point of reference for the development of different camps of Constructivism. 
Constructivist approaches were largely based on Wittgenstein’s interpretation of 
language that did not perceive the meaning of words to consist in their corresponding 
objects in the ‘outer world’, but in their specific use in political or social discourse. 
From this shared philosophical basis, Constructivism has roughly developed into two 
specific ways of interpretation. The sociological (or interpretative) constructivist 
perspective, also called ‘Constructive Realism’, mainly studies the impact of norms on 
actors’ identities, interests and behaviour, and stresses the importance of empirical work 
in order to approach the world “out there”.602 According to this interpretation, the ‘outer 
world’ is perceived to exist beyond the theorist’s view; the constructive power of 
language is limited to the context of political arguing and persuasion.  
[Sociological] Constructivism does not deny the existence of a phenomenal world, external 
to thought. This is the world of brute facts. It does oppose, and this is something different, 
that phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of knowledge independently of 
discursive practices. It does not challenge the possible thought-independent existence of (in 
particular natural) phenomena, but it challenges their language-independent observation.603 
The more radical interpretation of Constructivism, also called ‘Critical’ or ‘Constructive 
Idealism’, does not assume any objective world but rather seeks to identify the way the 
world is constructed.604 According to this perspective, the material realities are no more 
‘real’ than the discursive realities, as they do not exist independently as such.  
 
                                                 
602  According to the perspective of Constructive Realism, the agent has an epistemic but not an 
ontological influence on the world, meaning that knowledge is constructive in nature, but the 
existence of the world does not depend on the existence of a (constructing) agent. See 
CHRISTIANSEN Thomas/JØRGENSEN Knud Erik/WIENER Antje: The Social Construction of 
Europe. In: Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, Special Issue 1999, pp. 528-544, here p. 531. For 
more details, see also CHECKEL Jeffrey T.: Constructivist Approaches to European Integration. 
ARENA Working Paper, May 2006. Oslo 2006, p. 6. 
603  GUZZINI Stefano: A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations. In: European 
Journal of International Relations, No. 2/2000, pp. 147-182, here p. 159.  
604  Rhe agent has both an epistemic and an ontological influence on the known world, meaning that the 
existence of the world is just as dependent as any other constructed reality. See CHRISTIANSEN 
Thomas/JØRGENSEN Knud Erik/WIENER Antje: The Social Construction of Europe. In: Journal 
of European Public Policy 6:4, Special Issue 1999, pp. 528-544, here p. 531.  
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In short: neither aspect can be detached from the influence of the other. From this point 
of view, speech is not merely symbolic action. Language is seen to constitute meaning 
and to be inherently related to the establishment of rules within specific contexts. This 
approach suggests that a speech act, if performed successfully, produces a specific 
meaning or normative construct that, in turn, leads to rule-following.605 Language is 
seen as much more than simply a ‘neutral’ instrument or medium used for expression 
and the exchange of information; it is the very resource base that is able to determine 
political legitimacy and power.  
Discourse analysis employed for these study purposes becomes “research on regularities 
and function of linguistic resources”, with the notion of “regularities” stressing the non-
occasional nature of statements. Political utterances are perceived as “structuralized and 
strategically employed systems of meaning-giving.”606 While this rigid version denies 
any sort of innate feature in the social or human world, “lighter versions” make do with 
stressing the significance of value-related dynamics in political discourse. However, in 
essence, all variations of Social Constructivism can be said to perceive every social or 
human phenomenon as, at least to some extent, discursively created and thus, virtually 
constructed through processes of discursive interaction.  
Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped 
by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the material world.607 
In essence, the “constructivist game” consists in de-constructing and unpacking political 
discourse, trying to identify the normative factors that dominate and form political 
action and development.608 While the dominant schools of thought in IRT used (and still 
use) to take these normative factors as naturally or rather, as exogenously given and 
beyond the scope of analysis, Social Constructivism explicitly addresses the dynamics 
of identity constitution, construction and formation in international politics. In doing so, 
arguably, Constructivism has tried to produce a theoretical alternative to the neo-realist 
or functionalist paradigms. 
Constructivism emerged as an approach to break the stalemate that the mainstream debate 
ended in. Its critiques of mainstream scholarship focus on what it takes for granted or 
ignores. Constructivism studies the sources and the content of state interests and 
preferences, which are postulated, and it emphasizes the ideational and social side of 
international politics, which is ignored by the mainstream scholarship.609 
Social constructivist arguments have also become very common and popular in recent 
studies about Baltic Sea Regionalism. Countless contributions on the discursive 
                                                 
605  See CHRISTIANSEN Thomas/JØRGENSEN Knud Erik/WIENER Antje: The Social Construction 
of Europe. In: Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, Special Issue 1999, pp. 528-544, here p. 535.  
606  JUKARAINEN Pirjo: Norden is Dead. Long Live the Eastwards Faced Euro-North. Geopolitical Re-
Making of Norden in a Nordic Journal. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 12/1999, pp. 355-382, here 
p. 360. 
607  ADLER Emanuel: Seizing the Middle Ground. Constructivism in World Politics. In: European 
Journal of International Relations, No. 3/1997, pp. 319-363, here p. 322. 
608  See TASSINARI Fabrizio: Mare Europaeum. Baltic Sea Region Security and Cooperation from 
post-Wall to post-Enlargement Europe. Copenhagen 2004, p. 82.  
609  ULUSOY Hasan: Revising Security Communities After the Cold War. The Constructivist Approach. 
In: Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs, September-November 2003, p. 7. 
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construction of the BSR have mushroomed since the early 1990s. Many of these 
constructivist interpretations largely appeal to the Region-Building Approach (RBA) 
that – just in line with the main social constructivist argument – perceives regions as 
discursively constructed entities that are consciously constituted in the framework of 
specific political region-building projects. The so-called “classic” RBA was developed 
by Iver B. Neumann, a political scientist based in Oslo/Norway.610 The main difference 
of the RBA perspective on regionness or regions from other more traditional approaches 
to the analysis of regionalism lies in the fact that not the region itself is being analysed 
but rather the way the specific “regionness” is placed in political discourse.611   
 
Geopolitical approach  
definition of the region according 
to external factors, such as natural 
landmarks or state borders; 
  
 d
e
s
c
r
ip
t
iv
e
 
Cultural approach  
definition of the region according 
to its specific “domestic” or 
cultural nature, e.g. distinguishing 
features, common heritage; 
 
Constructivist RBA  
emphasises the patterns  
and ways the  
 
geopolitical and  
 
cultural “facts”  
are selected and strategically rearranged in 
the region-building discourse.  
     a
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Table 21: Descriptive and Analytical Approaches to Regions 
While both the cultural and the geopolitical approach treat the existence of a region as 
given, the constructivist view focuses exactly on how the region is being generated 
(“constructed”); it looks at the process of the constitution and/or the perpetual genesis of 
regions.612 The analysis is focussed on the political arguments that are used to promote 
regionalism; these arguments avail themselves of the “raw material” offered by 
geography, history and culture. In essence, the RBA tries to identify which external and 
internal factors are being deployed in order to justify, and thus, to construct a region. 
While assuming that “regions are talked and written into existence”, the RBA tries to 
identify613 
 
– how and on what grounds the existence of a region was postulated, 
– which actors perpetuate its existence, 
– which strategies they apply for that purpose, 
– how analysts of regions transport their knowledge to the community by either 
including or excluding certain aspects or factors relevant for the region.614 
                                                 
610  NEUMANN Iver B.: Regions in International Relations Theory. The Case for a Region-Building 
Approach. Oslo 1992. And NEUMANN Iver B.: A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe. 
In: Review of International Studies, No. 20/1994, pp. 53-74. 
611  Table generated on the basis of NEUMANN Iver B.: Uses of the Other. “The East” in European 
Identity. Manchester 1999, pp. 120-121. 
612  See NEUMANN Iver B.: Regions in International Relations Theory. The Case for a Region-Building 
Approach. Oslo 1992, p. 35. 
613  See NEUMANN Iver B.: A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe. In: Review of 
International Studies, No. 20/1994, pp. 53-74, here p. 59. 
614  NEUMANN Iver B.: Uses of the Other. “The East” in European Identity. Manchester 1999, pp. 41. 
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The existence of regions is preceded by the existence of region-builders, political actors 
who, as part of some political project, imagine a spatial and chronological identity for a 
region, and disseminate this imagined identity to others.615 
In its rigid version the line of argumentation of the RBA could go as far to claim that 
specific actors pursuing the objective of building or ‘constructing’ a region, so called 
‘region-builders’, strategically avail themselves of this ‘raw material’ in order to 
‘manipulate the inter-subjective understanding of regions.’ If these region-builders 
succeed in communicating the regional identity and togetherness that supports their 
political objectives best, they eventually achieve the materialisation of their promoted 
vision, which is mostly, tangible transactions and governance structures, ideally based 
on individual or collective emotional attachments.616 History is, as pointed out before, a 
very popular tool for the promotion and normative justification of regionalist visions or 
region-building projects, since it offers many value-laden arguments that suggest the 
existence of an innate regional identity. Schäfer emphasises the close relation between 
the process of region-building and the one of identity formation.  
The identity of the region and the region itself are continually constructed in discourses 
through a demarcation of the self against the other. Therefore, the policy-makers who 
construct the identity of the BSR by means of their discursive practices also construct the 
region as a whole.617 
The underlying constructivist claim of the classic RBA – that discourses are the very 
constituents of space – has also offered the analytical basis for critical geographers, 
often called “critical geopolitologists”.618 Ó Tuathail, one of the founding fathers of 
Critical Geography, stresses the power of mentally constructed spaces as follows: 
There is no such thing as neutral geography. Geography is about power. Although often 
assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product 
of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, 
and administer space.619 
In fact, these early contributions from “outside” the Political Science community 
constituted a seminal source of inspiration for respective approaches in integration 
theory, and more generally, in European Studies. Academic debates about “bordering 
and re-bordering Europe”, the “European territoriality” or “spatiality” and “regionness” 
                                                 
615  NEUMANN Iver B.: A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe. In: Review of International 
Studies, No. 20/1994, pp. 53-74, here p. 58. 
616  See ENGELEN Hilde Dominique: The Construction of a Region in the Baltic Sea Area. Geneva 
2004, p. 14. 
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have entered the field at a rather late point.620 The Eastern enlargement and the 
discussion about a European Neighbourhood Policy as some sort of Ersatzenlargement 
appears to have sparked politological interest in these questions.621 Pirjo Jurakainen has 
produced an illustrative example of how a constructivist framework can be employed in 
order to analyse and characterise Baltic Sea Regionalism. She sets out to explain the 
“discursive spatial construction of Northernness” by analysing the respective political 
debate in the context of a Nordic Journal, the Nord Revy, thus, making methodical use 
of content analysis.622 Her choice of the journal was based on the fact that in the late 
1990s, the Nord Revy had proved to be an attractive political forum for what she calls 
“the constructors of Northernness” that were “mastering northern space”, a group of 
activist individuals not only including academics and politicians but also other players 
from the private and civic sector. Interestingly, Jukarainen also points at the fact that the 
main exponents of Social Constructivism, among others Wæver, themselves actively 
contributed to the process of “talking the region into existence.”623 The following 
considerations build the starting point of her analysis:  
For at least three decades, starting from the 1960s, the dominant spatial representation of 
‘Northernness’ used to be ‘Norden’. [...] The newly emerging eastwards-oriented and 
Europeanised ‘Northernness’ is more reminiscent of a complex and multilevel spatial 
network than a clearly delimited, homogeneous territory ‘between the two blocks’. […] The 
‘North’ is beginning to exhibit a number of late-modern features. It is less territorial and has 
many layers and possible directions for future development.624 
Following the constructivist traits of the RBA, Jukarainen treats “spaces as politically 
constructed, whilst discourses are seen as the very constituents of space.”625  
Socially constructed ‘Northernness’ is like a constantly running videotape, out of which 
individual ‘still pictures’, that is to say specific contextual representations, can be taken and 
‘frozen’ for more thorough analysis. These ‘still-pictures’ or ‘takes’ of ‘Northernness’, even 
if ordered sequentially, cannot, however, describe the whole movie’, though they can 
function as useful markers for deeper study. This examination of common ‘grounds’ is 
possible because these ‘takes’ of ‘Northernness’ all originate from the same complex 
network of discourses.626 
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Jukarainen suggests viewing the structure of the region as some sort of “discursive 
network” where discursive ‘texts’ (speeches, writings, maps, pictures and other types of 
representative material) are passively describing or reflecting what the northern space 
‘really’ is, but are instead sources of activism that virtually construct a particular kind of 
discourse. She offers the following figure to depict the nature of this web of discourses. 
 
 
 
The process of discursive construction occurs in both the political and the social 
context,  
 
– social: the construction takes place intersubjectively, i.e. among various actors or 
social agents. The process could even be said to occur on trans-subjective grounds, 
since the individual contribution is eventually being merged;627 
– political: the discursive actors compete over dominant positions. This consideration 
raises the significance of power relations between the single parties involved.628 
 
The occurring region-building discourses are not organised in a fully predictable 
manner; rather than following a certain deterministic and linear development, they 
together form a “complex network with multiple development dimensions” meeting on 
either competing or complementary grounds.629 The model also provides for the 
consideration of so-called “nodal points” or “condensations of dominance”, meaning 
places where several discourses meet and potentially get linked to each other. These 
“condensations” allow the emergence of a certain “legitimate position” which makes 
them fairly consistent and durable.630 When it comes to the analytical identification of 
the “agents in charge” of discursive construction and their respective political or 
politico-strategic motivation, Jurakainen remains modest about the expressiveness of 
her model, stating that tracing the discoursing actors and their political motivation in 
greater detail might be “difficult if not entirely impossible.”631 
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Figure 6: Multiform Northernness, Generated by Pirjo Jukarainen 
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Therefore, this analysis leaves the question of the ‘ultimate origin’ of change to one side, 
instead focusing on the substance of the processes of social and spatial change; [and 
addressing questions like] what kind of space is/was Norden?632 
This inherent process orientation is largely symptomatic for analyses conducted on 
social constructivist grounds. The political process takes centre stage while the actor’s 
role is reduced to the function of a discursive creator without further questioning or 
elaborating on the motivational level or the background of interests and power bargains. 
The contributions arising from the “spatial” – and largely constructivist – wave in EIT, 
with Jukarainen being a prime example, have certainly been significant to the extent that 
they have added a new perspective to challenge the mainstream debate. Despite high 
hopes for the constructivist venture – “hopes that any open-minded social scientist in 
the field must share”633 – it appears fruitful just as much as necessary to discuss a series 
of arguments that other theoretical camps are holding against the approach, challenging, 
in turn, its alleged explanatory power and self-stated ambitions. 
b. Why the Explanatory Power of Constructivism Remains Low 
The so-called “constructivist turn” in EIT – an expression that evokes the qualities of a 
methodological or technical revolution – has put forth a huge bulk of empirical work. 
By explicitly presenting themselves as some sort of premature contenders that aim to 
challenge a wide array of consistently developed and established traditional approaches 
to integration, constructivists have certainly exposed themselves to the methodological 
standard procedures of external testing. Social Constructivism has received harsh critics 
by several analysts, while others have repeatedly emphasised that it is still struggling to 
define its form.634 
However, asking constructivists what substantively new insights they have on European 
integration is not a sign of indecent positivism that a good constructivist can safely 
ignore.635 
So why let us not pose the “intriguing and timely question”:636 What has constructivist 
theory contributed to our social scientific understanding of the EU, and more generally, 
of the European integration process? 
Early contributions from the constructivist camp had a distinctly defensive tone, 
preferring to define the very theoretical orientation as rather what it is not about and in 
what respect it is different from existing theoretical paradigms. 
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Constructivism can be characterized ex negativo, that is, by reference to what it is not.637 
This predication, uttered by a group of scholars that overtly refer to themselves as 
“constructivists”, could easily be developed into  
Constructivism can be characterized by reference to what it does not want to be. 
That is, to make it short: rationalist. Arguments about “what Constructivism can do”, 
and in turn, what Rationalism “is not able to explain” (or even see), constituted an 
important element in what could be called the first attempts of Constructivism to justify 
its own existence. This discursive act of “othering” Rationalism appeared to have even 
an identity forming effect for the constructivist community emerging in the course of 
the 1990s. Christiansen et al. offered a sequence of flaming affirmations that reflect this 
argumentative attitude. 
While rationalists often dismiss ‘merely symbolic’ discourse, the theory of communicative 
action [Note: Constructivism] enables analysis of these otherwise forgotten dimensions of 
policy-making. […] Neglecting the constructive force of the process itself, i.e. pushing 
intersubjective phenomena, and social context aside, lays the ground for missing out on a 
crucial part of the process. If the process is to be explained, it cannot be done with a 
research context that is closed towards interpretative tools.638 
While this will to distance themselves from their traditional theoretical predecessors 
may be largely understandable, confusingly, the very same constructivists have claimed 
only a few instants earlier that Constructivism plays “the role of a mediator” between 
classic Rationalism and more reflectivist perspectives. They claim to be located in the 
“middle ground” between the two major opposing paradigms in IRT to then again 
present themselves as a, or actually the single best, alternative to Rationalism, and thus, 
to any theoretical model classic integration theory has put forth.639 
The rationalist position can easily be subsumed within a constructivist perspective which, 
however, can offer much more, since it is based on a deeper and broader ontology.640 
Constructivist monologues about the ontological superiority of this very meta-
theoretical approach have been very prominent tools in the course of the respective 
theoretical debate. Constructivists generally lay ambitious claims to the explanatory 
power of their own analytical model.  
Constructivism is a social theory that is ‘applicable’ across disciplines which therefore helps 
us to transcend recurring inter-disciplinary squabbles, be it IR vs. comparative politics or IR 
vs. European studies.641 
Furthermore, social constructivism has the potential to counter tendencies towards excessive 
specialization in studies of European integration, tendencies to know more and more about 
less and less.642 
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One of the major contributions of constructivist approaches is to include the impact of 
norms and ideas on the construction of identities and behaviour.643 
Constructivists openly challenge the general explanatory power and analytical capacity 
of both traditional IRT and Comparative Theories. 
It is the constructivist project of critically examining transformatory processes of integration 
rather than the rationalist debate between intergovernmentalists (implicitly assuming that 
there is no fundamental change) and comparativists (implicitly assuming that fundamental 
change has already occurred), which will be moving the study of European integration 
forward.644 
However, to what extent does Social Constructivism really live up to its own stated 
intents? In order to discuss this question in view of a more specific case in point we can 
come back to the exemplary social constructivist analysis produced by Jukarainen, 
which was aimed to “explain the discursive spatial construction of Northernness”.645 
Jukarainen mainly focused on the identification of dominant discursive patterns, which 
she then perceives to be clustering in the form of “nodal points” or “condensations of 
dominance”.646 These dominant discursive motives that appear to be constituting the 
spatial image of “Northernness” are then compared to what “old Nordicity” is perceived 
to entail. “Old Norden” is defined as a “system of interstate cooperation between the 
Nordic States within the Nordic Council”, whereas “contemporary South-eastern Euro-
North” is said to involve “cooperation, conflict and competition within and beyond (!) 
[original emphasis] states, regions, cities, and localities.647“ 
The social constructivist eye is largely focused on the process of change, on how 
discursive patterns are shifted and what new images are being employed in order to 
construct equally “new” spatial entities. Since the specific role of the actor and the 
influence of strategic interests is perceived “impossible to trace”, Jukarainen – in a very 
typical social constructivist manner – tries to find the reasons for change in another 
context. Rationalist factors like the (potentially short-term) impact of conscious and 
strategic nation state choices are systematically excluded from the explanation. Change 
is rather perceived to occur on procedural grounds, meaning a decent and long-stretched 
change with diffuse and indefinite origins. Instead of trying to trace the source of policy 
innovation in contemporary political practice (in this case, post Cold War practice), 
Jukarainen eventually seeks to blur the alleged change that built the basis and point of 
departure for her analysis. 
Comparing the two notions [note: the ‘old North’ and the ‘contemporary Northernness’] 
there has been a complete change. We could say that not only the ‘video’ on play now 
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consists of new kinds of ‘still pictures’ (meaning spatial imaginations), but more radically 
perhaps it even seemed to be in need of a completely new name. [...] It is fair to suggest, 
however, that the diversification did not occur over a short period of time. Even during the 
former period characterized as ‘Nordic times’ there was much more going on than merely 
interstate cooperation. For instance, transnationally (note: not internationally) oriented firms 
had their cooperative links and networks transcending state boundaries long before the ‘end’ 
of the ideological juxtaposition.648 
With this argument and one of her major conclusions, Jukarainen not only relativises the 
significance of the change she has been scrutinising, she also dilutes her own analytical 
findings by drawing fairly vague and fuzzy conclusions. While the analysis of political 
and political scientist discourse as it has occurred in the context of a Norden-based 
journal has brought significant and highly remarkable discoveries about the 
argumentative tools and spatial images that were employed in this context, the 
concluding interpretation clearly lacked distinct explanatory factors or independent 
variables that could have structured the production of significant analytical outcomes. 
While arguably, it might not be appropriate to take one single social constructivist study 
in order to criticise the underlying theoretical model that (obviously) has wider 
conceptual implications, there are a few tendencies in Jukarainen’s chain of 
argumentation that could be identified as the major weaknesses that Social Con-
structivism can be taunted for. This is where I join in the criticism by Moravcsik who 
identified “a characteristic unwillingness” in constructivists “to place their claims at any 
real risk of empirical disconfirmation.”649 
Generally, the methodological foundation of Constructivism, if ever it goes beyond 
mere creative and eloquent reasoning about discursively subjected ‘raw material’, 
appears rather banal. It could be argued that most findings that constructivist studies 
lead to, have not been detected because of the alleged thinking pattern constructivism 
offers, but because the respective researcher succeeded in tracking motives and political 
objectives in every day discourse that give information about the background or 
strategic intention of a certain phenomenon, event or behaviour. Some of these analysts 
would probably also be good historians, since they show a lot of stamina when it comes 
to the study of fragments and splinters in current political affairs. One positive example 
in this respect is Leena-Kaarina Williams, whose findings offer a significant insight into 
the early history of Baltic Sea Regionalism.650 Williams has simply taken the effort of 
searching the local archives in the German Bundesland of Schleswig-Holstein, looking 
for empirical evidence to support her assumption about the virtual constructedness of 
the “Baltic Sea” notion. The constructivist framework made her doing just that: 
considering as many details as possible by scanning the material that contributed, in 
Neumann’s words, to “speaking and writing the region into existence.”651  
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However, Social Constructivism seems not to be about more than the simple claim that 
“identity matters” or, to add the methodological key message, “discourse matters”. The 
core argumentative line of Constructivism barely indicates a working strategy, but does 
not solve or explain any social problem or phenomenon. While Constructivism set out 
to criticise Neo-Realism and Neo-Functionalism for having neglected half of the truth, 
Constructivism in turn has to be blamed for its absolute focus on the discursive process. 
Constructivist studies on the BSR happen to be fruitfully descriptive. However, many of 
them never reach the point of conclusory reasoning about independent variables.  
Taking an abstract example: Region-builder A constructed regional vision X. He availed 
himself of argument Y and Z, perverting cliché XX in order to idealise and blandish the 
“real” objectives underlying the promoted vision X. Nice story plot, but what does this 
tell us about the priorities, interests and objectives of A? Discourse analysis, as a 
working method often suggested by constructivists, could probably lead us to the 
answer. But then, the merit goes to the patient observer or researcherm, and cannot be 
ascribed to the theoretical framework of analysis. If Constructivism suggests to identify 
how regions are “written and spoken” into existence, what is really innovative about this 
idea?  
That de Gaulle had very particular views on European integration or on French national 
security is not an exciting new constructivist discovery. Nor is it very surprising that there 
have been many plans for the institutional shape of the EU, some which became politically 
relevant whereas others did not.652 
The thorough analysis of both written and “other” sources (in the widest sense of the 
term) is an established part of every day work in history science; and so it is the case for 
other disciplines such as sociology or psychology.  
The social constructivist approach to regional integration is really not much more than some 
kind of lip-service paid to an approach that is now well developed in other fields such as 
sociology, psychology and linguistics.653 
Maybe this sort of criticism can be decisively disarmed by simply pointing at the fact 
that Constructivism in European Studies and more generally, in IR analysis, is not 
employed to offer an integral theoretical framework for a specific social or political 
phenomenon. As Tassinari defined the “constructivist game”, its rules are not as 
formally given as in most grand theories such as in the realist or functionalist strain; 
they rather depend “on how social reality displays itself”, and thus, they are constitutes 
in the very process of analytical operation or argumentative ‘doing’. “There is not an 
actual theory and probably not even one single constructivist methodology.”654 
Constructivism could rather be classified as a “theory of knowledge” or epistemology.  
However, this is, once again, what Constructivism does not want to be. 
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Constructivism focuses on social ontologies including such diverse phenomena as, for 
example. intersubjective meanings, norms, rules, institutions, routinized practices, 
discourse, constitutive and/or deliberative processes, symbolic politics, imagined and/or 
epistemic communities, communicative action, collective identity formation, and cultures of 
national security. [...] By emphasising that social ontologies constitute a key dimension of 
Constructivism, we distance ourselves from a view that reduces constructivism to primarily 
an issue of epistemology.655 
Another major deceit underlying constructivist thinking is that normative factors like 
identity or ideology can be completely measurable – or at least – apparent to the eye of 
the observant. The normative claim is directly linked with the positivist expectation that 
the “intersubjective meaning” is directly apparent to the external observer.656 In many 
cases, constructivist approaches seem to ignore what could be called the ‘trap of 
relativism’ since – in the strict sense – also the analyst or observer is subject to his or 
her own mental constructs, and when trying to analyse, and thereby, to (close to 
psychologically) interpret political or social language and discursive interaction of 
others, the same effect of habitualization will take place, and that might distort the 
alleged “intersubjective meaning” as it is postulated by Constructivism itself. Some 
constructivists actually do not directly oppose this criticism. They rather consciously 
emphasise that the theoretical foundations of constructivism themselves are subject to 
“continuous processes of social construction within the community.”657 
In many cases, the academic analyst is caught in his own discursively constructed 
world, interpreting discourses to gain knowledge or probably to achieve certain strategic 
goals within the scientific community. Lovering reflected this critical assumption in 
respect to the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) – a theoretical model for the 
explanation of regionalism that largely draws upon social constructivist foundations.658 
[The NRA must be seen as] an ideologically-loaded discourse which is proving to be 
extremely useful for existing organizations and a new regionally constituted service class it 
is fabulously successful. [...] The rise of the New Regionalism offers a striking example of 
an intimate connection between the construction of knowledge and the policy agendas of 
powerful institutions. The New Regionalism [...] has gained influence not because of its 
scientific content but because it has attractive ideological resonances for a range of 
corporate, political, cultural and academic actors.659 
As the following example taken from one of the major “bordering” and “rebordering” 
œuvres shows, these bold “Constructivist games” often lead to rather quaint findings, 
where the analyst himself seems to be twisted by normative construction, or was simply, 
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as Moravcsik put it, “waxing desperate with imagination”:660 The following citation 
taken from Möller gives an example of this tendency in social constructivist analyses: 
In the early 1990s, [...] many policy-makers [...] invoked a common historical heritage by 
referring to, among other things, the Hansa League. This may have been a useful starting 
point for region building, but from a long term perspective it has failed [...] because the 
historical identity markers [...] have been too weak, being too remote from and too 
irrelevant to people’s every day lives to provide sufficient amalgam to bind the Northern 
people together. However, rather than drawing the pessimistic conclusion that due to a lack 
of a collective memory the region building process in Europe’s North is ultimately doomed 
to failure, it is suggested here that we should treat as an asset what at first sight seems to be 
a liability. That is to say deconstructing the ostensibly unifying stories and acknowledging 
the existence of diverse and ambivalent collective memories may result in a Northern 
subjectivity that is based on an appreciation of, rather than a reduction in, difference.661 
At a later stage, Möller even adopts a heavily sermonal style postulating that  
an increase in pluralistic memory games is required in order for Northern subjectivity to 
grow. This means, first of all, an increase in the awareness of the deficiencies in the region-
building process with respect to the emergence of a mnemonic region, i.e. one that does not 
unite its inhabitants on the basis of common memories, but rather one that acknowledges 
that different groups of people have different sets of memories that are equally valuable.662 
While these honest concerns about the righteousness of the region-building process are 
more than justified, given the obvious disparity between rhetoric enthusiasm and factual 
political or “mental” progression, they also appear misplaced to the extent that the 
whole “process” (as that is what Möller claims to be analysing) is taken far too seriously 
and is being subjected to moral justifications.  
This is all not to say that constructivist informed contributions to the Baltic Sea 
Regionalism debate have not been important or significant. Constructivism should be 
seen as an additional perspective, a part of a mosaic of factors, and most importantly, a 
methodological guideline or strategy, but it is not a theory of its own. My main criticism 
of the constructivist approach is based on an argument suggested in the field of Social 
Geography: A region has always a dual character. On the one hand, a region might well 
be a cognitive construct produced in the course of discourse and thus, determined by 
inhabitants, observers, politicians, researchers and not least, by region-builders. 
However, a region is also ‘real’ in terms of “neutral and measurable.”663 Here the 
argument of the “light” version of Social Constructivism might come in with the riposte 
that the social constructivist perspective does not categorically deny the existence of 
material reality.  
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[Sociological] Constructivism does not deny the existence of a phenomenal world, external 
to thought. This is the world of brute (mainly natural) facts. It does oppose, and this is 
something different, that phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of knowledge 
independently of discursive practices. It does not challenge the possible thought-
independent existence of (in particular natural) phenomena, but it challenges their language-
independent observation.664  
This last point is, in turn, what I do openly oppose. Taking a “brute fact” out of the 
phenomenal world in Northern Europe, for example remoteness: as a factor, it can be 
measured on the basis of specific structural criteria that help to calculate the 
accessibility of a region, and thus, to come to know about any specific infrastructural or 
technical needs the respective region might have.665 This again, might determine the 
development of respective policies without being subject to social construction in any 
sense. Political solutions that might be developed in response to the factual challenge 
are likely to be constructed in discursive terms. However, the significance and 
politicising effect of the mere discursively independent “phenomenal substance” 
remains.  
The very example of the Hanseatic League could be employed in order to support this 
critical stance. Well before the League was formally established, the seaports alongside 
the Baltic Sea and the North Sea had already built up an important trading route that 
gradually tightened the link between them.666 I do not want to join in the traditional 
debate about the similarity of the different sorts of “New Regionalism” and its alleged 
historical precursor. Taking the League instead as a mere instance of regionalism itself 
and looking at the course of its development and the way it was established over the 
years, the social constructivist perspective becomes strongly challenged. At those times, 
a potential social construction of a spatial concept as wide-ranging as the one 
underlying the Hanseatic League was fairly limited in terms of communication and 
transfer of knowledge. Neither there existed technical possibilities for the ample 
promotion of the alleged region-building project, nor could the academic community be 
perceived as closely networked across land and state borders. Still, the League happened 
to establish a strong legacy. What laid the ground for its “existence” in both 
phenomenological and ideological terms could not be, as claimed by social 
constructivists, its continuous social construction by region constructors. The Hanseatic 
spatial concept could not be “spoken or written into existence.” The cooperative 
structures of the League rather resulted from concrete economic and political interests. 
In contemporary political discourse, where there are plenty of means to “communicate a 
region into existence”, the Hansa image (among many others) has been employed, and 
to a great extent also deliberately distorted in order to serve specific region-building 
arguments. However, the constitutive effect of these processes of construction should 
not be overestimated. While politically, the (partly) strategic employment of discursive 
tools is highly significant, it should certainly not lead us to the assumption that the 
region (or spatial concept) could not exist independently from these discursive 
                                                 
664  GUZZINI Stefano: A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations. In: European 
Journal of International Relations, No. 2/2000, pp. 147-182, here p. 159.  
665  See for example SPIEKERMANN Klaus/AALBU Hallgeir: Nordic Peripherality in Europe. 
Nordregion Working Paper, Nr. 2/2004. Stockholm 2004. 
666  See POSTEL Rainer: The Hanseatic League and its Decline. Paper presented at the Central 
Connecticut State University, New Britain. 20 November 1996.  
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processes. Discursive constructs, whether they involve politico-strategic intents or not, 
are not to be equated with the structural “substance” that brings the region (or another 
spatial entity) into existence. The constructs purported in political discourse are part of 
what the region “is substantially about” but they do certainly not determine its existence.  
The essence of these considerations could be depicted by using the renowned Iceberg-
Model that Johan Galtung introduced in the context of conflict analysis.667 
 
 
 
Galtung’s explanation of the constitution of conflict holds that it is comparable to the 
structural characteristics of an iceberg. The bottom nine tenths are hidden from view, 
while only the tip of the iceberg juts out above the waterline. While the context where 
this analogy has been originally employed is completely different, it still appears to 
offer a good model to illustrate the criticism of the social constructivist perspective. 
Political discourse as well as every single construct that is being employed, perverted or 
manipulated in the course of public and political debate only constitutes the ‘tip of the 
iceberg’, leaving the underlying interests and power-related motives unexplored. This 
general critique draws again on Moravcsik’s assessment about the “constructivist 
unwillingness” to place analytical claims “at any real risk of empirical discon-
firmation.”668  
Social constructivist analyses have certainly opened up a wealth of new insights into the 
study of regionalist phenomena. Indeed, the considerations about the history tool and 
other aspects occurring in the public discourse on Baltic Sea Regionalism added a 
strong constructivist element to my study as well.669 However, the intention behind this 
was more to support the description of the phenomenon. The reasoning about the 
employment of various different argumentative tools was rather meant to serve the 
purpose of introducing the matter of regionalism than explaining it. 
                                                 
667  GALTUNG Johan: Gewalt, Frieden und Friedensforschung. In: SENGHAAS Dieter (ed.): Kritische 
Friedensforschung. Frankfurt 1972, pp. 55-104. Figure taken from Institut fϋr Angewandte 
Kreativität (IAK), website www.iak.de [23 February 2008. 
668  MORAVCSIK Andrew: ‘Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark?’ Constructivism and 
European Integration. In: Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, Special Issue 1999, pp. 669-681, 
here p. 670. 
669  See chapter “Visions and Constructed Realities – the History Tool”, p. 51-, and chapter “The 
Argument of Challenges – United in Diversity”, p. 51-. 
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Figure 7: Social Constructivism and the Analytical ‘Tip of the Iceberg’ 
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This technical approach seeks to reflect the analytical weaknesses of constructivist 
explanation as laid out in this chapter. While the descriptive output of constructivist 
applications is rather dense, there is a clear lack in explanatory power. Constructivist 
perspectives often refrain from a systematic interpretation of the social interactions 
observed. Even though the main constructivist working method, content analysis, offers 
a good instrument for the identification of strategic motives and interests underlying 
social and political action, the explanatory output of most empirical studies stemming 
from the constructivist camp largely remains low.  
Moreover, despite their focus on the political process (most importantly, the discursive 
process preparing and framing political decision-making and acting) social 
constructivists are often reluctant to refer to the issue of finality. The potential outcome 
of a sequence of discursive action gets less analytical attention than the process itself. 
The rigid concentration of analysis on various aspects of discursive exchanges often 
appears to distort the ratio between the political arena where actions are being promoted 
and “constructed discursively” and the acts of factual cooperation, the establishment of 
material structures that transcend the realm of affirmative declarations and political 
arguing. What appears to be one of the most persistent misbelieves of Social 
Constructivism is that elitist discourse is expected to have – at least – a long-term 
impact on the broader political public and thus, an unconditional bearing on the 
formation of ideology and identity. This perspective does not only neglect the formative 
effect of individual perceptions about (material) political developments, it also denies 
(or at least underestimates) the direct impact of political decisions and policies on norms 
and beliefs.  
II. Intermediate Synthesis: Crosslinking Typologies and Theories 
This chapter seeks to draw reference lines from the constructivist Region-Building 
Approach (RBA) by Neumann over the typologies developed by e.g. Hettne (the 
Old/New dichotomy) to the array of theories of European integration discussed in the 
first part of this section by depicting the linkages (or “crosslinks”) between them in 
form of a synoptical overview. It is arranged according to the guiding principles that 
appear to be underlying each counterpart within a certain dichotomy. Equally, various 
specific characteristics of a type (e.g. Hard Regionalism) are seen to be reflected within 
a certain theoretical strain in EIT (e.g. Liberal Intergovernmentalism). The scheme starts 
out from the Old/New pair, since its conceptual implications are perceived to be most 
significant for this kind of synopsis, classifying them as follows:  
 
– “old” in terms of tendencially narrow or “special with regard to objectives” and  
– “new” in the sense of a “more comprehensive multidimensional process”670 
 
                                                 
670  HETTNE Björn: The New Regionalism: Implications for Development and Peace. In: HETTNE 
Björn/INOTAI András: The New Regionalism. Implications for Global Development and 
International Security. Helsinki 1994, pp. 1-49, here p. 1-2. 
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REGIONALISM 
OLD NEW 
top down 
hard 
bottom up 
soft 
theoretical approaches 
outside in 
 
these approaches study the region from 
the outside perspective, suggesting a 
systemic view dominated by the 
international/global context or more 
generally, by factors coming from 
outside 
 
inside out 
 
the formation of regions is thought to be 
effected from within, assuming a kind of 
core or centre within each region that 
builds the source out of which this 
regionness emerges 
 
geopolitical/material definition 
regionness as a fact, 
involving rigid bordering 
 
cultural/normative definition 
constructed or grown 
regionness, implying fuzziness 
of borders 
 
 
systemic approaches 
with an inherent globalism 
 
 
neorealist/intergovernmentalist strain 
 
 
critical approaches 
with a distinct focus on 
“domestic”/internal affairs 
 
           functionalist & “sociological” strain 
Table 22: Explaining Regionalism: Crosslinking Typologies and Theories 
Since the mere identification of dichotomies as well as the respective characterisation of 
typologies (Old/New and Hard/Soft Regionalism) offers little substance from a more 
abstract and theoretical perspective, such an overview might help to couple these largely 
descriptive categories with the bulk of theoretical approaches. Additionally, it also 
allows the reader to place the general discussion about theories in the wider context of 
regionalism studies as introduced in the first section of this study.671 Tassinari suggests 
a “continuum” for this kind of structuring overview in order to allow for the analytical 
consideration of positions ‘in between’.672 Accordingly, this scheme should not be 
perceived to be generally applicable or to comply with any sort of question linked to the 
positioning of a certain theory alongside the established categories. Following a rigid 
interpretation, the two “crosslinking columns” could be seen as either end of a spectrum 
of approaches. 
                                                 
671  See in particular chapter “Regionalism – Definitions, Delimitations and Typologies”, p. 34-. 
672  See TASSINARI Fabrizio: Mare Europaeum. Baltic Sea Region Security and Cooperation from 
post-Wall to post-Enlargement Europe. Copenhagen 2004, p. 16.  
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III.  Application Pattern II: The Correlation Between Meso and Macro-Level 
The question of applicability of EIT can also be posed in another context. Are the 
European Integration Theories at hand suitable to explain the correlation between 
macro-level integration and the integrative dynamics at the meso-level (i.e. in the BSR)? 
It appears obvious that the analysis aiming to answer this question has to focus on the 
potential “regional dimension” featured by various theoretical models. Hence, virtually 
“applicable” approaches should (at least) provide an understanding of  
 
– how the EU relates to its own (territorial) parts,  
– and vice versa, how these “parts” relate to the overall EU framework. 
 
Trying to remain within the practical scope of this study, I am neither willing nor able to 
detect these aspects in every single approach to integration that the last decades of 
European studies have put forth. Hence, I would like to approach this analytical 
complex by applying a (negative) logic of exclusion, by asking: What limits are set to 
the applicability of European Integration Theory when it comes to the explanation of 
complex political processes between the EU and a European regional entity such as the 
BSR? The search for the answer to this question should first lead us to the consideration 
of the following tendencies in (European) Integration Theory: 
 
– Given the fact that most European Integration Theories are designed to explain EU 
internal processes, there is a clear lack in emphasis on the specific circumstances of 
foreign policy.673 Since the complex interrelation between the EU and the BSR as a 
European meso-region can be regarded as part of a “grey zone” between the EU’s 
internal and external policy dimension, it is likely to constitute a marginal or 
borderline case for most theoretical models available in the field.  
– The traditional (and many of the current) approaches to European integration have 
been (explicitly or inexplicitly) designed for the European macro-level, i.e. the 
European integration process. These models largely tend to be either state-oriented 
or empirically focussed on the structural process of institutionalisation and the 
build-up of a (potentially) supranational polity sui generis.  
– The major strands in EIT seem to base on a “unitarist thesis”, following a certain 
“drive for centrality” which implies that their analytical sharpness is low by nature 
when it comes to the explanation of “peripheral” or decentralising phenomena.674 
– Most theoretical approaches to European integration draw a sharp line between 
macro-level and sub-level action. Instead of identifying and analysing the linkages 
between the two (or more) levels, the respective political processes are largely 
treated as two different and distinct political phenomena. 
 
When it comes to the discussion of approaches that consider the complex correlation 
between different levels of political action, one specific connotation may certainly crop 
up: the one of multi-level governance models in EIT. In fact, as laid out in the context 
of the first application pattern, governance models do not only describe the dispersion of 
competence across territorial levels but they also focus on the interconnection of 
                                                 
673  See CHRISTIANSEN Thomas/TONRA Ben: The Study of EU Foreign Policy. Between inter-
national relations and European studies. In: Idd. (eds): Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. 
Manchester/New York 2004, pp. 1-9, here p. 4. 
674  See PARKER Noel: Integrated Europe and its ‘Margins’. Action and Reaction. In: Id./ 
ARMSTRONG Bill (eds): Margins in European Integration. Houndmills 2000, pp. 3-27, here p. 18. 
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multilevel political arenas in the process of governing. In contrast to state centric 
approaches, multi-level governance does not contend that state sovereignty is preserved 
or even strengthened trough further integration; nor do multi-level governance 
approaches suggest that nation state influence absolutely controls institutional 
development beyond the state level. Decision-making between various levels of action 
is seen as loosely interconnected instead of assuming the persistence of tightly nested 
and hierarchical chains of bilateral links. Institutions are perceived to have an 
independent influence in policy making that cannot be derived from their role as agents 
of national executives.675  
By emphasising the poly-centricity of complex systems of integration, governance 
approaches certainly cover many important aspects that are significant in the context of 
the second application pattern. The correlation between the regional arena (the BSR) 
and the wider EU framework appears to comply with the notion of loose multilateral 
links as suggested by multi-level governance approaches. However, besides the fact that 
these approaches are not equipped to analyse the motivation behind such cross-level 
interactions, meaning interests and obviously existing efficiency calculations, they do 
not provide sufficient analytical potential to grasp the politico-strategic dynamics 
underlying this multi-layered system. As noted by Marsh and Furlong, “in practice, 
multilevel governance can also mean obscure elite-led agreements and public 
incomprehension.”676 Multi-level governance approaches are not perfectly precise in 
this respect.  
Another point of reference for the analysis of the macro-meso relationship, meaning 
macro-level processes and the respective bottom-up and top-down effects, results from 
the consideration, that from a nation state perspective (Sub)regionalism and European 
integration can be seen as two substantially different or even diametrically opposed 
processes of structural change virtually moving a political system ‘beyond the nation 
state’.677 Power and governance is dislocated “upwards” to the supranational level, and 
“downwards” to regional and local entities. The latter movement could also be said to 
head “outwards” since non-state bodies gain centre stage.678 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, twin forces continue to stretch the nation-state in 
opposite directions. States as they enter the new millennium are transformed not only by the 
centripetal pull of supranational integration, but also by the centrifugal forces of resurgent 
Regionalism. [...] Uncertainty generated by these countervailing forces prompts powerful 
and contentious arguments about the normative and empirical roles of subnational actors in 
increasingly complex webs of multi-level governance.679 
                                                 
675  See HOOGHE Liesbet/MARKS Gary: Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. Lanham 
2001, p. 3.  
676  MARSH David/FURLONG Paul: A Skin not a Sweater. Ontology and Epistemology in Political 
Science. In: MARSH David/STOKER Gerry (eds): Theory and Methods in Political Science. 
London 2001, pp. 17-41, here p. 38.  
677  ‘Beyond the nation state’ as a phrase dates back to Ernst B. Haas, one of the main exponents of Neo-
Functionalism. HAAS Ernst B.: Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International 
Organization. Stanford 1964.  
678  See AMIN Ash: Spatialities of Globalisation. In: Environment and Planning, No. 34/2002, pp. 385-
399, here p. 386. 
679  DOWNS William M.: Regionalism in the European Union. Key Concepts and Project Overview. In: 
Journal of European Integration, No. 3/2002, pp. 171-177, here p. 171. 
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Even though depending on the perspective these two dynamics do not always occur in 
terms of “countervailing forces” it should be taken into account that the alleged 
permanent cleavage between supranational “integratedness” and regionalist affixedness 
is likely to affect a nation state’s foreign policy orientation.680 (Sub-) Regionalism may 
also influence a state’s membership conduct and thereby have a positive or negative 
effect on the process of macro-level integration. These potentially conflicting dynamics 
between a macro-level entity and meso-level formations that intersect with the 
catchment area of the former are widely neglected in most theoretical models on 
regional (and European) integration. Together with the four counter-factors mentioned 
above, this consideration should make us reconsider the analytical self-limitation to the 
field of EIT. One of the strongest arguments in this regard is what Rumford called the 
EIT’s inherent “European solipsism”, meaning the tendency in European integration 
studies of viewing the EU as “the sole author of European developments.”  
In order to understand the dynamics of contemporary European transformation, EU studies 
must encourage a greater diversity of (theoretical) perspectives. [...] Developments in 
Europe are best studied within a global framework.681 
Decades of academic thinking about European integration have taught us to restrict our 
perspective onto the European case and to reject any sort of external analysis that tries 
to generalise the specific European case or abstract it on a more global basis. IR Theory 
has been blamed for its tendency to “normalise” the EU by applying a certain (state-
centric) logic to a system that is allegedly sui generis. 682 
The dominant paradigm in IR scholarship regards European integration as the practice of 
ordinary diplomacy under conditions creating unusual opportunities for providing collective 
goods through highly institutionalised exchange. From this ‘intergovernmentalist’ 
perspective, the EC is essentially a forum for interstate bargaining. Member-states remain 
the only important actors at the European level.683 
In fact, most traditional IR approaches concentrate on constellations of power and 
interest among states and neglect other significant factors such as the formative impact 
of institutions on state level political conduct or the importance of values and norms for 
the formation of interests and strategic objectives; most scholars in the field probably 
                                                 
680  Another very different perspective on the parallel process of Supranationalisation and Regionalism 
builds the basis of notions like the ‘Europe of the Regions’. According to the regional federalist 
perspective, the two dynamics do not appear as countervailing forces. They both contribute to the 
aim of compensating “what the modern nation state cannot do in a world of complex 
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to political reality. See GÄRTNER Heinz: Modelle Europäischer Sicherheit. Wie entscheidet 
Österreich? Vienna 1997, p. 56. See also chapter “What kind of ‘Europe of the Regions’?”, p. 206-. 
681  RUMFORD Chris: Rethinking European Spaces. Territory, Borders, Governance. In: Comparative 
European Politics, Issue 2/3 (July/September 2006), pp. 127–140, here p. 129.  
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of European Public Policy 6:4, Special Issue 1999, pp. 528-544, here p. 533. And MORAVCSIK 
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683  PIERSON Paul: The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist Approach. In: 
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also feel themselves merely focussing on the interaction of states through diplomacy or 
violence within an overall context of structural anarchy.684 However, EIT could equally 
be blamed for trying to develop a “general theory of regional integration from very 
particular European experiences.”685 
Hurrel probably has a point claiming that some political or social phenomena might 
appear to be politically complex but theoretically, turn out to be “rather easily 
explicable” by applying a “traditional toolkit.”686 He also goes on with a rather 
provocative but probably useful recommendation. 
Rather than try and understand other regions through the distorting mirror of Europe, it is 
better to think in general theoretical terms and in ways that draw both on traditional 
International Relations and on other areas of social thought. Hence we should consider 
foundational sets of ideas before they have become encrusted by their application to a 
particular region or case.687 
While in this context, Hurrell is referring to the applicability of EIT to other regions, 
meaning regions outside Europe, these considerations appear to be also highly relevant 
for the theoretical complex addressed in this study. These considerations build the point 
of departure for the following trial application of IRT to the Baltic Sea case. They have 
also led to the consideration of yet another theoretical camp in political science for the 
purpose of this study. By way of concluding this theoretical section, an “outsider” 
approach taken from the field of traditional comparative analysis, the system theoretical 
model developed by Talcott Parsons will be dealt with, intending to point out the added 
value alternative theoretical choices can bring when trying to analyse an issue as 
complex as the “Baltic Sea Conundrum.” 
D. Inputs from International Relations Theory 
Most approaches in IRT developed before or during the Cold War have mainly focussed 
on large-scale and global developments and processes. Only after the superpower 
overlay had been lifted, also IRT slowly started to open itself towards political 
phenomena at a “lower” level of action. However, since state-centric perspectives still 
dominate scholarship in this field, a theoretical IR model explicitly treating the subject 
of meso-regional cooperation or regionalism is difficult to come by.  
However, selected traditional IR approaches do address the aspect of cooperation 
occurring within a certain geopolitical unit, and therefore, appear to be arguably 
applicable for the purposes of this study. The arrangement of this chapter takes over the 
structure suggested for the discussion of various different approaches in EIT.688 The 
aforementioned “application pattern I” refers to the BSR in terms of a macro-cosmic 
entity, treating it as a phenomenon of its own with less attention to the ways it relates to 
the ‘outside world’, mainly meaning the broader context of European integration. The 
                                                 
684  See ROSAMOND Ben: Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke 2000, p. 164. 
685  See ibd., p. 159. 
686  HURRELL Andrew: The Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory. In: FARRELL 
Mary/HETTNE Björn/VAN LANGENHOVE Luk (eds): Global Politics and Regionalism. London 
2005, pp. 38-53, here p. 39.  
687  Ibd., here p. 39. 
688  See also table 19 presented in chapter “Applying Integration Theory to the Baltic Sea Case: 
Application Patterns”, p. 162-. 
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“application pattern II” then turns again to the issue of macro-meso relationships, of the 
virtual linkages between the BSR as a European region and the EU context as a broader 
context framing action in the BSR and transregional interaction across its outside 
borders. 
 
application  
pattern I 
Baltic Sea Regionalism is addressed as a self-standing phenomenon,  
 
– trying to identify the inherent dynamics that led to the establishment 
of the BSR as a common notion in regional/international discourse,  
– addressing the question about the quality of Baltic Sea Regionness in 
comparison to other more established geopolitical notions current in 
the Northern European context (e.g. the “Nordic system”). 
 
application  
pattern II 
The BSR is distinctly treated as a European region that holds a close albeit 
not exclusive connection to the EU. The analysis focuses on the theoretical 
incorporation of the macro-meso connections, trying to develop different 
models to depict the relationship between the BSR and its supranational 
counterpart, the EU institutional and political complex. 
Table 23: Application Patterns for the Critical Discussion of IRT in the BSR Case 
I. Application pattern I: The Security Community Approach 
Throughout the past decades, the Nordic North has established itself as a non-war 
community. Despite occasional frictions, the Nordic five have largely abstained from 
employing physical or material force as a means to solve or settle political differences. 
The Nordics have on numerous occasions found their way out of situations that would have 
typically led to war [or would normally have] a strong tendency to cause military action.689 
This specific Nordic phenomenon has inspired a number of political scientists just as 
much as IR theorists, who tried to develop various different models of explanation. The 
Security Community Approach (SCA) as developed by Karl Deutsch and some of his 
fellows in the late 1950s has certainly been among the most prominent abstract models 
applied to the Nordic case. Deutsch extensively dealt with the specific Nordic 
circumstances and claimed to offer a theoretical explanation to grasp the phenomenon 
of lasting and sustainable Nordic peace. The broad reception and success of his 
approach turned the Nordic case into a “standard example for an uncontested security 
community” that developed “features of a dogma”.690 The following sub-chapters give 
an overview of the theoretical model introduced by Deutsch in the framework of his 
logic of transactionalism in order to prepare for the critical discussion recently brought 
up by theorists like Adler and Barnett.  
 
                                                 
689  JOENNIEMI Pertti: Norden Beyond Security Community. In: ARCHER Clive/JOENNIEMI Pertti 
(eds): The Nordic Peace. Aldershot 2003, pp. 198-212, here p. 198. 
690  See ibd., here p. 199. 
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1. Deutschian Transactionalism  
The concept of security communities originally dates from Richard Van Wagenen.691 
However, it was only in the surroundings of Karl Deutsch that the approach eventually 
got international attention. Deutsch was what most in academia would perceive as the 
founding father of the SCA.692 Karl Deutsch pioneered transaction flow analysis as a 
distinct form of regional integration theory. The transactionalist perspective focuses on 
the magnitude and symmetry in the flows of social and economic transactions as well as 
of social communications. These flows are also perceived as the major indicators for the 
waxing and waning of regional security communities.693 Intensified transactions 
between national communities are thought to foster a sense of trust at the supranational 
level and hence, to produce a feeling of security. Deutsch defined the idea of a “security 
community” as a group of people/actors that becomes integrated to a degree and extent 
that the members of this community abstain from physical conflict and find other ways 
to settle their disputes. Deutsch differentiates between two different types of security 
communities:694  
 
– “amalgamated” or “unified” communities” (showcase: USA); 
– “pluralistic” communities, where members retain their legal independence and 
sovereignty. Today’s EU could be classified as this sort of a pluralistic security 
community, since it consists of a group of virtually integrated states, dominated by 
stability and a permanent absence of any risk of physical war between its members. 
 
Despite these formal differences, security communities are defined by a common 
element, which is the “dependable expectation of peaceful change.”695 
2. Security Community Building in Northern Europe 
The traditional formation of Nordic Cooperation has often been referred to as the ideal 
example of a Deutschian security community since it meets all preconditions for a 
peaceful resolution of controversies. The outstanding quality of Nordic Cooperation is 
said to be lying in its traditional cultural and ideological focus. Intra-Nordic discourse 
during the Cold War has been very much about identity building, togetherness and 
“we”-feeling while state-centric behaviour was close to inexistent.  
The Deutschian SCA has been among the most contested approaches in IRT during the 
Cold War era. By placing Norden within the domestic field of the states involved 
Deutsch declined to adhere to the general rule in traditional IRT that there is an 
important qualitative difference between the inside and the outside of state action. 
According to his explanation, the Nordic model succeeded in transcending the logic of 
international anarchy by developing a high degree of cooperative cohesiveness from 
                                                 
691  VAN WAGENEN Richard: Research in the International Organization Field. Princeton 1952. 
692  Adler and Barnett give a good overview of the respective scholar debate. See ADLER 
Emanuel/BARNETT Michael (eds): Security Communities. Cambridge 1998.  
693  See DEUTSCH Karl W.: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International 
Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton 1957, p. 16.  
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Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton 1957, pp. 3-6. 
695  See KATZENSTEIN Peter J.: Regionalism in Comparative Perspective. ARENA Working Papers, 
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within.696 This approach allows for the avoidance of various different dilemmas 
common in IRT. Security is not perceived to be solely determined by the international 
system; single actors can join in a community of security and peace in order to reduce 
the likelihood of tension between a certain number of selected partners. 
Using a constructivist approach with behaviouralist methodological connotations, Deutsch 
made a clear choice in arguing that the Nordic region had become a pluralist security 
community, a community not in terms of common security with some specific, sovereignty-
based, statist and centralising arrangements to provide for it, but something unstructured, 
societal and an island of peace amidst a broader setting based on the presence of the danger 
of war. The recipe for doing away with the danger of war, in his view, consisted of far-
reaching consultation, communication and co-operation. By their affinity and the 
establishing of a useful co-operative relationship, the Nordic countries had overcome the 
usual hardships of relations between states and eliminated the expectations of war in their 
interrelations.697 
During the Cold War, the security community concept was strongly opposed by the then 
dominating realist paradigm in IR analysis. Mostly the Deutschian security community 
application to the North Atlantic area was seen as highly hypothetical and “not in tune 
with the overall situation of power politics and spheres of influence during the Cold 
War.”698 Only after the dissolution of the bipolar world order, the concept became 
fashionable again. The social factors of a peaceful political order (identity, a common 
cultural understanding and shared values) which used to build an important element in 
Deutsch’s theoretical construct seemed to re-enter the academic debate and were taken 
up again as a starting point for further theorising. 
3. Adler and Barnett – Transactionalism Reconstructed 
It was Emanuel Adler together with Michael Barnett, who tried to produce a refined 
version of the traditional Deutschian security community concept. In their early papers, 
Adler and Barnett replaced Deutsch’s behavioural approach to regional integration with 
a constructivist stance, by embedding the basic model into what could be called the 
mainstream assumptions of Social Constructivism, i.e. that security communities are 
discursively constructed entities established between states that agree on the 
“unbearable destructiveness of modern war”, and thus, choose to strengthen their 
system of collective security. 
While Adler and Barnett are conventional in their view of the relation between theory and 
evidence, they resist the economist’s tendency of sidestepping the effect of actor identities 
on actor interests and strategies. Hence, their research agenda links up with perspectives 
stressing social psychological factors and social roles in international relations.699 
                                                 
696  See JOENNIEMI Pertti: Norden as a Post-Nationalist Construction. In: Id. (ed.): Neo-Nationalism or 
Regionality: The Restructuring of Political Space around the Baltic Rim. Stockholm 1997, pp. 181-
234, here p. 193.   
697  Ibd., here p. 194. 
698  STADSHOLT André: Security Communities and Communities of Security. Security Community 
Building in a Neo-Grotian Perspective. Flemingsberg 2001, p. 3. Online publication 
www2.huberlin.de/BaltSeaNet/forum/beitraege/ast.pdf  [23 January 2007]. 
699  KATZENSTEIN Peter J.: Regionalism in Comparative Perspective. ARENA Working Papers, No. 
1/1996. Oslo 1996, p. 8. 
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According to Adler’s interpretation, it is collective identity that lays the ground for a 
security community. Shared self-definitions lead to an internalisation of norms and 
values. Social learning creates stability and peace, above all if it is combined with 
general processes of functional integration.700  
Security communities are socially constructed because shared meanings, constituted by 
interaction, engender collective identities. They are dependent on communication, 
discourse, and interpretation, as well as on material environments.701 
Adler’s and Barnett’s main criticism of the Deutschian transactionalist SCA was its 
alleged inattentiveness to the “complex and causal ways in which the state power and 
practices, international organisations, transactions, and social learning processes can 
generate new forms of mutual identification and security relations.”702 Another 
weakness in the conventional SCA identified by the two critics is the indistinct 
relationship between the various analytical factors: transaction, identity, security and 
we-ness. In fact, Deutsch does not clearly indicate how security and identity actually 
relate to each other in terms of a cause-effect chain. He does not specify whether it is 
identity and mutual responsiveness that allows for the settlement of peace and security, 
which again, creates the ideal circumstances for further integration; or whether security 
is achieved through integration that increases the we-feeling and furthers the 
establishment of a common identity. Adler and Barnett sought to introduce a more 
linear sequence to the model, establishing that states are, in the first place, determined 
by external factors that make them aspire to joint solutions. They are then thought to 
move on with a process of social learning that is accompanied by the establishment of 
common institutions. This institutionalisation and formal settlement is thought to build 
the basis for trust and mutual responsiveness.703 According to this flow of transactions, 
the alleged “we-feeling” is rather part of the integration outcomes than part of the 
origins that build the foundation of a security community.  
4. Regional Security Complex Theory: Reactions from Copenhagen 
The application of a linear sequence of transactions to the Nordic case as suggested by 
Adler and Barnett has been strongly opposed by some analysts, most importantly those 
stemming from the core of the so-called Copenhagen School. Ole Wæver argued that 
the circumstances determining the Nordic case would largely not comply with the linear 
assumptions of the newly interpreted SCA by Adler and Barnett.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
700  See ibd., here p. 259. 
701  ADLER Emanuel: Imagined (Security) Communities. Cognitive Regions in International Relations. 
Millennium: Journal of International Relations, No. 2/1997, pp. 249-278, here p. 258. 
702  ADLER Emanuel/BARNETT Michael: Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective. In: Idd 
(eds).: Security Communities. Cambridge 1998, pp. 3-28, here p. 9. 
703  See ADLER Emanuel/BARNETT Michael: A Framework for the Study of Security Communities. 
In: Idd. (eds): Security Communities. Cambridge 1998, pp. 29-68, here p. 38. 
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The Nordic non-war community emerged in contrast to the expectations of most 
contemporary theorists of security communities, in having not been achieved by erecting 
common security structures or institutions, but primarily by processes of ‘desecuritisation’, 
that is progressive marginalisation of mutual security concerns in favour of other issues.704 
Building on a more radical constructivist stance, the critical Regional Security Complex 
Theory (RSCT) established by Buzan and Wæver claims for a more differentiated 
explanation of about how security or “non-war communities” come into being and what 
foundations they are built upon.  
A security complex is defined as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, 
desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be 
analysed or resolved apart from one another.705 
Buzan et al. acknowledge the centrality of state actors on the international scene, but at 
the same time, seek to move their analysis beyond the state level. They turn their 
attention also to non-official collective and individual actors, focussing in particular on 
the “speech acts”, meaning discursive interactions that contribute to “writing or 
speaking a region into existence”.706  
Another aspect about the RSCT that appears to be highly relevant in the context of this 
study is the amity/enmity pattern introduced by the classical RSCT in the early 1990s 
and taken up by the critical version some years later. The amity/enmity pattern results 
from the idea that security communities or more generally, security complexes may 
assume various different forms and that the normative or material foundations they are 
built upon might change over time. The amity/enmity pattern is intended to 
conceptualise this potential diversity of security complex phenomena, assuming that 
interdependence within a non-war community can range on a spectrum between amity 
and enmity: 
 
– amity involves positive interactions between the various actors within the security 
complex, this leads to the establishment of strong cooperative structures: 
– enmity: the interactions within a security complex are thought to be dominated by 
confrontation and conflict, or at least, by suspicion and fear.707 
 
Buzan also sought to consider the factor of gradual change, distinguishing between  
 
– changes that rise from within a security community (‘internal transformations’), and  
– changes that are effected by exogenous factors (‘external modification’).708 
 
He also found a category that he would label the ‘overlay’ option, implying that the 
security interdependence holding together a non-war community is considerably 
impacted by specific upcoming circumstances at the meta-level. The power emanating 
                                                 
704  WÆVER Ole: Insecurity, security, and asecurity in the West European non-war community. In: 
ADLER Emanuel/BARNETT Michael (eds): Security Communities. Cambridge 1998, pp. 69-118, 
here p. 204. 
705  BUZAN Barry/WÆVER Ole/DE WILDE Jaap: Security. A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder 
1998, p. 201. 
706  See ibd., p. 9. 
707  See BUZAN Barry: People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era. New York 1991, p. 189. 
708  BUZAN Barry/WÆVER Ole/DE WILDE Jaap: Security. A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder 
1998, p. 13. 
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from this meta-source of power is seen to be modifying the nature of internal 
interdependence, either in a way that the external threat tightens the security links 
within the community, or in a way that growing suspicion within the community 
hampers the quality of mutual support.709 
5. Inclusive Balticness: Extending the Nordic Non-War Community? 
These reflections about a differentiated and dynamic development of non-war 
communities build a good starting point for the discussion about whether the traditional 
Nordic peace system has been successfully extended to the wider Baltic Sea area, or 
firstly, whether this was intended to happen at all and from whose point of view. The 
underlying question whether the Nordic system as a mental construct happened to be 
substantially (and ultimately) challenged by the rise of “New Regionalism” and whether 
the Baltic States, while striving for (Northern) Europeanness, managed to open up the 
compact normative system of old Norden has been discussed at another point of this 
study.710 The conceptual considerations offered by Buzan et al. in the framework of the 
traditional and critical RSCT may help to grasp the conclusions drawn in that context on 
a more abstract level. When trying to recall the criteria that generally account for the 
emergence and persistence of a non-war community one could list the following: two or 
more states are thought to be  
 
– willing to cooperate; 
– constituting a geographically coherent grouping;  
– facing security problems that cannot be resolved apart from one another;  
– having a relationship marked by security interdependence, 
– either on the basis of amity or on the basis of enmity 
– to the extent that the ties among them are stronger than between them (or one of 
them) and an ‘outside’ actor or systemic reference. 
 
The notion of inclusive Balticness, of a BSR in which both the ‘Old North’ and the new 
‘Baltic Northerners’ merge in the framework of a compact regional entity, is verified in 
most of these aspects – at least at first sight.711 Factors like the “willingness to 
cooperate” and the question of “having a relationship marked by security 
interdependence” may well be perceived as given in the wider Baltic Sea area. But does 
that prove that the Nordic non-war community has indeed been successfully expanded 
to the Baltic States, Poland or even parts of Russia? A distinct “BUT” needs to be added 
when it comes to the substance of these qualities. Both characteristics are shared among 
the group of BSR states. All of them are  
 
– (most likely) willing to cooperate............................BUT not exclusively among them 
– (presumably) interdependent regarding security.... .BUT not exclusively. 
 
This problem is grasped by criterion (6) that asks for exclusive interdependence within 
the group. This conceptual condition is strongly challenged by the security implications 
of the general European (and Northern Atlantic) integration process that involves both 
the classical Nordic and the newly independent Baltic sphere.  
                                                 
709  See ibd., p. 14. 
710  See chapter “The ‘Nordic Bloc’ – Driving Core for Baltic Sea Regionalism?”, p. 73-, and chapter 
“Old North vs. New Regionalism. Visions Competing for the Same Space?”, p. 76-. 
711  See figure 5 “Mental subspaces in the European North”. 
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An alleged Baltic Sea non-war community would lack an important feature, which is, 
moral insularity building on mutual “expectations for peaceful change.”712 The EU 
accession of the Baltic States institutionally marked the fact that a Nordic non-war 
community was merely perceived as an option or tool to prepare full integration in the 
wider European (and Northern Atlantic) community. Never explicitly rejecting this 
option, on the long run, they strived for “more central” channels to secure their interests 
and progressively enhance their geopolitical position. Looking back, there has never 
been a Baltic liability to prefer going for a Northern European alternative and to join the 
club of reluctant, eurosceptical and exceptionalist member states as just where Sweden 
could be counted in. Equally, the Nordic system never really opened itself for this kind 
of extension. The Nordic States, and most of all Sweden and Finland, tried to take over 
a guiding role in the process of Baltic post-Soviet reorientation. However, these efforts 
were not aiming at a broader reorientation of Nordicness towards a more comprehensive 
concept of “Northern Europe”. Nordicness has remained exclusive, a fact that could not 
least be told from the rhetoric style employed in the inner-Nordic debate about the 
Baltic inclusion.713  
II. Application Pattern II: Sketching a Model of Explanation 
Application pattern II addresses the question of how the meso-level (i.e. the BSR) 
relates to its macro-level framework, the wider complex of European integration or 
more specifically, the European Union. The main point of reference here is the 
consideration presented at the beginning of this section that both Baltic Sea Regionalism 
(a meso-phenomenon) and the European project (a macro-phenomenon) can be seen as 
instances of “regional integration” or “regionalism”.714 There are many ways of how the 
two levels can be related to each other.715  
The following figure tries to outline the spectrum of possibilities in this respect. 
 
                                                 
712  See KATZENSTEIN Peter J.: Regionalism in Comparative Perspective. ARENA Working Papers, 
No. 1/1996. Oslo 1996, p. 8. 
713  For a detailed discussion, see chapter “Old North vs. New Regionalism. Visions Competing for the 
Same Space?”, p. 76-. 
714  See ROSAMOND Ben: Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke 2000, pp. 14-15. And chapter 
“Introductory Remarks on Regionalism and Integration”, p. 152-. 
715  For a discussion of system levels and considerations about the micro-meso-macro distinction of 
regionalism, see chapter “Levels of Regionalism: Macro-, Meso- and Micro-Regionalism”, p. 37-. 
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As shown in the figure, macro-regionalism could, for example, be perceived to be 
building on regionalist formations at lower levels. From another point of view, it could 
be seen to provide the framework or means that enable (sub)regional activity. The 
various possibilities listed above show clearly that most relationships are based on a 
two-way dynamic. Equally, the different variations are not all mutually exclusive but 
partly interlocking or conditioning each other. Given the variety of possible relations, 
this list remains exemplary and non-exhaustive. Application pattern II could be 
addressed by making use of a traditional tool current in the field of IR. Many IR studies 
approach research questions from a systemic perspective, asking questions like: how is 
phenomenon X embedded in the wider system of global politics? How does it relate to 
the ‘outside world’? To what extent is a regional entity subject to systemic impacts and 
of what sort and intensity are these impacts? How does the regional entity persist 
despite broad systemic impacts and with what instruments and action strategies does it 
seek to encounter what infiltrates from ‘outside’? While searching for an answer to this 
sort of questions, IR studies very often avail themselves of abstract models that help to 
visualize how a bilateral relationship is e.g. marked by superiority and dependence, or to 
demonstrate how an alleged centre relates to its periphery.  
Hence, what could be derived from the scheme above are various different models of 
meso-macro inter-relation or inter-action, where single elements from the list together 
form a distinct type of relationship pattern. Picking out for example the idea of the 
macro-level entity (in this case, the EU) providing the (necessary) framework for 
regionalist activities at the meso-level (Baltic Sea Regionalism), the following elements 
could be combined to build a coherent and comprehensive model of explanation: 
 
– the macro-level provides the necessary normative (or other) framework for the 
emergence or functioning of regionalist action at the (sub)regional level; 
– the macro-level enables Meso-Regionalism by offering appropriate systemic 
conditions; 
– the meso-level is dependent on the framing quality of the macro-level;  
Figure 8: Interaction and Influence Flows Between Meso- and Macro-Level 
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– the meso-level forms part of the macro-level by operationalising integration as 
delegated ‘from above’ downwards to the sub-regional and sub-sub-regional/local 
level. 
 
Following this procedure, different distinct models can be developed that help to 
approach the macro-meso issue on the basis of a systemic perspective. When adding a 
time factor, the different models can also be thought of as scenarios, as development 
patterns whose underlying cause-effect logic also informs about future structural or 
functional inclinations and ultimately, the finality of the complex and interlocking 
integration processes that compete against each other across levels, concur or happen 
independently from each other. The models presented hereinafter are seen to typify the 
most current (and obvious) relationship patterns, treating the BSR as  
 
– a European region or a subset of the wider European integration framework; 
– a peripheral region positioned at the margins of the EU system of gravity, (a model 
that could be seen as a variation of a); 
– an auto-dynamic entity that emancipates from the EU framework and incorporates a 
more comprehensive Europeanness with border-transcending elements. 
 
The explanatory power of these models is limited to the extent that they offer little 
proficiency for the identification of cause and effect chains or the exact ascertainment of 
independent variables underlying a relationship as complex as the one between the BSR 
and the EU. However, this working tool helps to structure a multidimensional research 
problem by offering a practicable way of depicting relationships between any sort of 
delimitable entities that emerge, operate and develop in the intricate system of IR. 
1. The BSR as a Subset 
According to this model, the BSR is perceived a sub-region of the EU and could – 
drawing on the terminology of set theory (Mengenlehre) – be termed a “subset” that is 
largely framed and dominated by its “superset”, the EU polity including all its 
normative implications. The impact of the macro-level is perceived to dominate any 
regionalist action occurring at a lower level. The BSR is subordinate to the wider EU 
framework to the extent that both its emergence and future development is dependent on 
the course of the general integration process. Accordingly, regionalist action within the 
subset cannot be seen as detached from the broader frame of European integration.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"region" is the subset of "EU" 
"EU" is the superset of "region" 
Figure 9: Model of Explanation I: Subset vs. Superset
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A model that builds on similar considerations is the one assuming a Europe of 
“Concentric Circles”. It has originally entered the scholar debate in the context of 
general European integration and the question of a prospective “variable geometry” for 
the European project. The circles were then perceived to depict subgroups of member 
states, which have achieved or strive for different levels of integration, with the 
candidate countries and prospective members building some sort of ‘adjacent circle’ 
around the Union. A similar notion is the one of selected or ‘functional circles’ (e.g. the 
currency, security and defence circle) with the EU building the unifying space or centre.  
Applied to the context of meso-regional formations relating to a macro-level context, 
the EU would be interpreted as the centre and reference point for its ‘adjacent’ circles, 
the meso-regions on the European continent. As the ‘centre’ of this constellation, the 
EU would be seen to function as a regulatory power relating to its ‘outer elements’ by 
way of standardised and/or multilateral patterns of interaction. Applying a similar 
interpretation to the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Michael Emerson 
suggested calling it the “Cobweb Model”. This constellation could also be illustrated as 
a “Hub-and-Spoke-Model”.716  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These two models depict two different ways of how the macro-centre (i.e. the EU) can 
relate to certain regional entities or how the macro and the meso-level interact with each 
other. While the Cobweb Model allows both for multilateral and bilateral relations and 
action flows, the Hub-and-Spoke-Model clearly emphasises the bilateral element. This 
bilaterality can also be interpreted in terms of a differentiated approach, which involves 
                                                 
716  See EMERSON Michael: European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy or Placebo? In: Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS). Working Document, No. 215/November 2004. Brussels 2004, pp. 
8-9. 
Figure 10: The Concentric Circles Model 
Figure 11: The Cobweb and the Hub-and-Spoke Model 
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that the macro-core develops a specific framework for each regional entity (e.g. 
different nation states based in a region, or different meso-regions in Europe), seeking 
to take into account the individual specificities of each bilateral link ‘outwards’.  
2. The BSR in a Cobweb Variation: Peripheral and Marginal? 
The first model of concentric circles could be developed further by stressing certain 
aspects about the alleged meso-macro relationship. Assuming that the core function of 
the Union is very distinct and strongly pronounced so that the BSR is put into a slanting 
position, one could develop the following cobweb-variation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to this model, the BSR is seen as a peripheral region situated at the very 
margins of the EU centre of gravity. The model is extended to the aspect of (physical) 
peripherality, which is thought to assume a certain air of political marginality. This 
model is close to the concept of “subsidiary systems” in that the EU itself including its 
closest neighbours is defined as a “regional system” consisting of a set of 
geographically proximate states with a certain perceived interdependence or inter-
connectedness on the political, economic and/or security level. The EU polity builds the 
core of this system that is surrounded by a number of “subsidiary systems encompassing 
the relations of a part of the regional area.”  
These ‘subsidiary systems’ consist of a group of states “alienated from the core in some 
degree by social, political, economic and/or organizational factors but which 
nevertheless play a role in the politics of the [regional] system.” The peripheral sub-
systems are thought to be both dependent on and conditioned by the core of the regional 
system.717 As for the BSR example, this dependency would e.g. be consisting of the 
EU’s political impact (regulative/‘disciplinary’) and financial assistance (distributive 
relation). Many studies about the BSR follow this pattern of interpretation, mostly in the 
context of a general criticism of the centrality thesis that assigns everything that is 
perceived ‘far off’ from the centre to the political margins of the integration project. 
Browning underlined the importance of challenging this dominant tendency of 
underestimating the role of (perceived) ‘marginal’ regions in respect to the wider 
European integration process.  
 
                                                 
717  See CANTORI Louis J./SPIEGEL Steven L.: The International Politics of Regions. A Comparative 
Approach. London 1979, p. 151. 
 BSR 
Figure 12: Model of Explanation II: the BSR as a Peripheral Region 
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Post-modern developments in Northern Europe have challenged the very figure and 
subjectivity of the EU and Russia [...]. For example, there has been much discussion in 
Europe of whether the EU is moving in an increasingly statist direction, or if it is instead 
developing more along the lines of multilevel networks and interlocking dimensions. Whilst 
the modernist statist discourse has strengthened in recent years, elements of dimensionalism 
also remain significant. Importantly, Northern Europe has not just been a recipient of these 
different debates, but has also arguably played a notable role regarding just how Europe 
(and Russia) unfolds. This is to say that the wide array of projects of regional cooperation 
that have developed in Northern Europe since the end of the Cold War have fundamentally 
re-conceptualised the nature of borders in the region (including EU borders), and as such 
significantly problematise any Westphalian aspirations that may exist at the EU centre.718 
The core message of this abstract offers the basis for yet another variation of the 
scheme. It seeks to grasp the issue of what repercussions the awareness about this 
pattern of perception (the ‘thinking the North marginal’) could have on the conduct of 
(sub)regional stakeholders towards the alleged centre and in view of the (sub)regional 
strategies they seek to pursue. If there are permanent signals of marginalisation coming 
from the centre, this practice is likely to influence the way region-based actors perceive 
their influence potential. This again can be expected to determine the strategic choices 
they take in order to maximise this influence towards the centre, or rather, compensate 
the marginality they are being assigned from outside, or in fact, from the centre. 
3. The BSR as an Auto-Dynamic Unit Within the Wider Unit Europe 
Building on the foregoing model of explanation, the BSR could also be seen as an auto-
dynamic (albeit not autonomous) unit that does correlate with the wider framework 
‘Europe’ to some extent but does not operate out of a consciously subordinate position 
or under the exclusive auspices of the EU framework. Part of the action and interaction 
directed to actors beyond the inner circle of European integration may be ascribed to the 
stakeholders’ awareness about their perceived marginality. Their awareness about their 
own reduced influence potential is expected to impact on their behaviour in a way that it 
makes them more reactive and susceptible to defensive or proactive strategies.  
Signals of marginalisation coming from the centre are perceived as a challenge to the 
regional stand-alone quality that fuels the efforts regional stakeholders make in order to 
substantiate the convergence of their (sub)regional surrounding and thus, to build up a 
compact and solid counterpart to the alleged centre. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
718  BROWNING Christopher S.: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): Remaking Europe in the Margins. Northern 
Europe after the Enlargements. Aldershot 2005, pp. 1-10, here p. 6. 
Figure 13: Model of Explanation III: the BSR as an Auto-Dynamic Unit 
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The major motivational background of these efforts could be termed a “positive self-
awareness” of the region’s own marginality. This awareness is not only thought to 
provoke defensive reaction, it also inspires the regional stakeholders to develop 
strategies of compensation that help to impair the systemic centrality of the alleged core. 
One important strategy in this context has been mentioned at another point of this 
study.719 This strategy is particularly common among the Nordic countries, but most 
present in the Swedish conduct on the European scene. Sweden has systematically tried 
(and still does) to profit politically from its own perceived marginality, trying to 
maintain its reputation as the “boring backwater of Europe” and thus, to gain important 
leeway and legitimation for its exceptionalist stance in many questions about a further 
deepening of European integration.720 This study confirms Browning’s postulation  
that a position in the margins often entails particular resources for action that enable the 
margins to play a significant role in shaping the nature of the whole. [...] Developments in 
Northern Europe may not just impact on the policies of the European centres, but to some 
extent also impact on the very nature and subjectivity of those centres, which in turn 
impacts on the nature of the broader European constellation.721 
The mere fact of a region being situated in a geographically peripheral position does not 
automatically imply that it is also politically marginal. However, in essence, I would not 
ascribe this alleged effect coming from the Northern periphery to what Browning calls 
the “formative power of the margins.” Besides the fact that the choice of words itself 
appears somewhat esoteric, it also neglects the role of state action and interests, and 
most importantly, of the regional orientation of single states. States often seek to 
instrumentalise the action arena offered in the regional context in order to reflect their 
foreign political orientation at a lower scale. In a second instant, this may also be 
expected to determine their political conduct on the European scene, hence as formal 
members of the macro-level project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The examples of Sweden and Finland have shown that states are likely to develop very 
different strategies in this context. While Finland since the end of the Cold War has 
always sought to “europeanise” its national interests and objectives, Sweden retained 
most of its suspicion towards supranational integration and comprehensive 
Europeanisation.  
                                                 
719  See chapter “Remotenesss and Marginality – the Periphery’s Romantic Temptation”, p. 28-. 
720  CAVE Andrew: Finding a Role in an Enlarged EU. In: Central Europe Review, Nr. 20. 22 May 
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Figure 14: The Auto-Dynamic Unit as an Arena for State Action (e.g. Sweden) 
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Generally, it appears to be easy and therefore particularly attractive for peripheral states 
to try to establish themselves in the best possible way at the regional level before they 
try to counter other more influential powers that are situated closer to the core. The 
regional self-containedness resulting from this sort of strategic considerations may, in 
the long run, promote the establishment of a rival sub-system that easily removes itself 
from the zone of visibility, and thus, gains considerable latitude to pursue objectives 
independent from or even running contrary to what is suggested by the core. The hub 
between the meso and the macro level in this model is built by nation states. In respect 
to the concrete case of Baltic Sea Regionalism, they also build the natural link between 
the EU framework and the phenomenon of sub-regional cooperation on the basis of 
initiatives coming from within, or rather from below in terms of a systemic hierarchy. 
Even grass-root action is potentially linked to the state level, since most sub-regional 
cooperations can only operate when given support from the national level. For example, 
cross-border co-operation for regional development normally requires an improvement 
of transport infrastructure, of communication systems, of border control procedures, 
education systems etc. Such improvement measures need efforts and decisions to be 
taken at the national level.  
Coming back to the model, this means that states based in a certain region are thought to 
be striving to transcend borders to the outside world (e.g. towards Russia) without 
employing the channels that emerge from their formal affiliation with the core. Such a 
tendency could potentially lead to the emergence of a region state, which is, as specified 
earlier in another context, a region that has reached a level of interdependence and 
integration that enables it to operate as a single actor.722 However, looking at the 
concrete circumstances in the Baltic Sea case, there are no clear indicators for an 
emerging region state in this very sense. What could instead be told from the regional 
strategies of single states, and here I am again alluding to the prominent Swedish 
example, is that they seek to build up their own image of the region. This implies that 
the region or regionness is not a ‘fact’ in terms of a political consensus between a set of 
involved actors. The single state is thought to construct its own version of the region, 
which serves as an arena for foreign political action without having to comply with 
broader supranational instructions. This convenient construct builds the basis for 
regional action up to the level of distinct proactiveness and regional activism.723  
The future development and deepening of the EU is not least a question of unity among 
the member states, unity about the question of finality of the European project (what 
Europe of the regions?). One of the imaginable scenarios could be that regionalist 
tendencies backfire and lead to disintegrative developments that are different from mere 
intergovernmentalisation (pillarisation) of integration. The question is whether the 
dynamic of asymmetric efforts, the “regionalist alternative”, could even reinforce the 
existing divisions within the EU-25. Holger Moroff underlined the danger that the EU 
ND could, for example, further a falsely perceived regionalism within the EU und lead 
to the intergovernmentalisation of the European project.724 
                                                 
722  See HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper presented at the 
Global Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan, pp. 3-4. See also chapter 
“What Makes a Region a ‘Region’?“, p. 32-. 
723  On “regionalist activism”, see chapter “Baltic Sea Region: What Sort of Regionalism’?”, p. 35-. 
724  See MOROFF Holger: Introduction. In: Id. (ed.): European Soft Security Policies. The Northern 
Dimension. Kauhava 2002, pp. 12-36, here p. 17.  
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In the EU official context, regionalist interactions are mostly viewed as a positive and 
desirable phenomenon that helps to strengthen transnational ties and thus, enhances 
deepening of the overall integration process. This study claims that transnational 
regionalism can also assume a counterproductive and disintegrative quality that furthers 
diversification and, in the context of peripheral regions, stimulates single state 
tendencies of isolationism and disengagement from membership responsibilities. The 
factor of regionalist self-sufficiency seems particularly significant in the case of the 
Nordic members, since their populations are among the most euro-sceptical in the EU-
27. In this sense, the reading of ‘regionalism’ is fairly critical and polemic. It implies 
that proactive regionalism in terms of regional assertiveness can lead to region-oriented 
self-centeredness and self-marginalisation on the European scene. Thus, at a certain 
scale, regionalism can gain a highly disintegrative effect on a member state’s European 
policies because it potentially affects the membership conduct of the respective country. 
4. What Kind of ‘Europe of the Regions’? 
The notion of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ (EoR) has originally entered usage in the 
context of the regional federalist movement of the 60ies and 70ies. The phrase then used 
to have positive if not enthusiastic implications for the future of the European project.  
The EoR conceptualization seemed to serve as a handy tool for both the ‘governmentalists’ 
and the ‘region enthusiasts’ in describing the spatial future of the EU: the EoR was seen as 
much a construction of neo-nationalistic region states as one of flexible and overlapping 
(trans)border regions. [...] Writers recognized that questions over the nature and structure of 
‘real regions’ in a regionalized Europe would remain unsolved, as the ‘region’ concept 
would always be interpreted in multiple ways. [...] However, it was precisely the 
tremendous vagueness of the region concept, and the conceptualization of the EoR for that 
matter – that made it so popular.725 
Despite this pluralism of interpretations, in its narrow sense the notion can be said to 
spell the promise of a Europe in which the nation state is no longer the primary unit of 
action and governance. This idea is very closely connected to the vision of a federal 
state of Europe since the “Euro” regions are thought to constitute the principal level 
between the nation state and the supranational level.726 In this ‘strong’ sense, the vision 
of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ entails the idea of emerging “region-states”; a concept that 
was also reflected in the aforementioned scale of regionness developed by Hettne.727 
Hettne suggests the highest level of “regionness” to become materialised at what he 
calls “an acting subject”. This state-like regionness involves that the respective region 
features a distinct identity, legitimacy and certain structures that allow formal joint 
decision-making.728 The resulting actor capability of various different regions in Europe 
                                                 
725  JUKARAINEN Pirjo: Norden is Dead. Long Live the Eastwards Faced Euro-North. Geopolitical Re-
making of Norden. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 12/1999, pp. 355-382, here p. 369. 
726  This sort of regionalism may occur within or across state territory or borders, involving pragmatic 
cooperation between regional and local authorities in areas of joint interest. For more details, see for 
example WEBER Karl: Der Föderalismus. In: EMMERICH Tálos/FALKNER Gerda (eds): EU-
Mitglied Österreich, Gegenwart und Perspektiven. Eine Zwischenbilanz. Vienna 1996, pp. 50-66. 
727  See OHMAE Kenichi: The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies. New York 
1995, p. 80. See chapter “What Makes a Region a ‘Region’?“, p. 32-. 
728  See HETTNE Björn: Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. Paper presented at the 
Global Seminar ‘96 Shonan Session’, 2-6 September 2006, Hayama/Japan, pp. 3-4.  
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would complete the picture of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ to replace the present ‘Europe 
of the Nation States’. The finality of this vision would be the establishment of a 
European federation that functions independently from the regulatory and distributive 
function performed by states. This concept is close to the idea of a ‘Europe of Olympic 
Rings’, which could be described as “a conception of Europe and the EU in which there 
is not one but several centres, power is dispersed throughout interlocking and 
overlapping regionalist formations with rather fluid external borders.”729 The model 
suggests a polycentric structure that builds on horizontal interaction. Regional entities 
are perceived to co-exist and form a European (or global) patchwork net of regions. 
 
Europe of ‘Concentric Circles’ Europe of ‘Olympic Rings’ 
regions subordinate to Brussels co-existing regional spaces                   
(‘neo-medievalisation’ of Europe) 
vertical integration horizontal interaction 
distinctive centre-periphery divide neither a clear centre nor a clear periphery730 
sovereignty-based concept of space 
 
 
 
 
post-sovereignty concept 
Figure 15: Europe of Concentric Circles vs. Europe of Olympic Rings 
The more complex the EU is becoming intrinsically, the more space will be needed for 
regional groupings inside it, with each increasingly likely to seek more autonomy in making 
contact with non-EU members. This potentially emerging structure of European political 
space can be metaphorically depicted as promoting an ‘Olympic rings’ vision of Europe.731 
The joint effect of the two major parallel developments ‘beyond the nation state’, 
Europeanisation and regionalism, has been said to relativise the importance of nation 
states in European, and more generally, in international politics. According to this view, 
the state-centric distribution of the European territory does no longer seem to be the 
single “best”. National state borders are perceived “artificial” while ethnic or open 
spatial entities are seen as more natural or “really belonging together”732, or, as Wiberg 
and Wæver put it, they are given as a “pre-political datum”, and thus are to be perceived 
                                                 
729  See JOENNIEMI Pertti: Can Europe Be Told From The North? Tapping into the EU’s Northern 
Dimension. In: MÖLLER Frank/PEHKONEN Samu (eds): Encountering the North. Cultural 
Geography, International Relations, Northern Landscapes. Aldershot 2003, pp. 221-260, here p. 259. 
730  The model does not fully comply with the original Olympic symbol, since no ring or unit intersects 
with all adjacent counterparts. 
731  MAKARYCHEV Andrey S.: Where the North Meets the East. Europe’s ‘Dimensionalism’ and 
Poland’s ‘Marginality Strategy’. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3/2004, pp. 299-315, here pp. 
301-302. 
732  See KEATING Michael: The European Union and the regions. Oxford 1995, p. 10. 
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as far more legitimate than any other structural imposition.733 The self-evidence of 
nationality, sovereign statehood, and national written histories are said to be fading.734  
In brief, the now-familiar suggestion is that nation-states will fade away in favour of regions 
and super-regions that can survive and thrive within the EU and the global economy. This 
vision is reinforced by the increasing tendency of both the EU and the regions to try to by-
pass the central state, often in the name of subsidiarity. Still, [...] there is as yet little 
evidence that central governments will fade away any time soon. Indeed, it may be the case 
that the popularised and overly simplistic Europe of the Regions scenario actually diverts 
attention away from the actual, more nuanced realities of Regionalism.735  
In fact, the overall developments in European politics have made clear that there is no 
immediate prospect of a materialising ‘Europe of the Regions’ in the narrow sense of 
the concept, not least because of the widely differing strengths of regional feeling and 
identity among the citizens of the European Union.736  
A more general and decent interpretation of the phrase ‘Europe of the Regions’ appeals 
to the argument that “regions matter”; this reading acknowledges the fact of regional 
allegiance as well as the value, in both economic and socio-political terms, of an 
intermediate level or interface between the local and the national or supra-national. In 
this sense, one might come to the conclusion that, in recent years, we have witnessed the 
establishment of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. 
One of the most striking and important expressions of this new salience of regions in 
Europe has been the creation of the Committee of the Regions by the Treaty of Maastricht 
in 1992 and its coming into existence in 1994.737 
The notion of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ underlying the creation of the EU CoR is built 
on the vision of a Europe in which regions and regional representations of various kinds 
have found a new self consciousness and new roles in politics and policy-making at the 
European level and beyond, which had hitherto been denied to them.738 Another 
interpretation could be based on a different understanding of what regionness is about. 
A viable model would be, for instance, the vision of a Europe of functional regions, 
where common interests in certain policy fields build the basis for cooperation. This sort 
of integration by functional terms is then thought to occur at different scales and most 
importantly, without being bound by geographical adjacency. Physical closeness is still 
not ruled out as a factor since it could be thought to favour the build-up of ‘nodal 
points’ or ‘condensations of dominance’. Clusters of interest are perceived to result in a 
concentration along (a) certain policy fields, and (b) in regional clusters. 
 
                                                 
733  WIBERG Håkan/WÆVER Ole: Norden in the Cold War Reality. In: Nordic Security in the 1990s. 
Options in the Changing Europe. London 1992, pp. 13-34, here p. 28. 
734  JOENNIEMI Pertti/WÆVER Ole (eds): Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region. Washington 1993, p. 
44. 
735  DOWNS William M.: Regionalism in the European Union. Key Concepts and Project Overview. In: 
Journal of European Integration, No. 3/2002, pp. 171-177, here p. 172. 
736  See WAGSTAFF Peter: The Committee of the Regions of the European Union. In: Id. (ed.): 
Regionalism in the European Union. Wiltshire 1999, pp. 188-193, here p. 188. 
737  LOUGHLIN John: Representing Regions in Europe. The Committee of the Regions. In: JEFFERY 
Charlie (ed.): The Regional Dimension of the European Union. Towards a Third Level in Europe. 
London/Portland 1997, pp. 147-165, here 147.  
738  For more details on the CoR, see chapter “The EU Committee of the Regions”, p. 92-. 
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The finality of this ‘functional regionalisation’ process would be a “networked Europe”.  
One of the related scenarios or variations could be a functional flexibilisation with 
regional clusters building on and allowing for open intersections (offene Schnitt-
mengen). It may be assumed that functional considerations on either side produce 
certain agglomeration forces that encourage geo-political clustering of political and 
socio-economic activities. This clustering may result in the build-up of “functional 
regions”, i.e. groupings of actors on either state or sub-state level according to their 
positive interdependence. These agglomeration forces thus lead to sectoral clustering: 
one policy sector leads to clusters in a certain position, another sector in another a.s.o. 
The geo-political distribution of political activities is thus very concentrated in each 
sector but dispersed at the level of all sectors together.739 
E. A Short Ride into the Field of Comparative Theory 
After consulting the bulk of EIT and taking a short excursion into the field of traditional 
IRT, this study will eventually turn to the “third” camp, the set of comparative models 
and system theory. There are various different practical considerations to support the 
methodical choice of calling on Comparative Theory (CT) while analysing an instance 
of (sub)regional integration. In fact, theorists like Ernst Haas have produced significant 
contributions in the field of European studies, obviously viewing the analysis of the 
European case as a distinctly comparative-historical enterprise. In his early con-
tributions, Haas composed systematic comparisons between various forms of regional 
integration that were emerging in the immediate post-war setting (including the Nordic 
Council, the Council of Europe, NATO, and, as yet another instance, the European 
Communities).740 From a methodological perspective, this short ‘ride’ into the field of 
CT is intended to function as a showcase as for how alternative (and for some, probably 
also absurd) theoretical choices can offer an added value when it comes to the analysis 
of an empirical phenomenon as complex and multifaceted as the “Baltic Sea 
                                                 
739  For a detailed discussion of regional clustering in BSR trade affairs, see WIDGRÉN Mika: Trade 
potential, intra-industry trade and factor content of revealed comparative advantage in the Baltic Sea 
region. In: Elinkeinoelämän tutkimuslaitos (ETLA): Discussion papers, No. 1034. Helsinki 2006. 
740  HAAS Ernst B.: International Integration: The European and the Universal Process. In: International 
Organization, No 4/1961, pp. 366-392. And HAAS Ernst B.: The Study of Regional Integration. 
Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing. In: LINDBERG Leon N./SCHEINGOLD 
Stuart A. (eds): Regional Integration. Theory and Research. Cambridge 1971, pp. 3-43. This very 
different methodological approach strongly inspired the formation of the neo-functionalist approach, 
which ironically, became an integral part of the bulk of self-restricted and euro-centric EIT. 
Figure 16: Networked Europe – Functional Regionalisation 
functional 
region/ 
sectoral 
cluster
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Conundrum”. This exercise should help to foil the counterproductive tendency in 
European studies of being close to autistic i.e. EU-centric, limiting the analysis of issues 
related to European integration to this single European case of regional integration.  
European integration has often been perceived as a unique case. Despite Giovanni Sartori’s 
warning that ‘he who knows only one knows none’ many EU scholars have been reluctant 
to consider the EU as one case within an n larger than one.741 
This chapter tries to illustrate the explanatory potential of traditional and allegedly 
remote approaches. It will be shown that the concept of “interlocking social systems” is 
also capable of reconciling the application patterns identified earlier in this section.742  
I. Structuring Social Action – Structural Functionalism by Parsons 
Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), an US sociologist with a strong European background, 
focused his work on the concept of “social systems” and “subsystems”. Parsons is one 
of the most significant scholars that modern comparative theory has brought about. 
Building on a structural-functionalist foundation, he established one of the most 
prominent models in classic system theory. Keeping the scope of this study in mind, the 
following outline is merely intended to introduce the trial application to the Baltic Sea 
case. Therefore it will not be able to give adequate credit to his significant theoretical 
achievements.743 The major question underlying Parsons’ intellectual work was that 
about social order. What actually inspired him to develop a model to explain social 
action was the puzzle that seemed to emanate inherently from the fact that society 
produced order where, telling from the prevalence of individual self-interest, nothing 
but disorder could be expected.744 This focus on the systemic foundations of social 
organisation makes his theoretical accomplishments highly relevant for a series of 
thematic aspects addressed in this study.  
Parsons aimed to offer a single theoretical model that could grasp the constitutive 
structures of “society” in terms of the abstract concept without limiting the model to 
certain empirical references or to certain specific examples taken from social reality. 
System theory perceives society as a system of social structures. These structures have 
to be functional in order to make the society work. Society is perceived to have needs, 
which have to be met in order to secure its persistence. The society as a macro-system is 
maintained by the contributions (social action) accomplished by social subsystems. 
Social action is thought to define, create and maintain the social system.745 One of 
Parsons major theoretical accomplishments is the so-called AGIL scheme, which he 
developed as a sociological paradigm to explain and analyse the complex constitution of 
social systems including the ways different system elements interact with each other. 
The term “AGIL” appeals to four different functions that are thought to shape social 
action. They must be performed within all social systems if they are to persist. 
                                                 
741  HOOGHE Liesbet: Prologue. In: Id. (ed.): The European Commission and the Integration of Europe. 
Cambridge 2001, pp. vi-xii, here p. vi. 
742  See chapter “Applying Integration Theory to the Baltic Sea Case: Application Patterns”, p. 162-. 
743  For more details, see PARSONS Talcott: The Structure of Social Action. New York 1937. And 
PARSONS Talcott: The Social System. New York 1951. And PARSONS Talcott: Sociological 
Theory and Modern Society. New York 1967. 
744  See ADAMS Bert N./SYDIE R.A.: Sociological Theory. Pine Forge 2001, p. 349. 
745  Ibd., p. 343. 
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Figure 17: The AGIL pattern by Parsons 
Starting out from the AGIL scheme, Parsons tried to draw up a complex raster about the 
structural constitution of society. He did not only focus on the processes occurring 
within each of these functional elements; he was also particularly interested in the 
connection between them. Parsons identified various different types of social 
organisations that match with these four functions in a way that the overall social 
performance of a system is jointly secured. Each of the four functions is thought to 
stand for an organisational ability within society.  
 
 ability to  
A 
G 
I 
L 
react to the changing external conditions 
secure the achievements of goals 
ensure the maximal level of cohesion and inclusion in the society/social system  
guarantee the maintenance of minimal social structure and order  
Table 24: Organisational Abilities According to the AGIL Pattern, Parsons 
Organisational structures with different orientations for action together cover the set of 
functions that account for the persistence of the system. 
 
 organisations  
A 
G 
I 
L 
with economic orientation (e.g. business firms)  
pursuing political goals (e.g. government agencies) 
with integrative orientation (e.g. social-control agencies, political parties) 
aiming at pattern maintenance (e.g. museums, religious associations) 
Table 25: Organisational Structures According to the AGIL Pattern, Parsons 
The four functions also build the constitutive character of each out of the alleged four 
social sub-systems, of which in turn, each represents a particular institution in society. 
The outputs of each subsystem are perceived to serve as inputs for the neighbouring 
subsystem. To put it briefly, the quadrinomial scheme is thought to shape the entire 
social system, being mutually reflected in all structural and procedural parts of it.746  
                                                 
746  Figure generated on the basis of WILLKE Helmut: Systemtheorie. Stuttgart/Jena 2000, p. 232.  
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Figure 18: Interlocking Input-Output System, Parsons 
Recurrent references to other abstract elements that comply with this 
basic AGIL pattern suggest the analytical incorporation of this 
systemic model by way of a schematic overview. The following raster 
seeks to outline how the single elements of the system are thought to 
be connected and in which horizontal and vertical continuing lines 
they are arranged.747  
 
                                                 
747  The scheme has been generated on the basis of PARSONS Talcott: Sociological Theory and Modern 
Society. New York 1967. 
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II. Reconciling Application Patterns: Trial Application to the Baltic Sea Case 
One of the major specificities of classic system theory is its claim to offer models with 
global applicability. Certain procedural flows are claimed to be common to all levels of 
social action. This universalist claim opens the scene to trial applications, such as the 
one to a complexly networked region like the BSR. The employment of the Parsonian 
AGIL scheme for the explanation of Baltic Sea social and political reality certainly 
imposes a series of methodological and operational problems. Chosing a very direct 
way of application one could discuss the various forms of how AGIL controlled and 
structured systems and subsystems are distributed in and across the region, and how 
they relate to their broader systemic framework. 
 
Concerning abstraction, this kind of theorisation has clearly reached the level where the 
identification of examples from the ‘real’ world becomes difficult. One could just take 
the complex of Baltic Sea Regionalism, pick out certain actors (“roles”) or processes 
and try to identify in each and every case of ‘what this very element is an instance.’ 
Adjacent internationalism or regionalist activism, as identified earlier, is a formative 
element in Swedish foreign policy towards its immediate neighbourhood. It could be 
interpreted, for example, as part of a social interaction with the allegedly hostile 
surrounding and a reaction to the redoubtable supranationalist pressure coming from the 
European core. The functions maintaining the Swedish system of reluctance are 
performed by several parts of the social system and reproduced at the sub-system level 
(see figure below). 
social systems 
(not specified) 
A G
I L 
A G
I L
ADAPTATION 
GOAL L ATTAINMENT 
INTEGRATION 
LATENCY
Figure 19: Complex social systems, Parsons 
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Figure 20: The AGIL pattern – the example of Sweden’s regionalist activism 
This trajectory of incorporating the specific regionalist attitude of ‘adjacent activism’ or 
‘internationalism’ is effected by multiple social processes. Together they substantiate 
political routine and the internalisation of the respective strategic action model in all 
parts of society. As a result, the action strategy becomes deeply incorporated; the latent 
patterns are reinforced repeatedly by the resulting social routine. This means that both 
the ‘inside’ persistence (the ‘bubble” of Swedish self-transfiguration) and the one 
warranted from outside (Sweden is persistently seen as a model) are safely maintained 
over a long period of time. The durable disfunctionality of one of the functional entities 
would significantly unbalance the whole systemic process, while short-term irritations 
might even lead to a reinforced backlash provoking increased isolation, and thus, 
reinvigoration of exceptionalist attitudes and objectives.  
By identifying the functional elements for each of the respective sub-systems, this 
depiction could, in a next step, be linked to its wider framework, the European 
integration complex.  
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The high level of abstraction of these models might be both an asset and a weakness of 
comparative theorising. On the one hand, it opens the analytical perspective for new 
ways of structuring empirical events and phenomena and allows for a broad, universal 
and flexible application to (apparently) very different research objects; on the other 
hand, it also bears the risk of turning the analytical process into an auto-dynamic act of 
‘thinking it to the end’, and thereby, of loosing track of the empirical relevance or even 
compliance and legitimacy.  
Parsons has been criticised for mingling theoretical ‘truth’ with empirical evidence in 
the course generating inferential conclusions, and for using both in an instrumentalist 
and in a selective way in order to achieve a consistent line of argumentation. A similar 
criticism could and should certainly be raised against the preceding trial application of 
his model. Hence, keeping the intrinsic shortfalls of ‘globalist’ models of explanation in 
mind, this ‘short ride into the field of Comparative Theory’ will not conclude with a set 
of rigid analytical claims but rather leave the floor to a concluding statement on the 
theoretical incorporation of Baltic Sea Regionalism and its connection to nation state 
regional policy.  
F. Conclusions on the Theoretical Incorporation of Baltic Sea Regionalism 
This chapter will seek to gather the insights that the foregoing discussion of various 
different theoretical camps has brought about. The issue raised at the very beginning of 
this study about the ‘(non)sense of theorisation’ shall build the overall point of reference 
for this conclusion of the theoretical section. The search for an appropriate theoretical 
foundation for the research problems addressed in this study has led us through three 
different strands in political theory. The first, and in respect to the topic of the study, the 
most obvious step in this process was to consult the bulk of (European) Integration 
superficial 
compliance 
integrative 
attitude 
second intent 
selective 
engagement 
normative 
reproduction of 
exceptionalism 
Sweden
   EU 
as either
a group of member states or a
supernational entity
 
                                    (EU) 
normative  
incorportation of 
Sweden’s role  
in the EU 
 for example 
Figure 21: Swedish regionalist activism in relation to the EU framework 
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Theory (EIT). Despite the clear correlation between integration theory and the analysis 
of a ‘Northern Perspective’ of European Integration, it appeared important and useful to 
raise the question of whether and to what extent EIT does actually address the issue of 
‘regionness.’ European integration may be seen as an instance of regional integration or 
regionalism.  
However, the analysis has shown that still only few of the theoretical approaches 
consider or intentionally focus on ‘regionality’ in the widest sense, including 
independent variables such as geographical proximity or geostrategic remoteness. 
Instead of tracing the “regionalist” elements in every single approach, the study first set 
out to apply the different traditional EIT models of explanation directly to the Baltic Sea 
case. This methodological choice built on the assumption that the Baltic Sea may 
equally be seen and treated as an instance of regional integration and that the main 
theoretical claims of each approach may therefore be transferred ‘downwards’ from the 
macro European case to the ‘sub’-regional case. The analytical implementation of this 
so-called ‘application pattern I’ was expected to result in a set of conclusions about the 
explanatory value of EIT for the purpose of direct application. Three major weaknesses 
could be identified in this context: 
 
– The inherent state-centricness of most traditional approaches to European 
integration constitutes a major obstacle to fruitful theoretical incorporation of the 
subregional puzzle;  
– A similar effect may be ascribed to the inherent EU-centricness of European EIT. 
Certain approaches start from distinctly European or EU-specific assumptions, 
overtly limiting their analytical focus on the specificities of the European case; 
– Another weakness results from the above-mentioned intentional and systematic 
consideration of ‘regionality’; while for the Baltic Sea case elements like proximity, 
remoteness, cohesion, bordering and rebordering play a central role, many EIT 
approaches do simply not regard these factors as significant for the pursued line of 
argumentation. 
 
These conclusions again show which analytical factors are particularly relevant for the 
composition of a comprehensive model for the ‘Baltic Sea Conundrum’. Suitable 
approaches should 
 
– be based on a differentiated understanding of actorness and consider various 
different types of actors (non-state, non-official actors; individuals and collectives); 
– build on a comprehensive concept of integration that allows application to any (or 
more than one specific) instance of regionalism;  
– provide appropriate room for the consideration of spatial factors and questions of 
regionness and regionality. 
 
Given the modest results that the discussion of EIT theories in the context of application 
pattern I has brought about, the study turned to the expectedly more complex and 
problematic question of relative applicability. Application pattern II sought to address 
the question of how the alleged macro entity, the EU, relates to the meso-level entity, 
the BSR as a European region. The analytical conclusions drawn in respect to the first 
pattern served as an important point of reference. Instead of re-considering every single 
approach in line with the analytical demands of application pattern II, the study rather 
aimed at identifying the elements that could prove problematic or even exclutionary in 
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that context. To what extent would EIT be suitable for the analysis or explanation of the 
interrelational complex? What could hinder the establishment of a clear-cut model of 
explanation that builds on EIT informed presumptions?  
The most significant (and in fact, decisive) drawback appeared to be the inherent 
inexactness or indifference of most EIT approaches concerning the relationship between 
different levels of action. Most theoretical approaches to European integration (with 
multilevel governance models as an obvious exception) draw a sharp line between 
macro-level and sub-level action. Instead of seeking to identify and analyse the linkages 
between the two (or more) levels, the respective political processes are largely treated as 
two different and distinct political phenomena. The Baltic Sea conundrum in turn seems 
to be substantially determined by these very cross-level interactions. Another, from the 
perspective of this study, unfavourable tendency in EIT results from the missing 
accuracy when it comes to the consideration of cross-level countervailing forces. 
(Sub)regionalism and macro-level (European) integration are hardly ever viewed from 
this angle. This habitus in EIT is reproduced in every day political parlance and 
interpretation, where regionalist tendencies are mostly seen as a positive side-effect (or 
at least, a concurrent inoffensive dynamic) of Europeanisation and post-nationalist 
development. This study in turn sought to consider the potential negative effects of 
regionalist side action and to identify the various different ways of bottom-up and top-
down interaction across the entire positive-negative spectrum.  
This analytical postulation of a more comprehensive theoretical framework led to the 
consultation of traditional International Relations Theory (IRT). This step in the 
working process was expected to provide important input about further analytical 
requirements that would eventually contribute to the construction of (rudiments of) a 
holistic model of explanation. The specific asset of IRT was seen in its relative 
universality, meaning that classic IRT does per definitionem not exclusively focus on 
one single case but rather address systemic research puzzles with a more ample focus. 
Given the wide spectrum of theoretical approaches available in this field and the 
disparity of different types of argumentation, the focus was directed to a selected IRT 
model, the Security Community Approach by Karl Deutsch, including its critical neo- 
and neo-neo-versions. Due to the extensive amount of preliminary work, meaning 
security community studies focussing on the Baltic Sea example, the study largely 
focussed on the critical evaluation of the purported analytical results of these studies. 
Deutsch himself has produced a seminal study in this respect, which, thanks to the broad 
reception of his work, happened to establish the ‘Nordic case’ as some sort of prototype 
security community. What could be derived from this section on a more abstract level 
and in context of the overall methodological objective of the exercise was that IRT 
could add a wide range of assets to the traditional study of (European) integration. The 
universality of the analytical categories employed (such as ‘systemic entities,’ elements 
of ‘overlay’ and ‘subordination’ and ‘selective interaction’) could be seen as both boon 
and bane. While the ‘boon’ obviously lies in the broad applicability of the models to 
very different cases, the ‘bane’ results from the empirical fuzziness and problem of 
consistent operationalisation. 
Given that the SCA was selected to cover application pattern I, the incorporation of 
application pattern II by way of IRT-specific models constituted the next step in the 
working process. This is exactly where the genuine added value of IRT could unfold, its 
system-oriented, totally comprehensive and global perspective. In this context, it was 
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tried to employ the most traditional tool in IRT, the use of abstracting models, diagrams 
and flowcharts for the delineation of complex research puzzles. This exercise proved to 
provide the utmost explanatory value, since the graphing of system-oriented schemes 
stimulated and structured the reflection of different possible scenarios of interaction 
between the macro and the meso level. Even though at this level of abstraction, the 
deduction of direct analytical claims becomes difficult, this working step appeared to be 
very significant in the general course of theoretical incorporation.  
In order to complete the picture, eventually, the study turned to the camp of 
Comparative Theory. This methodological choice was rather an inferential and logic 
continuation of the first two steps than a strategic move with clear analytical intentions 
or expected theoretical benefits. The title of the respective chapter indicates the 
indeterminateness (and to a certain extent, arbitrariness) of this endmost analytical 
action. The specific choice of Parsons’ model in turn has been far less arbitrary. Earlier 
dealings with his analytical construct have been highly formative in the sense that the 
elaborateness of his theoretical accomplishments proved to be highly instructive and 
meaningful in many, very different analytical contexts. Moreover, it has raised sustained 
awareness about the factual complexity and intricacy of any social problem as multi-
faceted as the ones arising from this highly networked region. Positioning the ‘short ride 
into the field of Comparative Theory’ in the broader analytical working process, it can 
be said, that the insights gained from this exercise, retrospectively, have not least also 
relativised the value of the theoretical solutions offered by the other, nowadays more 
established theoretical camps, namely EIT and IRT.  
By way of conclusion, I would like to try to draw one last overall picture of the 
theoretical outcomes produced in this section. The overall analytical objective of this 
study has been to ‘elaborate a comprehensive model of explanation’ that helps to grasp 
the ‘complex virtual links between the different analytical factors at stake’ (that is, the 
region, its European surrounding, and the specific case of Sweden and Finland). 
However, what has apparently been produced is an enormous bulk of theoretical 
considerations that might seem difficult to handle at first. I suggest the following raster 
for an advanced internalisation of this section. The various theoretical contributions 
from the different camps may be perceived as parts of a mosaic of explanatory models, 
in which each approach  
 
– is concerned with another aspect about the research puzzle (e.g. small state foreign 
policy or regionalist discourse) and 
– assumes a different function in the course of the analytical process. 
 
Depending on its argumentative orientation and analytical perspective, each approach 
may assume the function of either 
 
– explaining the research puzzle (in parts), 
– describing, structuring and conceptualising the subject or  
– suggesting normative interventions and raising critical awareness. 
 
Together, the various different models should be seen to produce a complex yet 
consistent body of analytical arguments. Every single element in the complex is 
supposed to contribute to an ever more faceted and nuanced picture of the Baltic Sea 
Conundrum. To the disappointment of some readers, this analytical process may not 
have led to the development of one single macro model or ‘Grand Theory of Baltic Sea 
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Regionalism.’ However, by having sought on the one hand, to avoid the isolation of 
certain approaches, and on the other, to combine various theory camps in the context of 
one specific research puzzle, this contribution has increased its potential to serve as a 
reference point for future investigation and research in the field. This practical approach 
was based on a vision that is similar to what Marker and Stoke described as follows: 
The key challenge [in political theorising] is not to launch a campaign for unity but to argue 
for diversity to be combined with dialogue. […] The discipline should avoid constructing 
itself into an uneasy collection of separate sects. There is a pluralism of method and 
approach out there that should not be denied, but it should not be ‘isolative’ but rather 
interactive. It should be eclectic and synergistic. That is what is meant by our claim to 
celebrate diversity. We argue that political science is enriched by the variety of approaches 
that are adopted within the discipline. Each has something of considerable value to offer. 
But each benefits from its interaction with other approaches.748 
I would like to close this chapter with a statement by A. Moravcsik, which obviously 
seeks to score with false modesty, but however, is in a way inarguably true. 
It is always prudent to remember that the world contains more complexity than any single 
theory can encompass.749 
                                                 
748  MARSH David/ STOKER Gerry: Introduction. In: Idd. (eds): Theory and Methods in Political 
Science. London 2001, pp. 1-16, here p. 4.  
749  MORAVCSIK Andrew: ‘Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark?’ Constructivism and 
European Integration. In: Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, Special Issue 1999, pp. 669-681, 
here p. 672.  
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Summary – Questions and Answers 
Which labels are commonly used to denominate geo-political entities in Northern 
Europe? And how do they relate to each other? 
The question of geopolitical terminology in Northern Europe has proved to be more 
demanding and problematic than it could have been expected. Common notions like the 
“Nordic” and the “Baltic States” or “Northern Europe” and “Scandinavia” can, in a 
regional context, have significant political and ideological connotations that do not 
always find support within the respective entity. The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) is 
extremely dense in terms of overlapping and intersecting geopolitical labels. The 
confusing variety of expressions could lead to the inference that their use is largely 
arbitrary, and thus, that a differentiating terminological discussion is not relevant. 
However, considering the frequency of political discussions on these questions as well 
as the evident employment of concise definition in political speech, it becomes clear 
that an empathetic approach to this issue is absolutely necessary. In brief, the study has 
come to the following code of geopolitical labels. 
Which political and geographical features determine the character of the BSR? In what 
way and to what extent do these specificities influence or determine politics in the 
region? 
The BSR could be characterised with the following catchwords: harsh climate, 
remoteness, ecological vulnerability, socio-economic disparity, geostrategic exposed-
ness and insularity. This set of BSR specificities is, in various different respects, both 
curse and blessing. On the one hand, the states and regional entities situated in the BSR 
have to face the obvious disadvantages resulting from their distinct geopolitical 
position. On the other hand, these very circumstances together build some sort of 
empirical foundation for the traditional Nordic attitude of exclusiveness and reluctance. 
This study has come to the conclusion that a geographically remote position stimulates 
isolationist state behaviour and enhances tendencies of relative compliance towards an 
alleged supranational core. This means that EU Member States situated in these 
geographical positions show an increased propensity for exceptionalist policy solutions 
and, in terms of ideological internalisation, for relative or ‘false’ compliance with 
formal membership commitments. This attitude often entails a euro-scepticist rate in the 
public that is above average. 
Nordic Countries Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland 
Northern Europe European Russia, Northern Germany, Northern Poland, Scandinavia, Baltic States 
Scandinavia Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland 
Scandinavian Baltic Sweden, Denmark and Finland 
Baltic States Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Finland 
Baltic Sea Region Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, as well as the 
German Länder of Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen (Regierungsbezirk Lüneburg) 
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How do these BSR specificities influence the way the region is seen from outside? 
States and regions situated at the margins of a continent or a political community are 
often associated with the idea of marginality in the sense of lacking political and 
strategic significance. Geographically remote areas are thought to be politically 
unimportant, or at least secondary in respect to the more central regions. This study has 
been based on the assumption that due to this common way of ‘thinking the periphery 
marginal,’ states situated in these areas are particularly inclined to develop distinct 
identities, and in a next step, exceptionalist or isolationist policy solutions. I treated this 
question also under the headline of “the periphery’s romantic temptation.” This is an 
allusion to the current habit of romanticising the periphery, and even more so, the 
Northern ‘margins’ of Europe. In many contexts, Northern Europe, if ever it is not 
regarded as a ‘blank spot’ on the power political map of Europe, is treated as a marker 
with a pre-given and unproblematic status. Northernness is often associated with value-
laden categories like the “Nordic spirit” and the “Arctic mystery.” Northern Europe is 
subjected to the arbitrary application of enthusiastic concepts that personate it as 
something extraordinarily different, and moreover, qualitatively superior or even 
supernatural. Actors based in the region are seen as largely inoffensive, tolerant and 
libertarian as well as harmless in the context of ‘realist’ power politics. As a 
consequence, the fact that Northern European states follow the logic of power 
maximisation and strategic self-assertion just as much as the more ‘central’ ones do, is 
often neglected. This study has come to the conclusion that the respective states have 
another choice than just to accept this imposed image. The analysis has shown that 
some states use this lack of interest and attention in order to establish alternative 
systems of political self-actualisation. They reduce their international commitment to 
the minimum and turn their attention to surrogate ambitions. 
What accounts for Baltic Sea “regionness”? What makes the BSR a “region”? 
Defining the BSR in terms of drawing sharp and clear geographical borders seems both 
difficult and problematic. The “Baltic Sea Region” is indeed thought to be about much 
more than just a simple conglomeration of national or sub-state entities. Accordingly, 
this study has tried to identify the various different ways, theorists have found to define 
regionness as such. Starting out from the mere notion of an entity constituted by a group 
of geographically adjacent areas, the analysis has led to more sophisticated models of 
explanation, such as the one of ‘functional regions’ or ‘region states.’ These conceptual 
considerations did not aim at the identification of the one single valid definition. This 
assessment of existing approaches rather served to prepare the theoretical discussion 
undertaken later on in the analysis. 
How and on what grounds did Baltic Sea Regionalism emerge after 1989? 
In the early 1990s, the BSR has seen the proliferation of an enormous number of 
regional initiatives, associations, councils and platforms. The specific international 
circumstances that resulted from the end of the Cold War paved the way for regional 
cooperation across the Baltic Sea Rim. This process of region-building across the 
former East-West divide has often been referred to as the “Nordic Boom,” the Rise of 
the “New North” or “New Regionalism.” Promoted by the decentralisation of the 
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international system and the removal of the superpower overlay, both the number of 
regional organisations and interest in what was called “Baltic Sea Regionalism” grew 
exponentially. There is no consensus in academia about who its real founding fathers 
were, and where exactly to allocate the starting point of Baltic Sea Regionalism. In fact, 
the way this phenomenon emerged should not be imagined as a clear-cut process of 
progressive, gradual and controlled regionalisation. There were many parallel and partly 
diverging region-building projects that characterised the early phase of ‘constructing the 
region,’ which turns this distinct course of development into a veritable repository for 
enhanced analytical investigation. Today’s BSR can be said to be the most networked, 
and therefore, among the most complex regions in Europe.  
How did the newly emerging cooperative structures interact with other (already existing 
and established) formations in the ‘Old North’, such as classic “Nordic Cooperation’? 
During the Cold War, Nordic cooperation tried to overcome the limits of state-centric 
strategies and instead, built on a deep societal and cultural commonality. Norden was 
largely an island of well-being, commonsense, tranquillity, low tension, security and 
stability which enabled the Nordic states to establish some sort of ‘third way’ in 
international politics that became known as the “Nordic model” or “Nordic balance.” 
This study has come to the conclusion that both the fall of the bipolar overlay and the 
EU accession of Denmark, Sweden and Finland had a strong “nationalising” effect 
within the Nordic formation. Both events have obviously enhanced competition and as a 
result, the mere aspect of being “Nordic” has lost most of its binding effect. A major 
reason for this might be that the instrument of othering has suddenly become more 
difficult to apply, meaning the diversification of neighbours and regional partners); in 
fact, given the international air of togetherness and integration at that time, the North 
could no longer construct itself in opposition to Europe. The EU accession of the Baltic 
States made them less “different” or “other.” Hence, it became more difficult for the 
Nordics to distance themselves in the purported exclusivist manner. The shift of Norden 
towards the BSR and thus towards more Europeanness also implied that the most 
challenging and proximate security threats were more and more expected to be handled 
on a European or at least, a Europeanised level. What then actually remained for the 
Nordic system of cooperation was mostly located in the field of soft-soft policies, such 
as culture, research and education. The analysis of the Swedish-Finnish relationship has 
shown that since the end of the Cold War, the intra-Nordic atmosphere has been largely 
dominated by an air of soft competition and diverging concepts of regional politics and 
integration.  
How can Sweden and Finland be characterised in respect of their basic concept about 
European integration and in what way does this determine the way they perceive their 
strategic roles in the BSR?  
Sweden and Finland have very different ideas about the basic value and function of their 
EU membership. Right from the beginning, their interaction with the supranational level 
of the Union has been based on very different conceptual foundations and expectations. 
While for Sweden, the choice to join the European Union was based on strong 
economic motives and concerns, the Finnish approach has been overtly affirmative from 
the beginning. Even though Finland also expected a set of direct advantages, it did not 
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reduce its motivation to these prospects. The Finnish accession was strongly marked by 
the idea of ‘leaving the past behind’ and ‘returning to Europe.’ Its profile as a formal 
member has in turn been clearly pragmatic and goal-oriented. Finland tried to fulfil its 
responsibilities as a loyal and solidary fellow member and part of the project, but has 
still never been reluctant to try to gain the most benefit from the fact of ‘being in the 
club.’ Finland has joined the Monetary Union and established itself as a fervent 
advocate of the 2004 enlargements. Hence, the modest success of its major geopolitical 
project, the Northern Dimension, has been a very frustrating experience for the Finns. 
Sweden on the other hand, has well tried to be a compliant and unobtrusive member, 
however, lacking genuine commitment to the overall objectives of European integration. 
In many key issues of European integration, Sweden has assumed an exceptionalist or 
reluctant position. The Swedes have rejected the single currency, and still today, they 
are among the most euro-sceptical populations among the EU-25/7. Sweden has 
evidently sought to establish a low membership profile, intending to gain important 
leeway for alternative (bilateral or decentralised) political arenas. This distinct character 
of the two states in respect to European integration is reproduced in their specific 
conduct on the regional level. While Finland has tendencially been more in favour of 
‘getting the Union involved,’ Sweden has always been keen to reduce the ‘outside’ 
impact coming from Brussels. From a Swedish point of view, the regional working 
agenda should by no means be systematically or formally linked to the institutional 
structure of the EU. Accordingly, Sweden has also been very sceptical about the Finnish 
attempts to establish a “Northern Dimension” of EU external action. 
How did the Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative emerge and which development has 
it taken in the first years? 
The Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative launched in the end of the 1990s constitutes 
one of the most important results of the Finnish EU membership. By way of this 
initiative, Finland tried to direct the Union’s attention to the Northern part of the 
continent and to enhance interest by other external stakeholders (Norway, Iceland, and 
most importantly Finland). However, in the first years of its existence, the policy has 
quickly lost momentum, facing a set of structural problems, and additionally, being 
hampered by lacking outside interest. Sweden has never been convinced about the 
added value of the policy. Hence, instead of supporting its Nordic fellow it chose to 
pursue other, less “supranational” channels in order to materialise its regional interests. 
Given this extraordinarily bad start of the policy, Finland has recently sought to revive 
its foreign political flagship by way of promoting a “New Northern Dimension” in the 
context of its EU Presidency in the second half of 2006. It tried the stimulate genuine 
commitment by way of restating the importance of the policy concept and by way of 
emphasising the added value the policy could bring for all partners involved. Given the 
reserved attitude of Sweden (and in parts of Denmark) and the obvious lack of interest 
on the side of the European Commission, the long-term effectiveness of this new 
initiative appears questionable. Moreover, the Finnish ambitions are increasingly 
sidelined by other EU policies, most importantly the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
whose implementation has recently lead to significant innovations in the field of 
regional and cross-border cooperation.  
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Which models of explanation could be employed in order to approach the Baltic Sea 
Conundrum from a more abstract perspective? 
In search of an answer to this important question, the study has followed an extensive 
path of trial theorisation, consulting various different camps in political theory. These 
trial applications could, keeping the scope of the study in mind, certainly not be 
exhaustive in every case. However, the whole apparently completed exercise has 
nevertheless led to the conclusion that a research puzzle as multifaceted and complex as 
the one of Baltic Sea Regionalism would actually necessitate even more theoretical 
prudence and comprehensiveness in order to be ultimately adequate.  
At the beginning of this study, I claimed for a comprehensive analytical framework that 
does not subjugate the empirical puzzle for the sake of clear-cut and consistent 
analytical outcomes. Many studies that follow a rigid theoretical framework tend to 
limit their analytical effort to the reproduction of certain abstract claims established in a 
detached context (as this is just what most theories are about). Studies that announce 
right at the beginning that their analysis is informed by a certain approach are likely to 
miss out important aspects about the phenomenon and to fail to contribute in a 
substantial way to the existing bulk of expertise in a certain field of empirical research. 
Seeking to counter this effect, in this study, the theoretical section is put to the very end. 
This should, however, not create the impression that the first parts are less elaborate or 
indeed, less accurate and legitimate in terms of the academic code of conduct. I would 
like to support this claim by asseverating that the theoretical considerations have guided 
every single step in the course of the more ‘empirical’ parts of the study. To a very large 
extent, this study has been written ‘backwards’, in fact, the first two sections have been 
the last ones to be completed. 
Which model does then solve the ‘Baltic Sea Conundrum’? 
This study never really set out to decrypt or even solve the Baltic Sea Conundrum. In 
fact, drawing a global picture of a matter as complex and multi-faceted as Baltic Sea 
Regionalism on the basis of a rigid and straightforward analytical pattern appears 
neither feasible not desirable. The overall analytical aim of ‘elaborating a com-
prehensive model of explanation’ could nevertheless be met in the sense that both the 
terminological and the theoretical considerations made in the course of this study are 
likely to have contributed to the understanding of the research subject as such. The 
added value of this study arises from the pursued trajectory of conceptualisation, 
abstract identification and theoretical incorporation of the various elements of the 
research puzzle, and can thus not be subsumed in the framework of an abstract or 
chapter. With each analytical step, from the development of a clear terminology to the 
conceptualisation of regionness and regionalism as well as to the critical evaluation of 
Sweden’s and Finland’s regional performance, this study has strived to move closer to 
the core of the subject matter. Hence, the fact that it has not resulted in a clear-cut 
model of explanation to cover all aspects of the thematic complex, must not be 
perceived as a failure but rather as part of the analytical outcome. 
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Epilogue 
Anything more to say about the theoretical incorporation of Baltic Sea Regionalism? 
This study has led the reader through an extensive process of theoretical abstraction and 
consideration, crossing various fields in political theory and trying to consider a wide 
array of different approaches and theoretical traditions. At this point, I am not planning 
to return to the single arguments in detail. Even less so, would it be appropriate (or 
viable indeed) to give a specific comment and outlook for each of the numerous models 
and approaches discussed earlier herein. However, there still seems to be room for a few 
critical comments, which might stimulate further discussion and research interest in 
these respects.  
By way of conclusion, I would like to turn once again to one of the most frequent 
theoretical models employed in the wider field of Baltic Sea Regionalism, which is, 
Social Constructivism. In the years following the end of the Cold War, hence the years, 
in which the phenomenon of “New Regionalism” emerged in Northern Europe, Social 
Constructivist contributions, literally flooded the field. As a result, arguing on 
Constructivist grounds has long since become a question of bon ton in Baltic Sea 
Regionalism studies. The defensive tone of early Constructivist contributions has even 
created the impression that only a Contructivist could be a ‘good’ Baltic Sea analyst. 
The region and its distinct structural development has indeed offered a veritable 
laboratory for theoretical excursions of any kind, and given the value-laden character of 
much political discourse in the BSR, it might well have been a veritable repository for 
Constructivist experiments. The Constructivist claim that everything in politics and 
society is (discursively) constructed, and thus also many elements within the complex of 
Baltic Sea Regionalism (most significantly, the region itself) has been proliferated in 
many different contexts of the Baltic Sea debate, but with consistent sophisticated 
eloquence and bold creativity. In fact, Constructivists have been among the most 
productive region ‘constructors,’ in the sense that they contributed abundantly to the 
process of ‘talking the region into existence.’ Constructivists were often inclined to 
infer a major constructive process or discursive region-building element where there 
was nothing more than an accidental misstatement, or simply, a bad uninspired speech.  
The polemic assertion that Constructivist scholars themselves have been more 
‘constructive’ and virtually activist than any other allegedly eager ‘region-builder’ on 
the political scene would certainly be countered by some, pointing at the existing 
Constructivist claim that indeed, scholars, analysts and policy consultants are well-
known and established elements in the purported process of region-building. While for 
some individuals in the Constructivist camp that really have these informal affiliations 
with regional actors or activists this might certainly apply, the large amount of 
‘outsiders’ in this regard must not be neglected. Many analysts that have published 
abundantly on the Baltic Sea actually operate from remote places, and just as myself, 
have no influence on or whatsoever role in the ‘real’ political process of region-
building. This large group of fervent ‘Constructivist outsiders’ (in terms of both their 
physical position and functional role in the process) have, turned the region into some 
sort of playground for reflectivist experiments and the literal ‘construction’ of elements 
of regionness that in essence, find little to null empirical evidence. The numerous 
problems about this sort of self-reproducing (allegedly empirical) research have been 
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extensively discussed in the introductory part of this study and have then been taken up 
again in the respective theoretical chapters. However, in short, the criticism is about 
declared constructivist studies that often end up in a maelstrom of self-affirmative 
theoretical constructs that have little empirical relevance or even legitimacy. Social 
Constructivists often just add alleged ‘empirical’ elements to their highly hypothetical 
monologues apparently expecting to create the impression of serious empiricist 
involvement that could help them to foil the permanent denunciations by realist and 
rationalist colleagues. 
I will not miss the chance of giving a concrete example. Constructivists have recurrently 
claimed that a main constitutive factor in the process of establishing the Baltic Sea area 
as a ‘region’ has been the tactical employment of argumentative strategies such as, most 
prominently, the so-called history tool. In line with this argumentation, alleged region 
builders (individuals or collective actors, officials or non-officials that are thought to be 
keen to establish or ‘construct’ a region) intentionally “write or speak the region into 
existence” by discursively availing themselves of so-called ‘raw material’ (i.e. any kind 
of argumentative substance that qualifies for the discursive construction of a region). A 
very common aspect that has been repeatedly ‘identified’ by many Constructivist 
analysts is, for example, the ‘Hanseatic’ argument. Region builders are said to employ 
this historical reference in a way that it serves them to ‘sell’ their regionalist ambitions 
under very different circumstances, and hence, under ‘false’ pretences. What sounds 
quite legitimate at first, does, in many cases, lack sufficient empirical evidence that 
would allow the analyst to actually infer a broader mechanism or phenomenon. While 
this has been done repeatedly and with few indications of honest self-criticism, hardly 
any exponent of the approach has ever set out to verify this claim in reference to a more 
comprehensive set of empirical data. Constructivists have produced very bold claims 
about the ‘social origins’ of Baltic Sea Regionalism. However, there have so far been no 
major attempts to produce quantifiable material to test these assertions on a larger scale.  
This study in turn has sought to compensate this lack of systematically gathered 
material. I would like to be brief on the respective outcomes. A comprehensive 
assessment of several regional organisations in the BSR and of their respective 
argumentative foundations has shown that about 28 out of 30 examples have never in 
the course of their existence, seen the employment of any sort of ‘constructed’ or 
‘constructive’ element in political or social discourse. Most associations and initiatives 
founded their regionalist activities directly on nothing but ‘raw material’, conceivable 
challenges, apparent threats and environmental concerns. Very few of them rely on the 
‘history argument’ or other argumentative tools that would stimulate the proliferation of 
certain spatial imaginations. What can be added to this evidence is that in essence, 
regions should not be thought to be (exclusively) ‘spoken into existence.’ If the pre-
given physical and normative foundations do not allow for a comprehensive regionness, 
discourse cannot ‘construct’ any material entity whatsoever. Regional entities merge on 
the basis of certain pre-given empirical conditions. Discourse may be supportive of such 
activities or intents but it cannot assume any major (or even decisive) constructive 
function. The criticism about the production of analytical claims without sufficient 
empirical evidence could in some variation certainly be extended to many other 
theoretical approaches. Whether drawing upon a distant sociological approach can put 
things right, might be arguable. Parsons’ model certainly lacks empirical measurability 
no less than Social Constructivism does. However, I leave the latter standing here alone 
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since its numerous exponents operating in the field of Baltic Sea Studies have been so 
particularly keen to expose themselves in a way that has no parallel in terms of self-
confidence, which in essence, is not yet a flaw, and very often, arrogance, which is a 
flaw in any case. 
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Annex: Baltic Sea Associations and Structures in Detail 
Ars Baltica  
Acronym     -- 
Founding year/launched in  1991 
Website    www.ars-baltica.net  
Governance model   transnational forum and network 
Policy field(s)    culture 
Organising principle   state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  CBSS 
Members and actors Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, Russia 
individual project leaders 
Ars Baltica aims at strengthening the cultural collaboration between the Baltic Sea 
States. It is based on two action pillars: one is related to the concertation and 
coordination in cultural policy development, the other consists of close cooperation 
between various different project contributors that cooperate in the framework of the 
network. The main objective of the network is to increase the international significance 
of the BSR as a cultural region. It builds on the assumption that culture should be 
promoted as a tool for handling social and educational issues. The practical aim is to 
offer a forum for cultural cooperation across the Baltic Sea rim, actively involving 
individual project leaders in order to give them an opportunity to voice their ideas and 
needs and to get into contact with the political decision-makers at national level. Some 
of the objectives of Ars Baltica go beyond the catchment area: it aims to establish and 
maintain strong links to other cultural organisations and networks in Europe and to 
promote the Baltic Sea cultural life outside the region. More generally, the network 
seeks to promote the value of regions and the significance of regional and inter-regional 
cooperation. 
Association of Castles and Museums around the Baltic Sea (ACMBS) 
Acronym     ACMBS 
Founding year/launched in  1991  
Website    www.baltic-castles.org   
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field(s)    art, culture, tourism 
Organising principle   state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  medium 
Cluster/organisational links to   Heritage Cooperation of the Baltic Sea States 
Members and actors national representatives, Sweden, Denmark, 
Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Russia, Finland  
administrations of single museums and castles 
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The Association was founded in 1991 on the castle of Malbork (PL), following the 
initiative of a Polish castle administrator. The association brings together 31 castles and 
museums stretching across the territory of the nine Baltic Sea States (Sweden 1, 
Denmark 5, Germany 4, Poland 1, Lithuania 2, Latvia 6, Estonia 2, Russia 4, and 
Finland 6). The institutional structure of the association includes a General Assembly 
meeting annually, a Board that meets twice a year and consists of the national 
representatives of the member countries and a working group that is responsible for the 
preparation of lectures and annual meetings. The Association is intended to enable non-
political and non-profitable cooperation between castles and museums around the Baltic 
Sea. Its major strategic aim is to increase the overall understanding of the cultural 
heritage among its members and to establish a network for teaching and learning among 
specialists in the field. The working activities are organised in six pillars: research, 
education, restoration, management, marketing and tourism. 
Baltic 21 
Acronym     -- 
Founding year/launched in  1996 
Website    www.baltic21.org    
Governance model   embedded project 
Policy field(s) spatial planning, sustainable development, 
environment 
Organising principle   state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  high 
Cluster/organisational links to  CBSS, BSSYA, BSSSC, HELCOM, VASAB 
2010, BLA21F, KBT, BTC, PPO, BUP, CCB 
Members and actors Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, 
Sweden, European Commission 
 official and non-official actors, public and private 
sector; 
Baltic 21 is a regional multi-stakeholder process for sustainable development initiated in 
1996 by the Prime Ministers from the eleven CBSS member states. It is designed 
alongside the UN model for an Agenda 21. The BSR has been the first region in the 
world to adopt common regional goals for sustainable development. The strategic 
objective of Baltic 21 is to pursue sustainable development in the Baltic Sea Region by 
regional multi-stakeholder co-operation. Accordingly, Baltic 21 provides a regional 
network to implement the globally agreed Agenda 21 and World Summit on Sustainable 
Development activities, while focusing on the regional context of sustainable 
development in its three dimensions (the environmental, the economic and the social). 
The Baltic 21 working agenda is divided into seven sectors: agriculture, education, 
energy, fisheries, forests, industry, tourism, transport, and spatial planning. Its 
institutional structure consists of  
 
– a steering group, the so-called Senior Officials Group (SOG) consisting of 
representatives from the CBSS member states, the European Commission, various 
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international and non-governmental organisations as well as representatives from 
regional and sub-regional networks and formations; 
– a bureau supporting the SOG, 
– Working Groups for each thematic sector, 
– General Secretariat based in Stockholm (working unit within the CBSS Secretariat). 
 
Baltic 21 members are the CBSS member states, the European Commission, inter-
governmental organisations, international financial institutions, international sub-
regional, city and business community networks and other international non-govern-
mental networks. 
Baltic BioTech Forum  
See ScanBalt – the Network of Networks 
Baltic Cooperation Forum (BCF) 
Acronym     BCF 
Founding year/launched in  1994 
Website    www.baltic-cooperation.eu  
Governance model   transnational network 
Policy field    trade, business, industry 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to   Hanseatic Parliament 
Members and actors non-governmental organisations based in the BSR, 
chambers of crafts, trade, industry and commerce  
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) from all around the world interested in setting up 
a business venture in the area form the main target group the network seeks to catch. It 
intends to provide a network structure to communicate outside interest in the region and 
to build a hub that coordinates interactions and arranges new relationships between 
outside actors and regional stakeholders. By offering a field-specific internet platform 
the network seeks to provide a communication forum for SMEs. It forms part of 
Europe-wide efforts to strengthen networking between skilled crafts and SMEs. The 
establishment of the network has been strongly backed by the Hanseatic Parliament. In 
fact, the two organisations still uphold very strong cooperative links. The BCF is also 
financially supported by the EU (however, there are no formal links on the institutional 
side). 
Baltic Development Forum (BDF) 
Acronym     BDF 
Founding year/launched in  1998 
Website    www.bdforum.org  
Governance model   transnational network 
Policy field    business, competition 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
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Cluster/organisational links to  CBSS (informal) 
Members and actors including officialsm and non-official participants 
from academia, media and business 
The BDF is an independent non-profit networking organisation. It was established in 
November 1998, on initiative of the former Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen. He emphasised the need of BSR decision makers for an open 
discussion platform where debates about overall regional development strategies could 
take place. As from 2001 the BDF is organised as a membership-based association. It 
offers participation to a particularly wide spectrum of different actors: it includes 
political organs as well as business players, actors from academia and the media. The 
members are companies, governments, public as well as non-official organisations and 
cities willing to contribute to the development of the BSR. The network involves more 
than 2 500 decision-makers from all over the region and beyond. The primary mission 
of the BDF is to promote the BSR as an integrated, prosperous and internationally 
competitive growth region. The BDF Honorary and Advisory Boards consist of a group 
of high-level political dignitaries and prominent business executives representing the 
entire Baltic Sea Region. The BDF perceives itself “the leading high-level and agenda-
setting networking organisation in Northern Europe and unique platform for innovative 
thinking, informal cross-sector/cross-border/cross-level encounters and concrete new 
business opportunities with a global perspective.” It seeks to facilitate and develop new 
initiatives, partnerships and international contacts to stimulate growth, innovation and 
competitiveness in the BSR. The overall strategic aim is to develop the BSR as a global 
centre of excellence and to establish the Region internationally as a strong and attractive 
regional brand. The BDF tries to maintain very close ties to the BSR business 
community, and therefore, perceives its overall goals as “business-driven”. One of the 
organisational key concepts promoted by the BDF is transparency, both in respect to 
business interests and political differences. The network is generally designed to bring 
various different actors from all sectors together, to identify focal issues in the course of 
discursive exchange, and then, to develop strategies that help the key stakeholders to 
identify and materialise actionable objectives. BDF tries to ensure common benefits 
through mutual understanding. The establishment of strong visibility is seen as the key 
to strengthening the region internationally. 
Baltic Environmental Information Dissemination System (BEIDS) 
Acronym    BEIDS 
Founding year/launched in  1998 
Website    http://beids.tec-hh.net  
Governance model   embedded project (Baltic 21) 
Policy field    environment, energy, transport 
Organising principle   state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  ? (project-oriented) 
Cluster/organisational links to  VASAB 2010, HELCOM and other projects (e.g. 
BALTICOM, BERNET), BALLERINA; 
Members and actors   states, represented by non-official project leaders 
Denmark, Germany, Finland, Lithuania, Poland, 
Russia, Sweden 
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The project aims at the circulation of intelligent information on environment, energy, 
transport and sustainable development issues. By providing a wide-ranging network and 
dissemination infrastructure, BEIDS tries to contribute to networking and know-how 
exchange in the region and to complement efforts towards transregional cooperation in 
sustainable planning. The project is embedded in the wider framework of Baltic 21.750 
Before Lithuania and Poland became full member states of the European Union, the 
project framework was largely intended to establish cooperative links across the 
Union’s borders. The main objective was to raise ecological awareness, mostly among 
non-EU-member states in order to facilitate the implementation of existing EU 
instruments in the region and beyond its borders. Today, this transborder effect is 
focussed on Russia, while Lithuania and Poland find themselves within the Union and 
are thus more strongly involved in the process of strategic aim development. By making 
its database available to other projects and associations, BEIDS seeks to establish links 
within the field of environment and sustainable development. The major consideration 
lying at the basis of the project is the awareness about the need to strengthen the 
development potential of the countries involved. Among the beneficiaries and project 
partners are government agencies, officials and private planners, small, medium and 
large firms in the energy and transport sector, municipalities, local actors, research 
organisations as well as NGOs active in the field and area.  
Baltic Institute of Finland (BIF) 
Acronym     BIF 
Founding year/launched in  1994 
Website    www.baltic.org  
Governance model   self-standing institution 
Policy field    all topical issues 
Organising principle   -- 
Degree of institutionalisation  high 
Cluster/organisational links to  -- 
Members and actors   -- 
The BIF is an independent organisation, which promotes multinational cooperation and 
joint projects in the BSR. It is based in the Finnish town of Tampere. The fundamental 
purpose of the Institute is to contribute to the development of the Baltic Sea 
cooperation. The institute’s activities materialise in concrete commercial, admini-
strative, educational and cultural development projects. Additionally, the institute 
organises seminars and workshops dealing with topical issues concerning the BSR. The 
institute collects and distributes information about current trends and themes within the 
area. The institute perceives itself an essential part of the cooperation network which 
has emerged in the BSR during the past decade. All activities include partners from 
various countries around the Baltic Sea (including Russia). The institute is maintained 
by the Foundation for the Baltic Institute, which was founded by the City of Tampere 
for this very purpose. 
                                                 
750  See respective chapter in this annex. 
      236
Baltic Metropoles Network (BaltMet) 
Acronym     BaltMet  
Founding year/launched in  2002 
Website    www.baltmet.org  
Governance model   transnational network 
Policy field competitiveness, innovation, technology, research  
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  BDF 
Members and actors official city representations, on request state 
authorities, on-member cities; Berlin, Copen-
hagen, Helsinki, Malmö, Oslo, Riga, Stockholm, 
St. Petersburg, Tallinn, Vilnius, Warsaw; 
The BaltMet Network was founded in October 2002, following the objective of 
providing the cities in the BSR with an informal structural framework to foster 
transnational cooperation. The network addresses capitals and large metropolitan cities 
all around the Baltic Sea, focussing in particular on the establishment of cooperative 
relations between the network members and partner cities as well as academic and 
business players based or active in the BSR. The network also addresses issues of 
inclusive Baltic Sea identity-building which is seen to form the basis for promoting and 
marketing the region internationally. The founding fathers of the network explicitly 
refer to the wider context of the Lisbon agenda claiming to pursue the goal of actively 
contributing to its realisation. Hence, the network holds an official content-related link 
to the regional working agenda of the EU.  
Baltic Island Network (B7) 
Acronym     B7 
Founding year/launched in  1989 
Website    www.b7.org  
Governance model   TNW 
Policy field    economy, spatial development,  
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  CBSS, UBC 
Members and actors   islands in the BSR 
B7 is a network of the 7 largest islands in the Baltic Sea including Bornholm/Denmark, 
Gotland/Sweden, Hiiumaa/Estonia, Rügen/Germany, Saaremaa/Estonia, Åland/Finland, 
and Öland/Sweden. The network seeks to minimise the permanent constraints that put 
islands at a comparative and competitive disadvantage to the mainland while still being 
required to offer their citizens the basic range of services and quality of life. B7 works 
to encourage the social, economic and spatial development of the islands to build on 
their uniqueness, promote cultural understanding and to learn through exchange of 
experiences and ideas. The B7 has an annual rotating Chairmanship and Secretariat. The 
network also has working groups specialising in environmental and social issues. 
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Baltic Local Agenda 21 Forum (BLA21F) 
Acronym     BLA21F 
Founding year/launched in  1997 
Website    www.bla21f.net  
Governance model   transnational network 
Policy field    environment, sustainable development 
Organising principle   state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  medium 
Cluster/organisational links to  Baltic 21, UBC 
Members and actors local authorities, represented by official contact 
persons, non-official stakeholders based in the 
region 
The Baltic Local Agenda 21 Forum (BLA21F) is a network of experts from local 
authorities, NGOs and various other organisations around the Baltic Sea who share a 
dedication to sustainable development. The Forum was founded at a working seminar in 
Lahti, Finland, in September 1997, where more than 70 participants from 9 countries of 
the Baltic Sea region committed themselves to the development of the network. It has 
been established to implement the Rio Process at the local and regional level and thus to 
strengthen and support Local Agenda 21 processes in all eleven countries in the Baltic 
Sea Region. A special emphasis is given to the countries in the eastern part of the 
region. BLA21F is not a short term project but continuous action to encourage the local 
level to carry out sustainable development and to find out means to protect the Baltic 
Sea. BLA21F aims at creating an active co-operation network to put the Rio Process 
into practice. BLA21F network has a national contact person in each country. Contact 
persons together with associate contact persons form the steering committee of 
BLA21F. They are also co-ordinating the work of BLA21F in the respective countries. 
The actors in the network are local authorities and stakeholders involved in LA21 
processes, such as NGOs and other organisations, business and local people interested 
in LA 21 work.  
The official keywords of the network are: awareness raising, public participation and 
responsibility. In practice these aims are carried out by co-operation, experience 
exchange and training as well as dissemination of methods and examples of good 
practice. The idea is to develop and integrate new ideas and approaches according to the 
local needs and local actors. Baltic Local Agenda 21 Forum has been appointed as the 
Responsible Actor of Baltic 21, Joint Action 7 (JO 7): increasing consumer awareness 
of sustainable development. JO 7.1. focuses on Local Agenda 21 projects to increase 
public awareness of sustainable development. In this connection BLA21F lead the 
project ‘Awareness Raising on Sustainable Development in the Baltic Sea Region - a 
contribution to localising Baltic 21’. In order to increase public awareness on 
sustainable development, the project addressed all stakeholders involved in LA 21 
processes in the BSR: local authorities, interested citizens, educators, business, 
consumer groups, local organisations and institutions. Furthermore, the BLA21F is 
networking with the Union of Baltic Cities to carry out the Joint Action 4 of Baltic 21: 
city co-operation and sustainable development issues in cities and communities.  
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Baltic Ports Organisation (BPO) 
Acronym     BPO 
Founding year/launched in  1991 
Website    www.bpoports.com  
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field    maritime issues, business, competition 
Organising principle   loose structure 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  -- 
Members and actors   port operators and users 
The BPO was established in October 1991 in Copenhagen, based on the main objective 
of facilitating co-operation between the ports around the Baltic Sea Rim and to provide 
for the productive use of the new possibilities for shipping that emerged in the region 
after the fall of the Berlin wall and the demise of the Soviet Union. More than fifty ports 
based in the BSR are full BPO members. In the first phase of its existence, the Western 
European ports played a leading role within the organisation, transferring knowledge to 
the East, and thus, disseminating important know-how (e.g. on market economy and 
business thinking) to the newly independent Baltic States. In the course of the 1990s, 
and not least, through the Baltic accession process, this situation has changed 
decisively. The Baltic ports have undergone a process of remarkable structural change. 
One of the major aims of the BPO is to improve the competitiveness of maritime 
transport in the BSR by increasing the efficiency of ports, promoting the region 
internationally as the strategic logistics centre in Europe and by improving the 
infrastructure within the ports and the connections between them. It seeks to enhance 
co-operation among the port users and operators, to introduce and apply new technology 
in the port sector, to improve the performance and the integration of ports into the 
transport chain, to enhance cost efficiency, good environmental behaviour, 
organisational development, co-operation with authorities and interest groups.  
Baltic Rim Network (BRN) 
Acronym     BRN 
Founding year/launched in  1999 
Website    www.baltic-rim.de  
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field    business, competition 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  -- 
Members and actors   various non-official actors, mostly business 
partners  
The Baltic Rim Network seeks to support various project partners with their entry into 
and opening-up of new markets. It provides hands-on help, purposeful activities and 
supra-regional presence in order to help various stakeholders with placing their products 
and service international competition. The network promotes its competence by 
emphasising its experience in product marketing, good personal contacts and an 
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internet-supported communication platform they are able to quickly introduce 
cooperation participants to new products and potential business partners from the Baltic 
Sea market. Today, the association brings more than 400 representatives from 
companies, NGOs, teaching and research institutions, local and regional authorities 
together. The overall aim of the BRN is to establish an environmental Market Place in 
the BSR – networking ecologically aware companies and promoting the technological 
transfer and the development of clean products and production processes. 
Baltic Sea Business Advisory Council (BAC) 
Acronym     BAC 
Founding year/launched in  1997 
Website www.chamber.se/bac  
Governance model   embedded advisory body 
Policy field    economy, business 
Organising principle   intergovernmental/state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  medium 
Cluster/organisational links to  embedded in the CBSS structure  
Members and actors   seconded national experts 
The BAC is not to be seen as a self-standing organisation. It is an advisory body that is 
embedded in the wider institutional framework of the CBSS. The primary aim of this 
council is to give advice on economic and business matters to various bodies in the 
CBSS. The representatives are nominated by national business organisations and 
appointed by each government. BAC tries to speak on behalf of the business 
communities in the BSR. It reports to the annual meeting of foreign ministers of CBSS 
as well as to other relevant ministerial meetings. BAC actively participates in the work 
of the CBSS Working Group for Economic Co-operation (WGEC). It also holds close 
working contacts with other CBSS units, most importantly with the CSO and the 
secretariat etc. 
Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce Association (BCCA) 
Acronym     BCCA 
Founding year/launched in  1992 
Website    www.bcca.de  
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field    business  
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  CBSS, UBC 
Members and actors   private companies 
The BCCA serves to unite the Chambers of Commerce of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden. The BCCA was 
established in June 1992 in Rostock-Warnem/Germany in order to give the business 
community of the region a united voice for common concerns. The BCCA represents 
more than 450 000 companies belonging to all sectors on the Northern and North-
Eastern European markets. The task BCCA is seeking to fulfil is threefold:  
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– to protect and uphold the interests of private entrepreneurship by advising policy-
makers in business related affairs,  
– to offer services to the business community and  
– to provide facilities for contacts, debates and meetings in the region. 
 
The BCCA General Conference is the BCCA’s highest authority that is entrusted with 
the negotiation and adoption of the annual working program. It convenes on an annual 
basis. Members are entrusted with one vote each, irrespective their Chambers’ number 
of individual member companies. These meetings are chaired by an elected Presidium, 
consisting of the president and four vice presidents. The BCCA Presidium directs the 
association’s activities in times between the annual conferences and is supported by an 
executive body. 
Baltic Sea Commission – Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (BSC-CPMR) 
Acronym     BSC-CPMR  
Founding year/launched in  1996 
Website    www.cpmr.org  
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field spatial planning, development, cohesion, 
environment, security, transport 
Organising principle   intergovernmental/state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  medium 
Cluster/organisational links to  BDF, BSSSC, CBSS, UBC, HELCOM 
Members and actors   officials of sub-regional and local entities 
     all Baltic Sea States (except Russia) 
The ‘Baltic Sea Commission’ (BSC/CPMR-BSC) is one of the six regional 
commissions that together form the ‘Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of 
Europe’ (CPMR). The CMPR is an umbrella association that brings together more than 
150 regions across 26 European countries. Living and working in the periphery implies 
a set of difficulties that are common to all of those regions. Hence, the main objective of 
the CPMR is to ensure that EU institutions and national governments consider the 
specific interests that arise from their peripheral position. Moreover, the association 
aims at furthering transnational cooperation in and among these regions in order to 
enhance their assets.  
"The idea is to achieve a polycentric Europe by promoting and coordinating actions that 
turn peripheries into large, integrated maritime units. [...] The CPMR is a powerful lobby 
defending the interests of more than 150 peripheral maritime regions."751 
The CPMR was set up in 1973, after a group of political actors had identified the need 
for an initiative that would enhance the involvement of peripheral regions in European 
integration, decrease the disparities in competitiveness and promote Europe’s maritime 
dimension. The basic structure of the conference provides commissions for each of the 
six major key areas in peripheral maritime Europe: the Atlantic Arctic, the North Sea, 
the Inter-Mediterranean (commissions founded in 1989), the Baltic Sea (founded in 
                                                 
751  Official website of the CPMR www.cpmr.org [26 November 2007]. 
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1996), the Balkans/Black Sea, and the Islands Commission (the latter two founded in 
2003). The CMPR is meant to provide a representative voice and to act as a negotiator 
in European integration matters. Since 1997, the CPMR disposes of a central office 
based in Brussels that is responsible for the direct contact with European key actors at 
both EU-institutional and governmental level. 
The CPMR Baltic Sea Commission (CPMR-BSC) was founded in Kotka/Finland in 
May 1996 alongside the strategic principles of the umbrella association. The CPMR-
BSC decided to put special emphasis on the promotion of a polycentric model for 
Europe by introducing an "alternative way of thinking in the Baltic Sea Area". At the 
moment, the CPMR-BSC brings 28 (maritime and non-maritime) regions from all 
Baltic littoral states (except Russia) together. The participating BSC regions are 
represented by actors at different levels of governance, mostly local and municipal 
entities (e.g. the Stockholm County Council [S] or the Regional Council of 
Ostrobothnia/Vaasa [F]). One of the general objectives of the BSC is to further co-
operation and partnership networks in the BSR. However, there is a clear priority on 
enhancing the coordination between regional authorities, i.e. of popularly-elected 
bodies and entities. Sweden (10 participating regions) and Finland (8) both show a 
strong presence within the BSC. In late 2006, the BSC Secretariat was transferred from 
Lahti/Finland to the Swedish town of Visby on Gotland Island.752 The BSC activities 
mainly deal with spatial development and planning, cohesion policy, human resources, 
environment, social welfare, economic growth, democracy and common security. 
Frequently, also EU enlargement is on the BSC agenda, since the commission considers 
itself as some sort of "first wave enlargement forum inside the whole CPMR".753 The 
BSC has promoted a series of INTERREG III B and C project proposals with the status 
of "BSC projects". Moreover, it has been involved in the task force work on the 
development of the new HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan.  
Generally, the BSC shows a very strong commitment to being an active source for 
proposals on EU policy making. Hence, most of its agenda points are directly related to 
the activities of EU institutions, or to specific EU policies. As for the focus of this 
study, the most important example in this regard is certainly the EU Northern 
Dimension (ND). The BSC member regions have shown considerable dedication to the 
development and implementation of the EU-ND. Generally, the BSC considers itself a 
hub actor between the regional or local and the European level.  
In fact, in the course of 2006, the BSC has taken up a series of initiatives in order to 
enhance networking between different Baltic Sea organisations. On 31 May 2006, the 
BSC organised a co-ordination meeting that aimed at bringing different BSR 
associations together. On that occasion, Heads and Secretaries representing the Baltic 
Development Forum (BDF), the Baltic Sea States Subregional Co-operation (BSSSC), 
B7 Islands, Union of Baltic Cities (UBC) and Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 
discussed and decided about concrete co-operation proposals, e.g. regarding transport 
and infrastructure, environment, human resources and health, the Northern Dimension 
and the European Maritime Policy.754 
                                                 
752  Gotland is also part of the CPMR Islands Commission. 
753  See official BSC website www.paijat-hame.fi/english/tasks/cpmr.htm [26 November 2007]. 
754  See BSC Newsletter, Summer 2006, p.5. 
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Baltic Sea Forum – Pro Baltica (BSF) 
Acronym     BSF 
Founding year/launched in:  1992 
Website    www.baltic-sea-forum.org  
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field    economy, culture 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to -- 
Members and actors   companies, institutions, sub-regional entities 
The Baltic Sea Forum was founded in Helsinki in 1992 as Pro Baltica Forum, a German 
Finnish non-profit organisation. It is the central part of a representative network of 
members from the business world, politics and administration. The Baltic Sea Forum is 
a private organisation which works closely together with a number of governments as 
well as with state-wide, regional and local institutions. The Forum renamed itself in 
2003 in order to further emphasise its focus on the entire BSR even more clearly. The 
Baltic Sea Forum has representatives in Aarhus, Bremen, Brussels, Helsinki, 
Kaliningrad, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Münchenstein, Oslo, Riga, Schleswig-
Holstein, St Petersburg, Stockholm, Tallinn, Vilnius, and Gdańsk. The BSF supports 
economic, political and cultural co-operation in the BSR. The Baltic Sea Forum has an 
extended network of members, representatives and partners from all fields of activity as 
e.g. economy, politics, culture, and science in the Baltic region and Central Europe. The 
organization is in permanent contact with governments as well as state, regional and 
local authorities and institutions in the Baltic States. The major strategic objectives of 
the association are to realise programs and objectives of the European Union, strengthen 
the Baltic economic region, create an independent platform for its members in order to 
exchange ideas, experiences, and opinions, initiate and encourage cultural exchange 
programs between the states, draft trend-setting recommendations to committees and 
institutions. These objectives are intended to be reached by organisation of conferences, 
meetings, and fora, an up-to-date networked with constant information exchange, co-
operation with key positions and partners in the Baltic Sea States, participation in 
international projects, drafting and editing of publications. The BSF fosters international 
co-operation through the organisation of conferences, meetings and events relating to 
current economic, political and cultural topics, provision of information for members 
and interested companies and individuals, support of projects and publications, and 
emphasis on the EU ND Action Plan and the promotion of Public-Private-Partnerships.  
Baltic Sea Healthy Cities Association 
Acronym     ---- 
Founding year/launched in  1998 
Website    www.marebalticum.org  
Governance model   transnational association  
Policy field    health, environment 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  embedded in a WHO regional program for Europe 
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Members and actors   cities, city administrations, local institutions 
Baltic Region Healthy Cities Association was founded in 1998 to promote Healthy 
Cities activities in the Baltic region. The goal of Healthy Cities is to make health and 
well-being a part of both the decision making and the activities of a city. It is a 
framework for the strategic planning, activities and assessment of a city. The Baltic 
Region Healthy Cities Association is a WHO Collaborating Centre for Healthy Cities 
and Urban Health in the Baltic Region. The European "Healthy Cities" movement is 
coordinated by the WHO Regional Office for Europe and has been carried out since 
1987. WHO granted the status in September 2002 for four years (2003-2006). The re-
designation of the Association as a WHO Collaborating Centre for Healthy Cities and 
Urban Health in the Baltic Region was confirmed in December 2006 for a next four 
year period (2007-2010). The work of the Association is targeted to all countries around 
the Baltic Sea, especially to  
 
– the cities in the Healthy Cities network,  
– the cities in the National Healthy Cities networks and  
– cities/municipalities interested to join these networks.  
 
The association aims to expand and reinforce the capacity of the WHO Centre for Urban 
Health and to support project cities and national networks. The Association acts as an 
extended operational arm of the WHO Healthy Cities programme by  
 
– establishing close and frequent contacts with cities and networks,  
– building a knowledge base of local needs, and  
– drawing on the technical resources of the cities and countries in the BSR.  
 
The terms of reference of the association are 
 
– to support the cities in implementing WHO Healthy Cities goals,  
– motivate new cities to join the networks,  
– to build the capacity of health and well-being expertise on a local level by 
networking with appropriate institutions and organisations,  
– to enhance the visibility of the Healthy Cities operations and communication,  
– to built information system of best practices and the state of well-being in cities 
belonging to the Baltic Sea Region Healthy Cities networks, and  
– to network with local, national and international health and well-being experts to 
share best practices and expertise.  
 
The activity areas follow the Health 21 and Healthy Cities priorities in Europe, which 
are  
 
– partnership building especially in integrated health development planning,  
– city health profiling,  
– governance and community participation,  
– sustainable development and health as well as urban planning.  
 
The everyday work of the office is conducted by The Baltic Region Healthy Cities 
Board, which consists of University of Turku, Åbo Akademi University, Social 
Insurance Institution of Finland, Turku School of Economics, and the City of Turku. 
The basic work is funded by City of Turku and Ministry of Social Affairs and Health in 
Finland. The Association work in close collaboration with City of Turku/Healthy Cities 
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Project. The members of the association are the City of Turku, the University of Turku, 
The Social Insurance Institution of Finland, Åbo Akademi University and Turku School 
of Economics and Business Administration. The member organisations of the asso-
ciation provide the expert services to support the goals of the Healthy Cities activities in 
the BSR. 
Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) 
Acronym     BSPC 
Founding year/launched in  1991 
Website    www.bspc.net  
Governance model   intergovernmental association 
Policy field    environment, maritime security 
Organising principle   state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  medium 
Cluster/organisational links to  CBSS, HELCOM 
Members and actors members from the national and various regional 
parliaments of the Baltic Sea States plus 
representatives of BSR-based NGOs; 
Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Germany, Poland as well as the Faroe 
Islands, Greenland, and Åland. 
The BSPC constitutes a parliamentary forum for the BSR. Its main objective is to 
develop cooperation among parliaments at the national and regional levels and to 
facilitate the multilateral dialogue on issues that are relevant for the region. 
Environmental topics and maritime safety are among the focal topics in this context. 
The first Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference was launched in 1991 upon Finnish 
initiative. Since then, annual parliamentary conferences are held every year on a rotating 
basis. Between the annual sessions, a Standing Committee provides for the monitoring 
of the implementation of resolutions that were adopted by previous conferences. The 
Standing Committee consists of eight members from the parliaments of the Baltic 
Countries represented through the Baltic Assembly, of the Nordic Countries through the 
Nordic Council, of Germany, Poland and Russia. This Standing Committee is also 
responsible for the organisation of the annual conferences. It decides the agenda and 
program in consultation with the host parliament. The institutional objective of the 
BSPC is directly linked to the CBSS, since it tries to build the parliamentary counterpart 
to the work of the governments in that framework. To this end, the CBSS chairman 
usually takes part in the annual BSPC and reports on the activities and achievements of 
the Council. The BSPC officially aims at strengthening the common identity of the BSR 
by way of close cooperation and coordination between national and regional 
parliaments, by trying to link to other important associations and cooperative structures 
in the region, and by providing a forum for debate and information exchange between 
parliaments and other organisations in the region or in other European regions. 
All national and regional parliaments as well as international organizations in the Baltic 
Sea region send delegates to the annual conference. These are the national parliaments 
of the Nordic (including Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland) and Baltic countries, of 
Germany and Poland, the regional parliaments of Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Karelia, 
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Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Schleswig-Holstein, the local parliaments of the cities of 
Bremen, Hamburg and St Petersburg, the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 
the Baltic Assembly, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary, Assembly of the 
Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe. The BSPC also holds an observer status in HELCOM. The 
Secretariat of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Cooperation is located in the Secretariat of 
the Nordic Council in Copenhagen. 
BSR Online Environmental Information Resources for Internet Access (BALLERINA) 
Acronym     BALLERINA 
Founding year/launched in  n/a 
Website    www.baltic-region.net  
Governance model   self-organising project 
Policy field    environment, energy, transport 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  HELCOM, Baltic 21, VASAB 2010, CCB 
Members and actors   non-official project leaders 
BALLERINA is an environmental database for the BSR. The initiative to establish the 
network structure originates from the United Nations Environment Programme. 
BALLERINA mainly focuses on the collection and upgrading of statistical information.  
Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Cooperation (BSSSC) 
Acronym     BSSSC 
Founding year/launched in  1993 
Website    www.bsssc.com  
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field    comprehensive 
Organising principle   intergovernmental/state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  high 
Cluster/organisational links to CBSS 
Members and actors   decentralised/subregional authorities 
The Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Co-operation is a political network hosting 
decentralised authorities (i.e. actors at local or sub-regional level) in the BSR and it was 
founded in 1993 in Stavanger/Norway as a direct result of the foundation of the CBSS. 
BSSSC membership is voluntary and open to all subregions (regional authorities) of the 
Baltic Sea area that are immediately below the level of central government. The 
organisation adopted a new statute in early 2004 as the nature of the challenges faced in 
the BSR had changed in the course of its first decade of existence. The revised points of 
reference contain the following objectives:  
 
– to act as a Pan-Baltic organization open to all regions around the entire Baltic Sea;  
– bring added value to regional co-operation on every side of the Baltic Sea;  
– promote and advocate the interests of the regions of the BSR to decision makers, 
such as national governments, the EU and globally;  
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– provide and disseminate expertise, best practice examples and implementation 
capacity with regard to BSR priority issues (mostly addressing national authorities 
and EU institutions). 
 
Credibility, Knowledge, Visibility and Flexibility are the designated guiding principles 
for the organization. Its main organisational bodies are:  
 
– Chairperson: elected by the board for a two-year period; external representative for 
the organisation and thus responsible for the relations with regional decision-makers 
and policy actors in the BSR (including collective actors such as the EU). 
– Board: decision-making body of the BSSSC, consisting of two representatives from 
each of the BSR countries; responsible for the ongoing promotion of the 
organisation’s political objectives and for the identification of priority areas. The 
political activities decided by the Board are based on a combination of the priorities 
expressed by the European Commission, the National Platforms and the CBSS. 
– Secretariat: supports the Chairperson and the Board; responsible for administrative 
tasks, the organisation of current activities as well as for public relation issues. 
– Ad hoc Working Groups: can be set up by the Board. Their main task is to collect 
information about certain priority issues. Presently there are five Working Groups 
dealing with the following topics: Agenda 21, Transport and Infrastructure, 
Northern Dimension of the EU, Youth Policy, Cohesion Policy. 
– National Platforms: forums for regional governments, ensuring that the Board 
activities are in line with the interests of the respective sub-regions. The Board 
Members are responsible for the platforms in their countries, and ensure effective 
co-operation. Each Platform appoints a contact point to strengthen the 
administrative capacity of BSSSC. 
– Reporter on Maritime issues 
– Contact Point, Brussels: responsible for the interface with EU-institutions 
The main working forum for the organisation is the annual BSSSC-Conference, which 
is – based on a rotating mechanism – held in one of the participating regions around the 
Baltic Sea. The BSSSC cooperates with European institutions and organisations and 
upholds close ties with other key organisations in the BSR. Even though the BSSSC 
operates on the sub-state level, it is still organised on intergovernmental grounds. It is 
directly affiliated with the CBSS, covering the respective local and municipal level. 
Also the BSSSC working groups work under the auspices of the CBSS. The BSSSC 
also holds a permanent observer status within the EU Committee of the Regions. It 
directly connects its political objectives to those of the respective Union policies, such 
as the Northern Dimension and the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Baltic Sea Region University Network  
Acronym     -- 
Founding year/launched in  2000 
Website    http://bsrun.utu.fi  
Governance model   transnational network 
Policy field    education, research, academia 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
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Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to   -- 
Members and actors university administrations;  
Estonian Agricultural University, Kaliningrad State 
University, Kaunas University of Tech., Klaipeda 
University, Med. University of Gdańsk, Riga Tech. 
University, St. Petersburg State University, Tallinn 
Pedagogical University, Tallinn Tech. University, 
Tech. University of Gdańsk, University of Gdańsk,   
University of Latvia, University of Tartu,         
University of Turku, Warsaw School of              
Economics and Vilnius University.  
The Baltic Sea Region University Network is designed as an umbrella organisation to 
facilitate and enhance co-operation between the signing parties. Cooperation in the 
framework of the network focuses on the following core areas: 
 
– Baltic Studies and Baltic Sea Region studies;  
– Distance Education and Open and Distance Learning;  
– European Integration and European Studies; 
– Institutional Management and Administration; 
– Management Information Systems and Information Technology; and 
– Regional Development. 
 
The members of the network seek to enhance student mobility by offering student 
exchanges within the region. Mobility is also granted to academic staff, seeking to 
augment working cooperations within the network and to establish new channels for 
knowledge exchange. The network also supports that involved individuals get the 
opportunity to attend seminars, congresses and conference meetings with a specific 
region-related focus. Joint research projects form the most ambitious cooperation field 
within the network, aiming to promote both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
Baltic Sea Tourism Commission (BTC) 
Acronym     BTC 
Founding year/launched in  1983 
Website    www.balticsea.com    
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field    tourism 
Organising principle loose pattern (with minor reference to 
nationalities) 
Degree of institutionalisation  medium 
Cluster/organisational links to  -- 
Members and actors   BSR-based tourist companies and organisations  
The Baltic Sea Tourism Commission is a non-profit organization with over 80 members 
based in the BSR. The idea of establishing such an organisation emerged at a Tourism 
Conference held in the Swedish town of Karlskrona in May 1981. In 1983 the 
association was formally established and given the name of Baltic Tourism Co-
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operation, or BTC for short. At first, the administrative structure of the association was 
limited to a permanent secretariat based in Norrköping, Sweden. In 1992 it was decided 
to set up a ‘Standing Commission’ with representatives from all interested parties, 
including Tourist Boards - national, regional and local, transportation companies (air, 
rail, ferry and cruise), port administrations and tour operators outside the area. In 1996, 
the original label and name of the association was turned into the current Baltic Sea 
Tourism Commission. 
BTC defines itself as a "result oriented marketing and networking organization." Its 
major aim is to promote tourism to and within the BSR. The main activities of the 
association can be divided into the areas projects and marketing. The marketing 
function includes free presentation of the   members on the BTC homepage, presen-
tation at selected fairs and trips for journalists and travel agents in the region. The 
annual BTC Travel Mart and Conference is the main networking event. By way of its 
activities and networking efforts the BTC seeks to pursue the following objectives: 
 
– secure a wider recognition of the Baltic Sea region as a viable tourist destination; 
– promote the regional identity and awareness to the media, the travel trade and the 
consumers; 
encourage a healthy development of sustainable and responsible tourism based on 
quality within the countries bordering the Baltic Sea; 
– collate data and information on the region by all logical methods; 
– initiate projects approved by the members; 
– liaise with official and voluntary sources and organisations; 
– promote the varied interests of its members by marketing and by providing member 
benefits such as networking opportunities at travel marts, exhibitions and 
conferences. 
Baltic Sea Trade Union Network (BASTUN) 
Acronym     BASTUN 
Founding year/launched in  1999 
Website    www.bastun.nu  
Governance model   transnational network 
Policy field    trade, business, economy 
Organising principle   loose pattern with reference to nationality 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  European Trade Union Confederation 
Members and actors   trade organisations 
The Baltic Sea Trade Union Network (BASTUN) was established in connection with 
the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) Congress in Helsinki in July 1999. 
The network consists of 22 organisations out of which 18 are members of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and 13 of the ETUC. 
BASTUN focuses on 
 
– supporting the trade union organisations in the EU membership application process,  
– trying to make the trade union voice heard to contribute to the implementation of 
the EU ND,  
– promoting collective bargaining at the labour market,  
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– influencing the Council of the Baltic Sea States by putting forward joint demands in 
areas such as employment, education and social policy,  
– formulating joint project applications to the EU and other institutions and 
foundations for financial assistance,  
– supporting the trade union organisations in the countries in transition in organising, 
organisational structure, administration and financing,  
– and utilizing state-of-the-art information technology, such as the Internet, for co-
operation and exchange of information.  
 
The permanent secretariat has recently been merged with the Stockholm based Council 
of Nordic Trade Unions. The network is involved in projects co-financed by the EU. 
Baltic Sea Youth Office and the Baltic Sea Secretariat for Youth Affairs (BYO/BSSYA) 
Acronym     BYO/BSSYA 
Founding year/launched in  1980 
Website    www.balticsea-youth.org  
Governance model   intergovernmental association 
Policy field    education, culture 
Organising principle   intergovernmental 
Degree of institutionalisation  medium 
Cluster/organisational links to  CBSS 
Members and actors   Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany. Iceland,  
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, 
Sweden; represented by ministry officials  
The BYO has been established in 1980 focussing on the intergovernmental cooperation 
between the Baltic Sea States in the field of youth affairs. It is based at the Regional 
Youth Council of Schleswig-Holstein (RYC SH), which provides for the infrastructural 
and administrative framework. The Working Group (WG) as the organisational core is 
responsible for the implementation of the corporate objectives, the promotion of a cross-
sectoral approach while working on youth issues within the CBSS, for the arrangement 
of the annual work plan and budget; it functions as a forum for exchange of experiences 
available to the national ministries. Member states are represented by seconded officials 
from the ministries for Youth Affairs. The work of the office is strongly linked to the 
activities of the CBSS. The country holding the chairmanship of the CBSS also holds 
the chairmanship of the working group. Positioned within the WG there is an advisory 
group consisting of the representatives of the outgoing, present and incoming CBSS 
chair countries. It takes its decisions on the basis of the working plan of the Secretariat, 
acts as a special adviser to the Secretariat and stays in close contact with it. The 
Secretariat prepares WG meetings together with the advisory group and the hosting 
country.  
Baltic University Programme (BUP) 
Acronym     BUP 
Founding year/launched in  1996 
Website    www.balticuniv.uu.se  
Governance model   transnational network 
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Policy field    research, sustainable development, environment 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  -- 
Members and actors university administrations, other research 
institutions 
The BUP is a network of more than 180 universities and other institutes of higher 
learning based in the BSR. It is coordinated by the BUP Secretariat situated at Uppsala 
University (S). The Programme focuses on questions of sustainable development, 
environmental protection, and democracy in the BSR. The aim is to support the key role 
that universities are perceived to play in a democratic society. This is achieved by 
developing joint university courses, and by participation in projects in cooperation with 
authorities, municipalities and others.  
Coalition Clean Baltic (CCB) 
Acronym     CCB 
Founding year/launched in  1990 
Website    www.ccb.se  
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field    environment, sustainable development 
Organising principle   loose pattern (with state references) 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  n/a 
Members and actors   non-governmental organisations based in the BSR 
In Helsinki, February 1990, non-governmental environmental organizations from the 
BSR countries united and established Coalition Clean Baltic (CCB) in order to co-
operate in activities concerning the Baltic Sea. CCB is a politically independent, non-
profit association. At present, CCB unites 26 member organizations from Finland, 
Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. The CCB 
member organisations have over half a million members in all countries around the 
Baltic Sea. The main goal of CCB is to promote the protection and improvement of the 
Baltic Sea environment and its natural resources. Common denominators for the CCB 
network include seeking opportunities to encourage new and constructive approaches 
and engaging people to become part of the solution instead of part of the problem. 
Being an international network organization, CCB has the advantage of being able to 
work both at the international and national policy levels as well as with concrete field 
projects. CCB is politically unaffiliated and it works on a non-profit basis, operating 
primarily through lobbying, information, environmental education and other activities to 
raise public awareness as well as through the contribution to concrete co-operation 
projects in the field.  
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 
Acronym     CBSS 
Founding year/launched in  1992 
Website    www.cbss.st  
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Governance model   intergovernmental association 
Policy field    multi-sectoral engagement 
Organising principle   intergovernmental, state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  high 
Cluster/organisational links to  BDF, BSF, BCCA, BSSSC, BASTUN, HELCOM,     
VASAB 2010, UBC, CPMR-BSC 
Members and actors  Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, 
Sweden, European Commission  
 Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
Founded in 1992 in order to create a regional forum for dialogue and coordination 
between the national governments of the Baltic Sea States. Norway and Iceland (since 
1995) are also members, as is the EU by way of a Commission representative. 
Moreover, France, Italy, Ukraine, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the USA 
hold the CBSS observer status. The member states are represented by their Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs. The Council convenes annually, at the end of each Presidency term. 
The Presidency coordinates CBSS activities and prepares the agenda for each Council 
meeting. Between the ministerial meetings, the CBSS Committee of Senior Officials 
(CSO), formed by high-rank officials from the national Ministries for Foreign Affairs, 
serves as the main discussion forum and decision-making body, in accordance with the 
guidance received from the Council. Under the auspices of the CSO, there operate three 
working groups and two lead-country expert groups: Working Group on Democratic 
Institutions (WGDI); Working Group on Economic Cooperation (WGEC); Working 
Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (WGNRS); Lead Country for Civil Security; 
Lead Country for EuroFaculty-Kaliningrad.  
Since 1998, the Council is supported by a permanent Secretariat based in Stockholm/ 
Sweden, responsible for administrative and organisational tasks as well as for the 
implementation of the CBSS Communications Strategy and the maintenance of 
cooperative relations to other organisations in the BSR. Overall political guidance is 
provided by the Baltic Sea States Summits that, since 1996, gather the Heads of 
Government and a member of the Commission on a biannual basis. The CBSS has 
considerably backed the EU enlargement process. After the accession of Sweden and 
Finland, the CBSS agenda had gradually syntonised with the relevant EU policies. At 
first, the CBSS was meant to be of "traditional intergovernmental nature", and "should 
not be seen as a new formalized institutional framework with a permanent 
secretariat."755  
The CBSS intends to serve as an umbrella organisation that facilitates coordination 
between various different regional organisations. To this end, the CBSS launched an 
internet portal (the so-called Baltic Sea Portal – www.balticsea.net) in order to provide 
for innovative channels of knowledge and information transfer and to enhance 
cooperation and coordination between the collective actors and stakeholders based in 
and focussing on the region.756  
                                                 
755  Terms of Reference for the CBSS, adopted at the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Baltic 
Sea States, 5-6 March 1992.  
756  For more information, see chapter "The Council of the Baltic Sea States" (p. 49-). 
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Hanseatic Parliament 
Acronym     -- 
Founding year/launched in  2004 
Website    www.hanse-parlament.net  
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field    business, small and medium sized enterprises 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  n/a 
Members and actors   non-official collective actors promoting SME 
In September 2004, the association of the Hanseatic Parliament was founded in St. 
Petersburg. Members of the association are more than 30 Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, Chambers of Skilled Crafts and other institutions who promote small and 
medium-sized businesses from all Baltic Sea States (Germany, Poland Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark). It is based in Hamburg, 
Germany. 
– The goal is to help making Northeastern Europe an economic area and to orient its 
economic area especially to the concrete requirements of small- and medium-sized 
businesses, and thus, promote these businesses and the entire economic area as well 
as possible. It focuses on the following tasks 
– strengthening of economic competitiveness of the BSR; 
– development of an intensive cooperation with a high spatial identification;  
– support of medium-sized economy and the skilled crafts, in particular all 
transnational activities and international cooperations;  
– promotion of vocational training, education of businessmen and executives of the 
medium-sized economy in form of dual bachelor studies as well as further training; 
– promotion of economic and cultural development in the partial regions of the Baltic 
Sea Region as well as support of the experience exchange and a cooperation 
orientated on regional strengths. 
Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) 
Acronym     HELCOM 
Founding year/launched in  1980/1992 
Website    www.helcom.fi  
Governance model   international regime 
Policy field    environment, maritime issues 
Organising principle   intergovernmental, state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  medium 
Cluster/organisational links to  CBSS and other environmental associations 
Members and actors Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Estonia, Finland, 
Latvia Lithuania, Poland and Russia as well as the 
European Commission 
The Helsinki Commission (also known as the Baltic Marine Environment Protection 
Commission) is the governing body of the "Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area", also known as "Helsinki Convention" which was 
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signed in March 1974 by all of the Baltic Sea littoral states (Denmark, Germany, 
Sweden, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Russia). Its main objective is 
to abate pollution of the Baltic Sea area caused by discharges through rivers, estuaries, 
outfalls and pipelines, dumping and normal operations of vessels, as well as through 
airborne pollutants. The Convention entered into force in 1980. In 1992, a second 
convention was signed in order to adapt to the new international circumstances. After 
ratification, this second Helsinki Convention entered into force on 17 January 2000. In 
contrast to the 1974 Convention, it also comprised the European Community as a 
contracting party.  
The HELCOM budget is partly covered by the European Commission, the rest of the 
costs are provided by the contracting parties (except the European Economic 
Community). The HELCOM members have pledged themselves to take action against 
the pollution of the Baltic Sea. To that end, each of them must adopt specific measures, 
e.g. ensure the creation of adequate waste reception facilities, ban the dumping of waste 
in the Baltic Sea area, or prevent contamination resulting from exploration or exploita-
tion of the seabed or the subsoil. Moreover, the contracting parties have committed 
themselves to science and technological research cooperation.  
The HELCOM meets on an annual basis. It adopts recommendations on the protection 
of the Baltic marine environment that have to be considered in the national legislation of 
each contracting state. The chairmanship rotates biannually, according to the 
alphabetical order of its member states. HELCOM is a well-established institution that 
may be considered as the major point of reference for Baltic Sea environmental affairs 
on the inter-governmental level. It fulfils technical tasks, such as the central co-
ordination in case of major maritime incidents and the conduct of permanent 
environmental monitoring. HELCOM conducts regular assessments of the status of the 
Baltic environment that serve as a basis for regional and international policy making. 
Thus, it also plays an important role in political terms: HELCOM evolves common 
environmental objectives whose implementation can have decisive impact on the 
latitude of national policy makers in the region. HELCOM aims at channelling the 
regional particularities into EU and global decision-making mechanisms. In order to 
strengthen the coherent appearance and adequate influence it tries to "reduce" the 
number of voices by way of sub-coordination among the relevant regional stakeholders 
(i.e. nation states and organisations). HELCOM maintains cooperative links to other 
regional organisations in the BSR. Most importantly, it is one of the major strategic 
partners to the CBSS. On many occasions, the two organisations hold stakeholder 
conferences to exchange views on BSR key issues and to develop common positions. 
HELCOM also involves all BSR stakeholders in the development of the ‘HELCOM 
Baltic Sea Action Plan’ that is required under the ‘European Marine Strategy’.757  
HELCOM also participates in the ‘Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership 
Cooperation’ (NDEP). In order to enhance the synergies between various processes and 
                                                 
757  In late 2005, HELCOM decided to elaborate a comprehensive environmental strategy to restore the 
Baltic Sea, the so-called ‘Baltic Sea Action Plan’. One its most important features is that it is being 
devised with active participation from all major stakeholder groups – from governments, through 
industry and NGOs, right down to individuals living on the shores of the Baltic Sea. In March 2007, 
a final stakeholder conference was held, before the Action Plan will eventually be adopted in 
October 2007. See HELCOM News, Issue 1-2/2006, p. 9. Official website of the HELCOM 
www.helcom.fi [29 November 2007]. 
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programs, to maximise the use of resources available within the BSR, and to avoid 
possible overlaps, HELCOM aims at formally linking its Baltic Sea Action Plan to the 
EU ND policy as from 2007.758 After the EU enlargement in 2004, all HELCOM 
Contracting Parties (except for Russia) were covered by EU regulations such as the 
‘European Water Framework Directive’ and the ‘European Marine Strategy’. This has 
partly changed the priorities of HELCOM in the sense that is focuses more on 
cooperation between the Baltic EU Member States and Russia, and on strengthening 
cooperation with Belarus and Ukraine.  
Heritage Cooperation of the Baltic Sea States 
Acronym     -- 
Founding year/launched in  1997 
Website    http://baltic-heritage.net  
Governance model   transnational network 
Policy field    culture 
Organising principle   state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  -- 
Members and actors   states, involving non-official experts 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, 
Sweden; 
Was initiated by the Baltic Sea Ministers of Culture. Its establishment built on the 
awareness about the growing necessity of a platform and meeting place where the actors 
in the field of heritage management could meet and discuss topics across borders. This 
led to the idea of creating a kind of market place, a forum for knowledge exchange and 
for the establishment of cooperative contacts between the actors in the field. The 
working structure of the association consists of various working groups (Underwater 
Heritage, Coastal Culture and Maritime Heritage, and Sustainable Historic Towns), and 
a Monitoring Group formed by non-official representatives from all member states, 
whose task it is to promote and further develop the co-operation.759 It is also responsible 
for the organisation of Cultural Heritage Forums on different topics. The main working 
method of the association is exchanging and spreading information on Cultural Heritage 
through the national bodies, identifying fields where Baltic Sea co-operation is needed, 
and the subsequent initiation and enhancement of networks through the arrangement of 
seminars and the production and dissemination of reports.  
Keep Baltic Tidy (KBT) 
Acronym     KBT 
Founding year/launched in  1993 
Website    no official website 
Governance model   transnational network 
                                                 
758  See HELCOM Heads of Delegation, 18th Meeting. Helsinki/Finland, 12-13 December 2005. 
HELCOM HOD 18/2005, attachment 2.  
759  Russia does not have a representative in this body; in 2006, Iceland became part of the group.  
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Policy field    environment, sustainable development 
Organising principle   state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  Baltic 21 
Members and actors   non-governmental organisations and initiatives 
The network was established in 1993 upon a Swedish-Finnish initiative. Today, the 
network brings together various different organisations and associations based in the 
BSR (including members from Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Sweden) 
and dealing in particular with environmental issues, prevention of environmental 
degradation and the issue of sustainable tourism. The network organises ad hoc 
activities for the protection of the Baltic Sea environment (such as cleaning beaches 
after major accidents) as well as information campaigns about maritime pollution. The 
network seeks to provide a platform for the exchange of knowledge and it aims at 
enhancing awareness about the ecological sensitivities of the region. It arranges 
conferences and workshops on an irregular basis bringing together non-official 
representatives from all member countries. They are organised in the following national 
associations: Keep the Estonian Sea Tidy (Estonia), Håll Skärgården ren (Finland), 
Keep Latvia Tidy, Friends of the Earth Latvia (Latvia), Lithuanian Fund for Nature 
(Lithuania), Keep St. Petersburg Tidy (Russia), Stiftelsen Håll Sverige Rent (Sweden). 
The Swedish Foundation ‘Keep Sweden Tidy’ (Stiftelsen Håll Sverige Rent) builds the 
formal link between the network an its participation in the realisation of the Baltic 21 
agenda. 
ScanBalt  
Acronym     -- 
Founding year/launched in  2002, former Baltic BioTech Forum 
Website    www.scanbalt.org  
Governance model   transnational network 
Policy field    (bio)technology and research 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  BDF 
Members and actors important actors in the field of biotechnology (e.g. 
university networks, life science industry 
ScanBalt was founded in 2003, following the dissolution of the Baltic Bio Tech Forum, 
with the overall aim of ensuring that North European Life Science and Biotechnology 
realises its potential for global competitiveness. It defines itself as a "mediating and 
coordinating network without formal power" whose strength depends on the strength of 
the individual networks participating. ScanBalt seeks to achieve this through the 
creation of a new ‘metaregional’ structure, which brings together regional and national 
expertise into one coherent, transnational, organisation. ScanBalt members are networks 
between universities, biotech/life science industry, hospitals and other actors in the 
biotech/life science arena. It coordinates existing networks and organisations and 
stimulates the creation of new ones. Therefore, it labels itself also "the network of 
networks". ScanBalt acts in a de-centralized manner, which is also reflected in its low 
degree of institutionalisation and its loose organisational design. The structure of the 
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association consists of an Executive Committee and a Secretariat. The secretariat 
participates in a number of funding activities. The ScanBalt secretariat produces a 
monthly overview of the most relevant EU calls and EU news, which is then published 
in ScanBalt news. The objectives of ScanBalt are to 
 
– Create a corporate identity for the ScanBalt BioRegion, 
– Develop visibility for ScanBalt BioRegion and the members of ScanBalt, 
– Attract human, industrial and financial resources, 
– Coordinate joint efforts in research, education, technology transfer, innovation and 
economic development, 
– Provide a platform to facilitate dialogue and collaboration between networks, 
academia, hospitals, public authorities, private companies and individuals, 
– Create a platform to facilitate dialogue with supra-national institutions. 
 
ScanBalt hosts a number of activities, and a number of funding sources are involved. At 
the international level, ScanBalt is presently receiving funding from the European 
Commission, the Nordic Innovation Centre and the Nordic Academy for Advanced 
Study (NORFA). At the national/regional level, ScanBalt is presently involved in a 
number of projects with partnership based co-financing. In April 2005, ScanBalt and the 
Baltic Development Forum (BDF) launched a partnership for cooperation and 
coordination. A significant element of this partnership is about turning ScanBalt into a 
stakeholder in the Baltic Sea Initiative 2010, a vision that intends to build up a forum 
for discussing the challenges and possibilities for improving competitiveness in the 
BSR. 
Social Hansa 
Acronym     -- 
Founding year/launched in  1992 
Website    www.social-hansa.de  
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field    social policy, employment 
Organising principle   loose pattern 
Degree of institutionalisation  low 
Cluster/organisational links to  UBC 
Members and actors   social organisations 
In 1992, Social Hansa was founded under the patronage of Björn Engholm, based on an 
idea developed by Carl-Einar Jörgensen from Copenhagen, who has been an active 
honorary member to this day. In 1999, the office was officially moved from Kiel to 
Lübeck. The aims of Social Hansa are to support the cooperation between social 
organisations by means of common projects, in particular with the new EU member 
states in the Baltic Sea Region. This includes the convergence of different structures and 
cultures as well as forming a network in order to fight against poverty Europe-wide. 
Today, the association consists of 71 members coming from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Poland, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway. There is a close cooperation with other 
organisations and institutions working on an international basis (most importantly, the 
International Council on Social Welfare – ICSW). Social Hansa seeks to contribute to 
giving the social dimension in BSR politics and social interaction more appreciation 
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within social and economic policy across borders, because that is what it perceives to 
build the basis for successful economic relations. After a longer period of uncertainty 
about the persistence of the association, it has been re-launched in March 2005.  
Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC) 
Acronym     UBC 
Founding year/launched in  1991 
Website    www.ubc.net  
Governance model   transnational association 
Policy field    multi-sectoral engagement  
Organising principle   state-centric 
Degree of institutionalisation  medium 
Cluster/organisational links to  CBSS, BSSSC, EU, Council of Europe 
Members and actors cities situated around the Baltic Sea, represented 
by local and municipal officials.  
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden 
(Belarus, observer)  
The UBC was founded in 1991 with the declared aim of promoting and strengthening 
cooperation and exchange of experience between the cities in the BSR. It seeks to 
advocate for common interests of the local authorities in the region, and to act on behalf 
of the cities and local authorities in common matters towards regional, national, 
European and international bodies as well as to achieve sustainable development in the 
BSR with full respect to European principles of local and regional self-governance and 
subsidiarity. The UBC brings more than 100 cities in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden (Belarus is involved with 
two cities, functioning as observers) together and seeks to cover many functional fields 
in its cooperation. In order to obtain these objectives the UBC intends to 
 
– Seek a systematic exchange of experience between member Cities in their common 
fields of interest by organising meetings, exhibitions, scientific and popular sessions 
as well as other events to popularise achievements of the individual member Cities.  
– Support and assist the member Cities in carrying out research work and publish 
their efforts to tackle the problems of the Baltic Sea and the adjacent land areas.  
– Promote interest in the history of the Baltic Region, its ecological and cultural 
heritage and work together to protect the Region’s landscape as well as its cultural 
and historical monuments.  
– Enhance inter-human contacts, particularly, among the youth of the member Cities 
by organising meetings, sport competitions, festivals, and other events.  
– Assist in and support the cooperation of professional group in the member Cities as 
well as that between individual Cities, for example, Twin Cities.  
– Launch initiatives and cooperate with the BSR governments and international 
organisations in resolving problems posed by economic development of the Baltic 
Sea Region and protection of its natural environment, thus enhancing its integration.  
– Foster communication ties and develop respective networks with other regional 
actors;  
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– Stage on public forums common motions, opinions and positions on the cities’ and 
the Baltic Sea Region’ s interests;  
– Collaborate in the process of European Union enlargement, bearing in mind the 
existence of the European dimension to the future of the cities;  
– Service its member cities in terms of information flow and help generate projects 
co-financed by EU, and other sources, offering cities project quality consulting;  
– Develop its own public relations program.  
 
The organisational structure of the association consists of the Presidium, the Executive 
Board and the Secretariat (situated in Gdańsk, Poland) as well as 13 Commissions 
covering specific functional areas (energy, business, culture, education, environment, 
health and social affairs, gender equality, sport, tourism, transport, urban planning, 
information, youth). The General Conference is the highest decision making body of the 
UBC and it convenes every second year in a UBC Member City. The UBC maintains 
formal ties with the European Union and with the Council of Europe, and it is closely 
affiliated with the CBSS and the BSSSC. The Union of the Baltic Cities is one of the 
few organisations that still emphasise the common heritage and the close to historic 
tradition of Baltic Sea cooperation. The UBC promotional material is among the most 
enthusiastic and visionary. In the context of its foundation in 1991, the organisers 
created the image of Homo Balticus, a specific human breed that is said to inhabit the 
Baltic Sea coastal area.760 
Vision and Strategies Around the Baltic Sea 2010 (VASAB 2010) 
Acronym     VASAB 2010 
Founding year/launched in  1992 
Website    www.vasab.org.pl  
Governance model   intergovernmental association 
Policy field    spatial planning 
Organising principle   intergovernmental 
Degree of institutionalisation medium 
Cluster/organisational links to  CBSS 
Members and actors states, represented by ministers (and involving 
also non-official actors) 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Belarus 
VASAB 2010 was founded in August 1992 in Karlskrona/Sweden, when ministers from 
10 Baltic Sea States decided on the development of a document titled "Vision and 
Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region 2010".761 It should contain an outline of the spatial 
development perspectives in the BSR and offer a useful basis for further enhancement 
and coordination of spatial planning policies with a regional focus. The respective works 
started in late 1992, and were successfully completed in 1994. Together with the final 
version of the document, the ministers of the contracting states also adopted an 
implementation program that stressed the role of co-ordination between national and 
                                                 
760  For a critical discussion of the concept, see chapter "The Tale of Homo Balticus" (p. 55-) in the main 
section of the study.  
761  Norway was among the contracting parties but seized to be an active member in 2003.  
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cross-Baltic spatial planning, bilateral and multilateral partnerships in project 
promotion, intensified exchange of experience, and transfer of know how and spatial 
research in areas of common interest promotion. The institutional structure of VASAB 
2010 consists of the Committee on Spatial Development (CSD), responsible for the 
overall co-ordination of common actions, and a supporting Secretariat based in 
Gdańsk/Poland. Generally, VASAB 2010 can be regarded as an intergovernmental 
entity, even though it does not exclusively involve state representatives. Germany and 
Russia, for example, also participate through representatives from the regions adjacent 
to the Baltic Sea. Belarus is represented through a non-official actor, the Institute for 
Regional and Urban Planning (IRUP).762  
VASAB 2010 fulfils the function of an umbrella association that aims at bringing 
different BSR-based initiatives on spatial development together. However, VASAB 
strictly follows the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. it leaves action to other organisations, 
whenever it is deemed profitable as for the official VASAB objectives. VASAB 
restricts its activities to issues that require a strong transnational element. In many cases, 
it acts as a mediator and communicator between the local and the national level. 
Moreover, VASAB cooperates with other cross-Baltic initiatives. As a lead partner in 
Baltic 21 it is closely linked to the CBSS. The CBSS in turn gives regular incentives for 
the further development of the VASAB initiative: On its 13th Ministerial Session held in 
the Polish town of Szczecin, the CBSS encouraged the Ministers for Spatial Planning to 
update the vision of long-term territorial development of the region together with the 
relevant regional stakeholders within VASAB 2010.763 The association is closely 
(though not officially) affiliated with the EU, and her spatial policies respectively. 
VASAB produces policy recommendations on various spatial issues. The current 
priority areas were laid down in the "VASAB 2010 Plus Spatial Development Action 
Programme", adopted in 2001.  
 
– Co-operation of urban regions on key issues of sustainable development  
– Strategic development zones important for transnational integration within the BSR  
– Transnational transport links important for cross-BSR and cross-Europe integration  
– Diversification and strengthening of rural areas  
– Development of transnational green networks, incl. cultural landscapes  
– Integrated development of coastal zones and islands. 
The European Commission has shown substantial interest in the VASAB 2010 
initiative. In fact, some projects emerging in the VASAB framework obtained 
INTERREG support. As the European Commission adopted the European Spatial 
Development Perspective (E.S.D.P.) in 1999, VASAB 2010 was officially considered "a 
first step towards formulation of a long-term framework for co-operation in many 
areas."764 VASAB has substantially contributed to the preparation of the Baltic 
                                                 
762  For more details on the activities and projects of the Institute for Regional and Urban Planning, see 
the official IRUP Website http://irup.by [30 November 2007].  
763  See Communiqué from the 13th Ministerial Session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, held in 
Szczecin/Poland, 9-10 June 2005. Official CBSS website www.cbss.st [19 November 2007]. 
764  European Commission: E.S.D.P. European Spatial Development Perspective. Towards Balanced and 
Sustainable Development of the Territory of the European Union. Agreed at the Informal Council of 
Ministers responsible for Spatial Planning in Potsdam, May 1999, p. 79. The E.S.D.P. is a non-
binding strategy document that aims at ensuring a balanced and sustainable development of the 
Union territory in accordance with the basic objectives of Community policy, i.e. economic and 
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INTERREG II C and III B operational programs.765 In its Gdańsk Declaration, adopted 
in September 2005, the VASAB addressed the EU with a set of concrete recommen-
dations for future spatial policy strategies.766 
                                                                                                                                               
social cohesion, knowledge-based economic competitiveness complying with the principles of 
sustainable development, and the conservation of diverse natural and cultural resources.  
765  INTERREG IIC was launched in 1996 as a new type of action in trans-national co-operation in the 
sphere of spatial development within the EU. INTERREG IIIB was launched in 2000, it placed 
special emphasis on the integration of remote regions. 
766  See Gdańsk Declaration, adopted on the 6th Conference of Ministers for Spatial and Development in 
the BSR, Gdańsk,19 September 2005. Available on the official VASAB website www.vasab.org.pl 
[30 November 2007].   
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